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In New Zealand, water supply has historically been a given.  There is a perception 
that the country is well-watered and up to a point this is true, or at least has been 
true.  However water is not always available at the right time or at the right place.  
In addition there are problems brought on by climate change, which will result in 
more frequent and more severe droughts in certain parts of the country.  Climate 
variability is coupled with a drive for the agricultural sector to increase 
production.  The question is whether our current water allocation system can 
operate effectively under these conditions.   The notion of sustainability has 
gained much traction in the last few years and this is a concept which we in New 
Zealand need to embrace in the matter of water allocation.  This thesis will 
examine the state of New Zealand’s water allocation situation and suggest 
improvement.  To this end this thesis will study the experience of the western 
United States where scarcity makes water precious. 
New Zealand has not adopted a sustainable approach to the allocation of water 
resources, arguably because it was never envisioned that the allocation of a 
resource considered abundant could become a problem.  As a result we have 
adopted a first-in-first-served process almost by default.  As such the process does 
not address the dictates of sustainability, but more importantly as pressure is 
brought to bear on water supplies, as there will be no more spare water to 
appropriate, further allocations will need to be an exercise in division, not 
multiplication.  Re-allocation of existing water rights through a market system 
will be essential to sustain the demand not only of a still more intensive 
agriculture but also for ecological requirements. 
There are certain requirements of a successful market system.  In the first instance 
the relative infrastructure is essential to deliver the water to its required 
destination.  The Government is in the process of addressing this issue which 
indicates it regards a water market system with a certain degree of affection.  
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Once the delivery (and storage) systems are in place, provided transaction costs 
are low enough to address opportunity cost issues there is no reason why a market 
system should not be successful once the structure becomes generally acceptable, 
given a market system for water rights is somewhat novel in New Zealand. 
While the recycling of unused or unneeded water rights is a sustainability 
narrative, it will be vital as a matter of policy to complement market transfers with 
a western United States-style beneficial use requirement which is likewise a 
sustainability discourse.  Such a measure will endeavour to audit water use and 
ensure that usufructory water rights are used wisely, are not unnecessarily wasted 
but more importantly these rights are actually used and not left unproductive or 
speculated.  As such, the doctrine will aim to stretch a finite resource to satisfy as 
many users as is feasible. 
A re-allocation system for existing water rights coupled with a domestic 
beneficial use doctrine is a sustainability narrative and has the potential to justify 
New Zealand’s currently undeserved reputation as a “clean green” country and to 
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1 Chapter 1. 
1.1 Introduction 
The Earth’s natural resources, especially water, are finite but are expected to 
continue to satisfy the needs of an ever-growing human demand.  Clearly then, the 
mathematics suggest an on-going process of division rather than multiplication 
when managing water resources.  Limited resources such as water will need to be 
competently regulated to determine a fair and equitable distribution among a 
growing number of people.   
Water has a special place in the resource inventory: it is critical to life itself 
and has no substitute.  Moreover, farmers are no longer content with nor 
financially able to rely on unpredictable rainfall for grass growth.  Some New 
Zealand farmers are intensifying their dairy-farming efforts in areas with very 
little rainfall.  Greater production requires greater grass and stock-feed growth 
which, in turn, requires water.  Hence, the demand for irrigation has risen and 
sustainable management of our water resources has become vital.  
“Sustainability” has become a key issue in discussions about the world’s 
natural resources, especially water.  The problem of sustainability of water 
resources has been exacerbated in New Zealand by the adoption of the first-in-
first-served system of water allocation. While western United States’ jurisdictions 
adopted the rubric of prior appropriation, and its essential doctrine of beneficial 
use, as a matter of practical necessity,1  this research will show that no such 
circumstances warranted the adoption of the “first-in-first-served” water 
allocation regime in New Zealand; a system which has been adopted by the 
courts.  This will be discussed in chapters 2 and 3.  In point of fact, water 
                                                 
 
1 This approach amounted to an outright rejection of the riparian doctrine, whereas the water-rich 




allocation issues have not become a real point of debate in New Zealand until 
quite recently.   
1.2 Background 
1.2.1 Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 
Currently New Zealand's water allocation mechanism is embodied in the Resource 
Management Act 1991. Prior to that, water allocation in New Zealand was 
entrusted to various administering tribunals - largely through the regional water 
boards and thereafter the Planning Tribunal.  Indeed the Water and Soil 
Conservation Act 1967 made direct reference to the matter of water allocation: 
“An Act to promote a national policy in respect of natural water, and to make 
better provision for the conservation, allocation, use and quality of natural 
water...”,2 and, significantly the beneficial use of water.3   
More importantly, the Act vested the rights to use, divert, take, or make 
discharges into natural water, and to dam any river or stream, solely in the 
Crown.4  This had the effect of extinguishing almost all if not the entire common 
(riparian) law in New Zealand (subject to certain existing rights provisions) which 
has now been replaced by a new regime of statutory water allocation provisions 
under the Resource Management Act 1991.  However, there are no explicit 
criteria given in the new Act to form a procedure for deciding the basis for 
allocation; but the courts, as is their function, stepped in to fill any statutory 
hiatus.  Cooke P in Keam v Minister of Works and Development had earlier put it 
thus: 
                                                 
 
2 Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967, extract from the long title. 
3 Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967, section 20 (5) (c). 
4 Section 21, but with certain exceptions. 
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Parliament has pointedly refrained from tying the hands of the 
administering tribunals by hard and fast requirements.  Clearly it 
would be wrong for the Courts to do so.  But to give effect to the 
broad purposes of the legislation, general working rules or guidelines 
can be evolved, as long as they are not elevated into something 
inflexible.  It is as a useful general test of that kind that I understand 
the Planning Tribunal’s proposition in its decision in this case that any 
proposed use of natural water should be a beneficial use, and that the 
loss which might follow from the taking of the water should be 
weighed against the benefit which will result from its use.5 
 
His Honour pointed out “...the [old Planning] Tribunal acted properly in 
setting out to weigh competing interests.”6  It is noteworthy that his Honour made 
direct reference to both the idea of “beneficial use” as contained in the old Act, 
and also to the concept of weighing up “competing interests” as this goes to the 
nub of the Water and Soil Conservation Act.  This approach will be discussed 
again in chapters 2 and 3 in relation to the Resource Management Act and the 
leading case of Fleetwing Farms Ltd v Marlborough District Council. 
1.2.2 Keam v Minister of Works and Development 
The Court of Appeal in Keam’s case confirmed a balancing test to be exercised by 
the issuing authorities under the Water and Soil Conservation Act.  The Court had 
obviously directed its mind specifically to the matter, and actually embraced the 
spirit of the Act, but it is fair to say the approach was not without its problems.  
The allocation criteria were somewhat confused.7  The issuing authorities had to 
balance two extremes; on the one hand to allocate water to so many users that its 
utility becomes virtually worthless, and, on the other, to surrender to an impulse 
simply to allocate on the basis of first-in-first served.  Of this particular priority 
                                                 
 
5 Keam v Minister of Works and Development [1982] NZLR 319 at 322 per Cooke P (Court of 
Appeal).  This case confirmed the Planning Tribunal’s approach. 
6 Ibid, at 324.  See also s 20 (5) (c) of the Act. 
7 At times the Tribunal took a somewhat ad hoc approach: Napier City Council v Hawkes Bay 
Catchment Board (1978) 6 NZTPA 426. 
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system, Barker J was of the opinion that a first-come-first-served system was not 
desirable:  
It may well be that the Act does implement a system of ‘first-come-
first-served’, which has the side effect of making more difficult the 
task facing those who apply for a water right later.  It may well be that 
such a system is the antithesis of orderly planning.8 
 
1.2.3 Brundtland notion of sustainability 
Philip Milne 9  considers that in general the Planning Tribunal executed its 
functions extremely well.  However it was faced with difficulties: 
The water rights system by itself is an inadequate and inappropriate 
tool for the equitable and efficient allocation of our increasingly 
scarce water resources. The vagueness of existing allocation criteria, 
the lack of priorities or guidelines to aid Tribunals and a frequent lack 
of baseline data about the resource, make the task of those allocating 
water a difficult one.  In the absence of comprehensive water 
allocation planning, tribunals are forced to make policy decisions and 
value judgments in a vacuum.10 
 
The potential to fill, or at least partially fill, that vacuum appeared in the 
form of the general Brundtland notion of sustainability, incorporated into our 
Resource Management Act in 1991. This Act repealed the Water and Soil 
Conservation Act, along with over 50 others. From giving no “hard and fast 
requirements” under previous legislation, the Parliament set out a specific purpose 
of “sustainable management” under the new Act when it is required to deal with 
natural and physical resources.  There is no “magic wand” however and allocating 
                                                 
 
8 Auckland Acclimatisation Society v Waikato Valley Authority (1983) 9 NZTPA 225 at 234. 
9 P Milne “Water Allocation and Management in New Zealand: Recent Developments” (1985) 11 
NZULR 245. 
10 Ibid, at 261. 
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authorities cannot create new water sources to meet demand, so a serviceable 
system of reallocation of existing water rights is essential.   
1.3 Structure of this Research 
This thesis will argue a two-pronged approach to water management.  First, New 
Zealand needs to introduce a system whereby existing water permits may be 
tradable (in whole or in part, temporarily or permanently) to ensure a system of 
division may succeed.  Secondly, an American-type beneficial use doctrine should 
be introduced to discourage speculation and compel those who have the use of 
water do so to a reasonably efficient standard.  Those who do not should forfeit 
their permits and that water made available to those who will.  The universal cry 
for sustainability in the consumption of natural resources has steadily grown and 
the introduction of tradable water permits in New Zealand and the introduction of 
a requirement to use the water efficiently in conformity with a beneficial use 
doctrine is simply a necessary step in the sustainability argument, and in 
conformity with the spirit of the Resource Management Act 1991.   
1.4 Methodology 
This thesis undertakes a conventional legal analysis of primary and secondary 
sources.  The analysis involves examining legislation (and Constitutional matters 
in the instance of the United States), as well as case law.  Legal issues are 
identified as well as consideration of relevant rules over a period of time to 
produce a clear understanding of law and its current status.  Reference to the 
informative experience in Chile will also be made. 
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1.5 New Zealand Water Situation 
Despite an abundance of good intentions, New Zealand’s situation in the matter of 
water allocation is somewhat precarious.  In historical terms, New Zealand has 
been well-placed in its provision of water.  We receive about 560,000 million 
cubic metres of waterfall as either water or snow each year ‒ enough to fill Lake 
Taupo nine times over.11  The difficulty is the distribution of this precipitation is 
not even throughout the country, nor is it consistent from season to season, nor 
from year to year.  Traditionally there has been ample water for all water permit 
applicants.  The situation however is rapidly changing.  The first of the Land and 
Water Forum Reports12 tell us that the total water allocation in New Zealand had 
increased by 50% between 1999 and 2006 and nearly doubled in the ten years 
from 1999-20 I 0, and is increasing.13  The report also tells us irrigation is by far 
the biggest driver of this demand,14 and our demand is 2-3 times higher than most 
OECD countries.   
Water is currently allocated at a rate of some 680 cubic metres per second, 
and over half of this water is allocated by the Canterbury region.  Some 
catchments are already over-allocated, and the rest are close to full allocation.15  
Full allocation does not mean that all allocated water is used: on the contrary 
between 20% and 80% of water allocated for commercial use (including 
municipal water supply) in some waterways is not being used at any one point in 
                                                 
 
11  Ministry for the Environment “Environment Aotearoa 2015” (2015) 
<mfe.govt.nz/publications/environmental-reporting/environment-aotearoa-2015> at page 55. 
12  Report of the Land and Water Forum: "A Fresh Start for Fresh Water", (2010). 
<www.landandwater.org.nz>. (See page 9, post). The Forum has produced a total of four reports to 
date. 
13  Ministry for the Environment “Freshwater Availability and Use” (2014) 
<www.mfe.govt.nz/issues/water/freshwater>.  
14 Over three-quarters of the 20,000 individual consented takes is for irrigation.  The Manapouri 
power station itself however consumes 41% of all the water used in New Zealand as it discharges 
directly into the sea at Deep Cove. 
15 Land and Water Forum “Report of the Land and Water Forum: A Fresh Start for Freshwater” 
(2010) Land and Water Forum page 16 para 54 <www.landandwater.org.nz>.  
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time, 16  but currently there is an inflexible system to transfer consents, either 
permanently or temporarily, totally or partially.  An inflexible system such as this 
reduces the availability of unused water for other uses, or indeed more 
importantly, for future users.   
Some national consistency in local water management has been driven by 
the two National Policy Statements on Freshwater Management issued by the 
Ministry for the Environment.  Two Statements have been issued, the first in 2011 
which has been superseded by the Statement of 2014.  Significantly both 
Statements reiterate the responsibilities on regional councils under section 
30(1)(e)(i) relating to the establishment of maximum or minimum levels of flows 
of water. This, of course, is vital for proper planning of water allocation. 
Currently consents are often issued as a joint “take and use” package which 
creates a problem when only the take fraction of the consent needs to be 
transferred.  A system needs to be introduced to minister to the aspirations of 
future users, and to address and advance the transfer of water consents from one 
commercial user to another; especially to more high-value end users, and, 
importantly, to manage and contain the way water is used by those who have the 
authority to do so. 
1.6 A Māori perspective 
A Maori dimension to the water management dialogue is critical. Whilst an in-
depth analysis of Maori approaches to water is beyond the scope of this thesis, 
integral to any discussion of water allocation is the perspective of Maori as Treaty 
of Waitangi partners with the Crown. European and Maori views on water are not 
necessarily in accord. 
                                                 
 
16 New Zealand Business Council for Sustainable Development A Best Use Solution to Solve New 
Zealand’s Major Water Problems, (2008) <www.sbc.org.nz/_data/assets/pdf_file/0009/56>.  
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The general European view is that water is a common, owned by nobody 
but managed by the Crown through various agencies. Importantly though 
European attitude now is that water is a commodity which may be traded 
commercially. Maori do not necessarily see water in this way, but to be fair 
neither do some Europeans. There is also a large amount of Maori scholarship 
which suggests proprietorship of water remains with them,17 a view outside the 
scope of this thesis, but which when resolved might have a fundamental impact on 
the way New Zealand's water rights are managed.   
In 2009 the Government set up the Land and Water Forum to investigate 
and report on the condition of water quality in New Zealand. The Forum has 
broadened its horizons to include water quantity as this inevitably affects overall 
quality. To date, the Forum has issued four reports, all recommending the 
introduction of water markets to make supply more efficient and flexible. This has 
become government policy. Notwithstanding the Forum's recommendations in 
this respect, Maori have contributed significantly to all four reports. 
Article Two of the Maori version of the Treaty of Waitangi guarantees 
Maori rangitiratanga (sovereignty) over their lands and taonga (treasures, for 
example water) for so long as they wished to retain them. 18   Maori also 
traditionally have a special relationship with water and exercise kaitiakitanga or 
guardianship over it. This has been recognised by statute and policy.19  
                                                 
 
17 For example Jacinta Ruru “Māori Legal Rights to Water: Ownership, Management, or just 
Consultation” 2011 Resource Management Theory and Practice at 119, 119-123.  See also Rachel 
Kennard “The Potential for Māori Customary Claims to Freshwater” ((LLB (Hons) Dissertation, 
University of Otago, date unknown).  Also Maia Wikaira “Māori Ownership of Freshwater: Legal 
Paradox or Potential?” (LLB (Hons) Dissertation, University of Otago, 2010). 
18  See discussion at Waitangi Tribunal Claim Wai 2358, available at 
<www.waitangitribual.govt.nz>.   
19 For example sections 6 (e) and 7 Resource Management Act 1991. 
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Without being too dogmatic, one Maori view is that they may have a 
traditional difficulty in approaching water in a purely commercial sense.20  In the 
words of Maori Marsden: 
[Maori] think of themselves as holding a special relationship to 
Mother Earth and her resources: as an integral part of the natural 
order, recipients of her bounty rather than controllers and exploiters of 
their environment. Therefore Mother Earth is to be treated with 
reverence, love, and responsibility rather than abuse and misuse.21 
 
The introduction of a water management tool in the form of a western 
United States “beneficial use” doctrine in conjunction with water markets would 
be expected to find resonance within Maoridom in the sense that it encompasses 
the idea of stewardship and prudent management, as well as responsibility as 
mentioned by Maori Marsden. 
1.7 Historic Attitudes to the Earth’s Resources have not always 
been Sound. 
On the 7th December 1972, the crew of Apollo 17 took a photograph of the Earth 
from over 40,000 kilometres in space.  This photograph is called “The Blue 
Marble” – the Earth is predominantly water 22 – and has become one of the most 
circulated photographs in history, although there had been earlier photographs of 
the Earth from space.  It is largely responsible for a sea-change in ecological 
attitudes on Earth.  Previously humankind had only looked outward from Earth to 
the vault of space, a type of universal cultural impercipience, with a resultant 
sense of enormity and infinity.  For the first time, humans looked inward from 
                                                 
 
20 See Durette M, Nesus C, Nesus G, and Barcham M “Maori Perspectives on Water Allocation” 
(2009) www.mfe.MaoriPerspectivesonWaterAllocationFINAL.pdf. 
21 Maori Marsden, in Te Ahukarama Charles Boyd (ed) The Woven Universe: Selected Writings 
of Reverned Maori Marsden (The Estate of Maori Marsden, 2003), at 35. 




space to Earth.  A process of reflective introspection unavoidably and 
unequivocally led humans to rationalize in a way they had not in the past, 
ushering in a fresh way of seeing our place in the universe, a realisation that we 
are, all of us, literally in the same boat, which can indeed be likened to a lifeboat.   
The photograph was released at an opportune time in world history during 
which there was a growing tide of environmental awareness.  Of the huge water 
resource on Earth, only a tiny amount is available for use by living creatures as 
well as human societies, and consequently it is obligatory that this resource be 
protected by proper management. The powerful image projected by The Blue 
Marble is one of the Earth as an isolated, vulnerable, and somewhat delicate 
entity.23  Importantly, the image was that of only “one world”, a little planet on its 
own with its own physical finiteness, but at the same time suspended in the 
infinity of the universe.  As an inevitable consequence of this image, human 
beings found a new sense of self.  The Earth’s attributes must as a matter of logic 
also apply to its inhabitants.  The consequence is that humans, despite their many 
internal differences, are really unified by a common interest, a concern for the 
health of our planet since the well-being of the planet will ultimately impact on 
the well-being of its inhabitants. 
1.7.1 “Spaceship Earth” 
The notion of the Earth as a limited self-contained unit – an organism if you will – 
was not new in 1972,24 but the concept was not predominant in collective thought.  
Barbara Ward25 and Kenneth E. Boulding26 for instance, in 1966 both used the 
                                                 
 
23 The medium is indeed the message: Marshall McLuhan Understanding Media: The Extensions 
of Man (Mentor, London, 1964).  As André Malraux explains, the camera has freed canvas from a 
combination of anecdote and narrative to become not simply a vehicle, but sheer expression itself. 
24  Henry George referred to the earth as a “well-provisioned ship” travelling through space: 
Progress and Poverty (WM Hinton & Co, San Francisco, 1879) at 245. 
25 Space Ship Earth (Hamish Hamilton, London, 1966).  
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expression “Spaceship Earth” in their publications.  Barbara Ward’s work is an 
admirable presage of Our Common Future and discusses the worldwide 
imbalance of power, wealth, and ideology but accurately identifies Earth’s 
position in the cosmos, and our place on it: 
Our planet is not much more than the capsule within which we have 
to live as human beings if we are to survive the vast space voyage 
upon which we have been engaged for hundreds of millennia – but 
without noticing yet our condition27 
 
Boulding’s broad (and complementary) thesis was that the inhabitants of 
Earth needed to mature from what he described as a “cowboy” economy to a 
“spaceman” economy thereby recognising the planet’s limited resources.  The 
cowboy approach is dramatically portrayed by Charles F. Wilkinson with his 
description of the profligate plundering of the virgin North American continent by 
European settlers. 
Expansionists during the past century [the nineteenth century] 
commonly invoked God’s name, arguing that He had placed the 
abundant resources there for a reason and that it was contrary to 
divine will not to put water, minerals, and land to productive use28 
 
This “productive use” involved uncontrolled extraction of royalty-free 
minerals leading to dramatic contamination of water and soil; the butchering of 
millions of bison, almost to the point of extinction; the clearing by axe and fire of 
some of the then most valuable commercial timber in the world despite an 1831 
prohibition; the plundering of fish for canning, for example those salmon and 
                                                                                                                                     
 
26  Kenneth Boulding “The Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth” in H Jarrett (ed) 
Environmental Quality in a Growing Economy (Resources for the Future/Johns Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore, 1966) at 3. 
27 Space Ship Earth, p 18. 
28 Crossing the Next Meridian (Island Press, Washington, 1992) at 16. 
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steelhead trout not killed by water pollution or water-course deviation; the 
diversion and ultimate dissipation of unimaginable volumes of water from rivers 
and aquifers which were simply acquired on the basis of qui prior est in tempore 
potior est in jure.29 
Boulding suggested humans historically regarded themselves as living on a 
virtually limitless plane, and when matters became too difficult in one spot, for 
whatever reason, they could usually expand beyond their frontiers, a theory 
possibly demonstrated by colonialism.  In the case of a cowboy economy (which 
is exploitative), humans simply helped themselves to nature’s boons without any 
thought to management or sustainability.  This he referred to as an open economy 
which, as a result of the startling realisation that the Earth’s resources are not in 
fact limitless, will need to be replaced by a “spaceman” economy which 
recognises that the Earth does not have an unlimited supply of anything.  
Boulding referred to this as a closed economy, reflecting the fact that humans are, 
despite earlier Christian dogma, really an integral part of a continuous cyclical 
ecological system.30  The difference between the two systems is stark in terms of 
consumption.  The cowboy economy regards consumption as a good thing - the 
progenitor of naked consumerism - and that such an economy is assessed in terms 
of production and therefore is seen in terms of the depletion of resources.  A 
spaceman economy on the other hand is concerned rather with the quality and 
complexity of capital stock (including human minds and bodies); and is primarily 
concerned with the maintenance of that stock and the development of technology. 
                                                 
 
29  Basically a first-in-first served system, an unsophisticated but practical allocation system 
employed in a region with little or no legal infrastructure by determined and self-reliant 
individuals. 
30 See generally James Lovelock “Gaia as Seen Through the Atmosphere” (1972) 6 Atmospheric 
Environment 579.  This theory was actually first postulated by Pythagoras.  Also Barry Commoner 
The Closing Circle: Nature, Man, and Technology (Knopf, New York 1971).  Commoner 
suggested the American economy should be remodelled to comply with immutable laws of 
ecology.  He was the first to suggest the idea of sustainability to a mass audience. 
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1.8 A Change in Perspective – A Brief Introduction to the Idea of 
Sustainability. 
Introspective dialogue of this nature illustrates the type of discourse following the 
Apollo 17 photograph.  However concern for the ecology of the Earth as a 
“system” had been discussed for many years.  The idea of “sustainable 
development” had its birth in forestry management of the 12th to 16th centuries, 
but the notion has broadened a great deal since then.   As early as 1908, forty-four 
American State and Territorial governors attended an environmental conservation 
conference called by Theodore Roosevelt at the White House.  Environmental 
awareness increased during the twentieth century: several National Parks were 
created in the United States; Rachel Carson’s seminal work Silent Spring was 
published in 1963;31 the Biosphere Conference was held in Paris in 1968; and the 
Club of Rome’s report The Limits to Growth32 was published in 1972, anticipating 
the Brundtland Report by some 15 years.  The Club of Rome’s report employed 
the term “sustainable” as a contemporary discussion.  Greenpeace was founded in 
1971 initially to protest American nuclear testing in Alaska, and was to become 
the visible (but radical) cheerleader for ecological concern.   
1.8.1 Post-World War II Concerns About the Environment 
Much of this concern had arisen from the Bretton Woods Conference of July 1944 
which induced globalised economic growth.  United States President Truman’s 
clarion call in 1949 for global “development” was also cause for environmental 
concern.  Both calls were borne by the need for wide-spread reconstruction after 
World War II, and were the motivating factor behind the establishment of the 
post-war economic system – a system which, it became clear, has led to 
                                                 
 
31 Rachel Carson Silent Spring (Hamish Hamilton Limited, London, 1963). 




accelerated environmental degradation and has eventually demonstrated that it is 
not sustainable. 
1.8.2 United Nations Support for Environmental Sustainability 
Prior to 1971 there were various environmental ginger-groups, for example the 
Club of Rome was founded in 1968 (which deals with a variety of international 
issues, not just environmental matters).  The environmental movement was finally 
endowed with some degree of official sanction when the United Nations became 
involved in ecological matters.  That body initiated the United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm in 1972, and subsequently 
its branch, an independent body named as the World Commission on Environment 
and Development’ as a response to economic globalisation and environmental 
degradation published its report Our Common Future,33 delivered in 1987 and 
which laid the groundwork for a subsequent series of consequential “Earth 
Summits” beginning in 1992.   
1.9 Commission on Sustainable Development 
Subsequent to the 1992 Summit at Rio de Janeiro, the United Nations General 
Assembly established the Commission on Sustainable Development (in December 
1992) and which is directly responsible for reviewing the progress of the 
implementation of “Agenda 21” of which New Zealand was a foundation 
signatory.  This initiative was introduced at the Rio Summit, and is largely 
responsible for the establishment of the growing worldwide agitation towards 
                                                 
 
33 World Commission on Environment and Development Our Common Future (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1987) also known as the Brundtland Report after Gro Harlem Brundtland, the 
chairwoman of the Commission and former Labour Party Leader (and later Prime Minister) of 
Norway.  It is probably fair to argue that the Brundtland report, like the Apollo 17 photograph, is a 
unifying force  but a unity which has blossomed as a defence to a threat – a worldwide threat of 




sustainability.  The focus of the Rio Summit was the drive to introduce to the 
world the paradigm of “sustainable development”.  This notion stresses the 
reflection that equitable social and economic development – not the least of which 
is the needs of future generations which must be factored into the equation – relies 
on the protection and preservation of our natural resources with effective 
proposals to prevent ecological damage.  “Sustainability” has since become an 
accepted but urgent concept in environmental matters.  It is seen as a matter of 
survival:  
Amidst the wailing sirens of the rescue operations undertaken in the 
name of some lifeboat ethics, the pressure on peoples and countries to 
conform to an emergency discipline will be high.  As soon as 
worldwide strategies are launched to prevent the boat from capsizing, 
things like political autonomy or cultural diversity will disappear as 
the luxuries of yesteryear.  In the face of the overriding imperative 
to s̀ecure the survival of the planet ́, autonomy easily becomes an anti-
social value, and diversity turns into an obstacle to collective action.  
Can one imagine a more powerful motive for forcing the world into 
line than that of saving the planet?34 
 
Our Common Future (the very title reflects the unity suggested by the 
Blue Marble photograph) makes for extremely thought-provoking reading.  Its 
very clear message is that humankind as a species – by virtue of its rate of 
expansion and consumption of natural resources – is living an unsustainable 
lifestyle, similar to some countries of late borrowing money beyond their capacity 
to repay.  The Report examines a sad list of catastrophes threatening the global 
ecosystem.  Both rich and poor nations are over-drawing their environmental bank 
accounts which will leave an uncertain legacy for future generations.  The planet 
Earth is simply not capable of sustaining the current rate of consumption of 
resources, especially non-fungible resources like water.  
                                                 
 
34 Wolfgang Sachs The Development Dictionary (Zed Books Limited, London, 1992) at 108. 
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In essential terms the Report drew a nexus between the conspicuous 
inequalities among nations and environmental damage: wealthy nations are 
somewhat shielded from the ecological impact of their lifestyles, and the poor 
nations are simply unable to take care of their environment.  Moreover the citizens 
of poorer nations tend to do whatever is required to subsist, let alone develop, and 
thereby degrade their environment more than do the citizens of rich ones. 
Therefore a dramatic redistribution of wealth is a vital component in the 
Brundtland tool-box; it is an unashamedly Socialist discourse.   
The report urged a return to multilateralism, with the pronouncement that a 
combination of population control, new technology, and sustainable development 
will stem the tide of destruction.35 The creed of “sustainable development” is 
specified as development by which humanity can meet the needs of the present 
generation without needlessly compromising the ability of future generations to 
meet their own needs.36  It is touted as a general panacea for the world’s resource 
management challenges; it is not a palliative measure.   
The challenge facing the Commission was simply to win the hearts and 
minds of the world, but the on-going challenge for “sustainability” as a principle 
is more practical, that is to ensure resource renewal and substitution, together with 
new technology (although it is noteworthy that American technology was unable 
to save New Orleans in 2005, despite the fact the risks to the city had been well 
identified) and to ensure economic growth outstrips population growth, resource 
consumption, contingencies  ̶  and unplanned aberrations.37   
                                                 
 
35 The Limits to Growth had been criticised for assuming an exponential growth in population and 
consumption, but an incremental development of technology. 
36 Our Common Future, p 8. The report is silent on what constitutes “needs”, but does talk about 
essential needs – food, clothing, shelter, and jobs. 
37  Barbara Ward in Space Ship Earth maintains during World War II the USA added the 
equivalent growth of a century to her economy (p 10). 
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1.10 Brundtland Report 
Despite a plurality of epistemological and normative perspectives on what 
actually constitutes “sustainability”, and various interpretations on the concept of 
“development”, the general objectives of the Brundtland Report were 
fundamentally embraced worldwide.38  New Zealand in particular had already 
included the notion of sustainability into legislation: 
An Act to – 
(c) Ensure that, in the management of natural and   physical resources, 
full and balanced account is taken of –  
(iv) the sustainability of natural and physical resources…39 
 
Issues of recycling and renewable energy (wind power, photovoltaics, and 
hydro-electricity) entered the discussion in the late 20th century, and currently in 
the 21st century concerns of greater global awareness of climate change and 
human activities accelerating the same together with discussions about ecological 
economics expand the debate beyond the scope of this discussion.  The doctrine of 
sustainability was initially intended to relate to the management of all natural and 
physical resources, including the allocation of water, and the Brundtland 
Commission’s primary argument was that human economies and social systems 
should reflect the capacity of the environment to accommodate these human 
organisations, and this is the thrust of this research.  
With this background, New Zealand embarked in 1991 on legislative reform 
of its management of natural resources. 
                                                 
 
38 Switzerland, Canada, Norway, Australia, the Netherlands, and especially New Zealand were all 
out of the stalls very quickly in embracing the Report. 
39 Environment Act 1986, title.  This Act came into force some 4 months before Our Common 
Future was published. 
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1.11 The Resource Management Act 1991. 
Sustainability of water resources was in fact a matter of constraint for the arid 
American west.  In historical terms and speaking generally, pre-colonial New 
Zealand and pre-colonial America were geographically remarkably similar: an 
essentially unspoiled territory rich in natural resources and fertile soils, thinly 
populated by self-sufficient and self-reliant locals, but colonised by invasive and 
acquisitive outsiders.   The obvious exception is the parched western states of 
America.   
1.11.1 Contrast with the Western United States of America 
The startling difference between New Zealand and the western United States is 
the amount of water resources available. New Zealand had abundant supplies; the 
western United States did not.  For the most part the western United States’ water 
policy has been focussed on supply initiatives (both delivery and allocation), but 
an important deduction of this research is that the American notion of “beneficial 
use” was a remarkably sensible home-grown system intended to promote the 
sustainability of a natural resource recognised for its critical importance at a time 
when such a notion was not accepted for other resources.   
New Zealand’s initiatives on the other hand have traditionally taken 
supply as a given, and focussed variously on flood control in the 1940s, 40 
pollution control in the 1950s,41 irrigation and power development in the 1960s 
and 1970s and early 1980s,42 all largely reactive resolutions to specific problems, 
                                                 
 
40 For example Soil Conservation and Rivers Control Act 1941. 
41 For example Waters Pollution Act 1953. 
42 For example Water & Soil Conservation Act 1967; National Development Act 1979; Clutha 
Development (Clyde Dam) Empowering Act 1983. 
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but focussed on environmental aspects since the 1980s 43  (an avoidance, or 
sustainability approach).  The environmental approach culminated in the Resource 
Management Act 1991. 
1.11.2 1980s Reforms 
The fourth Labour Government took office in New Zealand in 1984 fired with a 
general reformative zeal.  The environment was a major plank.  Several major 
legislative initiatives reflected this idealism.  The Environment Act was passed in 
1986 with the expressed purpose inter alia of taking a “full and balanced account 
of … the intrinsic value of ecosystems; and … the sustainability of natural and 
physical resources; and the needs of future generations”. 44   The Act also 
established the office of Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment.   
The Conservation Act was passed the following year and again the 
Minister for Conservation was charged with environmental husbandry.  The Act 
established the Department of Conservation with the objectives of inter alia of 
managing “… for conservation purposes, all land, and all other natural and 
historic resources…” as well as promoting “…the benefits to present and future 
generations of … the conservation of natural and historic resources generally…”45   
Both of these statutes recognise the importance of protecting ecosystems, 
and the interests of future generations, a notion central to the Brundtland Report 
published the same time (April 1987) as the Conservation Act came into force 
(the Royal assent was given on the 31 March 1987 and the Act came into effect 
the next day).   
                                                 
 
43 For example, the Water and Soil Conservation Amendment Act 1981; Environment Act 1986; 
Conservation Act 1987; Resource Management Act 1991. 
44 Environment Act 1986, title. 
45 Conservation Act 1987, s6. 
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The subsequent major reform was the passing of the Resource 
Management Act in 1991.  This Act adopted the overarching principle of 
“sustainable management” intended to pilot the use of water, and other 
environmental activities. 
1.11.3 Legislative History of the Resource Management Act 
The Resource Management Act was a significant undertaking – it was 
probably the largest piece of legislation to come before the House as a single 
measure – and while the general public of New Zealand may not have been well 
acquainted with the Brundtland Report; evidently some constituents were familiar 
with the general thrust of the Resource Management Bill, as there were over 3,500 
submissions received, more than 50 public meetings were held, and many hui, 
over a two-year Resource Management Law Reform period.  In short, the Act was 
a national undertaking of some consequence46 with spirited participation from a 
public well aware of the stakes, possibly as a consequence of the furore created by 
the introduction of the National Development Act in 1979, which tended for 
economic reasons to ride rough-shod over environmental concerns. 
The Bill was introduced by the Honourable Geoffrey Palmer (as he then 
was), then-Minister for the Environment.  New Zealand was the first country in 
the world to write the Brundtland principle of sustainable management47 as the 
guiding principle to environmental matters.  The Act significantly replaced many 
ad hoc statutory provisions that lacked any unifying approach or principle.   
                                                 
 
46 The Bill developed over a total of 4 years’ consultation involving two Governments of different 
persuasions. 
47  The Brundtland Report actually refers to “sustainable development” which is a somewhat 
different concept than “sustainable management”.  The former appears anthropocentric and the 
latter biocentric in nature.   
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In his speech the Minister stated “[The] new system will promote 
sustainable management of natural and physical resources, and with that will 
provide for considerably greater efficiency in the planning and consent 
processes.”48  This obviously includes water allocation.  The Minister noted: “The 
system it establishes will ensure that all relevant values are taken into account in 
reaching resource management decisions, and that it is done in a fair, consistent, 
and efficient manner.”49   
Before the Bill could be passed, a new government was elected.  In the 
third reading, the new Minister for the Environment, the Honourable Simon 
Upton, went to some trouble to discuss the Purpose clause and to explain the 
thrust of the new concept: “It has only one purpose – to promote the sustainable 
management of natural and physical resources.”50  He added: “The Bill should be 
seen as legitimising intervention only to achieve its purpose.”51  He also said that 
the courts would take Parliament’s intentions into account: 
Given that the purpose clause of a major code such as this will 
inevitably invite judicial consideration … it is important that certainty 
is quickly established on this point.  To the extent that judicial notice 
is taken of Hansard – and I hope that it will be in this case – I should 
like to take the trouble to make a carefully considered assessment of 
the Parliament on this occasion.52 
 
The Minister was afforded the opportunity to reinforce his message in 
1995 when he was invited to deliver the Stace Hammond Grace Lecture (the 
Minister’s former employers) at the Waikato University Law School.  In his 
lecture the Minister delivered a lucid and perspicacious consideration of the role 
                                                 
 
48 (December 11989) 503 NZPD 14166. 
49 Ibid, at 14166 
50 (July 1991) 516 NZPD 3018. 
51 Ibid, at 3018. 
52 Ibid, at 3019. 
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of purpose clauses in general, and that of the Resource Management Act in 
particular.  It is worthwhile reciting the purpose section of the Act in full: 
5    Purpose 
The purpose of this Act is to promote the sustainable management of 
natural and physical resources. 
In this Act, sustainable management means managing the use, 
development, and protection of natural and physical resources in a 
way, or at a rate, which enables people and communities to  provide 
for their social, economic, and cultural wellbeing and for their health 
and safety while- 
(a) sustaining the potential of natural and physical resources 
(excluding minerals) to meet the reasonably foreseeable needs of 
future generations; and 
(b) safeguarding the life-supporting capacity of air, water, soil, and 
ecosystems; and 
(c)   avoiding, remedying, or mitigating any adverse effects of 
activities on the environment. 
 
The section describes a theoretical integrated management approach to 
environmental husbandry and clearly describes the outcome sought by Parliament.  
Upton states that by proceeding to provide a detailed definition of “sustainable 
management”, the Act goes further than to articulate a desired “end” but rather 
elevates “sustainable management” to the status of a principle.  To this extent, 
Parliament has acknowledged the Department of Scientific and Industrial 
Research opinion in the resource management law reform debate that 
“sustainability” as a concept “should be applied in law in much the same way as 
other general concepts such as liberty, equality and justice.”53   By giving a 
statutory definition to the term, the legislature avoids the continental approach to 
statute-drafting which employs the use of abstract notions and which differs from 
                                                 
 
53 DSIR comments, appendix to Cronin, K. “The Relationship Between Sustainability and other 
Objectives for Resource Management” Resource Management Law Reform Core Group, 
Sustainability, Intrinsic Values and the Needs of Future Generations, Working Paper No.24 
(Wellington, Ministry for the Environment, July 1989. 
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the common law system of specific definitions. The intention is to try to elevate 
the expression from a vague general and abstract social/political notion (which is 
really a doctrine for political analysis rather than legal definition) to something the 
common law may get its teeth into.   
1.12 The Resource Management Act and Matters of Water 
Allocation. 
An examination of the genesis of the Resource Management Act assists in a 
determination as to whether or not its principles have been correctly applied in 
relation to water allocation in New Zealand.  As already noted, a problem in New 
Zealand is the adoption of a first-in-first-served system of water allocation.  Given 
that the Resource Management Act did not directly address the question of 
methods of distribution, those rules have been promulgated by the court system 
notably the Court of Appeal in Fleetwing Farms Ltd v Marlborough District 
Council, 54  and the High Court in Aoraki Water Trust v Meridian Energy 
Limited.55    
It follows that significant matters to be addressed in this research in terms of 
the sustainability precept in the Resource Management Act are to examine first 
whether the first-come-first-served system is the best system to meet the 
sustainability requirements of section 5 of the Act, and secondly how the principle 
became dominant in New Zealand law.  These examinations will involve an 
enquiry into the principles of the Resource Management Act, and whether the 
ratio of the consequential cases is indeed in conformity with those principles.   
                                                 
 
54 Fleetwing Farms Ltd v Marlborough District Council [1997] NZLR 257. 
55 Aoraki Water Trust v Meridian Energy Ltd [2005] 2 NZLR 268.  The High Court was, of course, 
bound by the earlier Court of Appeal ruling. 
24 
 
Further, perhaps consideration should be given to augment the instruction for 
efficiency contained in section 7(b) of the Resource Management Act by the 
introduction into the allocative process of some notion of “beneficial use” as 
mentioned by Cooke P in Keam’s Case,56 but developed along the lines of western 
United States’ thinking.  An approach of this nature can also be justified on the 
simple grounds of the proper husbandry of a strategic and non-fungible natural 
resource.  Given the parlous state of our catchments it could be argued that the 
mere system of allocation is only part of the problem; once the catchments are 
fully allocated (under whatever system) there will be no provision for future 
generations.  Some appropriate mechanism like a system allowing effective 
transfer of water rights will need to be included in the bureaucratic structure to 
enable the effective and efficient transfer of allocated water, either partially or 
temporarily that is to say a reallocation system.  Such a system might provide a 
way for new users to gain access to water, and is one of the options canvassed in 
all four Land and Water Forum reports.   
The New Zealand Institute of Economic Research also favours the idea of the 
trading of water rights.57  Therefore a critical question is whether it might be 
better as a matter of policy for New Zealand to adopt a regime of water markets 
complemented by the principles of a western United States-type doctrine of 
beneficial use in an attempt to protect the integrity of the market system and to 
ensure the resource is not simply squandered as were so many other natural 
resources in nineteenth century America. 
As we shall see there is a large volume of literature discussing sustainability 
as a construct both in New Zealand and overseas prior to the passing of the 
                                                 
 
56 See note 30, supra. 
57 See “Flowing on from the NPS” (July 2011) NZIER Insight No 38; “Water Management in New 
Zealand: A Road Map for Understanding Water Value” March 2014, NZIER Public Discussion 
Paper 2014/01 <www.nzier.org.nz/publications/water-management>. 
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Resource Management Act, and much since.  Before a discussion of the cases can 
be undertaken, we need in the next chapter to discuss the principle of 
sustainability and its location within the architecture of the Act.  This research 
will conclude that a reform of the process of the reallocation of water rights in 
New Zealand is essential.  Reform will actually be ultimately obligatory as the 
effects of current allocative inefficiencies are compounded by growth in economic 
development and population, and the harm of climate change.  “Sustainability” 
and the place of a limited and non-fungible resource like water within its construct 








2 Chapter 2 
2.1 A Brief Introduction to the Notion of Sustainability. 
Chapter 1 has demonstrated that the drive for sustainability in administering 
natural resources including water is as clear in New Zealand as it is overseas.  The 
objects of the Environment Act 1986 state that account must be taken of the 
sustainability of natural and physical resources.   
The Resource Management Act 1991 has as its principal object the 
promotion of the sustainable management of natural and physical resources.  An 
alteration to New Zealand’s allocative (or more likely re-allocative) processes to 
accommodate the needs of future generations will require an analysis of the 
sustainability construct.  Further, the first-come-first-served method of allocation 
of these resources as established by the leading case of Fleetwing Farms Ltd v 
Marlborough District Council,1 needs to be examined to decide whether it is an 
appropriate model for sustainable management.  The detrimental effect of the 
consumption of Mother Earth’s resources may be lessened by the adoption of a 
sustainability approach.   
2.2 Literature Review 
Cornucopian and Promethean discourse suggest that resource yield is not a 
problem, but rather shortages will galvanise human ingenuity to discover 
alternatives and solutions.2  Given that there is no known substitute for water, 
such a position in that case may seem somewhat naïve. Dryzek points out that by 
and large the cost of some natural resources had fallen in real terms over the last 
decade up to 1997 (suggesting a greater supply had a downward influence on 
                                                 
 
1 Fleetwing Farms Ltd v Marlborough District Council [1997] NZLR 257. 
2 See John S Dryzek The Politics of the Earth (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997) at 44-60. 
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price);3 however, the fact that the trend had persisted then for some time is no 
guarantee it would persist into the future.4  A more mainstream view is to regard 
the Earth’s resources as a capital sum steadily reduced by expenditure.   
Philip Elder makes the point that “sustainable growth” is an oxymoron; 
population expansion will ultimately reach a point beyond where the earth’s 
ecosystems are able to support it.5  He goes on to make the point: 
Past conflicts over distribution have been simpler because a growing 
economy improved the lot of the poor without sacrifice by the rich.  
But when the pie is no longer growing, only significant redistribution 
will work.6 
 
Elder is suggesting that the allocation of a finite resource will require 
meaningful future management.  The unpalatable truth is that at the mercy of 
consumption, conspicuous or otherwise, all non-renewing resources will sooner or 
later disappear – as well as those renewing resources consumed beyond their rate 
of replenishment occurring through natural processes.    
This reality has become generally recognised and, as a result, the notion of 
“sustainability” has become an important catchphrase and somewhat over-used,7  
so before the idea of sustainability can be discussed it is necessary to define 
exactly what it is that is being considered.  Interestingly the verb “sustain” and the 
adjective “sustainable” do not necessarily share exactly the same sentiment.  The 
verb has a number of meanings, mostly related to the concept of keeping going 
                                                 
 
3 Ibid, at 47. 
4 In fact it didn’t: see Tim Worstall “But Why did Julian Simon Win the Paul Ehrlich Bet?” (2013) 
Forbes <www.forbes.com/sites/timworstall/2013/01/13>.  
5 P Elder “Sustainability” (1990) 36 McGill L J 831 at 835-6. 
6 Ibid, at 852. 
7 Reference has even been made of the concept of “sustainable warfare”: “green” explosives which 




and carrying on,8 and has been in English since about the late 14th century.  The 
adjective, however, means9 “capable of being upheld or defended; maintainable” 
and did not enter English until the mid-19th century.  One of the various meanings 
of “sustain” is in the sense of “providing sustenance” 10 and it from this meaning 
the word “sustainable” has come.  However, the variable notion of ‘sustainability’ 
is an army marching to many different drumbeats.  It may be seen in ecological 
terms:  
Sustainability is simply a term to describe a rate of resource 
throughput which can be maintained within the threshold – or 
carrying capacity – of biological and physical systems.  It requires 
recognition of the limits of ecological systems, and adjustment of the 
rate of resource use and waste disposal within those limits.11 
 
The Brundtland Committee worked an anthropological viewpoint 
of sustainability: “…to ensure that [humanity] meets the needs of the 
present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs” 12, and it is from this proposition that its Report is 
referenced.  The United Kingdom government is using a more 
platitudinous definition: “Sustainable development is about ensuring a 
better quality of life for everyone, now and for generations to come”.13  
Justice Peter Salmon stated: 
                                                 
 
8 It derives from the Latin tenere to hold, keep. 
9 These meanings are those to be found in the Oxford English Dictionary. (1st Edition Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 1933). 
10 See section 5(2) (a) Resource Management Act 1991. 
11 Cronin, K “Practical Implementations of the Sustainability Objective” in Resource Management 
Law Reform Core Group. Sustainability, Intrinsic Values and the needs of Future Generations 
Working paper No 24 (1989) Ministry for the Environment p 3. 
12 “Needs” in the context of the Report, it must be argued, refers to basic human needs like food, 
shelter, clean water. (Seep 8).  However what of a refrigerator, television, and car in every 
household in extremely populated countries like China and India? 
13 HM Government “Securing the Future” (2005) www.govt.uk/government/uploads/system The 




Most definitions of sustainable development reflect this dual goal of 
intra- and inter-generational justice and the means of integrating 
environmental, social, and economic policies.  For example, Judge 
Weeramantry, Vice President, International Court of Justice and one 
of the world’s leading jurists has said: 
‘In the first place, what is sustainable development? It 
represents a delicate balancing of competing interests.  It 
represents the balance between the concept of development and 
the concept of environmental protection.  The concept of 
development is a human right.14  There is no room any longer 
for denying it this legal status.  The concept of environmental 
protection is likewise a very important foundation of various 
human rights, such as the right to life, the right to an adequate 
standard of living and the right to health.’15  
 
Justice Salmon is suggesting sustainability is a matter of juggling the 
interests of the biosphere, human culture and human economics.   
Economist Herman Daly’s general rule of consumption of renewable 
resources was simply that the sustainable rate of use can be no greater than the 
rate of regeneration of its source, which is somewhat self-evident.16   
Molly Melhuish provides a more expanded definition:  
Sustainable management of renewable resource systems maintains 
and supports their capacity to renew themselves, so they can 
withstand stress and shock, and continue to yield natural resources for 
human use [an unabashed anthropocentric construct] over the long 
term (although shorter-term cyclic decrease followed by increase in 
harvestable resource stocks may be allowable).17 
 
                                                 
 
14 As defined by humans however and therefore imbued with a conflict of interest. 
15  Peter Salmon “Sustainable Development in New Zealand” Address to Auckland Branch 
Resource Management Law Association (2002) <www.rmla.org.nz/librarydoc/index/order>. 
16 See Herman E Daly “Economics in a Full World” (2005) Scientific American 100. 
17 Incorporating ‘Sustainability’ Into Natural Resource Law Resource Management Law Reform 
Working Paper No. 24 (Ministry for the Environment (1989), p1. 
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2.3 Sustainable Yield 
Thus, sustainability requires an inbuilt safety device to withstand extraordinary 
circumstances.  The corollary to this is that a sustainable yield of any natural 
capital should be the yield that can be seized without diminishing the base of 
capital itself, even in unusual periods.  Given the capital of renewable resources 
like water varies over time (that is the maintenance needs of ecosystems change) 
so does the amount of the sustainable yield.  
The favourite example given as a renewable resource in general 
commentary is that of fish stocks, but the general principle applies to water and 
other renewable resources.  Ignoring the principle of density-dependent growth to 
which fish and other living creatures are subject, and substituting a simple rate of 
replenishment, the following graph illustrates the point of sustainable yield of a 
certain water resource.  The horizontal axis represents the size of the resource, and 
the vertical axis the rate of replenishment.   
 
Figure 1:Sustainable yield Adapted from Michael S. Common Sustainability and Policy (Cambridge 




Replenishment is greatest at resource size Smsy, and at the end of the S 
axis, replenishment ceases altogether.  A sustainable extraction rate is shown.  If a 
resource size of So is accepted, then an extraction rate of Ho will leave the 
resource with a surplus to cover dry periods, whereas an extraction value of Hmsy 
(maximum sustainable yield) will put the resource at risk of overexploitation.  It is 
clear those charged with the function of allocating resources, non-renewable or 
renewable, will need to exercise a degree of circumspection and discretion when 
doing so. 
2.4 Human Impact 
The human species is not divorced from the natural world despite the fact that it 
sometimes acts as if it were, but is for better or worse an integral part of it.  
Economic activity generally takes some levy from the natural environment.  In the 
case of water, although essentially a renewable resource (at least in most cases but 
not, for example, in a blind aquifer)  ̶  pollution also takes its toll  ̶  serious 
ecological damage will occur unless extraction and use are managed prudently, 
and the losers are the natural environment (immediately) and future generations 
(subsequently).   
Clearly humans are going to have an impact of some sort on the 
environment and probably the issue is to define the optimal impact we have, 
which is after all the function of normative economics.  Tietenberg and Lewis 
make an interesting point in which they suggest the environmental/economic 
dynamic is a closed system.18  The environment per se cannot be accurately 
described as entirely closed as it receives most of its energy from the sun.  The 
Earth’s freshwater system however is definitely a closed system.   
                                                 
 
18 Tietenberg, T and Lewis L, Environmental Economics & Policy (6th ed, Pearson Education Inc, 
Boston, 2010).  
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The important implication of this assertion is the first law of 
thermodynamics – matter or energy cannot be created or destroyed.  Thus the flow 
of produce passing into the economy from the environment must either 
accumulate in that system, or be discharged back into the environment as waste.  
If the accumulation stops, a balance has been reached between inflow and 
outflow.  A model of this nature is an anthropocentric – and outdated – metaphor 
for water.  All water coming in to economic use must either be used, or stored for 
later use, or it will pass back into the environment.    
Water finding its way back to the environment is “waste” in the commercial 
sense that it is not capable of providing a benefit to the economy, but also may be 
waste in the environmental sense that it is spoiled by pollution.  Waste in this 
sense affects the “environment” (as broadly defined by section 2 of the Resource 
Management Act) by making it less capable of providing for the economy, and 
less able to provide the life-supporting systems that we and other species rely on.  
This relationship implies the second law of thermodynamics – that entropy 
increases (that is to say energy no longer available for work).    
In other words as the conversion of one form of energy to another is never 
totally efficient, some energy is always lost during the conversion and the rest, 
once consumed, is lost forever.  Further, in a closed system – like water – and in 
the absence of new forms of input that system must eventually use up its energy 
and life will cease to function.  However the planet continues to receive solar 
energy and, because entropy law suggests there is an upper limit to the flow of 
this solar energy that can be sustained, once our stored energy (fossil fuels, 
nuclear energy, water etc.) is consumed, the amount of energy available to us will 
be determined by this flow, together with energy we can store up (through dams, 
trees etc.).  Accordingly we will come to rely on solar energy, and economic 
growth will be limited by its availability.    
There is the possibility of new technology and substitution in some cases ‒ 
however this is not the case with water.  The debate is in basic terms therefore a 
matter of inter-generational equity, and as such can be discussed in terms of 
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distributive justice.  Sustainability is probably not an aspect of distributive justice 
that, say, John Rawls would have debated since he considered justice to apply to 
humans only without the inclusion of non-humans.19 The debate goes further than 
one simply about ecology because future generations will be affected, and the 
argument shifts therefore very quickly to a question of intergenerational equity.   
Consequently, a paradigm shift in reasoning as exercised by democratic 
liberals could see a liberal theory of justice extended to the environment. This will 
involve a re-think of traditional western ideals of humans’ relationship to and 
attitude towards the Earth.20  Just how successful this is, however, is a matter of 
some conjecture.   
In broad terms, true liberal democrats view the natural environment as a 
factor to be included in a list of comprehensive ideals involved in the dialectics of 
justice, law, religion, politics, morality and so on, which make up the complicated 
club sandwich that is the institutional, constitutional, and philosophical 
framework of modern society.  Under this model, water resources and the natural 
environment must take their chances in the democratic reconciliation between the 
various factions.  In other words, the ecosystem is at the mercy of democratic 
majorities which might receive differing analyses during various polemics from 
time to time, as all are in constant flux.  It is by definition an anthropocentric 
discourse and accordingly there is no strong natural obligation to biocentrism. 
In broad-brush terms, ecologists have the natural environment at the core of 
their thinking, especially deep ecologists (who would have us restore the Garden 
                                                 
 
19 John Rawls A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, 1971). 
20 “Be fruitful and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it; and have dominion over the 
fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the 
earth” Bible Genesis 1: 28.  
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of Eden) in the mould of Naess and Lovelock.21  Rather than interests in the 
ecology being added as a layer of concern to social systems, ecological theorists 
prefer to overhaul each individual system itself and add a natural environmental 
ethical flavour to modify these individual norms.  It is an entire reconstruction, 
brought about by a growing awareness of simple ecological justice in the sense 
that not only that other life forms are entitled to their place on earth, but also an 
understanding of, and discomfort at, the damage the human species is inflicting on 
the planet, and by extension, to other life forms – and by further extension to 
ourselves.  
Rawls and his concepts of justice are, on this basis, passé: the natural 
environment and all other species of living creatures do not have any chance of 
making any decisions under Rawls’ “veil of ignorance”, and the question of 
Rawls, and for the utilitarians from whence he sprung for that matter, is simply 
whether “equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all” 
and “the greatest good for the greatest number” may be a clarion call for the 
destruction of our ecosystems. 
2.5 The Biocentric/Anthropocentric Debate 
The most important issue therefore is the decision as to what is to be sustained – 
the natural environment or human institutions (the economy, cultural and 
recreational structures, social justice etc.).  These two impact on each other, but as 
one candidate for office with Hamilton City Council observed in the 2010 
campaign (the aptly-named but ultimately unsuccessful Mark Servian) “The 
economy is a wholly-owned subsidiary of the environment”, somewhat reflecting 
                                                 
 
21 Arne Naess “The Shallow and the Deep, Long-range Ecology Movement. A Summary” (1973) 
Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 16:1, 95-100 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/00201747308601682>; James Lovelock “Gaia Seen Through the 




a notion contained in clause 20 of the 1980 World Conservation Strategy report 
(this quote was originally from economist Herman Daly).   
An accountant, especially, and an economic positivist ‒ what Aneurin Bevan 
might describe as a “desiccated calculating-machine” ‒ may have a different 
appreciation of sustainability than an environmental ecologist. 22   This 
ecocentric/anthropocentric moral discourse has been active over the 60 years since 
Aldo Leopold first articulated it and it has still not been adequately resolved.  In 
truth however it is probably rapidly becoming not just purely a matter of ethical 
standards but rather a matter of rudimentary exigency.   
It is fair to say that historically humans have met increased demand by increasing 
supply – what Boulding would refer to as the cowboy approach. 23  This course 
will inevitably result in a depletion of any resource which is plundered in this 
way, and the exhortation of the Brundtland Report to slightly increase production 
is noted.  As a result, humans will be forced by simple demand management into 
sustainable practices (for example maximising resource productivity), whether 
they like it or not.   
Leopold actually talks in terms of an “ecological necessity” that humans come to 
some ethical compound with the animals and plants growing upon the land.24  The 
general theory of Thomas Malthus is particularly relevant, that the power of 
population is indefinitely greater than the power in the earth to produce 
                                                 
 
22 But see Freer Spreckley’s 1981 expansion of traditional economic reporting framework, the 
triple bottom line theory: people, planet, profits.  
<www.locallivelihoods.com/cmsms/index.php?page=publications>. 
23  Kenneth Boulding “The Economics of the Coming Spaceship Earth” in H Jarrett (ed) 
Environmental Quality in a Growing Economy (Resources for the Future/Johns Hopkins 
University Press, Baltimore, 1966) 3. 
24 A Sand County Almanac (Oxford University Press, New York, 1966, The Land Ethic p217-241). 
The work was first published in 1949. 
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subsistence for man.25  Malthus’s classic argument is that population grows at a 
geometric progression (an exponential rate), whereas food only grows at an 
arithmetical rate (a linear progression).  Mathusianism is reflected in the Club of 
Rome’s publication The Limits to Growth.26 
The essential discussion therefore involves the resolution of the dialectics 
between economic production, sustainability, and justice to the environment.  The 
fundamental question posed by traditional liberals is whether justice can be 
extended to nature at all, given that nature is neither a moral agent, nor is capable 
of extending justice in consideration of receiving it.  An eco-centric view regards 
nature and humans as moral equals, a view traditionally yoked to notions of 
nature’s intrinsic value,27 and of goodness, and as such representing a preference 
perhaps not shared by everyone.   
The nub of the debate is whether nature really does have value in its own 
right, or whether ‘values’ are an essentially human construct and therefore human 
values alone should be the basis for formulating policy.  Such preferences are a 
product of value judgements and meta-ethical conclusions.  Some will argue that 
humans are not always blessed with innate knowledge of what is good or bad, but 
being endowed with the power of reason are able to conclude what ambitions and 
what functioning will enhance their lives and well-being ‒ as well as those that do 
not ‒ an exercise in making a choice, which by definition is an exercise in 
volition: 
Consciousness – for those living organisms which possess it – is the 
basic means of survival.   For man, the basic means of survival is 
                                                 
 
25 See Malthus, An Essay on the Principle of Population, Book 2 (Dent & Sons, London, 1973) at 
304-315.   
26 D Meadows, D Meadows, and J Randers Limits to Growth (2nded Universe Books, New York, 
1972). 
27 Rather like virtue being its own reward.  See also definition of “intrinsic values” in section 2 
Resource Management Act 1991. 
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reason.  Man cannot survive, as animals do, by the guidance of mere 
percepts.  A sensation of hunger will tell him that he needs food (if he 
has learned to identify it as hunger), but it will not tell him how to 
obtain his food and it will not tell him what food is good for him or 
poisonous.  He cannot provide for his simplest physical needs without 
a process of thought.  He needs a process of thought to discover how 
to plant and grow his food or how to make weapons for hunting.  His 
percepts might lead him to a cave, if one is available – but to build the 
simplest shelter, he needs a process of thought.  No percepts and no 
instincts will tell him how to light a fire, how to weave a cloth, how to 
forge tools, how to make a wheel, how to make an airplane, how to 
produce an electric light bulb or an electronic tube or cyclotron or a 
box of matches.  Yet his life depends on such knowledge – and only a 
volitional act of his consciousness, a process of thought, can provide 
it.28 
 
Ayn Rand is close to Locke in her reasoning.  Locke suggested our minds, 
tabula rasa at birth, gain simple ideas from sensations and form complex ideas by 
processes of consolidation.  Rand is suggesting humans need to discover specific 
values that provide the requirements of life, and according to her, a code of values 
accepted by choice, which is by definition a code of ethics, that is the difference 
between right and wrong behaviour.  She is suggesting a set of consequential 
moral principles where actions are designed to advance the common good, in this 
case survival.   
Leopold similarly saw a progression of ethical sensitivity from the 
interpersonal to relationships with society as an entity and thence to relationships 
with “the land” (the natural environment)29  This, he believes, will lead to a 
moderation of actions which were formerly based on simple expediency.  
Ultimately, if, as Leopold will have us believe, we humans will adopt 
environmental ethics ‒ an accepted code of values (voluntarily according to Rand) 
‒  then cancerous damage to our environment, especially to Earth’s fragile water 
                                                 
 
28 Rand A “The Objectivist Ethics” (1961) The Ayn Rand Lexicon: Objectivism from A to Z 
www.aynrandlexicon.com/ayn-rand-ideas/the-object.   




systems, will indeed be a great incentive for us to adopt a code of relevant 
environmental ethics, as this will be in our best interests, and will eventually be 
vital to our ultimate survival, and therefore may become a simple exercise in 
pragmatics.  As Malthus suggests, population is obviously the Wild Card.  It is 
possible we could reach the point (if we have not already) where there are not 
enough resources, especially water resources, to satisfy everybody’s needs let 
alone wants. 
Such a principle obviously demonstrates political philosophy or an 
academic construct rather than a universally accepted personal doctrine.  Hardin’s 
converse and pertinent (though largely metaphorical) theory suggests that 
individually people will act not in the interests of their community but rather in 
their own best interests, essentially because the individual will receive the 
benefits, the costs of which are shared among everybody else in the whole 
community.30   Accordingly, Hardin advocates that the solution will require a 
paradigm shift in human values and ideas of morality to better embrace a 
universal sense of altruism.   
Elder suggests education is an integral part of the reform process: 
“voluntary action is at least as important as government decree”.31  Until such 
change is effected (if change can happen), Hardin’s theory is more a guiding 
principle for authorities charged with allocating resources especially water 
resources and how those resources are used given their strategic importance  than 
something that can easily be melded into the human conscience.  Hardin’s 
recommendation is that coercion is required rather than a bald reliance on 
                                                 
 
30 “Tragedy of the Commons” (13th December 1968) Science Vol. 162 No.3859.  This theory 
echoes Aristotlean discourse.  Hardin was referring to “unmanaged commons” because some 
commons have been successfully managed ‒ in some cases for centuries: see E Ostrom Governing 
the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 1990).  Also GG Stevenson Common Property Economics (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 1991). 
31 P Elder “Sustainability” (1991)36 McGill LJ 831 at 837. 
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voluntary restraint, and specifically a permit system for extractive economic 
activities.  In any event, Our Common Future suggests human conscience is 
subject to compulsion in straitened times that is people will do whatever they can, 
individually or as a community to survive,32 and this ultimately translates into a 
matter of intra-generational equity. 
2.6 Practical and Ethical Considerations 
In summary, sustainability may be seen not so much as a moral requirement as a 
practical necessity.  Sustainability as an ethical proposition may have less to do 
with future generations as with problems closer to home and the current 
generation, given the damage climate change is inflicting on the planet now.  In 
any event, the question of future generations is simply an anthropocentric 
perspective of a duty of care humans are coming to realise they have for the 
world’s ecology.   
Further, Malcolm Grant sees the question of the provision for future 
generations as an ethical minefield.33  His argument is that humans are using 
resources at a rate that is prejudicing future generations (a simple statement of 
fact), but whether this is unfair to future generations is an ethical judgment, given 
that future generations will benefit from infrastructural and technological 
progress.  Those who oppose sustainability argue that either the welfare of future 
generations is not our moral concern; or, if it is, they question whether it is more 
important than the organisation of contemporary society in terms of poverty and 
inequality, which would be only exacerbated by the pursuit of sustainability for 
future generations.   
                                                 
 
32 World Commission on Environment and Development Our Common Future (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1987) at 27. 
33 Sustainable Management: A Sustainable Ethic? Paper delivered to Resource Management Law 
Association Conference October 1995.  See Frontiers of Resource Management Law Resource 
Management Law Association of New Zealand Brookers Limited Wellington, 2012, at p 40. 
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On the other hand, those who support sustainability need to explain why the 
interests of future generations should take precedence over contemporary 
widespread poverty and inequality.  Grant points out that we have demonstrated a 
dramatic inability to resolve the twin current problems of poverty and inequality 
of resource allocation without implementing complex programs to help future 
generations.  Hardin suggests restraint cannot be left to the individual conscience, 
and the Brundtland Report tells us people in poverty will inflict whatever damage 
on the ecology they need to in order to survive.  Hence some statutory restraint 
will need to be imposed to control the allocation of resources especially critical 
non-fungible resources like water; and this is the purpose of the effects-based 
Resource Management Act in New Zealand. 
The idea of resource consumption as a sustainable activity, sustainable 
development had its naissance in the early 1970s in the expression 
“ecodevelopment” which became expounded by some international agencies (at 
first referenced mainly to rural development projects in the Third World) 
according to Abaza and Baranzini to describe the development and sustainably of 
natural resources which, according to the authors, represented a symbiosis of 
ecological and economic production.34  (The word “symbiosis” in this context 
may be somewhat vague, but it essentially defines a mutually advantageous 
relationship, originally referring to people living together in a community.  
Currently the definition is somewhat more wide-ranging and while there is some 
sort of relationship between the environment and man’s institutions, it is difficult 
to describe it as symbiotic in its original meaning.  It would probably refer to a 
type of symbiosis known as parasitism, where one organism derives benefit while 
the other is harmed.)   
                                                 
 




The earth’s ecosystem is also the living-room for innumerable non-human 
species, which do not (in nature) rely on homo sapiens for their existence. Of 
course, “[d]evelopment cannot subsist upon a deteriorating environmental 
resource base; the environment cannot be protected when growth leaves out of 
account the costs of environmental destruction.”35  Shaw and Eichbaum give an 
anthropocentric viewpoint and describe environmentalism as a concern for 
protecting the environment for human benefit (emphasis added) whereas 
ecologism is a concern for the natural environment as a whole.36  “Of the themes 
which characterise ecologism and environmentalism, sustainability – economic, 
environmental, and social – is the most important.” 37   Given the Resource 
Management Act’s concern for sustainability, it is important to examine how (and 
how far) that Act trades off human and ecological concerns. 
2.7 Sustainability under the Resource Management Act. 
The central debate about section 5 of the Resource Management Act focuses on 
exactly what it is supposed to mean. The wording suggests an approach somewhat 
wider than simply managing adverse effects on the natural environment.   
Prior to the establishment of the final wording of Part II of the Act, which 
establishes the purpose of the Act and the principles by which this could be 
achieved, there was a fair amount of debate during the public consultation period 
relating to exactly what section 5 was trying to achieve. Many respondents felt 
section 5 was too anthropocentric, others that it failed to adequately provide for 
future generations.  Some felt the section did not adequately cater for the 
                                                 
 
35 World Commission on Environment and Development Our Common Future (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1987) at 37. 
36 Shaw R and Eichbaum C Public Policy in New Zealand (2nd ed Pearson Education, Auckland, 
2008). 
37 Ibid, at 150. 
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economy.  The Treasury in particular was very critical.38  Treasury submitted that 
it was inappropriate to incorporate social objectives, such as arbitrating the wants 
and needs of current and future generations in legislation concerned with 
environmental policy.  Rather, it considered that the new Act should manage 
environmental impacts of human activity by allowing local authorities to impose 
minimum bio-physical standards, that is the bio-physical bottom line.   
The discourse boiled down to a debate between those who hoped the 
statute would resolve inherent social, environmental and economic debates and 
those who hoped the statute would simply deal with the environmental effects of 
resource consents.39  The then-Minister for the Environment, Simon Upton, felt 
the Review Group (under barrister Tony Randerson) in the final draft of the 
section achieved a bio-physical (and neo-liberal) perspective, and said so: 
In adopting the present formulation of [section 5] the Government has 
moved to underscore the shift in focus from planning activities to 
regulating their effects of which I have spoken.  We run a much more 
liberal market economy these days.  Economic and social outcomes 
are in the hands of citizens to a much greater extent than they have 
previously been.  The Government’s focus is now on externalities – 
the effects of those activities on the receiving environment – and those 
effects have too often been ignored.40 
 
While Geoffrey Palmer gave a broad view of his understanding of Part II 
in his speech when the Bill was introduced, his successor Simon Upton (who 
spoke to the third reading) gave a rather more expanded view.  Upton enthused 
                                                 
 
38  See Treasury Paper on Sustainability (John Wilson) Resource Management Law Reform 
Working Paper No. 24 (Ministry for the Environment (1989). 
38 (July 1991) 516 NZPD 3019 (Resource Management Bill third reading). 
39 Review Group Discussion Paper on the Resource Management Bill (Ministry for the 
Environment), December 1990.  In the case of water, of course, it is the giving environment that 
will suffer. 





about the economic and social outcomes of consents under the new Act being in 
the hands of citizens to a greater extent than under the somewhat dirigiste system 
of the former Town and Country Planning and the Water and Soil Conservation 
Acts, and how the new Act was focused on outcomes.  He did acknowledge 
however that the new Act’s sustainability prescription would inevitably need the 
kind of directive and controlling approach to economic and social activity that 
will require a “focus on trade-offs reached in adjudicative fora”.41 The hope, of 
course, is that these forums will attune to the Act’s principles and be sympathetic 
to those principles, if they can work out what they are. 
2.7.1 An Examination of the Text of Section 5 
Section 5, which encompasses the purpose and principles of the Act is actually 
extremely broad: 
Notable though the Resource Management Act is for the aspirations 
and principles embodied in it, their very generality seems to have led 
in drafting to an accumulation of words verging in places on 
turgidity.42 
 
 The “natural and physical resources” mentioned in subsections 1 and 2 
includes “land, water, air, soil, minerals, and energy, all forms of plants and 
animals (whether native to New Zealand or introduced) and all structures.”43  
Section 5 is divided into three cumulative parts – one ensuring the welfare of 
future generations, and therefore clearly anthropocentric, the second ensuring the 
welfare of ecosystems and therefore biocentric, and the third ensuring the welfare 
of the environment.  This is not as biocentric as it might seem, because section 2 
defines “environment” to include 
                                                 
 
41 Above, n 38. 
42 Auckland Regional Council v North Shore City [1995] NZRMA 424 at 427.  The judgment was 
delivered by Cooke P (Court of Appeal). 
43 Section 2. 
45 
 
ecosystems and their constituent parts, including people and 
communities; and all natural and physical resources; and amenity 
values; and the social, economic, aesthetic, and cultural conditions 
which affect matters stated in paragraphs (a) to (c) or which are 
affected by those matters. 
 
It is this “unfocussed” definition of the word that creates a great deal of 
debate and can be confusing:- 
…section 5 creates an obligation to avoid remedy or mitigate adverse 
effects on people and communities, and on social and economic 
conditions.  The context makes clear that not just people’s health, 
safety and aesthetic preferences but also their economic well-being is 
to be protected from adverse effects.  That conflicts with the general 
thrust of the objectives of the rest of section 5 and indeed Part II of 
the Act.44 
 
In his address to the Resource Management Law Association 
Conference in 1994, Mr Upton expressed the opinion that section 5 required 
that the matters in subparagraphs a, b, and c of section 5(2) must be secured 
whatever the planned activity.  In other words his view is that people and their 
communities can provide for their health and safety only by ensuring that (a) 
the reasonably foreseeable needs of the future are met, (b) the ecological base 
for their wellbeing is sustained, and (c) the adverse effects of activities are 
avoided, remedied, or mitigated.   
However, the only way Upton can come to this conclusion is to ignore 
the broad definition of the word “environment” in section 2(1).  He was called 
                                                 
 
44 Salmon G “Notes on Some Emerging Issues in Resource Management” (paper presented to 
Resource Management Law Association, Wellington , October 1994). 
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to task by Kerry Grundy over the matter and there followed a barely civilised 
debate between the two, as can be seen in Upton’s response:45  
The answer is that, despite the curious artefactual nature of statutes in 
our legal system, Judges and others are supposed when the words on 
the face of a statute are less than clear, to frame their interpretation in 
terms of what Parliament intended.  And in this instance I am perhaps 
uniquely aware of what was intended.  That is because the drafting of 
s5 is largely mine.  I chaired the Cabinet Committee that settled the 
final form of the bill and maintained a close oversight of its 
metamorphosis through the Select Committee. I was well aware of the 
“holistic” view Mr Grundy was arguing for as one policy alternative; 
and equally aware of the “balancing” view espoused by the 
development lobby.  We consciously chose to impose a biophysical 
type of test because of a pragmatic view that there was a better chance 
of getting agreement on sustainability in those terms than the broader 
terms Mr Grundy argued for.46 
 
Upton’s premise is that the section should be given a narrow interpretation 
to comply with the Act’s ecological intentions.  He ends his address thus: 
“sustainable practice, not semantic perfection.”47 
The word “while” in section 5(2) has a critical meaning and has been the 
subject of much debate.48  Professor Fisher’s opinion is that reading “while” as a 
subordinating or strong conjunction the provision would come to mean the 
management function would be weaker than the ecological function that is to say 
short-term human values cannot take effect unless certain ecological values are 
sustained.  However, with “while” read as a co-ordinating or weak conjunction, 
then human and ecological values have similar weight − the ecological/liberal 
                                                 
 
45 See Kerry Grundy “In Search of a Logic: s5 of the Resource Management Act” (1995) NZLJ 40 
and Correspondence at 124 and 125. 
46 Simon Upton (1995) NZLJ Correspondence at 124. 
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democrat tension discussed above.  Neither construction is ideal.  A 
straightforward reading of the provision in the context of the tenor of the Act 
makes the subordinating case a somewhat inelegant use of the word “while” (the 
plain use of the word “if” would be more precise), but in certain cases 
subordinating conjunctions may be used as weak co-ordinating conjunctions (the 
“colourless use”) and used mainly as an elegant variation to avoid repeating the 
use of the word “and” (this word is already used 6 times previously in the first 
part of section 5(2)).   
This conjunctive construction would, it is submitted, make for a more 
grammatically satisfactory reading of the provision but would definitely be 
counter to the Act’s sustainability imperative, to Bruce Pardy’s notion of an 
environmental bottom line,49 and to both Geoffrey Palmer’s and Simon Upton’s 
yearnings.  There is however a further sense of “while”, that is “during that time”, 
and “or so long as”. 50   This is also mentioned by Fisher as his preferred 
interpretation.   
Thus the sustainable management function would only apply so long as 
the provisions of paragraphs a, b, and c of section 5(2) are adhered to.  This 
interpretation, says Fisher, would give long-term environmental considerations 
some measure of control over short-term management objectives.  It is less strict 
than “if”, and more demanding than “and”; an interpretation according to Sarah 
Kerkin that must be implemented, otherwise the Act’s purpose may never be fully 
implemented.51 
                                                 
 
49 Below n 64. 
50 Oxford English Dictionary. (1st ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1933). 
51 Sarah Kerkin “Sustainability and the Resource Management Act 1991” (1992-1995) 7 Auckland 
U L Review 290 at 298. 
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The semantic arguments have not reached into the heart of the matter: how 
to decide the dispute given the integrated management requirements of the Act.  
Despite a lack of guidance as to how the decision should be made, it is probably 
relevant to compare the Resource Management Act 1991 with the Water and Soil 
Conservation Act 1967.  It is probably fair to say that both Acts represent a 
framework rather than a blueprint for addressing their core matters.   
2.7.2 Case Law  
The Court of Appeal in Keam v Minister of Works and Development52 confirmed 
the Planning Tribunal’s approach to decision-making that a cost/benefit analysis 
should be undertaken and that a “broad test” would be appropriate, but that a 
weighing of advantages and disadvantages is not required if there are no 
significant disadvantages.53   
The Planning Tribunal’s successor the Environment Court came to accept 
the “overall broad judgment” test, possibly as a result of the High Court decision 
in New Zealand Rail v Marlborough District Council and Auckland Regional 
Council v North Shore City.54  “There is a deliberate openness about the language 
[of Part II], its meanings and its connotations which I think is intended to allow 
the application of policy in a general and broad way.”55   
                                                 
 
52 Keam v Minister of Works and Development [1982] 1 NZLR 319. 
53 Ibid, at 322-323. 
54 New Zealand Rail v Marlborough District Council [1994] NZRMA 70; Auckland Regional 
Council v North Shore City [1995] NZRMA 424. 
55 New Zealand Rail v Marlborough District Council [1994] NZRMA 70, at 86. 
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Ironically, about the same time as the Court of Appeal was hearing 
Fleetwing Farms Limited v Marlborough District Council,56 the overall broad 
judgment test was established by three Environment Court cases.57  
However, the acceptance of this approach has now been called into 
question: Environmental Defence Society v the King Salmon Company Limited. 58  
The Supreme Court in that case criticised the “overall broad judgment” approach 
as this did not, in the Court’s opinion, necessarily contemplate environmental 
bottom lines, and rather preferred a strict interpretation of planning documents 
when couched in prescriptive terms. 
2.7.3 Further Interpretive Issues 
There is actually a strong human-interest flavour to the provision.  It is little 
wonder commentators (including some judges) have been constrained to 
complain of the “baffling complexity” of the section.59  To muddy the waters 
further, sections 6 and 7 contain a large list of matters to be taken into account 
in achieving the purposes of the Act in relation to managing the use, 
development, and protection of natural and physical resources; it is 
overwhelmingly eco-centric in nature. Section 104, on the other hand, contains 
matters which must be taken into account by a consent authority; it is 
overwhelmingly anthropocentric in nature, including, oddly in contemporary 
economic thinking, section 2A (added in 2005) which compels the consent 
authority when considering an application to take into account the value of the 
investment of the existing consent holder.   
                                                 
 
56 Fleetwing Farms Limited v Marlborough District Council [1997] 3 NZLR 257. 
57 Trio Holdings v Marlborough District Council [1997] NZRMA 97; North Shore City Council v 
Auckland Regional Council [1997] NZRMA 59; Aquamarine Ltd. V Southland Regional Council 
(C126/97). 
58 Environmental Defence Society v The King Salmon Co Ltd [2014] NZSC 38. 
59 See BV Harris “Sustainable Management” (1993) 8 Otago L Rev at 73. 
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The result is that the Environment Court and superior courts must juggle 
often competing values which are, by definition, incapable of being accurately 
comparable either in magnitude or in emphasis – with little guidance from the 
Act.  Royden Somerville QC also makes the apposite and practical point that 
the value-laden matters in section 5 cannot be proved by primary evidence in 
quite the same way that adjudicative facts can.60 
Interestingly, the New Zealand Parliament chose the expression 
“sustainable management” over the Brundtland touchstone of “sustainable 
development”: it was apparently felt the former term was more specific than the 
latter as it was believed there would be some uncertainty about its concept and 
application. 61   There was also the concern of the Review Group about the 
notions of the redistribution of wealth inherent in the Brundtland definition and 
the challenge of social inequities, and there were severe misgivings whether 
such concepts had a future in New Zealand environmental law.  Another 
question for example is whether it is a proactive or reactive term.  In any event 
“management” connotes mere administration or husbandry, whereas 
“development” suggests a structured process of growth.   
Having said that, one view is that the practical effect of section 5 is it 
“encapsulates the fundamental underpinnings of the concept of sustainable 
development [the Brundtland construct] in the sense that it requires decision-
makers to adopt an integrated perspective for managing natural and physical 
resources.” 62  Rather than biophysical matters being a prime objective, this 
definition sees those matters as an equal ingredient along with social, economic, 
and cultural concerns in the decision-making process.  This is an interpretation 
                                                 
 
60  See Brooker and Friend The Resource Management Act 1991: An Introductory Review. 
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61 Simon Upton Purpose and Principle in the Resource Management Act, (1995) Waikato L Rev 2. 
62  Peter Skelton and Ali Memon “Adopting Sustainability as an Overarching Environmental 
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with which the Minister for the Environment responsible for the Bill’s third 
reading, Simon Upton and his co-authors do not agree.63  They suggest the fact 
that the broad Brundtland definition of sustainable development was discarded 
in favour of a more narrow definition argues against the integrated 
interpretation.  They conclude that, while Skelton and Memon’s interpretation 
is certainly possible, if that were Parliament’s intention, the formula for 
sustainable development would have been adopted. 
In our view, the plain wording of section 5 is easy enough to 
understand without recourse to concepts like sustainable development 
that are not referred to, or the insistence that an ‘anthropocentric’ 
reading of the section must necessarily involve weighing up 
everything against everything else.  Neither do we find that Skelton 
and Memon add clarity in stating that section 5(2) contains “a 
definition or more correctly, a description of the term ‘sustainable 
management’ at least for the purposes of the Act.”  In our view 
section 5 (2) is a straightforward statutory definition that spells out 
what it is that is supposed to be ‘promoted’ by the Act.64 
 
The authors further argue that a biophysical interpretation cannot be 
dismissed simply on the basis that the section captures anthropocentric values.  
Any judgements under the Act about the importance of biophysical matters will 
be general judgements by humans reflecting human values, even if those values 
are not shared by everyone.  The wording of section 5(2)(b) – “safeguarding the 
life-supporting capacity of air, water, soil, and ecosystems…” – provides a 
measure by which the interests of future generations (a beneficiary of the 
biophysical construct) can be gauged. If these resources can no longer support 
life, the interests of future generations are compromised. 
The discourse is essentially an environmental ethical one, and reflects the 
debate between ecological theorists and democratic liberals. In terms of the Act, 
                                                 
 
63 Simon Upton, Helen Atkins, and Gerard Willis “Section 5 re-visited: a critique of Skelton and 
Memon’s Analysis” (2002) 10 RMJ 10. 
64 Ibid, at 12-13. 
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the argument is whether the natural environment should be added as an extra 
component to the list of anthropocentric concerns in section 5, or whether the 
ecological element should be added to each of those concerns to the intent that 
interest in ecology permeates the whole anthropocentric dynamic.  In the event the 
natural environment is only added as a layer of concern, it will need to take its 
chances in the interaction of all the others and will be at the mercy of value-based 
jurisprudence and democratic majorities.  Certainly this is not the tone suggested 
by Mr Upton’s speech, reproduced in Hansard: “The Government’s focus is now 
on externalities – the effects of those activities on the receiving environment…”65 
(nor the Review Group’s statement above). 
The problem is not solved by the wording of section 5.  Generally it states 
that the purpose of the Act is to promote (not achieve) sustainable management 
while sustaining the interests of future generations and satisfying certain 
ecological functions, leading to spirited debate.   
Bruce Pardy argues for an ecological construct.66  He contends that section 
5(2) can be divided into 3 separate ideas, not simply following the 3 separate 
clauses in subsection 2.  The first relates to the sustainable management in the use, 
development, and protection of only natural and physical resources which he 
claims targets only ecological elements.67  However the Act defines “natural and 
physical resources” as including “structures” which are clearly human, thus laying 
the groundwork for example for a nature/heritage discord.68  The second part 
states these resources are used, developed, and protected in a manner that provides 
for human social, economic, and cultural well-being and for human health and 
                                                 
 
65 (July 1991) 516 NZPD 3019 (Resource Management Bill third reading).  As already noted, what 
of the giving environment? 
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67 Ibid, at 353. 
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safety, and is clearly non-ecological.  The third part, he contends, states these non-
ecological goals are to be pursued while sustaining the potential of resources, 
safeguarding life-supporting capacity and avoiding adverse environmental effects 
which are also ecological in nature.  Once again, the definition of “environment” 
in section 2 it is submitted is overwhelmingly anthropocentric.   
Despite these inconsistencies, Pardy’s thesis, like Upton’s, is that the 
intention of the statute is ecological,69 and, as ecological values are knowable, 
human input is not sustainable if it adversely affects those values.  In other words 
he is advocating the establishment of ecological bottom lines.   He concludes: 
The purpose of the sustainability enquiry is to distinguish between the 
activities which do not change how ecosystems function and those 
that do.  This purpose is apt to be lost if the question of sustainability 
is confused with whether an activity is socially, economically, or 
culturally advantageous.  Such non-ecological considerations may be 
important, but they are separate.  If an activity is not evaluated 
according to its effect on ecosystem function, ecological sustainability 
cannot be achieved. 70 
 
Such a construct seems to be sensible.  Without ecological sustainability 
there would be no social, economic or cultural sustainability.  BV Harris 
concludes the section’s complexity together with its tendency to abdicate law-
making responsibilities in favour of the courts make it too uncertain to be 
effective.71  In contrast, Geoffrey Palmer argues that the time when Parliament 
could spell out everything in black-letter law has passed (thus suggesting a 
Continental approach to law draftsmanship); but he does concede that there 
appears to be a reluctance among some judges of the Planning Tribunal (now 
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Environment Court) to boldly follow the intent of the legislation, which he says is 
clear enough.72 It is time for the courts to strike out on new and creative paths.73 
Barry Brunette suggests that, despite the differing views of section 5, 
applying the principles of that section to water resources would result in the 
following provisions:74  
• present water resource needs for social, economic and cultural well-
being, as well as health and safety (section 5(2)) 
• the potential of water resources to meet the future needs of future 
generations (section 5(2) (a)) 
• safeguarding the life-supporting capacity of water resources (section 
5(2) (b)) 
• avoiding, remedying or mitigating adverse effects of activities on 
water as a component of the environment (section 5(2) (c)).75 
 
The Keam test required that “any proposed use of natural water should be 
a beneficial use, and that the loss which might flow from the taking of the water 
should be weighed against the benefit which will result from its use.”76  As noted 
the Environment Court is likely to have come to generally adopt an overall-
judgment approach to matters before it, requiring it to make a decision using a 
broad judgment about whether the proposal is within the parameters of section 5 
and whether it also promotes the sustainable management of natural and physical 
resources.  If this is the case, as pointed out by Brunette, exercising this statutory 
discretionary power will now require more than a balancing of economic interests 
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against the interests of the environment, but also  the balancing of today’s 
interests against the interests of future generations. 
The question, of course, is how the superior courts have dealt with section 
5, particularly in relation to allocation of natural resources which is at the heart of 
this enquiry.  Geoffrey Palmer suggested: 
Once an appropriate case reaches the New Zealand Court of Appeal, it 
can confidently be predicted that a suitably progressive yet workable 
approach will be taken to the Act.  That Court has a sound record on 
environmental issues.   It has increasingly shown itself to be capable 
of dealing effectively with the challenge of crafting broad principle 
into workable judicial tests, a task at which it has excelled in cases 
under the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990.  The Resource 
Management Act 1991 is analogous in important respects.77 
 
Bold words indeed, but the more important question is how well the Court 
of Appeal has lived up to them? 
2.7.4 Fleetwing Farms Limited v Marlborough District Council. 
In summary, then, it is clear the Resource Management Act is the consequence of 
a sustained and determined agitation not just within New Zealand but globally, 
insisting on a more eco-friendly and responsible attitude sympathetic towards the 
environment and the vast array of different creatures living within.  Central to the 
theme of sustainability is the function of resource allocation, and it was this 
question which confronted the Court of Appeal in the case of Fleetwing Farms 
Limited v Marlborough District Council,78 relating to conflicting applications to 
establish mussel farms.  
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The case calls for close analysis because it was the first time the Court of 
Appeal had the opportunity to discuss the allocation of natural resources within 
the Resource Management Act 1991.  As noted above, Geoffrey Palmer was 
confident the Courts would fashion a specific judicial answer to broad political 
principle.  In Fleetwing the Court was obliged to adjudicate on two separate 
applications (Fleetwing and Aqua King) affecting the same resource – in other 
words the grant to one applicant would necessarily preclude a grant to the other.  
It would be expected the Court would decide the matter according to the 
principles of sustainability, which is its brief under the Act.   
The Court’s decision rested on a consideration of bureaucratic actions 
underpinned by difficulties surrounding the date and process of the filing of 
competing applications.  (The matter related to the allocation of marine farming 
resources.)  Aqua King filed its application first, but Fleetwing’s was the first to 
be formally accepted by Council as complete.  Both applications were heard on 
the same day, and both were declined on the same day.  Aqua King’s notification 
of the decline of its application was dated the 29th November 1993, but 
Fleetwing’s was dated the 1st December 1993.  Aqua King lodged its appeal on 
the 21st December 1993, and Fleetwing lodged its appeal on the 6 January 1994.79  
Fleetwing’s argument was simply that the appeals should be heard in order of the 
filing of the complete original applications with Council that is Fleetwing’s first, 
then Aqua King’s application.  The Planning Tribunal resolved to hear Aqua 
King’s appeal first as although incomplete it was filed first, and relied on section 
272(1) as authority to do so.  This section stated that the Planning Tribunal80 is to 
hear and determine all proceedings as soon as practicable after the date on which 
they are lodged unless in the circumstances of the case it would be inappropriate.  
The section does not say that matters are to be heard in order – that seems to have 
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been assumed.  In any event the word “practicable” means nothing more than 
“feasible”.  Further, the requirement is to determine the matter, not simply remit it 
back to Council for further consideration. Therefore if the Tribunal were so 
minded it might have compared both applications and made a decision based on 
sustainability principles by granting the application to the more efficient of the 
operators.  Instead, the Tribunal declined to exercise its discretion under 
subsection (1) by concentrating on form, and refused to depart from its philosophy 
of hearing the appeals in order of filing, even though Fleetwing’s application had 
effectively overtaken Aqua King’s in the bureaucratic process.   
Fleetwing appealed to the High Court (Gallen J) which simply concurred 
with the Tribunal and upheld its normal practice of hearing appeals as soon as 
practicable,81 and in order of lodging (when the documents are accepted by the 
Registry); and confirmed the Tribunal’s conclusion that in this case there was no 
substantive reason to exercise discretion to depart from this norm. 
Fleetwing appealed to the Court of Appeal.  Despite Geoffrey Palmer’s 
glowing testimonial,82 it is probably fair to say the Court did not engage the 
subject in quite the same way the Court did in Keam’s case, and has undertaken a 
procedural rather than a substantive discussion, that is to say processes over 
outcomes.  Richardson P delivered the judgment, addressing sustainable 
management with a somewhat perfunctory reproduction of section 5, devoid of 
any discussion, commentary, or analysis.  The Court noted the Act’s concern for 
timetable,83 and noted sections 102 and 103 both allowed for combined hearings 
for two or more applications in respect to the same proposal, in the case of a 
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single applicant.  The Court held that this is consistent with the approach taken in 
sections 104 and 105 but then, with respect, draws a long bow: 
Clearly the statute requires each applicant’s application or 
applications to be determined on their own merits.  It does not allow 
for a comparative assessment of competing claims for the same 
source. 
The conclusion that the statute requires the council to judge each case 
on its own merits also accords with the primacy attached to s5.  If the 
relevant statutory criteria infused with the underlying objective of 
sustainable management are met in a particular case there is nothing 
in the Act to warrant refusing an application on the grounds that 
another applicant would or might meet a higher standard than the Act 
specifies.84 
 
It must be argued that these conclusions are simple non sequiturs, and it is 
quite uncertain what the Court meant by referring to a higher standard than the 
Act “specifies”, given no discussion on the matter has been raised in the 
judgment.  It could be equally argued that by preferring one applicant over 
another as well as confirming a beneficial use notion (as suggested by Keam) the 
Court would be better complying with its brief under section 5 which is, after all, 
the purpose of the Act.  It should be noted also that this is virtually the only 
discussion of section 5 in the whole judgment.  Oddly the Court suggested in view 
of the time constraints, the authority would be justified in refraining from a 
comparative analysis to meet its deadline.  This is to simply ignore the provisions 
of section 37 and to recommend that the overarching purpose of the Act should be 
sacrificed on the altar of bureaucratic expediency. 
The Court then went on to discuss the Marine Farming Act 1971.  The 
judgment argues that section 8 of that Act gives the controlling authority power to 
exercise a preference of one application over another: 
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Every such determination may, in the discretion of the controlling 
authority, be by lot, or by having regard to the financial or other 
circumstances of the applicant, or to the likelihood of the applicant 
being able successfully to develop a marine farm, and the 
determination of the controlling authority shall be final.85 
 
This is an example of the dirigiste system criticised during the third 
reading of the Resource Management Bill and which so alarmed Upton.  The 
Court concluded that since these earlier provisions were not carried forward to the 
new Resource Management Act, the Parliament obviously intended applications 
to be dealt with on a first-come-first-served basis.  Additionally their Honours 
pointed out that section 399 of the Act (“Applications received on the same day”), 
which deals with transitional matters, required that applications86 in the pipeline 
were to be dealt with in order starting first with those “endorsed with the earliest 
date” 87  (the Court was careful to point out this included marine farming 
applications – the present case is such an application, although not a transitional 
matter).  This, the judgment contends, is also a clear indication the legislature 
intended applications to be dealt with on a first come, first served basis.88  Their 
Honours then discussed alternative provisions the legislature may have provided 
in the Act, and alternative provisions of certain other statutes. 
With respect, it is submitted there are several possible challenges to the 
Court’s conclusion on these points.  In the first place, the reference to the Marine 
Farming Act and the conclusion therefrom is, again, a simple non sequitur, and 
does not support the presumption the Court has come to, especially given the lack 
of discussion of section 5 of the Resource Management Act.  Secondly, section 
399 of the Act is in Part 15 which deals with “transitional provisions”, and 
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accordingly by the very quality of the inherent notion of the term, is temporary in 
nature and characteristic, and simply means “intermediate”, 89  because the 
provisions are intended to have effect for a limited period of time.  Thirdly, the 
discussion of alternative and qualitative provisions is meaningless since that 
discussion itself lacks a qualitative element, and has taken place in the absence of 
any analysis of section 5 of the Act. 
The next topic relevant to our discussion considered by the judgment is the 
question of section 270(1).  This provision enables the Environment Court to hear 
together two or more proceedings relating to the same subject matter unless in the 
Court decides it is impractical, unnecessary, or undesirable to do so.  This 
provision is to be contrasted to the provisions contained in section 103, which 
enables Council to hear two or more applications by the same applicant together 
(with certain caveats).  The Court felt the provisions of section 270 were 
sufficiently broader to allow the Environment Court to hear together two or more 
applications by different applicants.  
Their Honours, however, decided this provision does not authorise the 
Environment Court to make a comparative assessment as between respective 
applicants, and that each application must be considered on its own merits.  This 
might invite some particular mental gymnastics on the part of the members of the 
Tribunal. The question that needs to be answered is what the purpose of section 
270 actually is, and how it relates to section 103.  The Court of Appeal clearly 
thought there was no relationship.  Therefore it could equally be argued the 
purpose of the section is precisely to allow such comparisons by linking the 
provisions in section 270 to section 5.90  While each case needs to be judged on its 
own merits, there is no provision in section 270 to preclude the Environment 
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Court from deciding that one applicant is more meritorious, or sustainable, than 
another.   
Their Honours then moved to discuss section 272, relating to the hearing 
of proceedings.  That section requires proceedings to be heard (and determined) as 
soon as practicable after filing, unless the Court in the circumstances of a 
particular case deems it inappropriate to do so.  The Court of Appeal felt 
compelled to view this provision as a prescriptive pronouncement to accord 
priority on a first-come-first-served basis, despite that proviso.  This bland 
conclusion is not particularly coherent, nor logical.  The judgment goes on to say 
“[a]s with any statutory discretion, that power is to be exercised in conformity 
with the purposes of the legislation and the policies underlying the legislation.”91  
Unhappily rather than proceed to a learned exposition of the theory and principles 
of sustainability, their Honours indulged in an exercise of form and procedure 
over substance, ignoring the principle of integrated management, and instead 
discussed the necessity of the Court to programme its caseload and fixtures 
appropriately.   
A further matter of note is the question of section 104, which stated (at the 
time – it has since been amended) “…when considering an application for a 
resource consent, the consent authority shall have regard to …(g) Part II.”  It is 
appropriate to reflect on the previous words of the Court of Appeal in Auckland 
Regional Council v North Shore City: “Such an Act [the Resource Management 
Act] is not to be approached in any narrow way or with an eye to the protection of 
supposedly vested administrative interests.”92  Their Honours (it was a full Bench) 
were referring to the relative planning roles of regional and territorial authorities 
but the notion could equally apply to the Court itself.   
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The judgment goes on to reaffirm that each case must be considered and 
determined on its own merits, but ignores the fact that the Court could make a 
merit-based assessment leading to a decision between certain alternative 
applications. “Where there are competing applications in respect of the same 
resource before council, the council must recognise the priority in time”.93  This 
specific portion of the judgment is the authority for the first-come-first-served 
system adopted as a result within the resource allocation system in New Zealand.  
While competing applications are relatively uncommon, given that competition 
for diminishing (and valuable) resources like water will increase, the decision is 
of considerable importance.  Significantly, what the case did not determine was at 
what stage priority was achieved: 
As presently advised, we are inclined to the view that receipt and/or 
notification by the Council is the critical time for determining priority 
in such a case, but in the absence of extended argument and of any 
need to do so, we prefer not to express a concluded view.94 
 
This preference was destined to create more bureaucratic discussion in the 
future,95 and it was decided by the Court of Appeal that priority was achieved by 
the first party to file a complete application, but confirmed the first in first served 
approach decided by Fleetwing Farms Limited v Marlborough District Council.  
The important cases were moving further away from a substantive discussion of 
integrated management and the Act’s fundamental doctrine, and concentrating on 
legal processes. 
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Clearly, the Court in 1997 did not engage in the enquiry in quite the same 
way the same Court did in Keam’s case in 1982.96  Clearly the judgment appears 
to be the result of certain preconceived notions on the part of the Bench, which 
could also explain why the judgment is completely lacking in energetic scrutiny 
and analysis of the purposes and principles of the Act.  Their Honours made 
reference to the Court of Appeal case of Northland Milk Vendors’ Association 
Inc. v Northern Milk Ltd 97   as authority for their approach to administrative 
matters.  That case held that where in new legislation a very real problem has 
certainly not been expressly provided for and possibly not even foreseen, the 
responsibility falling on the courts is to work out a practical interpretation 
appearing to accord with the general intention of Parliament as embodied in the 
Act.  The courts can, in a sense, fill gaps in an Act but only in order to make the 
Act work as Parliament must have intended.  Their Honours (Cooke P, McMullin 
and Somers JJ) even spoke of complying with “the spirit of the Act”.   
To the contrary Hammond J was exactly on point in TV3 Network Services 
Ltd v Waikato District Council98 where he stated: 
In my view Part II of the RMA is critical to the new statute.  It 
requires courts and practitioners to approach the new machinery 
provisions, and the resolution of cases, with the hortatory statutory 
objectives firmly in view.  The fact that there are some difficult issues 
of interpretation of Part II itself, and its relationship with the rest of 
the RMA, does not absolve consent authorities and courts from 
wrestling with those problems; or justify the side-tracking of Part II.99 
 
This is what Fleetwing failed to do and the comment might be seen as a 
veiled criticism of that case given that decision was made in July 1997, and 
                                                 
 
96 Keam v Minister of Works [1982] 1 NZLR 319. 
97 Northland Milk Vendors’ Association Incorporated v Northern Milk Limited [1988] 1 NZLR 
530. 
98 TV3 Network Services Ltd v Waikato District Council [1997] NZRMA 539 (High Court). 
99 Ibid at 543. 
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Hammond J’s decision was handed down in September the same year.  Their 
Lordships in Maunsell v Olins100 observed that a statutory provision must be given 
a generosity of interpretation to afford it its primary meaning according to the 
tone of the Act, unless it is clear that some other meaning must be given to it to 
obviate injustice, anomaly, absurdity, or contradiction.101  “… section 5 is about 
environmental sustainability rather than efficient, let alone equitable 
allocation.”102  This does not absolve the Court from its duty.  
Fleetwing prompts the questions: (1) how allocating any resource to the 
first person standing in line can possibly comply with the persistent global 
clamour for humankind to soften its ecological footprint; (2) how such a regime 
could adhere to the integrated management rubric of the Resource Management 
Act; and (3) how such a process, in the absence of any comparison, can possibly 
lead to the most beneficial or efficient use of public resources, irrespective of 
which view the Court may have of Part II of the Act, especially section 7(b), that 
is to say having particular regard to “the efficient use and development of natural 
and physical resources”.103  This is more conspicuous, even in cases of plentiful 
supply, given some water permits may last up to 35 years.104   
The High Court had occasion to discuss the priority system in Aoraki 
Water Trust v Meridian Energy Ltd.105  Although the case was primarily about the 
nature of water rights and the non-derogation of those rights, the Court did have 
occasion to discuss Fleetwing. Given the High Court is bound by the Court of 
Appeal ruling, the basis of Fleetwing was accepted without demur.  That 
acceptance is despite the fact that their Honours (Chisholm and Harrison JJ) spent 
                                                 
 
100 Maunsell v Olins [1975] AC 373 (House of Lords). 
101 Ibid, at 391. 
102 Milne P “Allocation of Water Between Productive Users” (2003) RMJ 12 at 12. 
103 See Marlborough Ridge Ltd v Marlborough District Council [1998] NZRMA 73 at 86. 
104 Section 123 Resource Management Act 1991. 
105 Aoraki Water Trust v Meridian Energy Ltd [2005] 2NZLR 268. 
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some time reviewing the features, as they saw them, of the Resource Management 
Act.  These features include, they state, inter alia:- 
(1) the sustainable management concept underpinning the Act which 
revolves around the management of resources as opposed to leaving 
their fate to chance (s5); (2) the obligation on a consent authority to 
have particular regard to the efficient use of resources (s7(b))…106 
 
The Court refrained from any comment as to how this view of the Act 
could be in harmony with the Fleetwing ruling. 
As mentioned above the first-come-first-served principle has led to 
uncertainty due to the fact that the bench in Fleetwing did not decide at what stage 
priority is achieved.  This was the basis of the Central Plains Water Trust cases 
involving first Ngai Tahu Properties Limited, and secondly Synlait Limited.107  
Both cases ultimately reached the Supreme Court for deliberation, but both 
matters were settled, thus sparing that Court the burden of making a decision, but 
denying our superior Court the opportunity to review the whole matter.   
The question before the Court of Appeal in the Ngai Tahu case was 
whether priority was achieved when the first (complete) application is filed with 
Council, or rather when the first application is ready for public notification under 
the Act.  It is worth noting that counsel on both sides agreed that Fleetwing was 
doctrinally binding in this instance, and the argument before the Court was how 
best to apply the principle in this case.108  Baragwanath and Hammond JJ109 both 
held that priority must remain with the first complete application to be filed 
                                                 
 
106 Ibid, at 276-7. 
107 Ngai Tahu Properties Ltd v Central Plains Water Trust [2008] NZCA 71; Central Plains Water 
Trust v Synlait Ltd  [2009] NZCA 609. 
108 Ngai Tahu Properties Ltd v Central Plains Water Trust [2008] NZCA 71at paragraph 90 (per 
Hammond J). 
109 Hammond J expressed some reservations as to the efficacy of this approach (see paragraph 97). 
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(barring unreasonable delay).110  Their reasoning essentially was that otherwise a 
later simpler but entire application ready for notification and that does not need to 
proceed in stages might undermine years of preparatory work and research and 
torpedo an uncompleted but complex and expensive project.  This position will be 
accepted by those applicants and their supporters who take part in a “gold-rush” 
application, and file early to foil later aspirants.  In the case of Central Plains the 
“take’ application was divorced from the “use” application which was to be filed 
later.  Even the take application of 2001 was incomplete in itself and was not 
therefore ready for notification as a single application.   
Robertson J, dissenting, found that this approach is putting the cart before 
the horse and that the correct approach would be to give priority to the complete 
proposal that could be publically notified first, as Ngai Tahu had done.  In this 
respect he agrees with Salmon J in Geotherm Group Ltd v Waikato Regional 
Council.111 That learned Judge summed matters up by stating that the first come 
first served principle is appropriate to benefit the application which is first ready 
for notification because otherwise there would “run the danger of giving priority 
to an inadequate application”. 112   Robertson J argued his (and Salmon J’s) 
approach would enable the allocating authority to more accurately comply with 
Part II of the Act and make a better informed decision, as well as receiving 
informed public submissions.113  His reasoning was simply that the authority is 
unable to make a decision until and unless it knows what is involved with the use 
of the water: 
                                                 
 
110 Whatever that means – no definition was given.  It is to be noted the Central Plains proposal 
had been extant since the first feasibility study in 1999 and nothing much seems to have happened 
to progress matters to the point where the application was ready for notification between 2001 and 
2005.  Counsel for Ngai Tahu correctly submitted that at the very least matters remained within the 
control of Central Plains. 
111 Geotherm Group Ltd v Waikato Regional Council [2004] NZRMA 1(High Court). 
112 Ibid, at paragraph 30. 
113 In the present case, for instance the North Canterbury Fish and Game Council. 
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Although Mr. Wylie [of counsel for Central Plains] must be correct 
when he submits that an application to “take” water alone can be a 
stand-alone and discrete matter, it is bereft of reality to suggest that a 
consent authority, in determining whether to grant such an 
application, would not give consideration to the use to which the 
water was going to be put.114 
 
This is a powerful dissenting opinion and the case decision is quite 
unsatisfactory as it appears to suggest a more complex proposal should have 
priority over a simpler option, irrespective of the merits of the more complex, 
save for the small possibly complicating matter of notice.  It is noteworthy that 
two of the Central Plains trustees also sat on the Board of Ngai Tahu Properties 
Limited, so there is the not inconsiderable matter of conflict of interest.  Despite 
this, it is an efficiency/policy interface which was debated again soon after in the 
Court of Appeal in the Synlait case,115 with more or less the same narrative.  The 
court made comment on the written submissions of Mr. White QC (as he then 
was) in his capacity as amicus in the earlier Ngai Tahu case.  The thrust of those 
submissions was that the courts were not paying enough regard to the principles 
of the Resource Management Act.  This was rejected: 
To give Part 2 full rein would cut across the RMA’s strict time limits 
and the detailed regime containing them.  But that is not necessarily to 
reject it completely.  Not only do the themes of Part 2 suffuse the 
whole RMA but the decision-making power in s104 is expressly 
subject to that Part.  How are the competing elements to be 
reconciled?116 
 
In point of fact the Act’s time limits are not necessarily so strict: section 
37.  Be that as it may, the Court concluded there needed to be a distinction 
between two different priorities, that of hearing and that of merit.  The Court 
found that, as it had in the Ngai Tahu case, that the first to file a complete 
                                                 
 
114 Central Plains Water Trust v Ngai Tahu Properties Ltd [2008] NZCA 71 at paragraph 132. 
115 Above, n 106. 
116 Central Plains Water Trust v Synlait Ltd [2009] NZCA 609 at paragraph 82. 
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application will have priority of hearing.  However later applicants, as ordinary 
members of the public, may challenge the first application in terms of its 
application and concepts at the section 104 hearing. 
In this way the two themes of the RMA can be reconciled.  There is a 
presumptive application of the statutory timetable (theme (1)), 
including a presumptive hearing priority to the first filed, but the 
consent authority, when acting under s104, has the power to apply the 
Part 2 and other (theme 2)) considerations rather than allow the theme 
(1) factors to deprive the community of a benefit which it considers 
outweighs them.117 
 
Theme (1) remains the dominant consideration.118  However Associate 
Professor Kenneth Palmer states: 
…this decision must be welcomed as returning the focus under the 
RMA to achieving sustainable management, and rejecting the notion 
that the first in time has a priority entitlement to use land, water, or 
other resource.119 
 
With respect, the judgment states that each case is to be judged on its own 
merits, which is not new.  It is submitted that the case does not really “return the 
focus under the RMA to achieving sustainable management” as Associate 
Professor Palmer claims.  It may direct the attention more towards that, but as the 
Court of Appeal states (paragraph 91) the primary concern is the statutory 
timetable.  In any event the Court pointed out that a later applicant who wishes to 
make submissions at the section 104 hearing may not present their full 
application.  Consequently Council may be denied receiving important 
submissions.   
                                                 
 
117 Ibid, at paragraph 90. 
118 Ibid, at paragraph 91. 
119  K Palmer “Central Plains and Synlait – a two theme approach to hearing priorities and 
sustainable outcomes” (2010) RM Bulletin 117 at 118. 
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Thus, there is still to be no comparison of the various merits of competing 
applications and the sustainability principles of Part 2, the provisions of section 
104,120 especially section 104(1) (c), and of section 30,121 are not entirely and it is 
submitted satisfactorily addressed.  More serious is the fact that if a council 
considers the potential effects of an application to be minor, notification is not 
required,122 and, consequently, parties which that council do not consider to be 
affected may not have the opportunity to make submissions, and worse, may not 
even be aware of the application. There is the further complicating factor of the 
2009 amendments to the Act (the addition of Part 11A) curbing the scope of 
submissions which may be made by trade competitors and their surrogates.  In 
2009, the New Zealand Māori Council (as a direct result of the abandonment of 
the Supreme Court case of Ngai Tahu v Central Plains) undertook an 
unsuccessful application to the High Court for a declaration under the Declaratory 
Judgments Act 1908 that “[p]riority as between competing applications under the 
Resource Management Act 1991 for a finite resource should be determined 
through the exercise by consent authorities of a discretion.” 123 
It would seem intellectually unsound to abjure the Act’s foundation 
principles in this way.  An explanation may be that the courts were perhaps 
seduced into abandoning the Act’s precepts in favour of neo-liberal economic 
dogma. New Zealand enjoyed several decades of Keynsian social democratic 
hegemony.  The thrust of that policy was, naturally enough, to use the state’s 
capacity to encourage economic growth (and stability) as well as equality of 
distribution through regulation, and control of markets, if necessary.  This policy 
of government interventionism received a measure of intellectual criticism as 
                                                 
 
120 Revitalised in 2003. 
121 Revitalised in 2005. 
122 Section 93. 
123  New Zealand Maori Council [2009] NZHC 1098.  The application was struck out on 
application by three parties: the Attorney General, Trustpower Limited, and Meridian Energy.  It 
was held to be inappropriate for the High Court to rule on a Court of Appeal finding (Fleetwing). 
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some of the regulations and restrictions were to a certain degree inconsistent and 
arbitrary.   
When the New Zealand economy stagnated under Robert Muldoon’s 
watch in the mid-1980s, the traditional principles were rejected with the election 
of the Fourth Labour Government in 1984.  Finance Minister Roger Douglas’s 
policies simply eschewed government control in favour of open competition with 
a free market utilised as an allocative mechanism to control economic activity.  
This model was alluded to by Simon Upton during his Third Reading of the 
Resource Management Bill – “we run a more liberal market economy these 
days”124 – and the theory is simply to reduce the size and influence of government 
and instead allow the “market” to pick winners and losers.  Whether this is a good 
mechanism to distribute strategic and diminishing public resources like water for 
periods up to 35 years – given the Act has inadequate provisions for the transfer 
of those permits – is a question which will be discussed later.   
Another factor alluded to in the Synlait case is the question of consistency 
as a result of devolution of management.  The veiled suggestion is that council 
officers are fickle: “It is impractical to use as a measure of priority…the mutable 
test of what a council officer, more or less cautious, more or less informed, might 
stipulate under s91…”125  With the greatest of respect, similar arguments apply 
also to Her Majesty’s judges, but interestingly the Parliament amended section 30 
in 2005 to (inter alia) endow individual regional councils with the function of 
establishing rules126 (if appropriate) to allocate the taking and use of water,127 with 
the likelihood of some inconsistency, (depending how individual councils frame 
                                                 
 
124 516 Hansard 4 July 1991 at 3019. 
125 Synlait Ltd v Central Plains Water Trust [2009] NZCA 609 at paragraph 88. 
126 The Local Government Act 2002 imposes statutory responsibilities on regional and territorial 
authorities. 
127 The Government has however signalled its intention to remain involved in water matters: see 
The Ministry for the Environment “National Policy Statement for Freshwater Management 2014” 
(2014) <www.mfe.govt.nz/publications/rma/nps-freshwater>.   
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their regulations), but probably a departure from neo-liberal rhetoric.  Likewise, 
section 104 was amended by the insertion of subsection 2A, also in 2005 to 
require consent authorities to take into account when considering an application 
the value of the investment of existing consent holders.   
Memon and Skelton argue (in 2007) that128 many regional council staff 
and elected officials have taken a narrow environmental interpretation of section 5 
(unlike the Environmental Court) – in other words if an application were 
environmentally acceptable, a consent should be given, and it was up to “the 
market” to control matters from there.   On the other hand one commentator 
agreeing with the Synlait comment above has stated: 
The ideals of the RMA are, in fact, compromised by regional councils 
at nearly every step – from choosing not to publically notify consent 
applications to stacking hearings panels with commissioners known to 
be sympathetic to a desired result.  Regional councils are not 
independent arbitrators of the environment – they have vested interest 
in “economic development” and, because of the election cycle, it’s the 
short-term gain that’s important to them and not the long-term loss to 
the environment.”129   
 
There has been some other criticism of this devolution of function,130 but the 
reality will be seen in the rules each council is making in response to their 
responsibility under the 2005 amendment of section 30, that is subsection (1) (fa) 
(i) relating to the making of rules (hopefully eschewing the first-in-first-served 
principle) in a regional plan (“if appropriate”) to allocate the taking or use of 
water.  This process is now well under way and some councils have either 
                                                 
 
128  Memon A & Skelton P “Institutional Arrangements and Planning Practices to Allocate 
Freshwater Resources in New Zealand: A Way Forward” (2007) 11 NZJEL 241 at 253. 
129  Mike Joy “The Dying Myth of a Clean, Green Aotearoa.” (2011) New Zealand Herald  
<http://m.nzherald.co.nz/business/news/articles.cfm?c_id=3&objectid=10721337>.   
130  For example Brunette B. “Freshwater Management and Allocation under the Resource 
Management Act 1991: Does First-in First-served Achieve Sustainable Management Principles?” 
(2006) 10 NZJEL 169 at 177 et seq; See also Memon A & Skelton P (supra at n128). 
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completed for example Waikato Regional Council, or almost completed their 
reviews.   
In any event, until each council completes the making of effective rules, the 
underlying Fleetwing principle will apply to those that have not yet done so. The 
ambition of “sustainability” and “sustainable management” is a laudable one but it 
is fair to say that the original legislative intent has been somewhat frustrated by 
bureaucratic outcomes of administration.  The disagreement between Simon 
Upton and Kerry Grundy illustrates the point exactly.  That discussion also 
illustrates how difficult it can be to accurately express legislative intent when 
competing interests are factored into the reckoning.   
As Plato illustrates in his Dialogues although it may be difficult to adequately 
define a concept, people can readily give examples of that concept.131 It is clear 
the New Zealand courts have not adequately addressed the concept of 
sustainability.   The American doctrine of beneficial use of water resources is 
indisputably a narrative about sustainability and sustainable management and so 
could very well be adopted in New Zealand in terms of the purpose of the 
Resource Management Act.  By adopting the first-come-first-served model of 
resource allocation, the New Zealand courts have not come to grips with the basic 
intent of the Resource Management Act.  This discussion will conclude that the 
first-come-first-served system is not in harmony with the Resource Management 
Act’s prescription of sustainable management. Accordingly some discussion of 
the priority system will be undertaken in the next chapter. 
  
                                                 
 
131 For example see Laches and Plato’s discussion about the definition of courage. Edith Hamilton 







3  Chapter 3 
3.1 First-in-first-served. 
3.1.1 Introduction. 
As we have seen in the preceding chapter there has been a world-wide trend 
towards sustainability in the treatment of natural resources, as there has been in 
New Zealand.  Although Fleetwing Farms Ltd v Marlborough District Council 
did not involve water allocation, the New Zealand courts have, for better or worse, 
adopted the first-in-first- served system of natural resource allocation, including 
water.  This chapter will examine that system.   
In terms of the Resource Management Act 1991 the resolution of 
competing applications should, as a matter of basic law, quite simply and 
unequivocally comply with that Act’s purpose and principles.  Retired 
Environment Court Judge David Sheppard put it thus: 
On priority to use a resource, [this] calls for management of 
freshwater to be strongly influenced by concepts other than who 
applied first: 
The first concept is sustaining the potential of freshwater resources to 
meet future needs; 
The second is the imperative of safeguarding the life-supporting 
capacity of fresh water, and of ecosystems associated with it; 
Thirdly, freshwater management has to be influenced by the national 
importance of providing for the preservation of the natural character 
of fresh water and its protection from inappropriate use etc; 
Fourthly, management has to be influenced by the national 
importance of providing for the relationship of Maori, and their 
culture and traditions, with their ancestral waters and taonga; 






The reasoning for the “first come, first served” concept for substantive 
priority for freshwater,…[does] not however seem to be derived from, 
or influenced by, those concepts.1 
 
The problem has been acknowledged by the Executive: “Water allocation 
works on a first-in-first-served basis and does not reflect the value (that is to say 
economic, environmental, recreational or cultural) of water.”2  
The type of allocation/value of water debate is arguably generally within the 
parameters of the purposes section of the Act.  The question then is whether the 
first-in-first-served method of the allocation of our water resources is an 
appropriate system.  The method of distribution of our water resources, however, 
is a discussion about allocative efficiency, not just environmental protection per 
se. There are many differing ways of allocating natural resources ‒  renewable or 
not; the first-come (or in), first-served policy is basic and to be contrasted to an 
informed decision-making process, which involves an appreciation of 
environmental, economic and possible technical considerations, and which usually 
employs cost-benefit analyses.   
The first-in-first-served model has the advantage of being simple in concept 
and execution, at least in theory,3 the system being an interpretation of “queuing”, 
and is probably efficient at processing the allocation of abundant resources.  The 
system does not discuss the merit of one claimant compared to another (an 
equitable balance between various diverse points of view) but rather blandly states 
that one claimant is more deserving than another simply by a position in a queue.  
                                                 
 
1  DF Sheppard “Reaching Sustainable Management of Fresh Water” (2010) Resource 
Management Law Association page 11-12 
<www.rmla.org.nz/upload/files/address_session_3_v6_(2)>.  
2  Ministry for the Environment “Fresh Water Management National Policy Statement (S32 
Evaluation)” April 2011 HG Document No R001v9-WE130567-01at 32. 
3 However as to when an applicant actually joins the queue can be problematical.  See Central 
Plains Water Trust v Ngai Tahu Properties Limited [2008] NZCA 71; Central Plains Water Trust 
v Synlait Limited [2009] NZCA 609. 
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The applicants “compete” by waiting in line,4 but the system does nothing to 
encourage productive efficiency that can benefit everyone. “Productive 
efficiency” has the potential to ensure scarce resources are not merely allocated, 
but allocated in a way that ameliorates scarcity through efficacy, thus possibly 
improving the supply, the value, or even the utility of what is produced.  It is a 
legitimate expectation that the benefit from public/Crown resources like water be 
maximised as far as practicable.   
The first-in-first-served system avoids the need to address the issue of 
sustainability altogether.  A reductio ad absurdum approach may illustrate the 
point: the system may be adequate for, say, shopkeepers and car parks (these, of 
course have priority parking for disabled people) but it is unlikely the system 
would be used to decide job applications, for instance applications for academic 
chairs. It is certainly a perennial ethical problem within the medical profession 
and the question of waiting lists which debates whether in such case the system is 
a fair natural lottery with an egalitarian approach or whether the system is 
fundamentally flawed in moving people up a waiting list by allowing morally 
irrelevant issues such as wealth, power, connections, and more importantly 
changing principles or ideals to decide just how scarce medical resources are to be 
allocated.  It is worth also noting that the Helsinki Rules adopted in 1966 and 
governing the competing uses of waters of international rivers does not adopt the 
first-in-first-served system.  In fact Article 5 sets out a list of eleven various 
factors to be taken into account (generally equally biocentric and anthropocentric 
in nature) in deciding the equitable sharing of waters of an international drainage 
basin.5 
                                                 
 
4 Unless some try to jump the queue which could be argued was the case in Central Plains Water 
Trust v Ngai Tahu Properties Limited (note 3 supra). 
5 Helsinki Rules 1966, available online at:  
<www.colsan.edu.mx/investigacion/aquaysledad/proyectofrontera/helsinki%20Rules%201966>.   
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3.2 Allocation and the Question of Fairness. 
The priority principle is based on Locke’s thesis of the rectitude of chronological 
possession, but it embodies the idea of haphazard fortuitous gains and offends 
normative notions of distributive justice ‒ of whatever flavour ‒ and, as such, it is 
a debate about equity.  Distributive justice is probably founded on the assumption 
that unless some important difference should justify otherwise, all persons should 
be treated equally in distributive matters, and to treat people unequally in the 
distribution of important benefits and burdens in the absence of such justification 
is an ideal of bias.  As already noted, the big question in terms of the Resource 
Management Act’s purpose is whether the natural environment and the welfare of 
all the other organisms living within should be afforded locus as a “person” in the 
distributive debate: the anthropomorphic answer is “no”; the eco-centric answer is 
“yes”.   
This burden of justification should be regarded very seriously when 
addressing the issue with those acted against.  Of course there may be relative 
accord as to the general meaning of the general term “equity” (in the general sense 
of “fairness”) but it is really an elusive concept and there are important differences 
of opinion on its application which results in a variety of interpretations 
manifesting themselves from a variety of perspectives.   
3.2.1 Utilitarian Approaches 
Broadly speaking, the main schools of thought on the matter are the views of the 
utilitarians6 John Rawls,7 and Robert Nozick.8  Bentham’s ideal of providing the 
                                                                                                                                     
 
Factor 4 of Article 5 relates to past utilisation of the waters in the basin (not in the sense of 
priority), but is only one of the many factors to be taken into account. 
6 Bentham, J Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1789). 
7 John Rawls A Theory of Justice (Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass., 1971). 
8 Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1974). 
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greatest happiness for the greatest number ignores the interests of those who 
would miss out altogether under a first-in-first-served system; and, without the 
opportunity to plead their case, perhaps the greatest number could somehow 
redistribute a portion of their happiness to others to provide some for everyone.   
Utilitarianism does not restrict the subordination of the interests of some 
over the interests of others, except that the overall outcome should be good for the 
majority.  Its proponents are more concerned with the “average” welfare of 
society as a whole, even to the extent of sacrificing the interests of individuals to 
the common good.  Bentham’s (Lockean) answer of course is that where equality 
and security of tenure come into conflict, security must prevail; but this is no 
succour to those without anything to secure ‒ and the utilitarians cannot form a 
strong enough argument to discharge their duty towards excluded persons, 
especially those excluded by a crude chronological system, and more especially 
when a critical resource like water is involved.   
3.2.2 Critique of “first-in-first-served” 
Rawls’ view on the other hand would be that under his “veil of ignorance” (to 
ensure impartiality), no-one would agree to the first-in-first-served system simply 
because it produces inequalities of opportunities due to the implacable 
chronological nature of the model, and those lacking in fortune would miss out 
entirely: it is essentially an egoistic discourse.  Rawls’ answer to this is his 
“difference principle” which would allow unequal distributions if those 
inequalities benefit those worse off in society and it would be rational for people 
to accept this given they make their decisions in the original position that is 
behind the veil of ignorance.  Equal opportunity ensures that those with equal 
impulsion and aptitude have an equal chance of success.   
The first-in-first-served system does not provide equal opportunity (except 
perhaps in terms of barging into the line) and hence cannot be seen in Rawlsian 
terms as “just” on any level.   Nozick (who was not so much concerned about 
social justice as such but rather the establishment of property rights) posits that a 
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doctrine is just not in terms of distribution, but rather whether there is a just 
process of establishing property rights, that is to say outcomes are not so 
important as procedures.  Nozick takes a Lockean approach to the accumulation of 
natural resources -  the righteousness of original acquisition.   
John Tisdell’s 9  view of Nozick’s position is stated as: “[f]ollowing 
Nozick, for a water doctrine to be just it should have evolved from the individuals 
joining together from rational self-interest to protect natural rights and only allow 
the water authority to provide protection for water rights against fraud or 
deceit.”10  Following his line of reasoning, for an authority to allocate the resource 
(as in New Zealand) would be beyond the function of his “minimum state”.   
Nozick is not an anarchist, however; and justifies some form of state 
apparatus to protect resource owners from hostilities from aggressive and possible 
indigent outsiders (“independents”) which, seen from a different perspective, 
smacks of the tyranny of the majority over the minority, and some will see 
democracy in this light.  Further, Nozick tracks a Lockean path towards resource 
accumulation so that individuals are free to pursue the acquisition of resources not 
held by others, provided this does not compromise11 the rights of others already in 
existence ‒ a suggestion of Pareto optimality ‒ a watered down version of a first-
in-first-served system.  In the real world the government owns or controls many 
resources (for example minerals, water) so it is reasonable to expect government 
involvement in allocative decisions.   
                                                 
 
9  Tisdell JG “Equity and Social Justice in Water Doctrines” (2003) 16 No 4 Social Justice 
Research 401. 
10 Ibid, at 411. 
11 In his “minimum state”, or indeed and any state, it would be an insurmountable task to know 
this, or indeed how to calculate it.  It may be theoretically possible in a given instance, but there 
would be difficulties in a general application. 
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As Garrett Hardin’s theory suggests, individuals need to be coerced into 
refraining from resource consumption which they would individually calculate as 
being the most rewarding where individual profits are achieved at public cost.  
Generally speaking, governments establish endogenous processes with the 
purpose of improving overall social well-being,12 admittedly a difficult task as this 
is hard to measure.  It has however a wider responsibility to address the needs of 
unrepresented or inadequately represented groups.  In terms of distributive justice, 
(and the Resource Management Act) this responsibility extends also to future 
generations. 
3.2.3 Equitable Considerations 
Equity is important because people value it and in this context it is protection for 
the individual against the hostilities of the state, as well as that of other 
individuals.  That is one matter, but allocative efficiency13 quite another.  The two 
do not make for easy bed-fellows, since an improvement in efficiency does not 
necessarily have equitable outcomes.  It is a tension between the rights of the 
individual and the interests of society.   
Any allocation that requires more primary resources (such as water) than 
another to achieve the same end is clearly undesirable from an efficiency 
perspective.  Similarly efficiency might require the maximum use of inputs, and 
one project which produces less than another from the same inputs is equally 
undesirable. It is also undesirable from the perspective of the general precepts of 
the Resource Management Act.  The first-in-first-served system does not allow 
the necessary calculus to take place.  From the economy’s point of view, initial 
outputs determine further distributions like goods, income, technology, but from 
                                                 
 
12 See generally Aristotle “Politics” <classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/politics.html> 
13 There are other ideas of efficiency of course for instance technical, productive (which may 
become important when deciding allocative outcomes). 
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the natural environment’s point of view, the main issue should be a reduced strain 
on resources (both renewable and finite) and a reduction of any negative knock-on 
effects borne by the ecosystem.   
In terms of the Resource Management Act, and, given that some consents 
can last for up to 35 years; any inefficiencies will necessarily be amplified with 
the passage of time and such inefficiencies have an inter-generational impact as 
the interests of future generations may well be compromised. Therefore the 
mechanism for allocating natural resources should engage a system of cost-benefit 
analyses implicit in a comparative assessment of competing applications.  
Environmental components such as water (and clean air) are public resources and 
there is little incentive on the part of the consent holder to remedy inefficiencies 
once they are factored into a consent.  Under a cost-benefit analytical system, 
efficiency is increased when desired outputs are increased relative to the necessary 
inputs.  The environment can be seen in these terms as simply a provider of raw 
materials, but the process with the greatest net benefits can be identified.  A cost-
benefit equation is an ordinary tool of analysing policy and regulatory impacts.  
The Ministry for the Environment employs cost-benefit analyses to establish a 
number of their policies, for instance on recycling, soil contamination, air quality, 
water measuring devices.  In relation to air quality, in 2004 the Ministry for the 
Environment used a cost-benefit analysis to study air quality initiatives, and this 
study was updated in 2009, again using the same method.14 
3.3 The Government Addresses the Fleetwing Principle. 
The area of New Zealand where the matter of competing applications is most 
stark (a competition between both differing users and uses) is water at the 
Waitaki Catchment in Canterbury.  The region has 70% of New Zealand’s 
                                                 
 




irrigated land, and for a number of reasons the Canterbury Regional Council had 
not formulated a strategic water allocation plan.15  The Government introduced 
the Resource Management (Waitaki Catchment) Amendment Act Bill in 2003.  
The purpose of the new Act was described as: 
The aim of the Bill is to amend the Resource Management Act 
1991…to enable the merits of competing water uses for the Waitaki 
catchment to be considered and to establish a framework for the 
allocation of the water “that will allow for sustainable 
development.”16 
 
Importantly, Sinclair Knight Merz (of Australia) was commissioned by the 
Ministry of Economic Development to undertake an analysis (as required by 
section 32 of the Act) of the proposal to take water in the Waitaki catchment.17  
The Act as passed established the Waitaki Catchment Water Allocation Board, 
which was required to prepare an allocative framework that ultimately became 
part of the Regional Plan: the Regional Council allocated the (Waitaki) water 
rights based on the Resource Management Act, and the Board’s framework – but 
may consider competing uses by a cost-benefit analysis.   
Clearly, the Government intended to revisit the water allocation 
methodology, especially given about the same time the Cabinet invited the 
Minister for the Environment to undertake a significant review of the Resource 
Management Act, including water allocation, with a view to improving the quality 
                                                 
 
15  See M Morgan & Others Canterbury Strategic Water Study Report 4557/1 (2002), 
<www.researcharchive.lincoln.ac.nz/bitstream/10182/3> (Last accessed 4 February 2014). 
16 Bills Digest No. 1051 (9 December 2003). 
17 Ministry of Economic Development National Cost Benefit Analysis in the Waitaki Catchment: 
Model Scoping Report 30 October 2003. 
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of decisions and processes. 18   The result was Cabinet Paper: Improving the 
Resource Management Act 1991.  Part F states: 
The RMA establishes a regime where natural resources (freshwater, 
geothermal, coastal space and assimilative capacity of air) are 
allocated on a “first-in-first-served” basis. First in first served gives 
preference to current rather than potential users, and avoids having to 
address the most economic allocation of the natural resource.19 
 
Further: “There are some simple amendments considered necessary to 
proceed with now to address resource allocation issues: - (a) Explicit recognition 
of natural resource allocation as a role and responsibility of regional councils.”20  
There is a natural tension between two outcomes – a lack of national consistency 
on the one hand, but improved local outcomes on the other with the devolution of 
control to the individual regions, which in any event is the intention of the Act. 
The result was the Resource Management Amendment Act 2005, and the 
material provisions of the relevant section of the principal Act (as amended) read 
as follows: 
30. Functions of regional councils under this Act‒ 
(1) Every regional council shall have the following functions for the 
purpose of giving effect to this Act in its region: 
… 
(fa)  if appropriate, the establishment of rules in a regional plan to 
allocate any of the following: 
the taking or use of water (other than open coastal water) 
 
Thus, the position in New Zealand is that the Fleetwing process of dealing 
with competing applications on a first-in-first-served basis is a default position 
                                                 
 
18 Cabinet Paper “Improving the Resource Management Act 1991” (13 September 2004) CAB Min 
(04) 30/10. 
19 Ibid, at 162. 
20 Ibid, at paragraph 168.  
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and will only apply to those regions where the councils have not yet formulated 
their response to section 30 (as amended), or indeed will have done so but opted 
to retain that system.  
3.4 How the Allocating Authorities Manage their Responsibilities 
Among the responsibilities which the Resource Management Act lays at the door 
of the allocating authorities is the important matter of the need for the 
establishment of Regional Policy Statements and Regional Plans. 21   This 
important function provides an “overview of the resource management issues of 
the region and policies and methods to achieve integrated management of the 
natural and physical resources of the whole region”.22  This policy framework 
regulates the contents of the regional plans which assist councils in carrying out 
their statutory functions under the Act. These documents were among the earliest 
documents prepared by the councils after the introduction of the Resource 
Management Act, and are mostly under review; second generation documents are 
currently being prepared.   
All councils adopted the first-in-first-served procedure (which was really 
decided for them by the Fleetwing decision), but this practice is universally under 
review.23  Additionally if they had not already done so, councils are probably now 
obliged in their Regional Plans to take into account their further responsibilities 
under the 2005 amendment to the Act,24 viz the establishment of rules in the 
Regional Plan to allocate the taking and use of water25 (among other resources), 
given that Regional Policy Statements provide a structure to guide the contents of 
                                                 
 
21 See Part 5 and Schedule 1 of the Act. 
22 Section 59. 
23 The exception is the Chatham Islands: the council has not issued any water permits and doesn’t 
see the need for them (personal correspondence). 
24 Section 30 (1) (fa). 
25 Paragraph 41 of the third report of the Land and Water Forum recommends regional plans as 
being a better tool to manage the quality and allocation of water than the consent process. 
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the Regional Plan.  Accordingly this amendment requires Regional Plans to be 
amended to accommodate this statutory requirement.  These rules probably 
should, by virtue of the imperative implicit in the statutory provision, make 
provision for adjudicating between competing applications.   
Moreover, for some years these allocating authorities had been looking 
forward to the prospect of a National Policy Statement relating to freshwater 
management.  The subsequent first Land and Water Forum report26 anticipated the 
first National Policy Statement for Freshwater Management by only a few 
months.27  One of the heads that first Forum Report identified was that of an 
improvement to the allocation process.  The first Land and Water Forum Report 
however concludes in relation to water allocation:  
The current first-in-first-served system does not [emphasis added] 
need to change in catchments where there is an abundance of water 
and little prospect of that changing.  There should, however, be a 
mechanism for moving to a different allocation scheme, in the form of 
a threshold of pending scarcity or proportion of total allocation being 
reached.28 
 
The suggestion was confirmed in Recommendation 35 of the third Report 
of October 2012.  With the greatest of respect, this may be impoverished thinking.  
The clear suggestion is that we can currently abuse abundant water sources until 
future generations are constrained to cobble together restraining allocative 
mechanisms.29  In any event the third Report also says of the first-in-first-served 
system: “There is no guarantee that the use profile that has emerged from this is 
                                                 
 
26 Land and Water Forum. 2010. First Report of the Land and Water Forum: A Fresh Start for 
Fresh Water. “A Fresh Start for Freshwater” is not to be confused with an earlier report of the 
same title. 
27  Unbelievably it took 20 years to introduce this fundamental component of the resource  
management programme. 
28 Land and Water Forum. 2010 First Report of the Land and Water Forum, paragraph 128. 
29 Indeed, it is possible these steps will need to be taken by generations not so future. 
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efficient or equitable…”30  At least a management approach now, (as required by 
the Resource Management Act) would demonstrate our willingness to play our 
role in the sustainability construct.  Apart from the equities involved, it is 
essentially an efficiency discourse and to act otherwise would arguably be 
contrary to one of the Resource Management Act’s objectives.  
In matters of allocation the second National Policy Statement for 
Freshwater Management which came into effect on the 1st August 2014 has as its 
several general objectives 31  the purpose of safeguarding the life-supporting 
capacity of ecosystems, sustainably managing the taking and using of freshwater, 
and the maximisation of the efficient allocation and use of water.  The Statement 
emphasises the requirement of every regional and unitary council to make or 
change its Regional Plan to the extent necessary to achieve these objectives.  
Matters central to the allocation issue is contained in Objective B1, Objective B2, 
and Policy B3:   
Objective B1 
To safeguard the life-supporting capacity, ecosystem processes and 
indigenous species including their associated ecosystems of 
freshwater, in sustainably managing the taking, using, damming, or 
diverting of freshwater. 
 
Objective B3 




By every regional council making or changing regional plans to the 
extent needed to ensure the plans state criteria by which applications 
                                                 
 
30 Land and Water Forum. 2012. Third Report of the Land and Water Forum: Managing Water 
Quality and Allocating Water, paragraph 197. 




for approval of transfers of water take permits are to be decided, 
including to improve and maximise the efficient allocation of water. 
 
It is hard to imagine how the adoption of a first-in-first-served process 
(even in catchments with current water reserves) could possibly comply with this 
policy initiative, and as a consequence councils will have to adopt a process of 
comparative analysis when scrutinising competing applications.  Councils – even 
water-rich ones – with an attitude averse to “picking winners” (which was the 
usual defence of the first-in-first-served procedure) will likely need to rethink 
their processes. 
The hugely important Policy B3 and also the recommendation of the third 
report of the Land and Water Forum for allocating authorities to increase the 
flexibility32 of the transfer of water permits under section 136 of the Act is noted:   
Water within the allocable quantum [in essence water remaining after 
an allowance for ecological requirements] needs to be easily 
transferrable between users, to allow it to move to its highest valued 
use, (i.e. to enable society as a whole to obtain the greatest collective 
value from the water resources across the full range of values).  The 
design of the allocation system should remove administrative barriers 
to transfer and trading.33 
 
It is therefore clear that the Land and Water Forum is signalling a two-
pronged need for change: first it wants to discourage the use of the first-in-first-
served process in allocating water resources; but, secondly, and much more 
notable, the Government’s acceptance of the Report is affirming quite clearly that 
the transfer of water permits to a higher-value user will be an important platform 
in the quest for greater efficiency in water resource management.  Thus, both 
National Policy Statements and the third report of the Forum provide a distinct 
                                                 
 
32 See clauses 26 and 27 in the List of Recommendations of the Report. 
33 Land and Water Forum. 2012. Third Report of the Land and Water Forum: Managing Water 
Quality and Allocating Water, Recommendation 25. 
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suggestion that New Zealand needs to prepare for water markets. 34   Such a 
scheme is a quantum leap and therefore it is entirely appropriate in the next 
chapter to examine this initiative in terms of a discussion of the introduction of the 
trading of water permits.  
 
                                                 
 
34 See also Land and Water Forum. 2012. Third Report of the Land and Water Forum: Managing 
Water Quality and Allocating Water, paragraphs 64-68; Recommendation 3(c). 
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4 Chapter 4 
4.1 Transfer of Consents under the Resource Management Act 
1991 
As demonstrated in the last chapter, the Land and Water Forum Reports have 
made it clear that a relaxed system of water rights transfer is one of the desirable 
improvements to New Zealand’s overall water resource husbandry.  Such a 
mechanism should be introduced, but, if it were, it would not be particularly in 
harmony with the provisions of the Resource Management Act 1991 in its present 
form.  This chapter will address this issue. 
The central provision relative to the transfer of consents is contained in 
section 136(2) of the Resource Management Act which reads as follows: 
A holder of a water permit granted other than for damming or 
diverting water may transfer the whole or any part of the holder’s 
interest in the permit – 
(a) to any owner or occupier of the site in respect of which the permit 
is granted; or 
(b) to another person on another site, or to another site, if both sites 
are in the same catchment (either upstream or downstream), aquifer, 
or geothermal field, and the transfer – 
(i) is expressly allowed by a regional plan; or 
(ii) has been approved by the consent authority that granted the 
permit on an application under subsection (4). 
 
Subsection 4’s provisions are essentially that the application for a 
transfer shall be treated as an application for a consent ab initio, in the 
event the transfer is not provided for in the regional plan.  The Act’s 
provisions relating to the transfer of water permits ‒ unless allowed in the 
regional plan ‒ are therefore not very nimble, given the lengthy and 
expensive consent process to which the provision refers.  The free-market 
rationalism of the two governments involved in the formation of the Act 
would suggest an easier transfer process would be contained in the section 
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and it is notable is that there was an inability prior to the 2005 amendment 
to even transfer permits temporarily.1  
Section 136 of the Act therefore currently allows the transfer of 
water consents under certain conditions.2  It may be argued that sections 5 
(“sustainable management”) and 7 of the Act provide the mandate for the 
transfer of water permits – the general provision of section 7 in particular: 
“the efficient use and development of natural and physical resources.”  
The main argument in favour of a transfer system is to allow a transfer of 
a consent to more efficient or higher-value users.   
Of particular interest is the definition of “efficient allocation” in the 
definition section of both National Policy Statements for Freshwater 
Management: “Efficient allocation” includes economic, technical and 
dynamic efficiency.”  The use of the expression “dynamic efficiency” is 
an important departure from the use of “efficiency” per se in a general 
sense (say in the sense of making optimal use of scarce resources).  The 
notion of dynamic efficiency is a well-developed economics discourse 
and relates to efficiency over time, a balance of short term goals and long 
term concerns and often results in the maintenance of efficiency by the 
introduction of new technologies and working techniques over an 
interval.3   
The expression “efficient allocation” appears in both National 
Policy Statements on Freshwater Management in Objective B3 (“To 
improve and maximise the efficient allocation and efficient use of water”) 
                                                 
 
1  Section 2A, allowing temporary transfers, was inserted by the Resource Management 
Amendment Act 2005. 
2 Referred to as “permits” in the section. 
3 See T Tietenberg and L Lewis Environmental Economics and Policy (6th ed, Pearson Education 
Inc, Boston, 2010) at 29. 
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and Policies B2 (requiring councils to ensure their regional plans contain 
provisions for the efficient allocation of water) and B3 (requiring councils 
to ensure regional plans contain provision for the transfer of permits).  
Thus these policies require the on-going achievement of a desired 
outcome arguably with the expenditure of the lowest input with lowest 
possible technical inefficiency.  In terms of the outcomes of Policies B2 
and B3, this would suggest an ease of transferability to achieve the most 
economically efficient use of water resources persisting over time.  
4.2 Trends Towards an Easing of the Transfer of Water Permits. 
In point of fact, the old Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 contained a basic 
provision allowing the transfer of water permits to new owners or occupiers of the 
land to which the right was attached.4  The essence of the provision in section 136 
of the Resource Management Act 1991 is that the permits may only be transferred 
to another site within the same catchment and only if allowed by the regional 
plan, or a resource consent to do so is granted by the allocating authority.5  The 
problem was that not all regional plans allowed such a transfer, possibly because 
councils perceive a danger when such action can be completed without their 
involvement.6   
Both National Policy Statements requires every council to include criteria 
in its regional plan by which applications for approval of transfers of water take 
permits are to be decided.7  It can be confidently predicted councils will try to 
ensure they have some input into the transfer process.  Despite the Resource 
                                                 
 
4 Section 24A as inserted by s3 Water and Soil Conservation Amendment Act 1969. The permits 
are called “rights” under that Act.  Its effect was retrospective. 
5 Section 136 (2) (b) (i) and (ii). 
6 If such a provision is included in the regional plan, a simple notice to council is all that is 
required: section 136(3). See also The Favourite Limited v Vavasour [2005] NZRMA 461 at 
paragraph [30] (High Court) where Ellen France J described Council’s function as a “postbox”. 
7 Policy B3.  
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Management Act’s provision (at section 122) that resource consents are neither 
real nor personal property,8 the decision in Aoraki Water Trust v Meridian Energy 
Trust9 makes it clear that the holder of a resource consent has a right to use the 
resource attached to the consent and which accordingly has some value, in some 
cases not inconsiderable value, which in turn suggests the permit has some 
characteristics of property.10  A degree of confusion is inevitable but it is certain 
that there exists some form of legal privilege capable of being transferred – 
provided certain factors are conducive to the establishment of an expedient system 
of alienation.   
Memon and Skelton express the view that section 122 is designed to allay 
public concerns that water remain in the public domain and that ownership thereof 
should not be privatised.11  However it is the right of access to the water that is 
being transferred (not the ownership of the water itself); the benefit of the water 
itself is merely usufructuary in nature.  A Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 
Technical Paper drawing on overseas experience states: 
Much of the literature stresses the need for clear, enforceable property 
rights to water or ‘pure property rights to water’.  Development of 
such rights appears to be seen as the next important stage in the 
Australian government’s reform of water policy.  A number of 
principles for the implementation of effective property rights have 
been established.  These stipulate that water entitlements must be 
clearly specified in terms of: 
• Rights and conditions of ownership tenure 
• Share of the resource being allocated 
• Details of agreed standards or services to be delivered 
                                                 
 
8 Such a provision might arguably act to frustrate the provisions of section 136, that is to say 
transferees may lack confidence as to what they have purchased. 
9 Aoraki Water Trust v Meridian Energy Limited [2005] 2 NZLR 268. 
10 See also the provisions of section 122(2) and (3).  The question of property will be discussed in 
chapter 5. 
11 Memon A & Skelton P “Institutional Arrangements to Allocate Groundwater Resources in New 
Zealand: A Way Forward” (2007)11 NZ J Envtl L 241 at 258. 
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• Constraints on transferability 
• Constraints on resource use or access12 
 
The practical problem is that, despite the provisions of the Resource 
Management Act, water permits in New Zealand have been regarded as property 
of some kind by various interested parties from consent holders through to real 
estate agents, and the value attributed to them has been pragmatically 
amalgamated into the value of the land, despite the fact that the permits do not run 
with the land.  Although the renewal of a water permit is not guaranteed under the 
Resource Management Act, in practice up to now this has occurred as a matter of 
course, even though conditions may be reviewed.  The interested players argue a 
degree of certainty is essential to ensure continued confident investment in future 
planning.13 
There has been a continual debate on the issue of permit transfer from the 
time of the passing of the Act.  In a 1997 publication, the Ministry for the 
Environment identified several factors which are prerequisites for a transfer 
system to function effectively.14  First, there needs to be a fully allocated resource 
where demand exceeds supply, otherwise new permits would simply be issued to 
new applicants with no incentive to transfer existing permits either in whole or in 
part.  In the event there is no new water for new applicants, a competent system of 
re-allocation is of some consequence.   
Secondly, there needs to be sufficient technical knowledge about the 
resource availability and the environmental effects of its use to enable council to 
                                                 
 
12 Economic Efficiency of Water Allocation MAF Technical Paper 2001/7 at paragraph 3.3. 
13 Memon A & Skelton P “Institutional Arrangements to Allocate Groundwater Resources in New 
Zealand: A Way Forward” (2007)11 NZ J Envtl L 241 at 259.  
14 Resource Management Ideas.  No12 Transferable Permits-From Theory to Practice, at page 5. 
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set suitable restraints on consumption.15  Permit holders will have certainty as to 
how these restraints will affect them.   
Thirdly, there needs to be a policing system to monitor events with 
appropriate sanctions meted out to those who transgress permit conditions.  
Fourthly transaction costs need to be kept down so that the benefits (both private 
and community) exceed the total costs of the exchange ‒ the establishment and 
administration of a system would naturally involve certain amount of costs.  
Lastly, the system needs to be flexible and sufficiently diverse.   
Although implied in the above, Joseph Sax in the final conclusion to his 
New Zealand paper advises that the system must also be simple.  A Byzantine 
scheme or indeed even one similar to the current resource application process 
would be self-defeating – “If your system generates a lot of work for water 
lawyers, you have already failed,” 16 – a complicated transfer process increases 
transaction costs, sometimes substantially as well as creating delay.  A technical 
report (that is to say not Government policy) from the Ministries for the 
Environment and Agriculture and Fisheries in 2004 identified certain benefits 
derived from a trading system: 
Enhancing the transferability of water permits would potentially lead 
to an improved overall system of water allocation and use.  To the 
extent that trading facilitates the reallocation of water resources, the 
first-in first-served approach to making initial allocations would be of 
less concern.  Similarly, where initial administrative allocations turn 
out not to be to the highest valued use, trading potentially allows this 
to be corrected over time reducing the need for councils to review 
allocations.  In turn this would potentially provide greater certainty 
for investors, with reviews of allocations primarily driven by 
environmental factors rather than the need to provide for other uses.  
                                                 
 
15 Councils have this responsibility under section 30 (1) (e) of the Resource Management Act. 
16 J Sax “Our Precious Water Resources: Learning From the Past, Securing the Future” [2009] RM 
Theory and Practice 30 at 51. 
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The emergence of a price for water would also provide incentives for 
technical efficiency in use.17 
 
Regional councils are generally cautiously supportive of a transfer system 
but some have up to now shown a degree of reluctance to the establishment of one 
within their borders.  As stated this may be due in part to their lack of confidence 
in their ability to maintain control of the transfer process, but also due to the fact 
that such a system may be unpopular and may be politically suspect.  The 
Northland Regional Council review of its Regional Policy Statement for example 
probably sums up the fears held by some residents.  The discussion document of 
October 201018 promotes the notion that the 2005 amendment to section 136 of 
the Act to encourage and facilitate the transfer of water permits – temporarily or 
permanently – would promote more efficient use of water by freeing up unused or 
unwanted allocations.19   
The Discussion Paper however also articulates the concerns of many 
submissions received which were against such a scheme:  
The majority of submitters oppose the transfer of water permits via 
market forces.  They feel that water is a “common” resource and the 
ability to transfer water permits will effectively privatise it – they 
support the idea of communities determining what the best use of 
water is.20 
 
                                                 
 
17 Water Programme of Action- Water Allocation and Use (2004b) MfE 561 paragraph 10.9.2. 
18 Northern Regional Council New Regional Policy Statement  Discussion Document 2010. 
19 In some cases catchments are over-allocated but do not experience problems because some 
permit holders do not extract their full entitlement.  Therefore it is important to take into account 
those matters referred to in section 30 (1) (i) and (ii).  Policies will need to be introduced to 
ameliorate the problem of over-allocated resources. See Report of the Land and Water Forum, 
September 2010, paragraph 142, and Policy B5 and B6 National Policy Statement Freshwater 
Management, May 2011, and July 2014, which have virtually identical provisions. 
20 Northland Regional Council New Regional Policy Statement Discussion Document 2010 at 71.  
96 
 
The Technical Report 21  identifies problems as well, notably negative 
public perception of such a scheme as well as the management of potential 
environmental impacts.22  Councils have an obligation under section 30(1) (e) of 
the Act to control water flow and levels ((reinforced by Policy Bl of both National 
Policy Statements for Freshwater Management) but not all have managed to 
achieve this outcome due to lack of facilities.  To environmental impacts must be 
added social and cultural matters.  Further the nature and duration of consents are 
other matters needing to be addressed.  Clearly, the “take” and “use” components 
of the permit will need to be separated to enable the transfer system to properly 
function; and, from investors’ perspectives, the longer the duration of the permit 
the better. Memon and Skelton also suggest that restrictions on councils’ power to 
review conditions would add to the security of the investment undertaking. 23  
Splitting permits in this way and restricting councils’ powers are clearly beyond 
the current parameters of the Act. 
In any event, obviously, there is the need for change to accommodate the 
provisions of the National Policy Statements on water, 24 especially Policy B3 
which has the same provision in both Statements, and which took effect on the 1st 
July 2011.  This requires every Council to include provisions for the transfer of 
water permits in their regional plans.  One commentator has suggested the 
National Policy Statement may not be as staunch as might be supposed at first 
blush.   
Philip Milne suggests that although a regional plan must give effect to the 
National Policy Statement, this would be subject to Part 2 of the Resource 
                                                 
 
21 Supra, at note 17. 
22 Meticulously also identifying the interests of lessors. 
23 Memon A & Skelton P “Institutional Arrangements to Allocate Groundwater Resources in New 
Zealand: A Way Forward” (2007)11 NZ J Envtl L 241 at 260. 
24 See section 55 Resource Management Act whereby councils are obliged to give effect to such 
Statements.   
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Management Act, and if inconsistent then part 2 would prevail. 25  This may not 
be the case however because the effect would be to allow councils to cherry-pick 
elements from the Statement for inclusion into their Plans, and decline to 
implement others.  This is unlikely to be the case. 
Notwithstanding this possible outcome, the amendment process must be 
complete by the end of December 2030.  While the Resource Management Act 
devolves to the regions the task of managing local resources, in the case of 
nationally significant issues central government will give direction to local 
councils for the making resource management decisions.26  Councils are stuck 
with this process irrespective of submissions made to them by their ratepayers.   
It is notable that, in a survey prepared for the Ministry for the Environment 
in 2001,27 the authors identified several factors bothering a minority of those 
interviewed.  While three-quarters of those questioned generally supported the 
idea that water rights should be able to be transferred between properties, the rest 
presented a cocktail of differing concerns including a philosophical aversion to 
paying for a natural resource, anxiety that the system would increase the use of 
the resource thereby putting its reliability at risk, a simple lack of altruism, 
unfamiliarity, a lack of confidence that the market would find players, a belief that 
the current transfer system indicates that the price has gone too high, and a lack of 
confidence that the system would be fair.28  These individuals will need to adopt 
                                                 
 
25 Milne, P. “The NPS on Freshwater Management: What will it mean in Practice?” (November 
2011) RMJ 13 at 16.  
26 The Minister for the Environment actually has wide powers under Part IV of the Resource 
Management Act. 
27 Ministry for the Environment Attitudes and Barriers to Water Trading, Lincoln Environmental 
Report 4464/1 December 2001 (TR 115). 
28 Ibid, at 13. 
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the same confidence that the Parliament has in acknowledging that the allocating 
authorities will be able to devise a means to implement Policy B3. 29   
More significantly however, slightly less than eighty per cent of 
interviewees indicated their support for the notion of temporary transfers of water 
permits – almost half identifying as lessee rather than lessor – although the 
number supporting the notion of permanent transfers were somewhat lower, at just 
under sixty per cent.30   
4.3 The Need for Infrastructure. 
Of critical importance is investment in water infrastructure, both storage and 
delivery.31   Storage of water has the potential to resolve a number of issues 
relating to permit transfer.  It would allow temporal as well as spatial transfers, 
and also generating a certain confidence in supply,32 and, by extension, in the 
system itself.  The National Infrastructure Unit has identified some other 
important benefits.33  
In addition to smoothing the variability of supply, water storage and 
delivery systems would enable exporters to take exploit higher-value markets that 
require a reliable supply of high-quality products, as well as helping New Zealand 
deal with the straits of climate change.  The Property Council of New Zealand at 
its 2011 National Conference (held in Australia) suggested New Zealand needed 
                                                 
 
29 Both National Policy Statements for Freshwater Management Implementation Guides include 
direction to Councils in giving effect to the Policies contained in the Statements. 
30 The main reason was the belief that the land was probably dependent on a supply of water for its 
utility. 
31  The small size generally of New Zealand’s catchments is an unfavourable element, and 
infrastructure expenditure is inevitable for an effective market system to flourish.  Water 
infrastructure is dramatically expensive. 
32 Ministry for the Environment Attitudes and Barriers to Water Trading, Lincoln Environmental 
Report 4464/1 December 2001 p 39. (TR 115) 




to spend one billion dollars funding water supply, treatment, and management 
issues.34 The New Zealand Infrastructure Unit is committed to annual reports on 
progress on the 2011 National Infrastructure Plan.  This body reports on a number 
of core infrastructure matters including “productive” or “rural” water.35 
The Government is obviously cognizant of the need for infrastructure 
expenditure.  The first Report of the Land and Water Forum identifies this as one 
plank in its raft of reform suggestions.  Provided planning and construction is 
done correctly, the Report states that rural water infrastructure will allow for 
greater crop diversity as well as reducing pressure on river flows and the amount 
of water per hectare required to be irrigated due to greater efficiency.36  The 
consenting process will need to be reviewed to enable incentives to be built into 
the process that give clear signals to proponents of large water schemes about the 
collaborative behaviour and capabilities that are required, and to favour consent 
applicants who collaborate with each other.37  Similarly the term of consents 
should be reviewed, as their duration can affect investment certainty.38   
Certain strong signals have come from the Government about its intention 
to make the transfer of water consents more usual and accepted than is currently 
the case.  In addition to its initiative in the National Policy Statement for 
Freshwater Management, important indications were contained in the Budget of 
2011.  This Budget announced the government’s commitment to an expanded 
irrigation fund to support the development of new water harvesting, storage, and 
                                                 
 
34  The Property Council of New Zealand National Conference Proceedings (2011) 
www.propertynz.co.nz/files/Events/John%20Rae.pdf. 
35  See National Infrastructure Unit “Infrastructure 2013” (2013) National Infrastructure Unit 
<www.infrastructure.govt.nz/plan/2011implementation/2013report/nsir-oct13>.  
36 Land and Water Forum. 2010. First Report of the Land and Water Forum: A Fresh Start for 
Fresh Water para 151. 
37 Ibid, at para 155. 
38 Ibid, at para 163. 
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distribution infrastructure. 39   In preparation for the Budget, the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Fisheries commissioned the New Zealand Institute of Economic 
Research to estimate the economic impacts of increasing irrigation in Canterbury, 
Wairarapa, Waimea, and Hawkes Bay by a total of 347,000 hectares.40   
This is a significant area and would increase the total area of irrigated land 
in New Zealand to over 900,000 hectares.41  Dams and delivery systems will 
require an equally significant capital outlay.  The Report is predicated on the New 
Zealand Infrastructure Plan (2010) which identifies infrastructure policy as being 
focused on productivity and employment growth.  The conclusion the Institute 
arrived at is that by 2035, irrigation could increase agricultural exports by 2026 by 
$4 billion per annum in 2010 terms that is to say inflation and price increases 
excluded.  The Institute’s report formed the basis of a Ministry of Agriculture 
paper to the Cabinet Economic Growth and Infrastructure Committee on 11th 
March 2011. 
The Institute’s Report recognises these regional-scale schemes will cost 
about $9 billion 42  requiring private-sector finance, probably from multiple 
investors and a suitable return on investment.  Developments of this nature are 
largely an unknown quantity in New Zealand and will require a new business 
model.  High standards of commercial governance will be required and return on 
investment will need to be shared by both irrigating farmers and infrastructure 
investors.  The risks will probably need to be underwritten by local or more likely 
central government.  Importantly, the risks of this type of investment are not yet 
clearly understood by financial markets, and, until they are, a factored-in risk 
                                                 
 
39 This had been discussed in MAF Technical Paper 2001/7, at paragraph 3, page 11. (See note 12 
supra). 
40 NZEIR The Economic Impact of Increased Irrigation Final Report to Ministry of Agriculture 
and Fisheries 9 November 2010 at para [44]. 
41 Ibid, at para 22 and para 44. 
42 Including on-farm costs (See para 4). 
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assessment might challenge the viability of the schemes. However, the potential 
gains are such that the government has committed itself to the programme.   
Accordingly the Budget announcement in 2011 confirmed the government 
will allocate $35 million over 5 years for the Irrigation Acceleration Fund to 
support the development of irrigation infrastructure proposals to the ‘investment-
ready’ prospectus stage.  The second stage of government involvement entails a 
state investment of up to $400 million ‘seed money’ of equity in the construction 
of regional-scale schemes to encourage third-party investment.43  The Crown will 
be a minority partner, but its involvement will give the schemes a much needed 
official blessing.  The Budgets of 2013 provided $80 million, 2014 $40 million, 
and 2015 a further $25 million.  Overall however, the combination of the National 
Policy Statement for Freshwater relating to instruction to regional councils over 
permit transfers and the government commitment to infrastructure announced in 
the 2011 Budget suggests strongly that the government is viewing the notion of 
water permit transfers ‒ and by extension some species of a market system ‒ with 
a definite degree of anticipation.  Importantly, climate change science is telling 
humankind as a species to prepare for climate extremes such as droughts and 
water projects of the type envisioned by the Government will be of critical 
importance in the short- to medium-term future. 
4.3.1 The Opuha Dam 
There are already a number of small private irrigation schemes operating in New 
Zealand.  The Community Irrigation Fund was established in 2008 and supplied 
funds for several projects.  This Fund has now been incorporated in the 
Accelerated Irrigation Fund, established in 2011, and has continued to fund 
community schemes.  Arguably one of the most successful is the Opuha Dam 
                                                 
 
43 Provision has also been made for the endowment of $15 million for waterway clean-up. 
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scheme commenced in 1995 and operated by Opuha Water Limited. This 
initiative supplies not only water for irrigation, but also commercial and domestic 
water for the Timaru District Council, and in addition has its own 7.4 megawatt 
hydro-electric scheme.44  In terms of its irrigation scheme, the project provides 
support for some 16,000 hectares for the irrigation season which is September to 
April.  The project is currently working towards an Audited Self-Management 
system, that is to say some of the responsibilities of the Canterbury Regional 
Council are delegated to the company under agreed terms.  The thinking is that a 
lower compliance burden can be achieved as well as better adaptive water 
management utilising local knowledge, rather than suffering the imposition of a 
“top-down” regulatory approach (this can be seen in terms of a transaction- cost 
discourse).  Opuha Water Limited holds a number of consents to dam and 
discharge supplied water from Lake Opuha.  Each individual shareholder however 
is required to have a water permit issued by the Canterbury Regional Council to 
take and use this water and this amount corresponds with the shareholding water 
allocation.  The shareholders may sell their shares permanently (for example with 
farm sales), or lease them on a medium-term basis (for instance an irrigation 
season), or short-term ‒ weekly or monthly.  Both sellers and buyers simply 
register their interest with the administrator, and the parties negotiate between 
themselves the price and amount of water to be transacted.  
There are a number of identifiable factors impelling the success of the 
Opuha project.  Lange, Winstanley, and Wood have identified several.45  First, 
there is the matter of certainty of access any stored water.  Shareholders have their 
access continuously recorded so they know exactly how much of their allocation 
they have left at any point in time.  Consequently, farmers are able to decide 
                                                 
 
44 Contracted out to TrustPower as from the 1st November 2011.  The contract was previously held 
by Contact Energy. 
45 Lange, Winstanley, and Wood Water Transfers in Practice – Some Issues Revealed. Institute of 
Environmental Science and Research Limited (2006). 
103 
 
whether they have water to trade, or whether they need access to more water.  
This is a very strong incentive to trade.46   
The second factor is a corollary of the first – a revelation that water has an 
economic value, thus having an effect on trading decisions.  Although a 
contentious issue, there is no denying that the value of the shares has increased.47  
Concomitantly the value of the irrigated land has increased as well.   
Thirdly, the authors identify the degree of enhanced economic activity in 
the area.  This includes not only a return on investment of the shareholders, but 
also a significant increment in crop production resulting in the establishment of 
processing factories at Timaru and continuing contracts for farmers.  Commerce 
such as dairy, lamb, grain, and seed industries also benefit.   
Fourthly, since the scheme was set up, there have been changes to the river 
management regimes.  Minimum flows have been imposed on the Tengawai 
River, and farmers who have rights to take water from that river are sometimes 
compromised because the flows are too low for extraction to occur.  The trading 
system is a simple one, in contrast to the transfer system within the Resource 
Management Act and has the potential to compensate these farmers who can 
transact with others further down the catchment not affected by the same 
restrictions.   
Fifthly, the scheme is blessed with a simple administration system. The 
administrator (Hubbard, Churcher & Co., Timaru) collects all relevant 
                                                 
 
46 Each share irrigates 4 hectares providing 1000 cubic metres per week for the irrigation season.  
The total volume per season is 22,500 cubic metres per share at a flow rate of 1.6534 litres per 
second. 
47 The shares initially cost $250, but are currently trading for $5,000. See “Opuha Water Limited 




information,48  and keeps a list of those wanting to trade and those wanting access.  
The project also has its own website.   
Lastly, the authors recognise that the system is self-policing.  Stock-piling 
of water allocations is unlikely because users have to pay eighty per cent of the 
water charges irrespective of whether they use the water or not, and in any event 
the shareholders are all bona fide farmers.  Anyone trying to speculate would very 
quickly be identified by those concerned. 
The authors also identify factors working against a transfer system.  Apart 
from geographical restrictions and regional council regulatory constraints,49 the 
main barrier is an attitudinal one.  Water trading is not common in New Zealand 
yet,50 and there is the reasonable perception that permanent transfer could result in 
a loss of access to water, thus possibly affecting production and thereby reducing 
the value of the relevant land.  Temporary transfers are more common.51  Some 
Maori, and, indeed, some Europeans, have a belief that water trading is wrong in 
principle,52 and some members of the general community believe that economic 
efficiency is not the most important criterion.   
It has to be noted, however, that anecdotal evidence suggests the trout and 
salmon fishery in the Opuha River and Opuha Lake is greatly improved, greater 
flows have resulted in fewer river mouth closures, and the lake has provided 
recreational opportunities.53  The authors note that while at the shareholders’ end 
of the bureaucracy the system might seem simple and straightforward, in fact it is 
                                                 
 
48 For instance, hydrological information, security of supply, characteristics of rights to be traded. 
49 Somewhat ameliorated by the Audited Self-Management process.  The “audited” component is 
important. 
50 However, there are a number of water brokers established, for example Hydrotrader Limited. 
51 Around 600 in the year 2011 (per T. McCormick, CEO 25/11/11). 
52 Iwi generally hold a contentious view that ownership of water resources rests with them. 
53 Opuha Dam Ex Post Study, August 2006 (Ministry of Economic Development through Aoraki 
Development Trust) 41-42. 
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relatively complex.  Of course there is the added issue of equity in terms of 
distributive justice.  In the case of Opuha, the processes used to engage members 
of the community were extensive, and successful.54  However the decision to 
invest would be made in many instances in the absence of either experience in 
water matters, or funds, and these affected farmers have been excluded from that 
water market process. 
4.4 Tradable Permits as Economic Instruments. 
Although this research is not an economics discourse, some analysis needs to be 
made of the marketing of water rights.  Markets are used for distributing and re-
distributing both natural resources and produced goods.  It is crucial however that 
the commodity being marketed be clearly identified by the players.  Knowledge of 
what is being traded is the only real requirement: the parties do not even have to 
meet.  
The Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development55 stated (in 
the Fourth Principle) that water had an economic value and should be recognised 
as an economic good.  This statement probably proclaimed a universal 
understanding – water has been seen in economic terms as having a value for 
some centuries – but the controversy of the statement came from its view of water 
in naked economic terms, rather than in terms of a universal human right.56  The 
Principle is probably not yet universally accepted, but the de facto position is 
quite clear, and that is water is seen as an economic good, and therefore it does 
                                                 
 
54 Lange, M Equity and Fairness in Water Resource Allocation and Management Water and 
Health <www.esr.cri.nz/site/Collection/Documents/ESR/PDF/SocialScience/Water and 
HealthIssue 35.pdf>, at p3. 
55 International Conference on Water and the Environment Ireland January 1994. 
56 But see UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. General Comment No 15 




actually have some sort of value, as opposed to both cost and price, and the 
distinction is vital.  The value of water is described in the following illustration:  
 
Figure 2: P Rogers, R de Silva, and R Bhatia “Water as an Economic Good: How to use prices to Promote 




The full value of water can thus be seen as the total of both ecological and 
economic worth.  Cost on the other hand is a wholly disparate (economic) 
discourse: 
 
Figure 3: P Rogers, R de Silva, and R Bhatia “Water as an Economic Good: How to use prices to Promote 
Equity, Efficiency, and Sustainability” Water Policy 4 (2002) 1 at 3. 
 
The cost of water can be seen as the total amount of all resources 
expended in producing goods and services.  Both value and cost are entirely 
different from price.  Price is a matter determined by cost but not solely so, as it 
reflects a fluid discrepancy between supply and demand.  Contemporary 
economic theory informs us that decentralised environmental economic 
instruments provide the flexibility to change quickly to certain market conditions 
108 
 
as well as provide the incentive to the parties to respond cost-effectively to 
government objectives:   
... used properly, [economic instruments] are ruthlessly neutral, 
relatively immune to special pleading, costly to avoid, and effective in 
inducing private economic agents to change their accustomed 
behaviour.57 
 
Although environmental economic instruments are largely utilised to 
mitigate pollution effects,58 they can also be used in a quasi-regulatory capacity to 
reallocate certain (in our case water) command and control consents in the form of 
tradable permits. Tradable water permits are actually more accurately described as 
legal instruments, albeit cross-dressed as economic instruments.  They are legal 
instruments in that they describe some contractual relationship or create some 
rights and obligations between the parties, but display the ambition to be 
economic instruments because they have the potential to achieve environmental 
policy goals. They achieve this by modifying the behaviour of the parties through 
market signals rather than explicit prescriptions, with an intended consequential 
improvement in the quality of environmental activities.   
In the case of water permits, markets will allow the redistribution of 
already allocated water both used and unused with the potential to conserve the 
water supply at source.  In the event that allocating authorities issue minimum 
flows and water levels (which they are required to do), a cap on the supply will 
create some scarcity as it is possible more water will be unavailable for extraction.  
Such a redistribution is a matter of sustainability, but it will also free up the 
resource for the possible use by others, thus contributing to economic growth.  
Classic economic theory suggests the system will inspire a transfer of entitlement 
                                                 
 
57 Bertram G “Economic Instruments and Environmental Policy in New Zealand” (Paper presented 
to Resource Management Law Association Annual Conference Wellington October 1994). 
58 Thus giving voice to clause 16 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 
(in short: polluter pays). 
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(in whole or in part; permanently or temporarily) and result in a shift towards 
more efficient use by others who value the water more than the transferor.  The 
self-interest carrot is a more effective model than the command and control stick 
of traditional methods in achieving efficiency.  
More importantly, both parties come to realise that as a result of the 
market transaction, the subject matter, water ‒ or more accurately access to the 
water ‒ has a certain price,59 and accordingly both will value it more, 60 which 
could in turn mean that both parties will come to recognise there is value in the 
natural environment, as well as being an exercise in pragmatism, that is to say the 
exercise may teach the parties to conserve the environment for monetary, not just 
ecological reasons.  It has to be acknowledged that historically there has been a 
certain tension between market forces and environmental protection.  However: 
Among the more enlightened participants in the environmental policy 
process the air of confrontation and conflict has now begun to recede 
in many parts of the world.  Leading environmental groups and 
regulators have come to realise that the power of the market can be 
harnessed and channelled towards the achievement of environmental 
goals, through an economic incentives approach to regulation.61 
 
The flexibility of the market system may result in the achievement of 
environmental goals at a lower cost.  The efficacy of environmental economic 
instruments then is really a combination of both economic efficiency and 
environmental effectiveness.  Economic efficiency combined with effective 
environmental practices will also arguably result in sustainable development, with 
the possible addition of deference to social responsibility. 
                                                 
 
59 Such a view may likely encourage investment in water storage. 
60 Some environmentalists eschew the notion of placing a monetary value on the environment. 
61 Tietenberg T “Economic Instruments for Environmental Regulation” (1990) 6 Oxford Review 
of Economic Policy 17 at 17.  
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Sinner and Salmon make the further point that under the traditional system 
councils have faced some difficult water allocation decisions: 
Logic might suggest [allocated limits] should be no more than 100% 
of the available flow in excess of that needed to maintain in-stream 
values in a river, or up to 100% of the rate of replenishment of a 
groundwater resource.  But because different users need water at 
different times, 100% allocation usually means that some available 
flow goes unused.  For this reason, among others, some resources are 
“over-allocated”, e.g. to 130%, but if councils enforce minimum flow 
regimes, over-allocation reduces the security of supply of those who 
have water permits, especially if users expand production or otherwise 
make more complete use of their allocated amounts. 62 
 
Economic instruments in the form of tradable water permits have the 
potential to obviate this problem.  If councils allocate to 100% of the available 
resource, any water not being used during any particular interval can be traded to 
those who need it at the time.  This potentially reduces the need to over-allocate 
the resource to take full advantage of all available water.  
As noted, the traditional regulatory approach of environmental protection 
and decentralised economic market instruments are not really alternatives because 
regulations and prices may complement each other.  The normative model will 
have a regulatory agency ascertain allocative levels.  There is of course the 
polemics of the hoary debate as to whether these levels reflect biocentric or 
anthropocentric values, but from an economist’s point of view, the regulator 
should balance the marginal costs and the marginal benefits of more rigorous 
environmental protection.  The result however has to be politically realistic. 
Permits are distributed according to set principles, but these principles may be set 
in a variety of ways.  From the point of view of circulation, though, the market 
                                                 
 
62 J Sinner and G Salmon “Creating Economic Incentives for Sustainable Development” Report to 
the New Zealand Business Council for Sustainable Development November 2003 at 24. 
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will reallocate those permits.  In equilibrium the price will reflect the marginal 
willingness to pay for a marginal extractive right.   
Importantly, from the viewpoint of the objective of dynamic efficiency (that 
is to say. a balance of short term and long term goals contained in the National 
Policy Statement for Freshwater Management), such efficiency may be achieved 
by reducing depletion (and therefore costs) by investment in techniques and 
technologies that reduce water consumption.  A charge (say, by way of a premium 
paid for extraction paid on an increasing scale) pursuant to Pigou’s Theory63 may 
produce dynamic efficiency as well, but the difference is in the equilibrium: it is a 
governmental agency that sets the charge, and this charge may set an excess of 
either supply or demand, depending on the level set, but the charge will need to be 
set over and over, as the ideal level will be a moving target.  The calculus needed 
to set (and collect) the charges will probably be extremely complicated and will 
need to rely on accurate information collected centrally ‒ a cost-benefit analysis 
will identify a reasonable target quantity to balance environmental against other 
interests.   
In terms of sustainability, the regulator should balance the marginal cost of 
more environmental protection against the marginal benefit of more 
environmental protection; and, in terms of efficiency, then, a Pigouvian system is 
extremely poor.  In terms of environmental policy though, the major difference 
between marketable permits and charges is seen in terms of distributive justice.   
The ethical arguments prompted by competing claims for natural resources 
are an on-going and a significant source of controversy.  In purely economic 
dialectics, however, Coase Theory propounds that initial distribution like a first-
in-first-served model has little if any ultimate effect on efficiency (provided there 
                                                 
 
63 See generally AC Pigou The Economics of Welfare (Macmillan, London, 1920). 
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are sufficiently low transaction costs), but rather such initial assignment is only a 
simple distribution of wealth in the form of natural resources.  Those initial 
allocations may, of course, be re-allocated by the market to any highest bidder. 
4.5 Lessons from the American and Canadian Scallop Fisheries. 
The differences between regulated and rights-based systems are starkly focussed 
by an interesting comparative study into the American and Canadian scallop 
fisheries conducted by Robert Repetto in 2001.64  This is a particularly apposite 
study as, prior to the Hague Line being drawn across George’s Bank by the 
International Court of Justice in 1984, both countries had open access to and 
competed for the same scallop resource with the result that the fishery became 
dangerously overfished by largely inefficient harvesting techniques.  Following 
the drawing of the Hague Line, 65  each country has fished its own area of 
influence, but using different management techniques.  The United States 
continued with a regulatory approach, whereas Canada adopted a rights-based 
transferable quota system in 1986.  The comparison is particularly appropriate as 
scallops are not migratory, and both countries use similar harvesting techniques.   
Further, as the author states, although some Canadians and Americans might 
disagree, there are not large differences in cultural background, legal traditions, or 
fishing histories of the two countries.  It is therefore an entirely empirical study 
and it is quite reasonable to infer that the differences come about due to 
differences in management.  The two fisheries have been subsequently compared 
by collecting biological and economic data pertaining to each one for periods 
before and after the Canadians adopted their transferable quota system in 1986.66  
Biologically, the Canadians have managed to maintain their stock at a higher level 
                                                 
 
64 R Repetto “A Natural Experiment in Fisheries Management” (2001) Marine Policy 251-264. 
65 Repetto broadly suggests a comparison with the 38th parallel and the vivid differences between 
the (regulated) North Korean and the (free-market) South Korean economies.  
66 Prior to that, the Canadians operated a command and control system also. 
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of abundance, closer to the levels consistent with the maximum biological and 
economic yields.  They have also managed to avoid the taking of under-sized 
scallops.  By contrast, before the scallop grounds were closed to harvesting the 
Americans suffered substantially higher rates of exploitation, even of under-sized 
scallops, and led to lower levels of stock abundance, far below those consistent 
with optimum yield.   
Economically there is a stark difference in both static and dynamic 
efficiency.  In the United States, the size of the (already bloated) fleet remained 
virtually the same due to restrictions on licensees’ ability to stack multiple 
licences onto a single vessel, and a regulated reduction in the allowable number of 
days at sea have impinged heavily on those operators who would have fished their 
vessels more intensively.  The Canadians, on the other hand, have managed to 
reduce the size of their fleet significantly, with a steady reduction in the number 
of days spent at sea. The Canadians have managed to significantly increase 
revenue per sea-day due mostly by a sevenfold increase in catch due to an 
improvement in stock numbers.  The revenue in the United States fell sharply due 
to reduced stock numbers, and taking of undersized scallops.   
In terms of dynamic efficiency, the Canadian industry invested in larger 
more modern boats, as well as investing voluntarily in a government research 
programme.  The Americans, on the other hand, have resorted to complaints that 
the government research programme has underestimated the scallop population by 
missing dense populations, and have lobbied to have the permissible catch 
increased.  At the time of writing [2001] 65% of the Canadian quota remained in 
original hands, suggesting smaller operators have not been at a significant 
competitive disadvantage, or that a rights-based regime necessarily results in 
monopolization of the industry.  Because the entitlement is valuable, the 
transferable entitlement commands a price.  Those with quotas but with high cost-
structures possibly find it more profitable to sell their quotas to others, rather than 
utilizing them.  Those with lower cost-structures can take on more quotas and still 
make a profit. The market system makes all this possible. 
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4.6 The New Zealand Fisheries Quota System. 
New Zealand has a current example of economic instruments used as tradable 
permits in the form of its own fisheries quota management system and lessons for 
a water market system may be gleaned from this.  Although the system has its 
drawbacks, it is generally acknowledged to work reasonably well and was 
introduced in October 1987.  Although obviously not unique to New Zealand, 
ours is actually the world’s largest application of an individual transferable quota 
system.   
Historically, it became clear by the early 1980s that the generally-held 
belief that the oceans were teeming with fish unaffected by harvesting was quite 
incorrect. The sustainability of the industry was a risk.  The main problem was 
that the fisheries (both inshore and deep water) were held in common ownership 
where nobody has ownership of the fish until after they were caught (similar to 
the situation with water).  The imperative therefore was to catch as many fish as 
possible before they were harvested by another boat, an example of Hardin’s 
theory of the Tragedy of the Commons.  
Traditionally, the fishing industry was controlled by regulation – that is to 
say fishing methods (nets, tackle etc.), the number of boats, and limiting the 
season.67  A change in approach resulted in the introduction of a scheme in the 
form of the quota management system that rather controlled how much fish (in 
tonnes) were to be caught.68  This system relies on a blend of regulation and 
market performance, as it should.  Each year the Minister of Fisheries gathers 
information to set the Total Allowable Commercial Catch for a particular species 
for each year and from year to year, allowances being made for non-commercial 
                                                 
 
67 The Law of Unintended Consequences meant that by limiting the length of the season, boats 
were obliged economically to head to sea irrespective of conditions thereby compromising safety. 
68 It is worth noting when it became known a quota system based on catch history was to be 
introduced, fishing activity increased markedly. 
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activity such as recreational and customary uses. The total represents the amounts 
of fish quota owners are allowed to catch of a particular species each year and is 
expressed in tonnes, which can vary from year to year. In each year quota owners 
are assigned an annual catch entitlement calculated both on the share of the total 
quota they hold and the total annual commercial catch.  Once the total annual 
catch for any year is known, the kilogramme equivalent of each quota share is 
calculated and transferred to the quota owner on the first day of each fishing year 
as an annual catch entitlement.  This establishes the tonnage of fish that the quota 
owner is able to catch within the next fishing year.  Both individual quotas and 
annual catch entitlements are definite property with defined rights which attract a 
price and may be mortgaged, transferred either permanently or temporarily, or 
gifted under the Fisheries Act 1996, and a register of both quota and annual catch 
entitlements is kept by the Ministry for Primary Industries.69  Trade is facilitated 
by newspaper and magazine advertisements, as well as the services of brokers.  
The Fisheries Act (which is continually amended) limits how much quota any one 
person or company may hold,70 in order to avoid a monopoly by any one holder 
for any one area or of any one species.  Such a system could quite feasibly be 
adapted to assist in water market activity.   
That is not to say that the New Zealand fishery is without its problems.  
There are some difficulties with the Quota Management System including legal 
disputes and there is not always total agreement about the level of the Maximum 
Sustainable Yield (there are particularly problems with the Orange Roughy stock).  
Management of individual species may not have regard for the welfare of others.  
However, the marketing of quotas is working reasonably well despite the fact that 
the property right in the quota is not a classic property right because it represents 
                                                 
 
69 See Part 8 Fisheries Act 1996. 
70 See Fisheries Act 1996, section 59, and 5th Schedule.  Generally quotas are owned by New 
Zealanders, but exemptions are now available to enable some foreign companies to own both 
quota and annual catch entitlements. 
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only a share in the total allowable catch and does not provide an exclusive right 
(that is to say the exclusion of others) to the fish.  Traders understand the nature of 
what they are transacting, and that it is possible the Minister may set the allowable 
tonnage for any species at zero at any stage for the common good ‒ thus rendering 
the property right inactive.  In the case of water, trading in permits will occur if 
the nature of what is being traded is generally understood.  Farmers especially 
would recognise the need to give a “hair cut” to a right in times of water shortage.  
Immediately following the introduction of the transferable quota system in 
New Zealand there was a flurry of market activity during which the sum of the 
transactions was greater than the total amount of quota allocated.71   The logical 
inference is that some quota must have been sold or leased a number of times 
during the first few years.72   A further logical inference is that less efficient 
operators may have left the industry making it more efficient overall.  From an 
overseas perspective an American study73 of our system has concluded: 
Whether market-based instruments are being applied to fish, 
pollution, or other resource problems, the ability of firms to buy and 
sell quotas in a well-functioning market is necessary for achieving 
efficiency gains.  In practice, one might worry that these markets may 
be thin or plagued with information problems…  
We typically observe both a sufficient number of market participants 
and high enough levels of market activity to support a competitive 
quota market [in New Zealand].  The level of activity has risen 
steadily over the years, consistent with the notion that the 
development of these markets takes time.74 
 
                                                 
 
71 Lock K and Leslie S “New Zealand’s Quota Management System: A History of the First 20 
Years” (2007) Motu Working Paper 07-02 Motu Economic and Public Research 24. 
72 See Allocation, Trade and Holding of Quota, chapter 3 <www.fish.govt.nz/.../qms_chapter_03>.  
73 Newell R, Sanchirico J, and Kerr S “Fishing Quota Markets” (2002) Resources for the Future 
<ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/10451/1dpo2oo2o.pdf> 31-32. 
74 The authors further note that there are some markets with few transactions but these tend to be 
economically and ecologically unimportant (p 32). 
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The lesson from both our own and the Canadian experience would suggest 
that, given robust parameters (for example property-right structures that are 
clearly and unequivocally defined), trading in economic instruments works well in 
(re)-allocating resources, and responds vigorously and effectively to market 
conditions.  The aim of the fisheries model is to ensure fish stocks do not become 
exhausted.  The same applies to water markets: this chapter demonstrates they can 
provide a valid mechanism to divide water rights as far as practicable, initially for 
the benefit of vendor and purchaser but ultimately for the benefit of the whole 
community as well as the environment.  In the case of water, rigorously 
maintained minimum water levels and flows would be crucial and the market 
system would need to operate around these limitations.   
Private property rights are a legitimate implement in managing environmental 
degeneration.  Given the fisheries model was cobbled from scratch in New 
Zealand, a similar water model is indeed a distinct possibility.  As always, the 
Devil is in the detail and the question is how a market for water permits might 




5 Chapter 5. 
5.1 The Place for Water Markets 
5.1.1 The Importance of Economics 
The previous chapter established that both the Land and Water Forum and the 
New Zealand government would like active water markets to be established in 
New Zealand and that there are clear benefits both economically and 
environmentally from doing so.  It is appropriate now to look at water markets in 
some detail.   
Water markets have been functioning in the western states of the United 
States of America virtually from the outset of western settlement.  The nature of 
the water rights is clearly understood, as is the market process. If New Zealand 
were to introduce tradable water permits in the form of property rights, some 
discussion about a market system is necessary.  This research is not an economics 
dialogue, but economic ideas are as important in any discussion of a market 
system as are legal concepts.  The two complement each other.  There are two 
basic concepts of water re-allocation – reallocation through a purely 
administrative system (of whatever type), or reallocation through a market system.  
A market system would rely on a legal framework to administer the economically-
based decisions of the participants.  Once tradable permits are introduced, the 
question is how the alienation of them can be transacted.  This and the next 
chapter will examine the special case of water markets. 
There are essentially two main types of administrative solutions: 
administrative control of quantity issued to applicants (including perhaps the 
specification both of the time and purpose of extraction), and the administrative 
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control of prices (including a tiered approach to pricing).1  There are problems 
with both of these administrative solutions. The former might enlarge, rather than 
contract, the bureaucratic machinery, thereby having the potential to create 
considerable transaction costs,2 and expand the role and influence of government.  
Further, bureaucrats are largely sheltered from the economic consequences of 
their actions.  Further still, the bureaucracy is unlikely to have all the relative 
current information necessary to achieve its goals.  The latter system of managing 
prices is the more common form of control.  Such a system regulates the 
consumption of water through pricing regimes.  There are however efficiency 
difficulties (in the general sense of the term) with such a system.  The following 
graph illustrates the problems: 
 
Figure 4: Clement A Tisdell Resource and Environmental Economics (World Scientific, Singapore, 2010) at 
300 
                                                 
 
1 See Clement A Tisdell Resource and Environmental Economics (World Scientific, Singapore, 
2010) at 299-305. 
2 The “economic equivalent of friction” OE Williamson The Economic Institutions of Capitalism 




Tisdell explains it thus:  the demand curve for water is at D1-D1, and its 
availability is at X0. per period.  P1 represents the regulated price of water and the 
water is allocated exactly at this price.  The economic value of the use of the water 
is maximised if everyone pays the same price for the water because this ensures 
equality in the marginal willingness of everyone to pay for the water.  On the 
other hand, the supply and demand for water is inconveniently variable,3 and 
accordingly it may be difficult for administrators to accurately determine the 
appropriate price of water relative to its supply.  If it is assumed again that water 
availability is at X´0 but the price is fixed at P0, the graph illustrates that there will 
be an excess of demand over supply.  The administrator might then increase the 
price to reduce the demand.  These prices are regulated rather than assessed by the 
market.  In the event that the water is priced differently for different groups of 
users, the inevitable result is that water is not allocated in such a way to maximise 
its overall economic value, that is to say. the water cannot as a matter of logical 
necessity be priced at its maximum overall general efficiency for both – it will 
represent either a subsidy for one or a tax for the other.   
Tisdell further suggests that water pricing by administrators may be the 
subject of distributional or political determinations.  If the price of water is set at 
P0 (on distributive grounds), the profits of the water consumers are obviously 
higher than if the consumers had paid the price at P1, and the profits will vary 
between P1 and P0.  The calculus is clearly not merely one of general efficiency, 
and the pricing may be an exercise in husbandry motivated beyond the parameters 
of economics.   
                                                 
 
3 Variability is related to temporal and spatial differences of hydrological fluctuations for example 
precipitation, river flows, even water quality.  It is not to be confused with the notion of 




Another approach is to price water on a tiered structure so that the price 
increases with the amount of water consumed.  This approach is designed to ration 
the allocation of water.  Tisdell provides the following explanation: 
 
 
Figure 5: Clement A Tisdell Resource and Environmental Economics (World Scientific, Singapore, 2010) at 
302. 
 
The system works in the manner following viz the demand line D1D1 
requires the consumer to pay P0 per unit for the first X0 units used.  If the buyer 
purchases up to X1 units, rather than paying P1X1 for the water used the consumer 
will pay the amount that is smaller by the amount (P1-P0)X0 located in the shaded 
area.  Also, if everyone pays P1 for their marginal purchases of water, the graph 
tells us the demand would be brought into equality of supply (if the income effect 
on demand is zero).  If we assume there are no externalities, the allocation will be 
efficient because everyone pays the same price for their marginal use of water.  
The equality of price results in the marginal value of use equal for all consumers.  
The insurmountable difficulty however is that the administrators know very little 
if anything at all about the day to day supply and demand dynamics (especially on 
an individual consumer level) and therefore it is impossible for an administrator to 
adjust prices effectively in the manner that a market system can.  
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5.1.2 The Advantages of Markets 
In a free-market scheme self-interest will ensure participants will be aware of and 
weigh up the relative risks and opportunities before commencing to treat - and 
will sink or swim by the decisions they make.  A regulatory system would make 
the task of valuing alternative uses an extremely difficult and time-consuming 
task.  A market system both establishes the value of the commodity traded and has 
the flexibility to reflect changes in the value-system.  On a cost-benefit analysis, 
then, water marketing is seen generally as a vastly better approach to the question 
of reallocation of resources. Conversely legislation that restricts water transfers 
may suggest that “policymakers do not expect the gains from market transactions 
to outweigh the political and economic costs of allowing active markets to 
develop.”4  This is of course a policy matter. 
As noted previously, the market system may be used when conjoined to 
economic instruments as a system acting as an amicus of nature, in which the 
participants can help preserve natural resources, or at the least use them in a more 
efficient manner. 5   These market structures can be superimposed on a 
government-regulated allocation regime,6 thus ensuring limited rights to divert 
water are ultimately efficient, thereby minimising the cost of regulation to the 
economy.  A further advantage is that the ability to transfer ownership of a water 
right will foster an incentive with the right-holder to oversee the resource 
carefully and to use it more efficiently in order to preserve it due to its value.  If a 
right-holder can make a profit from the sale or lease of water rights, he or she is 
                                                 
 
4 BC Saliba and DB Bush Water Markets in Theory and Practice (Westview Press Inc., Boulder, 
1987) at p 8. 
5 See Tom Tietenberg and Lynne Lewis Environmental Economics & Policy (6th ed, Pearson 
Education, Boston, 2010) at 495-6. 
6 Depending on jurisdiction, this regime may also include prior appropriation or riparian doctrines.  
Public allocation systems involve governmentally-administered distribution of rights. See Tom 
Tietenberg and Lynne Lewis Environmental Economics & Policy (6th ed, Pearson Education, 
Boston, 2010) at 178-183. 
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likely to indulge in practices that conserve the water for sale thus making that 
water available to others.   
Carol Rose proposes a curious argument, that markets promote democracy 
and moderate the power of the State.  In this respect she is virtually quoting 
Milton Friedman’s thesis (Capitalism and Freedom (University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 1962):   
Because the socialist state could control jobs, education, and indeed 
advancement on any front, Friedman argued, the socialist state could 
repress dissent easily.  Capitalism and private property, on the other 
hand, offer multiple sources of power, taking the forms of income, 
prestige, and assets.  Thus, on Friedman’s argument, states that permit 
private property and free enterprise also foster the proliferation of 
multiple power sources and, ultimately, diverse political views and 
movements. 7 
 
However, the market system has a more prosaic function, viz enabling one 
party to contract with another to trade some form of property for money or some 
other form of exchange.  The most important function of the market system is that 
of providing a systematic process by which the voluntary participants are able to 
contact each other and interact in such a way as to reach a conclusion to buy and 
sell commodities or services.  It is not merely a simple mechanism to define the 
price of a commodity, but encompasses the necessary accoutrements of 
administration, regulation, payments, and enforcement, which are all legal 
matters.  Further, economics as a discipline does not debate the interests or well-
being of one party over another – that is an ethics argument and traditionally 
economics is more concerned simply about the efficiency effects of alternative 
policies.  
                                                 
 
7 Carol Rose “Privatization – The Road to Democracy?” (2005-2006) 50 St Louis ULJ 691 at 705. 
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An illustration is appropriate.  Two parties A and B have water rights, 
party A is a farmer and party B an industrialist.  Party A has a surplus of water, 
party B a deficit.  A certain volume of water, say 1000 cubic metres may represent 
$1,000 in potential profit to party A, but party B offers $5,000 for it.  There is a 
$4,000 disparity in the marginal value to each party.  Should the transaction 
proceed, both A and B are better off in terms of their own preferences.  The 
debate over price is a purely distributional one. However party A is unlikely to 
sell another 1000 cubic metres on such terms.  For one thing, water is now more 
scarce for him and giving up more water may mean he will need to abandon more 
pressing uses.  On the other hand party B may not be so anxious to purchase as 
before as his immediate need has been satisfied, and more water would be put to 
less urgent needs.  For both party A and party B the marginal value in use has 
declined with increases in consumption.  Conversely, the marginal value in use 
will increase if consumption is reduced.  The conclusion is that efficient 
allocations are attained when there are no mutually advantageous exchanges 
possible between any pair of participants in a trade.8   
Not all market activities are dissociated calculations, however.  For 
instance there are certain extra-economic values which should be considered as 
well, especially in the case of water.  First, certain sectors of society might value 
water beyond its economic value by simply leaving it in situ, for example  
recreation, fishing, cultural, and ecological virtues. The Resource Management Act 
states in section 30 that one of the functions of regional councils relates to 
establishing minimum water flows and levels but notwithstanding that, society 
needs to calculate the benefits of allocation in the form of production, employment 
and the like, balanced with the protection of the ecosystem – the familiar 
anthropocentric/biocentric debate.    
                                                 
 
8 See J Hirshleifer, JC de Haven, and JW Milliman Water Supply – Economics, Technology, and 
Policy (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1960) at 38.  
125 
 
Secondly, in the United States and elsewhere where water markets are 
employed, certain sectors of society fret that water might be transferred away from 
traditional agriculture to industrial use, a higher-value user.  However this is the 
very basis of economic efficiency.  Dispassionate economics by its very nature 
places all marketable commodities on a par for instance the desire for foodstuffs 
and the desire for manufactured goods. It does not enquire into preference 
formation.   
These preferences, though, are balanced on the margin and there is no great 
political move to encourage the consumption of one over the other.  Once the 
desire for food is satiated there is nothing iniquitous about the consumption of 
manufactured goods.  It is reasonable to accept all rational individuals act in this 
fashion9 and on the margin the desire for food is no different than the desire for 
manufactured goods.  In any event if society felt there was no balance it could 
subsidise the one and tax the other, but at least at present there is no general 
agitation for this to happen.   
Thirdly, some would argue that the distribution of wealth and talents 
affects the conditions of supply and demand, which in turn affects prices and 
values and accordingly the market system may not be the ideal device for resource 
(re-)allocation.  However, there may exist some social preference for a certain 
degree of inequality as reward for effort and a certain amount of re-distribution of 
wealth is achieved through the market (and tax) systems and that improvements in 
efficiency increases society’s overall wealth without drastically upsetting socio-
economic equilibrium. 
                                                 
 
9 It is acknowledged that some less rational and more intemperate individuals do not.  Behavioural 
economics is starting to explore motivation drawing on insights from psychology and sociology to 
present a better picture of actual decision-making than the “rational person” offers.  See for 
example Christine Jolls, Cass R Sunstein and Richard H Thaler “A Behavioural Approach to Law 
and Economics” in Cass R Sunstein (ed) Behavioral Law & Economics (Cambridge University 
Press, New York, 2000) 13. 
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Before a market system can flourish, certain basic necessities need to be in 
place – infrastructure, a method of introducing vendor and purchaser (and the more 
the better), and certainty surrounding the legal security of the rights transacted that 
is to say market scope. From a legal perspective, chief among these is the crucial 
question of status and ownership of the commodity to be bought and sold. If 
consideration is to be exchanged the item being purchased must have definite 
ownership capable of being alienated.  The question of trust goes to the very heart 
of the market system, especially the matter of surety of title.   
However, in the case of water there is an even more basic question: should 
water ‒ including access to water ‒ be regarded as a tradable commodity at all, or 
should it be regarded as a “common” good, which is owned by no-one but at the 
same time in a sense owned by everyone?  Despite their involvement in the Land 
and Water Forum Reports, Maori are of the view that water is not a commodity but 
rather a taonga or treasure.  If it were a commodity, it can be bought and sold in 
commercial transactions between willing actors, but if it is a common good, it is a 
public sector responsibility and should be collectively owned and managed.  In this 
respect an important political feature to the argument is that consumers of water 
become individual customers rather than a body politic.10   
In point of fact, both socio-economic theorems have their attractions and 
the arguments flow back and forth.  Those in favour of the Dublin Principles argue 
that water is no different from other natural resources like bauxite, oil, or coal and 
the like, and feel justified in using water in the same manner as other resources 
used to bolster the economy.  In any event the fact that water is treated in some 
areas as a marketable but non-fungible commodity necessarily gives it value and 
therefore likely to be the beneficiary of careful husbandry by those hopeful to 
profit from its tradability.   
                                                 
 
10 The obverse of Carole Roses’s argument above – see note 7. 
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Further, given that water is unevenly distributed by nature the market 
system might ensure those who (somewhat perversely) establish golf courses in a 
desert pay the costs of doing so at the expense of more efficient uses elsewhere.  
Moreover, as climate changes and extensive deforestation takes its toll, greater 
pressure will be put on diminishing water reserves which may even end in conflict, 
and the market system has the potential dynamics to defuse such tensions and as 
prices increase, consumption is likely to decrease. 
5.1.3 The Special Case of Water 
On the other hand, the contra-argument is that water is a special case; that it is an 
apolitical resource randomly distributed by nature around the globe, but essential 
to all life on it – not just human life, including the associated social and cultural 
mechanisms.  The argument extends to the point that humanity has reserved for 
itself an equal right for everyone to have access to the resource.11  This is naturally 
a political discussion.   
More prosaic is the argument that if access to water is dependent on 
economic exchange, those too poor to purchase it will need to go without.  This is 
a distributive justice debate.12  As noted, the economists’ answer is that by giving 
water a value, there will be an incentive to save it, thereby making more available 
to others, and according to the laws of supply and demand, at a reasonable 
(market-controlled) cost.   
In any event, treated as a human right with open access the result may be a 
“tragedy of the commons” where the benefits accrue to the individual but the costs 
                                                 
 
11 See K Bakker The“Commons” Versus the “Commodity”: Alter-globalisation, Anti-privatization 
and the Human Right to Water in the Global South. <Aguabolivia.org/wp-
content/uploads/2010/07/ier-04-documento_Bakker 2007.pdf>. 
12  The same argument can be applied to junior appropriators under the American prior 
appropriation system, or indeed those who miss out under the riparian model. 
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are shared jointly by all and consequently some restraint needs to be imposed, with 
the further result that not all humans will have access at all times: in other words, 
access will not continuously be a human right.  
As with most antithetic arguments, the answer is somewhere between.13  
The  State has the power to allocate water resources – and thus influence the 
supply of consumer goods – but their subsequent redistribution is more effective 
through the market system.  John Wodraska’s general thesis is that water is both a 
common and a commodity, and a hybrid model would be an appropriate solution 
to the debate.  While Wodraska does not debate the issue of water markets, he 
posits that conservation is the key to water management, and water markets, it is 
submitted, would be a legitimate and pragmatic tool in the water manager’s 
toolbox.   
Professor Barton Thompson, a well-known commentator on this issue, has 
a thesis which also argues for a hybrid model, which is a rather neat amalgam of 
the three issues he identifies and which also fit nicely into the Resource 
Management Act’s framework.  His conclusion is that water should be regarded as 
a “public commodity”.  He sees three themes in the water debate: water as a public 
trust (the State holds and manages water as custodian for the public as a whole), 
water as an economic commodity (to be priced and traded by the private market 
system), and water as a human right (where the public has access to potable 
water): 
When combined, the three themes suggest an alternative vision of 
water as a public commodity.  This vision recognises that the public 
has a critical interest in water.  Water is unique among all resources.  
Water is essential not only to life, but to virtually any human 
endeavour and thus the betterment of society.  Water is an 
                                                 
 
13 See J Wodraska “Water: Resource or Commodity?”  Maxwell S (ed) The Business of Water 
(American Water Works Association, 2008) 245 at 245.  See also B Thompson Jr. “Water as a 
Public Commodity” (2011-2012) 95 Marquette L Rev 17 at 17. 
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irreplaceable element of most healthy, functioning ecosystems – and 
thus the production of ecosystem services is of importance to people.  
Water is also intrinsic to most religions and cultural systems.  For all 
these reasons, water is inherently public, and governments have a 
continuing obligation to ensure its effective management for overall 
societal well-being, including both environmental protection and 
essential human consumptive needs.  However, commodifying water 
can actually help promote these goals.  Pricing, markets, and even the 
participation of private entitles have helped ensure that water is not 
wasted and, when properly directed and regulated, can help promote 
the environment and increase drinking-water access. Treating water as 
public but not as a commodity will fail to maximize social benefits, 
while treating water as a commodity but not as public will fail to 
ensure that water meets all public needs.14 
 
What Professor Thompson is saying is that the public has a stake in water 
management and a market model has the potential to promote efficient water use 
thus promoting the public interest.  Each of the themes plays a different part in the 
water management discussion.  Both public trust and human right themes might 
merely relate to water management but more importantly suggest the ultimate 
good of water management is not entirely economic.  In terms of the public trust, 
as noted in chapter 4 the State can and does use the market system for 
environmental craft-work.  More specifically as already noted above: 
… the commoditization of water, by increasing water efficiency, can 
reduce the pressure on existing environmental flows and on 
groundwater aquifers.  Private water markets, moreover, can both 
assist the government in achieving environmental protection and 
permit individuals to contribute towards a higher level of protection 
than the government provides.15 
 
In terms of a human rights deliberation, Thompson mentions that although 
there is a problem of demand exceeding supply in some parts of the world, the 
real problem is more likely to be access rather than supply.  These areas may have 
neither the resources nor the resolve to supply water to all citizens who must use 
                                                 
 
14 B Thompson Jr “Water as a Public Commodity” (2011-2012) 95 Marquette L Rev 17 at 18-19. 
15 Ibid, at 41. 
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their own limited resources to access water supplies.  Small-scale water markets – 
usually informal – provide access for these people. This is especially the case in 
Asia.  These markets are very competitive, and by providing access to those who 
otherwise would not have it, the income gap between farmers is also reduced.   
Thompson gives two major examples of jurisdictions that have embraced 
the “public commodity” model – South Africa and Chile.  Unlike Chile, South 
Africa has stressed the role and importance of environmental protection since its 
1996 Constitution.  Private ownership of water is proscribed, and water reserves 
are provided for both environmental and human needs.  This is an interpretation of 
water as a public trust, but the Republic has introduced water markets as a tool to 
improve systemic efficiency.   
Chile, on the other hand, has been at the vanguard of world reform of 
water management – that country has been a proponent of free-market reform.  
Chile’s commoditization of water has significantly contributed to the gross 
domestic productivity of those regions who have embraced the system.16  While it 
has recognised the importance of water to citizens ‒ bolstered by the utility of 
subsidies ‒ Chile has not been so assiduous in matters of the public trust interest in 
water.  Despite the 1981 Water Code providing that water is a natural resource for 
public use,17 water transfers under that Code were permitted without deference to 
environmental considerations.18  South Africa, by contrast, has.  In other words 
Chile has not balanced Thompson’s three issues into an effective whole.19   
                                                 
 
16 B Thompson Jr “Water as a Public Commodity” (2011-2012) 95 Marquette L Rev 2011 17 at 
49. 
17 Clause 5: “Water is a national public asset and gives individuals the right to use it in accordance 
with the provisions of this Code” (approximate translation from the original Spanish). 
18 Major reform in 2005 was intended to address environmental protection matters. 
19 Chile reformed the 1981 Water Code in 2005 to address some environmental concerns. 
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It is clear the tensions between the three themes needs sound management.  
Further as a corollary, water markets per se are not, in isolation, necessarily an 
effective tool for environmental stewardship. Minimum water levels and flows 
play a critical role. 
Thompson’s argument is an elegant one, and provides a niche for the 
market system to play its part in environmental stewardship.  Buried in the 
Resource Management Act 1991 are arguably representatives of his three themes 
viz. sections 14(3) (human right), section 30 (public trust) and section 7(b) 
(commodification).  It is an important discussion given the change in international 
attitude to water as suggested by various United Nations instruments.  For 
instance in the original 1945 Charter and the later 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights no express mention was made of water, probably because it was 
regarded as a given and was inherently necessary for the achievement of many of 
the goals.  The Dublin Statement is 1992 was important because express mention 
was made of the economic value of water.20  This was ground-breaking at the time 
as it did not qualify water as a universal right and was therefore highly contested 
by human rights groups.   
In 2002, the United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights adopted General Comment 1521 which was formulated as a comment on 
Articles 11 and 12 of The International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights promulgated in 1966.  These Articles22 direct that a right to an 
adequate standard of living, including adequate food was a basic human right.  
Water is not mentioned, but perhaps buried in the intent of the Articles.  The 2002 
General Comment specifically fills in the gaps, as it were – it describes water as a 
                                                 
 
20 See generally Our Common Future (1987).  The sentiment was also articulated by Agenda 21 at 
Rio de Janeiro in June 1992. 
21 UN Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights “The Right to Water” (2002) UNHCR 
<www.unhr.org/49d095742.html>.  
22 These came into “force” on 3 January 1976. 
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“public good” access to which is a “human right” at paragraph 1, and “…water 
should be treated as a social and cultural good, and not primarily as an economic 
good.”23 Although these comments are not legally binding the sentiment is that 
water is seen as a universal right.   
More recently, on the 28th July 2010 the General Assembly of the United 
Nations passed resolution GA/10967 recognising that access to water was integral 
to the realisation of all human rights, and later on the 30th September same year 
the United Nations Human Rights Council adopted a resolution 
(A/HRC/RES15/9) recognising that the human right to water (and sanitation) is 
part of the basic right to an adequate standard of living.  This is the first time the 
Council has openly declared itself on the issue, despite the fact that such a view 
was openly accepted by the Council’s officials for some time.  The matter is 
complex, and renders down to the problem of defining something into existence.  
Platitudes are all very well, but practical problems still exist, and it would appear 
the commodification of water will inevitably assist with the realisation of the 
United Nations ideals.  Seen with a functioning practical view of matters, captured 
water is in fact very much already seen as a commodity (which admittedly is 
different from unappropriated water), whether it be the startling global market for 
bottled water, the beer and soft drink markets, or even the coffee market.  The 
point is that water is being regarded as, treated as, and traded as a commodity 
whether or not the commentators agree with such a locus and this is not taking 
into account worldwide formal and informal water markets for farming or 
industry.  Water is being bought and sold world-wide, so clearly forms of a water 
market system exist world-wide. 
                                                 
 
23 At paragraph [11]. 
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5.1.4 The Notion of Property. 
Central to the consideration of water markets in New Zealand is the nature of the 
ownership of consents under the relative provisions of the Resource Management 
Act.  As seen in the previous chapter, legal certainty of both ownership and 
substance of consents is crucial to the proper functioning of any credible trading 
system.  Whilst the nature of ownership of quotas is characterised under, say, the 
Fisheries Act 1996, or even the Emissions Trading Scheme under the Climate 
Change Response Act 2002, the same cannot be said of consents under the 
Resource Management Act.  
Before a discussion of the ingredients of the Act’s system of ownership, 
some mention needs to be made regarding the question of privatisation of water. 
Water markets in New Zealand are not predicated on the notion of privatising the 
ownership of the water itself, only on the idea of alienating a consent (or part of a 
consent) issued pursuant to the Resource Management Act to take water, which is 
an entirely different matter.  The old Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 
generally extinguished the existing common law riparian rights and replaced them 
with a statutory administrative system mutatis mutandis the same as the system 
we have today under the Resource Management Act.  In neither statute did the 
Crown purport to own the country’s water resources:  
The Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 left intact the general 
common law principle that the water itself is, until appropriated, not 
the subject of property.  But with certain exceptions that Act vested 
the sole right to dam any river or stream, or to divert, take, or use 
“natural water” (among certain other rights in respect of natural 
water) in the Crown.24 
 
                                                 
 
24  FM Brookfield “Water” in Sir Robin Cooke (ed in chief) The Laws of New Zealand 
Butterworths, Wellington 3 at 46.  See section 21 Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967. 
134 
 
The English case of Embrey v Owen held that flowing water is “of public 
right”: “… flowing water is publici juris … in the sense that … none can have 
property in the water itself, except [that] which he may choose to abstract from 
the stream …”25  Under the Water and Soil Conservation Act and the Resource 
Management Act, the Crown did, however, fetter itself with the obligation to 
manage those resources. 
Although the Crown is charged with the management of water, it also 
does not “own” the physical water.  Water continues to be regarded 
legally, economically, and socially as a public good, owned by 
everyone and no-one, with the Crown holding only ‘rights’ to water.  
These rights may be allocated to individuals in the form of a resource 
consent.26 
 
The question of privatisation does not, then, apply, given a vendor cannot 
pass a better title than he or she has to start with: nemo dat quod non habet.  That 
is not to say the Parliament does not have the power to vest ownership of water in 
the Crown: it probably has the power to do so but not the political will.  There is 
currently no great lobby for this to happen, and such a move would be politically 
risky, given the possible Māori claim to the physical ownership of water. 27 
Similarly in the United States: 
Although the popular literature refers to the tradable permit approach 
as “privatizing the resource”… in most cases it doesn’t actually do 
that.  One compelling reason in the United States why trading permits 
do not privatize these resources is because that could be found to 
violate the well-established “public trust doctrine”.  This common law 
doctrine suggests that certain resources (such as water and, arguably, 
                                                 
 
25 Embrey v Owen (1851) 155 ER 579; 6 Ex 369 at 585. 
26 O Nyce “Water Markets under the Resource Management Act 1991: Do They Hold Water?” 
(2008) 14 Canterbury LR 123 at 141. 
27 See NZ Maori Council v Attorney General [2013] NZSC 6.  See also Rachel Kennard “The 
Potential for Maori Customary Claims to Freshwater” (2006) Otago Yearbook of Legal Research 
<www.otago.ac.nz/law/research/journals/otago036803.html>.   Also Jacinta Ruru “Māori Legal 
Rights to Water: Ownership, Management, or just Consultation?” (2011) Resource Management 
Theory and Practice at 119. 
135 
 
air) belong to the public and that the government holds them in trust 
for the public; they can’t be given away. 28 
 
Property rights are, naturally enough, a dominant institution in most, if not 
all, the developed capitalist economies. 
In the world of Robinson Crusoe property rights play no role.  
Property rights are an instrument of society and derive their 
significance from the fact that they help a man form those 
expectations which he can reasonably hold in his dealings with others.  
These expectations find expressions in the laws, customs, and mores 
of a society.  An owner of property rights possesses the consent of 
fellowmen to allow him to act in particular ways.  An owner expects 
the community to prevent others from interfering with his actions, 
provided that these actions are not prohibited in the specifications of 
his rights.29 
 
A question of some moment is what “property” actually is, and how does 
the notion meld with the provisions of the Resource Management Act.  Barton 
makes the point that there is generally a gradual “propertizing” of many natural 
resource consents, and that the attraction of property rights is that they are good 
against those with whom we do not have a contract, that is to say, strangers.30  
The oft-quoted definition of property is that of Wilberforce LJ: 
Before a right or an interest can be admitted into the category of 
property, or a right affecting property, it must be definable, 
identifiable by third parties, capable in its nature of assumption by 
third parties, and have a degree of permanence or stability.31 
 
                                                 
 
28  T Tietenberg, “Tradable Permits in Principle and Practice” (2007) 
<web.mit.edu/ckolstad/www/TT_SBW.pdf> at p 15. 
29 H Demsetz “Towards a Theory of Property Rights” 57(2) The American Economic Review 347, 
at 347. 
30 B Barton “The Nature of Resource Consents: Statutory Permits or Property Rights?” (2009) 
NZLS CLE 51 at 59. 
31 National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175 at 1247-8. 
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France-Hudson,32  however, discusses the nature of property rights and 
identifies further characteristics.  Exclusivity ensures the benefits of the resource 
accrue to the owner and gives a long-term incentive to enhance the resource 
because the benefits will accrue to the owner.  Duration is important because it 
has a direct influence on investment in the resource – the owner can invest early 
and obtain the benefit some years later.33 Flexibility affords the rights an ability to 
be adjusted without weakening the holder’s title and enable the owner to change 
the use of the resource without consequence.   
Many rights come with necessary stipulations however and these will 
make the consents less flexible.  Security of title is a reference to the degree of 
risk that attaches to the exercise of the right over time, and like exclusivity it 
allows an owner to be sure to receive the benefits from the investments in the 
resource.  Restraints on state-acquisition of private property are now found in 
most developed countries.  Transferability is a key concept and makes it possible 
for a market to operate, and for the resource to flow to a higher-value user.  It is 
also a method by which the owner may realise his investment. France-Hudson 
adds a further criterion, viz divisibility but this is really part of the transferability 
aspect.  It would allow a permit holder to reduce his scale of activity without 
losing the right completely.   
A discussion of “property” in legal terms is quite natural: lawyers and the 
courts are more at home in referring to property in this way.  Gibbons’ paper, 
however, includes the point made by former Environment Court Judge Jackson 
that in terms of the Resource Management Act both law and economics are 
necessarily intertwined inasmuch as both economics and the Act are inherently 
                                                 
 
32  B France-Hudson “Private Property’s Hidden Potential” (Doctor of Philosophy Thesis 
University of Otago, 2014) at 296-304. 
33 Barton makes the point that a lease is property even though it may be for the duration of one 
day, or even one hour.  
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concerned with resources.34  He goes on to quote Anderson & McChesney’s view 
of an economic approach to property rights which suggests there are both formal 
and informal rules governing access and use of both tangible and intangible 
assets.35  There is a clear tension between a numerus clausus approach to property 
rights (that is to say there is a closed number of recognised property rights), and 
the idea that statutory property affords resource consents rights based on the 
attributes of the consent rather than attempting to squeeze these attributes to fit 
general property law.36 
5.1.5 The Nature of Consents under the Resource Management Act 1991. 
There are therefore clear advantages in the ownership of clearly-defined and 
understood property rights.  There are however other important claims to 
environmental benefits of ownership.  Laura Fraser37 gives two main ones: first, 
ownership settles the question of control and the importance of the resource in 
terms of encouraging an affinity with the resource and fosters an interest in its 
conservation thus engendering an incentive to preserve the resource and thereby 
fostering public participation in environmental policy.  Secondly, she states that 
individuals make better managers than governments with better efficiency 
underlain by a public preference for individual choice over regulation.   
Ms Fraser makes the point that the advantages represent a mixture of 
philosophical ideas and pragmatism combining to encourage environmentally 
advantageous use.  However she also points out some disadvantages.  She 
                                                 
 
34 Gibbons T “Property Rights in Resource Consents: Some Thoughts from Law and Economics” 
(2012) NZULR 46 at 49.  
35 Ibid, at 51. 
36 The recent introduction of carbon credits has been described as introducing a new property: see 
Hepburn S “Carbon Rights as New Property: The Benefits of Statutory Verification” (2009) 31 
Syd L Rev 239.  She suggests an evolution in the attitude to the public trust doctrine towards a 
proprietary verification of natural resources. 
37 L Fraser “Property Rights in Environmental Management: The Nature of Resource Consents in 
the Resource Management Act 199” (2008) 12 NZ J Envtl L 145 at 157-161. 
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suggests private ownership will obscure the public qualities of the resource 
resulting in an attitude of use rather than sustainability.  With respect, this is to 
confuse principle with practice. Sustainability is the remit of those formulating 
policy, but those working within that framework will almost invariably have a 
subjective and practical outlook.   
The most significant disadvantage Laura Fraser identifies is the question 
of compensation for the taking of property.  “Specifically, if compensation is 
payable for restrictions on a property right in an environmental context, actions to 
protect the resource may be less likely due to the financial disincentive created.”38  
The decision in Aoraki Water Trust v Meridian Energy Ltd39 offers the consent 
holder a certain protection against an expropriation argument.   
The last argument Ms Fraser proposes against ownership of resource 
consents is one of nomenclature.  The argument suggests there is a connotation of 
privilege of “property” in consents, so suggests the instruments should be called 
‘licences”.  This, of course, is mere semantics. 
It would appear on balance that outright ownership of a consent under the 
Act would be appropriate. In summary: 
There are multiple advantages of property rights arrangements 
including flexibility, cost-savings, information generation, migration 
to high-valued uses and better alignment of incentives for 
conservation or investment in the resource.  The more complete are 
property rights, the more the private and social benefits of resource 
use are meshed, eliminating externalities and the losses of the 
common pool.  Furthermore, when agents are owners of some part of 
the greater rents from reducing the externality, they have greater 
                                                 
 
38 Ibid, at 160. 
39 Aoraki Water Trust v Meridian Energy Ltd [2005] 2 NZLR 268. 
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incentives to comply, to police one another, and potentially, invest in 
the stock. 40 
 
However the Act has some legally perverse provisions relating to 
ownership of consents and section 122 (1) generally states that they are neither 
real nor personal property but they may be treated as personal property in certain 
cases for example the creation of a charge (subsection 3).41  Obviously, there is 
ample opportunity for confusion.  Subsection 1 is quite definite, but the following 
provisions cloud the issue.   
Pankhurst J in Dart River Safaris Ltd v Kemp42 did not address the issue 
directly, but he was certain a consent – despite section 122 (1) – afforded the 
consent holder with legal rights of some sort, despite the fact that they are not 
predicated on land law.  These rights are such that they may not be “denied or 
eroded” (at paragraph 27).  This is a view taken by their Honours in Aoraki Water 
Trust v Meridian Energy Ltd.43  Further, their view (at paragraph 26) was that the 
consent was in the nature of a licence (described somewhat loosely as a “bare 
licence”) bearing in mind the provisions of section122(1).  Later in the decision 
after reviewing the provisions of Part 6 of the Act their Honours concluded that:  
A number of specific provisions…elevate the status of a water permit 
from something in the nature of a bare licence to a licence plus a right 
to use the subject resource.  In that sense it has similarities with a 
profit à prendre. 44 
                                                 
 
40 GD Libecap “The Tragedy of the Commons: Property Rights and Markets as solutions to 
Resource and Environmental Problems” (2009) The Australian Journal of Agricultural and 
Resource Economics 53 at 134. 
41 It should be remembered the Resource Management Act is primarily a consent regime, not an 
ownership regime.  It is not designed to deal with the consequences of the importation of property 
ideas. 
42 Dart River Safaris Ltd v Kemp [2000] NZRMLR 440 (High Court). 
43 Aoraki Water Trust v Meridian Energy Ltd [2005] 2 NZLR 268. 
44 At paragraph 34.  The Crown does not have a proprietary interest in the water in the first place 
so it is hard to imagine how a water permit could be classed in the nature of a property right as 




The discussion is clearly predicated on property law, which is 
understandable.  The High Court received an opportunity to discuss the provisions 
of section 122 with the case of Armstrong v Public Trust.45  Fogarty J came to the 
conclusion that as section 122(1) is located in Part 6 of the Act, and since that Part 
also contains provisions relating the transfer of various types of consent46 then the 
logical conclusion is that the purpose of section 122(1): 
… is to prevent other transfer of consents except as provided for in 
this statute.  Subsection (2) of s 122 can then be seen as providing 
some general qualifications.  Paragraphs (a) and (b) deal with the 
involuntary transfer and para (c) and subs (3) allow the securitisation 
of consents.  Such recognition of property rights is contained.  What 
Parliament has set its face against is the unfettered transfer of resource 
consents except where specifically provided.47 
 
And again: 
This Court will not find that the legislature has so intervened to 
displace the common law position as to joint tenancy [the argument 
related to the survivorship provisions of joint tenancy], by a side 
wind, when pursuing control over the allocation of scarce resources, 
as it is doing in the RMA.  To the extent that it does in fact allow 
property rights under the RMA, the common law as to real and 
personal property will apply, subject to constraints in the specific 
provisions of the statute.48 
 
The statement does not assist with identifying the nature of the ownership 
of a resource consent however.  Such a consent possesses the attributes of 
something owned: it is definable, it can be identified by third parties, it is capable 
of assumption by third parties, and it has a degree of permanence and stability.49  
                                                 
 
45 Armstrong v Public Trust [2007] 2 NZLR 859. 
46 See sections 134-138A (inclusive). 
47 Armstrong v Public Trust [2007] 2 NZLR at 863. 
48 Ibid, at 864.  
49 See National Provincial Bank Ltd v Ainsworth [1965] AC 1175 at 1247-8. 
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Cases such as Aoraki Water Trust v Meridian Energy Ltd50, The Favourite Ltd v 
Vavasour51 and Hampton v Hampton52 make it clear that they also have value, a 
necessary pre-requisite in the event section 122 (3) providing for a charge to be 
granted over a consent as security to a creditor were to be invoked.  Complicating 
the calculus is the fact that although the consent may not be personal property, the 
natural resource extracted, be it minerals or water, definitely is: 
that the subject matter of the licence (i.e. the right to participate in a 
fishery that is exclusive to licence holders) coupled with a proprietary 
interest in the fish caught pursuant to its terms, bears a reasonable 
analogy to rights traditionally considered at common law to be 
proprietary in nature.53 
 
And, further: 
What was once a “common” or “public” has been converted to the 
exclusive but controlled preserve of those who hold licences.  The 
right to commercial exploitation of a public resource for personal 
profit has become a privilege confined to those who hold commercial 
licences.54 
 
Thus, a property right in natural resources comprises an amalgam of a 
right to participate in extraction coupled with an ownership of the resource taken.  
The grant of a consent establishes a possession of value of whatever label – for 
example a statutory licence – and legitimate commercial expectations are that this 
possession will be protected.  Professor Barton puts it rather neatly: “it is often 
asserted that the government should not alter ‘vested rights’ of one kind or 
                                                 
 
50 Aoraki Water Trust v Meridian Energy Ltd [2005] 2 NZLR 268, [2005] NZRMA 251. 
51 The Favourite Ltd v Vavasour [2005] NZRMA 461. 
52  Hampton v Hampton Environment Court Christchurch, September 2008 C102/08.  This 
unfortunate family dispute is still before the courts in 2015. 
53 Royal Bank of Canada v Saulnier (2008) 298 DLR 193 at 209. 
54 Harper v Minister for Sea Fisheries (1989) 168 CLR 314 at 325. 
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another without harm to the reputation of the jurisdiction as an investment 
destination.”55  The cases suggest a traditional legal approach prevails.   
Barton makes the point that the courts should not muddy the water of 
statutory interpretation with importations that stray from parliamentary intent.56  
From a purely pragmatic viewpoint, in the event a functioning water market 
system were to be established in New Zealand and the provisions of section 122 
(1) were to create a measure of uncertainty, those provisions would need to be 
amended to provide resource consents with some degree of certainty of legal 
identity.  Any legal practitioner acting for a purchaser of a water permit who did 
not advise his client of the provisions of section 122 would be failing in his legal 
duties.  The client’s reaction is likely to be more practical than that of scholars.  
5.1.6 A Further  Note on Water Markets 
Even in the event that the appropriate marketing apparatus were missing or found 
wanting, spontaneous or informal marketing may still take place.  There are 
informal water markets throughout the world.  In parts of Asia, notably India and 
Pakistan, as well as parts of North Africa and Latin America, there are very 
healthy informal markets.  The case of India is particularly illustrative.  Water 
may be sold there informally on an hourly basis.57  Apart from the problem of 
corruption – some officials need to be paid to provide the water to which farmers 
are entitled – in some areas appropriate infrastructure is lacking.  Despite this 
informal markets fulfil an important need:  
                                                 
 
55 B Barton “Property Rights Created Under Statute in Common Law Legal Systems” in Property 
and the Law in Energy and Natural Resources. A McHarg, B Barton, A Bradbrook, and L Godden 
(eds) (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2010) at 81. 
56 Barton B “The Nature of Resource Consents: Statutory Permits or Property Rights?” (2009) 
NZLS CLE 51 at 77. 
57 K Palanisami “Water Markets as a Demand Management Option: Potentials, Problems and 




The most convenient water supply, which is standard for all urban 
dwellers in wealthy countries, is piped water into the house from a 
reliable piped-water network.  Such supplies rarely serve the urban 
poor of Africa, Asia and parts of Latin America….Those without 
functioning water connections or wells (in many cities both water 
connections and wells are of intermittent reliability) have to venture 
out to collect water from other sources, and often need to negotiate 
with other people.  It is in this scramble to secure daily water needs 
where alternative systems of water resale and vending come in.58 
 
The problem with informal markets such as these – both rural and urban – 
is that they generate no fiscal advantage to the government (at least not directly) 
nor do they provide incentives or funds for investment in appropriate 
infrastructure.  Further there is no one to ensure agreements are adhered to.  It is 
better to acknowledge the practice officially and create water rights that may be 
traded thereby providing secure and open rules of conduct.  Transaction costs are 
of prime importance: “Where costs to each person of defining and defending 
rights exceed the potential for gains from trade, then there is no incentive to 
act.”59  In the case of water, being a fugacious resource,60 those costs can be quite 
high.  Garrick makes the point that institutional change is expected when benefits 
of a rule change are sufficient to overcome transaction costs.61 
Informal markets expand to fulfil a need, fill a gap as it were, and this 
apparatus may be found, for example, in the United States: water rights in 
Colorado have been transacted among traders on a permanent basis for more than 
a century even though no centralised trading arrangements have been in place,62 
                                                 
 
58 M Kjellén & G McGranahan Informal Water Vendors and the Urban Poor. Human Settlements 
Discussion Paper Series 2006 <www.iied.org/HS/publications.html>. 
59 J Bennett “Markets and Government – an Evolving Balance” in J Bennett (ed) The Evolution of 
Markets for Water. (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited Cheltenham UK (2005) 1 at 3. 
60 That is to say it can move around in such a way that is difficult to determine. 
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thus giving comfort to those who require more water for their needs.  The market 
prices will, of course, reflect the actual opportunity costs free of distortions caused 
by subsidies.  Easter, Rosegrant and Dinar put it thus: 
There are two distinctly different opinions about the institutional 
setting required for efficient market exchanges: The neoclassical view 
posits that a legal system is required; a more pragmatic view 
emphasizes the importance of informal contract enforcement. 63   
 
The authors go on to quote Greif (1997:239-40), who observes: 
This neoclassical view that places the legal system at the centre of 
contract enforcement in market economies has recently been criticized 
on the basis of evidence indicating that many contemporary exchange 
relations in the West and elsewhere are informal.  The associated 
contract enforceability is not provided by the legal system but is based 
on reputation, general morality, and personal trust within social 
networks.  Empirical evidence indicates the importance of two distinct 
systems of informal contract enforcement: the individualistic system 
of informal contracts enforcement prevalent in the West, under which 
the reputation and morality of the individuals are key, and the 
collectivist system of contract enforcement prevalent in most other 
societies, under which the personal trust within the social network is 
critical.64 
 
The suggestion is that in the absence of formal arrangement, an informal 
system could fill the void.  Clearly a formal arrangement would be preferable, and 
provide comfort to the vendor and purchaser. 
                                                 
 
63 KW Easter, MW Rosegrant, & A Dinar A “Formal and Informal Markets for Water: Institutions, 
Performance, and Constraints” (1999) 14 No1The World Bank Research Observer February) 99 at 
100. 
64 Ibid, at 100. 
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Brent Layton in his paper in Resource Management Theory & Practice 
201165 makes the point that structures and markets are actually complementary, 
not alternatives.   
In a New Zealand context, he gives a couple of examples from the era 
before the country embraced a demonstrably market economy.  The first of these 
is the New Zealand futures market.  This began in 1985 when there was no 
specific legislation to accommodate such an initiative.  The International 
Commodities Clearing House was instructed to provide software and to act as 
clearing-house.  Layton states that at the time in the absence of clear legislation 
there was a general concern that the activity might be regarded as a gambling 
activity by the relative officials and the resultant contracts would be therefore 
unenforceable.  The matter was therefore resolved by settling each day’s contracts 
at the end of each day’s trading thereby limiting the Clearing House’s exposure to 
one day’s movement in prices.   
The second example relates to the New Zealand Electricity Market.  This 
market was also created without specific legislation, and to make matters worse 
the government made it clear it would not enact any.  The solution to 
enforceability was to structure this market as a multi-lateral contract.  
Participation was voluntary and market rules had to be agreed to by the parties to 
the multi-lateral contract. Commerce Commission consent was necessary lest the 
agreements be regarded as “price-fixing” under section 30 Commerce Act 1986. 66  
If this were the case the contracts would be illegal and therefore, as with the 
                                                 
 
65  B Layton “Tradable Systems for Water: Best Use and Maximising Value” in T Daya-
Winterbottom (ed) Resource Management Theory and Practice Thomson Reuters (2011) at 107.  
Layton was the Director of the New Zealand Institute for Economic Research from 2003 to 2008. 
66 The angst was the result of an abundance of caution because in fact the Commerce Commission 
determined that the market functioned by measuring prices, not fixing them.  See B Barton “From 
Public Service to Market Commodity: Electricity and Gas Law in New Zealand” (1998) 16 Energy 
& Nat Resources L 351 at 367. 
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futures contracts, unenforceable.  The solution required complex multi-party 
negotiations with attendant costs and travail to ensure enforceability.  
However, in the case of water, in New Zealand, with its robust 
institutional legal structures, there is no reason why a largely frictionless system 
not be put in place: there is no need for informal markets and further, with a 
simple but sturdy market system, there should be no demand for them either.  The 
transfer of water rights, which in some cases may represent to the purchaser a not 
inconsiderable investment as well as investment opportunity, requires the measure 
of comfort and certainty that is furnished by a sturdy legal system where water 
rights – which as a matter of necessity will need to be cleft from the land in 
respect of which they were originally granted – may be recorded and defended 
before a judicial tribunal if a vigorous and confident market were to ensue. 
Layton’s theme is that there are a number of other lessons for future water 
markets to be learned from history.  These lessons can be applied to water markets 
which have been discussed earlier, but Layton puts them into context:67 
(1) Clarity about what is being traded.  Normally there would be no problem, 
but it is the abnormal circumstances that usually take time to mature and it 
is how these circumstances are dealt with which determines whether 
parties are willing to participate in the market.  Absolute certainty is not 
essential, just so long as the participants have sufficient information to 
factor into their decisions, for example the possible abatement pro rata of 
fish quota in the event of a change in the allowable catch has not 
obstructed the trading in fish quota.  In the case of water, the chances of 
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the allowable water take from various aquifers being reduced in the future 
would be relatively high as knowledge of the ecologies of them evolves. 
(2) Tradability and highest value user.  It does not matter whether a water 
permit is obtained gratis as part of a publicly-sanctioned allocation (as is 
the case in New Zealand), or paid for by the holder; if it is freely traded 
every permit-holder faces its highest use value when deciding to use it, 
trade it, or leave it idle.  In other words, the opportunity cost of using, 
selling or leaving idle a water permit is its value in its highest use by 
someone else.  For rational economic decision-making about the use of a 
water permit, the cost that matters most is the opportunity cost, not its 
original cost (ignoring the value to the Crown). 
(3) Tradability and Allocative Efficiency.  Economists regard dynamic 
efficiency (with its emphasis on investment for the future) as the most 
important type of efficiency to economic growth and the improvement of 
economic welfare in the long run.  Allocative efficiency (or lack thereof) is 
unimportant if water permits are readily tradable (and transaction costs are 
sufficiently low).  It is also important that one party does not gain enough 
market power to influence the market and raise prices above the value of 
their benefit to society at the margin.  The Commerce Act 1986 generally 
governs markets and prohibits conduct that restricts competition.  It is 
worth noting that the Waikato Regional Council proposed, under Variation 
6 of its regional plan, to grant Mighty River Power a virtual monopoly of 
water in the Waikato River above Karapiro – certainly enough to grant the 
power company market power.68  There was no proposal to make the 
power company’s water rights tradable, which would have been 
allocatively inefficient, unless every drop of water in the upper Waikato 
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Matter of appeals under Clause 14(1) of Schedule One of the Resource Management Act 1991 
Decision No [2011] NZEnvC 380 at 56. 
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were more valuable if used for power generation than any other alternative 
use. 
(4) Initial Allocations and Wealth Distribution.  The corollary of the 
importance to economic growth of dynamic efficiency is the principle of 
non-derogation.69  The expropriation of water rights, however acquired, 
without proper compensation will naturally inhibit investment.  The 
consequence of this is that if or when a new legal regime relating to water 
rights is created (for instance when the resource becomes scarce), or 
adverse environmental impacts are discovered, it is important not to 
remove those rights or diminish them without relevant compensation.70  
Grand-parenting of existing allocated rights avoids the negative impact on 
dynamic efficiency of expropriation of those rights.  Provided trading is 
readily available, there should be no problem with grand-parenting of 
existing water rights provided anticipation of same does not result in the 
artificial increase in consumption in order to increase entitlements.71  If, on 
the other hand, grand-parenting leads to an allocation of the resource 
which is inappropriate, the authorities may tender to buy back some 
unused or underused rights, so that those who value them least may cash 
them in, but those who value them more may keep them.  A pro rata 
“haircut” across the board to comply with established minimum water 
levels and flows would initially create inefficient outcomes, but these 
would be ameliorated by subsequent transfers through the market which 
would re-establish efficiency within the reduced allocation. 
(5) Broadening the Market Improves Outcomes.  Layton makes several points 
here.  First (as an economist) he asserts that speculators play a useful 
                                                 
 
69 See Aoraki Water Trust v Meridian Energy Trust Ltd [2005] NZRMA 251 at paragraphs 36-38. 
70 The author gives the example of the economic chaos in Zimbabwe created by the authorities 
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economic role by providing lubrication for the system and thereby 
improving the allocative efficiency of outcomes.  The wider and more 
diverse the source of market participants the better as this will improve the 
outcomes in terms of allocative efficiency.  Secondly, as already 
mentioned in the case of water rights, it is sensible to separate the right to 
take water with the right to use water.  This will free up trading by opening 
the market to those who currently do not have the right to use water.  
Conversely, it should not be essential that those who buy a right to take 
water already have a right to use water.  Finally, prohibiting the transfer of 
water between different types of use (for example irrigation and industrial) 
will preclude water from gravitating to its most valuable use, thereby 
resulting in allocative inefficiency. 
Discussion of general water markets in New Zealand is not novel, and Layton 
concludes his paper with a brief discussion of the New Zealand Business Council 
for Sustainable Development’s 72  publication entitled Sustainable Freshwater 
Management – Towards an Improved New Zealand Approach. 73  This 
comprehensive (and largely hydrological) report suggested a theoretical new 
water allocation framework for New Zealand.  A straw-man approach was 
suggested by the Council with a view to remedying the current water allocation 
systematic shortcomings as it saw them:74  
(a) value-based allocations precluded by the first-in first-served system; 
(b) high transaction costs; 
(c) all allocated water is rarely utilised incurring significant opportunity costs; 
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(d) a diversity of in-stream values are hidden under the “environment” label 
and therefore risks to each in-stream value are unable to be compared to 
risks to other values; 
(e) the risk avoidance policy taken for ecological protection precludes a 
balanced consideration of all risks associated with water allocation 
decisions and risk mitigation policies; and 
(f) lack of short- and long-term security of allocation. 
The report suggests that regional councils will continue to set the rules for 
managing the environmental, recreational, cultural and economic interests in the 
relative catchments, with central government providing guidance through 
National Policy Statements and National Environmental Standards.  Thus, a 
mixed statutory planning and market regimen would be responsible for the 
architecture and stewardship of the water resource – what the Business Council 
refers to as the “best use solution”.75   The community, through the planning 
process, determines the original allocation (as it does now, within limits set by 
central government), but a voluntary market system would be utilised to re-
distribute the water allocated to the tradable pool.   
The salient features of the proposal for New Zealand are as follows: 
(a) by necessity, the water taken would unbundle the “take” from the “use” 
components of the consent; 
(b) the water right would be a secure property right; 
(c) the entitlements would be transferable, pursuant to rules defined in the 
plan for that purpose; 
                                                 
 
75 This was articulated by the then Chief Executive Officer of the Business Council for Sustainable 
Development Peter Neilson at the Annual Conference of the New Zealand Resource Management 




(d) the entitlements would represent a proportional share of the available 
water rather than a guaranteed volume or flow rate; 
(e) these proportional entitlements would be adjustable in accordance with 
scientific or other exigencies;76 
(f) the granting of a permit (the report uses the term “water access 
entitlements”) would take into account relevant reliability of supply; 
(g) Council-promulgated rules would define which voluntary transfers would 
be permitted activities, and those that are discretionary activities; and 
(h) a hibernating entitlement would be considered “used” if it is required in 
the future, but it may be temporarily transferred for a defined period. 
Layton concludes that the Business Council’s proposals are generally in terms 
of the matters mentioned in his paper.  He is critical, however, of some aspects of 
the proposal and some issues may need further reflection, but clearly a great deal 
of thought has been expended on a theoretical market model. 
Regional councils are currently addressing their regional plans to include 
matters required by the National Policy Statement for Freshwater Management, 
including provision for transfer of consents.   
The Waikato Regional Council has already worked on this and completed 
Variation 6 of its Regional Plan.  This is a practical embodiment of Council’s 
requirements to effect a transfer of a consent to take water.  The provisions are 
contained under the heading “Efficient Use of Water”.  A very interesting 
comment is that poorly planned or managed irrigation can result in nutrients from 
the land leaching into a water supply thus causing a degradation of water 
                                                 
 




quality.77 Policy 2 of the integrated Regional Plan includes as an efficient use of 
water the facilitation of the transfer of water take permits, provided such a transfer 
does not offend policies relating generally to water quality and natural 
characteristics and monitoring.   
Policy 3 contains relative provisions for the transfer of water permits, and 
provided the transfer meets the relative requirements contained in the Regional 
Plan, the transfer is concluded by a simple notice signed by both parties and 
delivered to Council no later than 5 working days prior to the date of the transfer.  
Clause 3.4.4.1 of the Regional Plan contains provisions by which the Council will 
play its part in facilitating the transfer process and touting its benefits. It is likely 
that a market system will develop around these transfer provisions.  All-in-all, the 
transfer process under the regional plan is designed to operate within relative 
environmental boundaries. 
5.2 Water Markets in Chile 
As already noted, one jurisdiction where the ecosystem takes no particular 
precedence in a water market economy is that of Chile.  There were a number of 
water reforms in Chile prior to the adoption of the 1981 Water Code.78 The 1981 
version was predicated on the new constitution of the military government of 
Augusto Pinochet.  This constitution embraced free-market economic policies and 
the water code (“the Chilean Model”) was a child of this neo-liberal thinking, 
although to be fair it was also a compromise between the neo-liberals and the 
conservatives.  The “Chicago Boys”79 got most of what they were after: “a laissez 
faire legal framework that allowed private market transactions of water rights, and 
                                                 
 
77 Waikato Regional Council Regional Plan (Variation 6) at 3.4.1. 
78 For example, 1855 State Civil Code, 1951 Water Code, 1967 Water Code. 
79 A group of young Chilean economists, most of whom trained at the University of Chicago under 
Friedman.   
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tight restrictions on government spending and regulation in the water sector”.80  
Crucially though the neoliberals were obliged to abandon the legal rules and 
financial provisions which they felt would have increased the cost of water – 
matters which they believed were important in establishing market discipline and 
efficiency. 
…because agricultural water use was the dominant priority and 
concern among those who wrote the [1981] Water Code, the legal and 
institutional arrangements for other water management issues were 
either overlooked or simply left to the free market.  Problems of river 
basin management, coordination of multiple water uses, conflict 
resolution, economic and environmental externalities, and so forth 
would have to be handled by the general framework of the 1980 
Constitution, which established strong private property rights and 
economic freedom, weak government regulatory agencies, and a 
powerful but incompetent judicial system.81 
 
The chief aim, then, was to establish efficiency by a reallocation system 
within agricultural and irrigation markets.  Secure property rights which could be 
freely traded gave comfort to investors secure in the knowledge that water rights 
would not be expropriated without due compensation.  New water rights may be 
obtained from the Dirección General de Aguas82 provided, however, there was 
evidence that the water was actually available and the new use did not harm 
existing right holders, similar to New Zealand’s initial allocation system.  Any 
competition for the same water was dealt with by way of an auction system, 
unlike New Zealand’s first-in-first-served system.  In a 2008 article, Bauer 
suggests Chile put the cart before the horse: 
In other countries that have allowed or encouraged water 
markets…these markets have been a policy instrument within the 
larger context of water law and regulation.  In Chile this order is 
reversed: water resources management takes place in an institutional 
                                                 
 
80 C Bauer Siren Song (Resources for the Future Washington USA, 2004) at 47. 
81 Ibid, at 50 (written in 2004). 
82 The Directorate General of Water, or DGA. 
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context that has been shaped by and for water markets.  The Chilean 
Water Code is so laissez faire that the overall legal and institutional 
framework has been built in the image of the free market…83 
 
Thus the original objectives of the Code were the primacy of agriculture 
and irrigation, and the assumption was simply that free markets would reallocate 
some of this water to non-agricultural use.  Bauer’s paper admits the system has 
some advantages including (inter alia)84 
(a) the encouragement of private investment in water and infrastructure 
(admittedly variable throughout the country); 
(b) trade has resulted in the re-allocation of water resources (in certain 
circumstances and geographical areas); and 
(c) the creation of non-consumptive water rights has encouraged hydro-
electric schemes, first by the government and later by private companies.85 
The negative impacts however are not unsubstantial:86 
(a) a lack of coordination of multiple water uses in managing river basins, 
together with a lack of integrated management of surface water and 
groundwater; 
(b) the difficulty in resolving water conflicts through both judicial and non-
judicial means; 
(c) the non-internalisation of both economic and environmental externalities; 
                                                 
 
83  C Bauer “The Experience of Chilean Water Markets” (2008) Expo Zaragoza at 3 
<www.zaragosa.es/contenidos/medioambiente/cajaAzul/18s6-P3-carl%20J.520BauerAcc.pdf>.  
84 Ibid, at 5. 
85 Unfortunately, not without serious and uncompensated impacts on other water users, particularly 
irrigators. 
86 Above n 83 at 6; C Bauer Siren Song Resources for the Future, Washington USA, (2004) at 124. 
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(d) a lack of clarification, enforcement, and monitoring of the relationships 
among different property rights and duties, for example the relationship 
between consumptive and non-consumptive water rights; 
(e) a lack of environmental and ecosystem protection; and 
(f) a lack of public assistance to poor farmers to improve social equity in 
matters of water rights and water markets. 
These are complex problems which are, fundamentally, the very challenges 
that an integrated management system ‒ such as New Zealand’s Resource 
Management Act 1991, National Policy Statements, National Environmental 
Standards and specialist Environment Court ‒ is designed to address.  
Addressing the 2005 Chilean reforms, Bauer is of the opinion that these reforms 
did not go far enough, but did improve the situation somewhat: 
(a) there has been an improvement in water rights title information and 
record-keeping; 
(b) management of groundwater has been improved; 
(c) the DGA’s regulatory authority over future grants of water rights has been 
bolstered (but not over existing rights); 
(d) the problem of minimum ecological flow has been addressed; 
(e) most interestingly a fee for non-use has been introduced.  This is designed 
to attack speculators, hoarding, and monopoly of water rights.87 
The current global water crisis is driven by growing scarcity and 
growing conflict, two water problems that are ever more tightly bound 
together.  Although economic principles can be powerful tools for 
dealing with water scarcity, legal and political institutions are the key 
to resolving water conflicts.  Moreover, scarcity is not simply a 
physical problem – rather, it depends on social context and is often 
                                                 
 
87 Perhaps speculators do not provide the right grade of lubricant to the market process, as asserted 
by Layton in his paper (supra at note 73). 
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driven by social factors more than physical factors…This further 
underlines the importance of legal and political institutions in shaping 
the use of economic principles.  In short, the Chilean experience 
confirms the need for a more critical and interdisciplinary approach to 
water law, economics, and policy.88 
 
Bauer is criticising the Chilean system but, by extension, is supporting the 
western American system.   
5.2.1 Contrasting the Chilean and United States Approaches 
The two models are starkly different.  Chile shares a great deal in terms of 
geography and hydrology with the western United States as both have areas which 
are predominantly arid, both have rejected riparianism,89 and both have adopted 
some form of market structure to aid in the re-allocation of water resources.  Both 
have allowed the private ownership of water rights, and have partitioned the 
ownership of water rights and the ownership of land.  Both recognise water as 
usufruct in nature, and acknowledge that there is a difference between ownership 
of the access rights and ownership of the resource per se. While the Chilean 
Model is a creature of statute, the western American system however is generally 
embodied in the doctrine of prior appropriation, an organism of the common law, 
which “grow’d like Topsy” to suit the local conditions.  A critical difference 
though is that unlike Chile, in the western United States a purchaser must show 
need and demonstrate that the water can be put to beneficial use,90 and there is 
provision for forfeiture for non-use.   
While both Chile and the western United States have adopted the market 
system as a means of re-allocation of water entitlements, the Americans have 
                                                 
 
88 Above n 83 at 10.  
89  Generally speaking, in the case of the western United States: some of these American 
jurisdictions retained riparianism in a modified form for example California, Texas, and 
Washington. 
90 Many such jurisdictions define beneficial use by statute. 
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vastly more experience in this regard and have been trading water rights through 
the common law for nearly two centuries.  The relatively recent Colorado-Big 
Thompson system which was established on an administrative transfer model has 
been actively trading water since 1959, and as a result has a large body of 
institutional knowledge.  Accordingly, some examination of that model is 
appropriate.  
5.2.2 The Colorado Big Thompson System 
The Colorado-Big Thompson system is quite different to general western 
American water markets because it avoids the “no injury” rule prevalent 
elsewhere in the west. New Zealand does not have this rule, which states that a 
transfer of a water entitlement may only be completed provided the change does 
not compromise the rights of junior appropriators, which New Zealand does not 
have. 
5.3 Summary 
In summary, then, although there is a lot of legal design that is critical to water 
markets, they have several advantages, chiefly: 
(a) They introduce flexibility into the overall allocative system and can quickly 
allow for changing demands, conditions, and technologies.  Whilst it is 
acknowledged the transfer of water may raise concerns about unwelcome 
changes in local economies, and consequential changes to established local 
social and community order; it needs to be recognised that a functioning 
economy should have a system to allow declining commercial undertakings to 
be displaced by new and vigorous ones. 
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(b) Their utility allows for swift reactive measures in times of need.91 
(c) They allow for a central mechanism by which buyers and sellers interchange 
information about water requirements and demands, suppliers and supplies, as 
well as transfer opportunities and establishing prices. 
(d) Water markets have the potential to promote conservation in the sense that 
they would enable permit-holders to husband their entitlements and sell what 
they save.  This is actually an exercise in opportunity cost economics. That 
system would be easier, quicker, and with less anxiety than the current 
forfeiture/abandonment system in western states.  The corollary of course is 
that by freeing up entitlements that are allocated but unused for whatever 
reason, the burden is reduced on further new allocative demands placed on 
rivers, aquifers, lakes etc. In addition, water markets may afford governments 
and environmental groups the occasion to purchase water for ecological 
purposes for example in-stream flow and water levels.   
Traditionally in the American west, it was regarded as waste to allow water to 
remain in a river unused.  This thinking is, thankfully, changing.  In the period 
1990 -1997, total acquisitions of water in the United States by purchase, lease, or 
donation for in-stream use totalled more than 2.3 million acre-feet ‒ the volume of 
water that will cover one acre of land to a depth of one foot.92  As mentioned the 
Colorado-Big Thompson market system is not typical of general American water 
markets, but has definite lessons for New Zealand and which go well beyond 
simply lessons as a financial market model.  The next chapter will examine the 
Colorado Big-Thompson market system in some depth. 
 
                                                 
 
91 During the major drought in 1991 the state of California was able to purchase water from those 
who did not need it and on-sell to those that did. 




6 Chapter 6. 
6.1 Water Markets:  The Colorado Big-Thompson System. 
The previous chapter illustrated how water markets might function.  It is 
appropriate now to examine overseas experience in a water market and how 
lessons from abroad may assist New Zealand in establishing a water market 
model.  New Zealand has an example of an operating water market in the form of 
the Opuha Dam project near Timaru.  The Opuha project (which was mentioned 
in chapter 4) is a successful one and interestingly the factors driving that success 
are, mutatis mutandis, the same factors driving the success of the western United 
States Colorado-Big Thompson project.   
This very large project represents one of the most active and well-
established water markets in the western United States, but as explained in the 
previous chapter it does not represent the general western American water 
market.1  Opuha and the Colorado-Big Thompson share similarities.  Both are 
used for various irrigation, municipal, industrial, recreational, and hydro-electrical 
benefits, both are largely snow-fed, both have had disasters, 2  and both have 
energised local economies.   
6.2 Reasons why Colorado-Big Thompson has been Successful 
This research has identified that there are four main reasons why the American 
scheme has been so successful, which are common to both Colorado-Big 
Thompson and Opuha.  First, both schemes have clearly-defined water rights 
steeped in contract law: Opuha relies on clearly-defined rights to the company 
                                                 
 
1 It has been actively trading water rights since 1959. 




shares.  Secondly, both projects are defined by their reliability of supply. 3  
Thirdly, in the case of farmers, both are used as a supplementary supply.   
Fourthly, both have a simple and cheap administration system which is the 
absolute core of the success of both systems as it keeps transaction costs to a 
minimum.  That process is crucial to the success of a market system and the 
American project demonstrates this extremely well.  The process also establishes 
why it is proper to examine the American scheme in some detail, given its long 
history.   
The Colorado-Big Thompson scheme has the added advantage of large 
numbers of varied market participants.  However from the perspective of this 
research, both use economic instruments in the form of tradable rights to achieve 
their ends.  Internationally the employment of (formal) water markets for both 
mercantile and environmental application is increasing.  In Colorado there has 
been trading of water-rights for well over 100 years.  In this State, the market 
system is a judicial one and has not been very efficient.  Outside the general 
judicial system however there are examples of districts where water has been 
traded administratively within the district area. One of the most reputable and 
efficient of these markets is operated by the Northern Colorado Water 
Conservatory District with the Colorado-Big Thompson system: 
The water right transfer market that has developed for Colorado-Big 
Thompson (C-BT) Project water in north-eastern Colorado is one of 
the most active and well established water markets in the western U.S. 
C-BT Project water has been actively traded between agriculture, 
municipal and industrial uses since the early 1960s.  In several ways 
the C-BT market symbolises a best case example of existing water 
                                                 
 




markets, because it lacks many of the restrictions or difficulties faced 
by other markets.4  
 
The project has an impressive footprint and an interesting history. The 
project spreads over approximately 250 miles. It stores, regulates, and diverts 
water from the Colorado River on the western slope of the Continental Divide to 
the semi-arid Eastern Slope and employs a comprehensive distribution system. It 
provides supplemental water for irrigation of about 640,000 acres of land, 
municipal and industrial use, hydroelectric power, and water-oriented recreation 
opportunities.  It diverts on average about 213,000 acre-feet of water per annum.5  
It includes no fewer than 12 major storage systems fed by 35 miles of tunnels and 
120 ditches covering 95 miles (the transportation or delivery system), 7 hydro-
electric power plants and provides water for no fewer than 30 cities and towns.  Its 
construction required sophisticated technology for the day.6 
The facility was financed through, and built by, the U.S. Bureau of 
Reclamation.  The U.S. Bureau of Reclamation holds the water rights granted to 
the Federal Government by the state of Colorado to supply the project.  The 
Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District is granted, by contract, the 
perpetual rights to use the water made available by the construction of the project 
(excluding water made available by the Green Mountain Reservoir as well as 
water for Rocky Mountain National Park and the town of Estes Park), provided it 
abides by the terms and conditions contained in the repayment contract with the 
Bureau of Reclamation: 
                                                 
 
4  Ari M. Michelsen “Administrative, Institutional and Structural Characteristics of an Active 
Water Market”. (1994) Water Resources Bulletin, American Water Resources Association 1 at 3. 
5 The Scheme has a total capacity of 310,000 acre-feet. 
6 The Alva B. Adams Tunnel which transfers the water from the western slope of the Colorado 
River to the eastern Front Range of Colorado, runs in a straight line under the Continental Divide, 
is 13 miles long and nearly 10 feet in diameter. 
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16. On payment of all construction repayments by the District as 
required by this contract, and compliance by the District with the 
covenants it is required to perform, the District shall have the 
perpetual rights to use all water excluding water made available by the 
Green Mountain Reservoir and the water rights reserved in Articles 24 
and 25 hereof,7 that become available through the construction and 
operation of this project, for irrigation, domestic, municipal, and 
industrial purposes, but excluding any and all uses for power.8  It is 
agreed and understood that the use of the water made available by the 
project shall be primarily for irrigation and domestic uses; and that the 
manner of delivery shall be to this end…9 
 
The cost of construction of water infrastructure is extremely high.  The 
Bureau, however, was concerned, naturally enough, that the Federal Government 
should secure a means of recovering its construction costs, or at least a decent 
portion thereof.  Thus, the Bureau required the then newly-formed North 
Colorado Water Conservancy District (established in September 1937) to enter 
into a repayment arrangement of the District’s share in advance, but it was agreed 
that the District’s exposure would not exceed $25,000,000 to be repaid over a 
period of 40 years.10  The resultant repayment contract dated 5th July 1938 enabled 
the District to sell its allotments, that is to say a share in the water delivered by the 
project at a predetermined cost; in addition it enabled the District to start 
contracting with potential water users before the project was actually finished and 
the final cost established.  Thus, the District was able to finance its obligations to 
the Federal Government by a combination of taxes,11 wholesale hydro-electric 
sales, and significantly through revenue derived from the allocation and re-
allocation of water allotments. The State of Colorado passed the Water 
                                                 
 
7 Water for the Rocky Mountain National Park and the town of Estes Park. 
8 This was amended on 21st June 1968 to include power, with monetary compensation to the 
Bureau for loss of revenue. 
9 Article 16 Contract between the United States and the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy 
District dated 5th July 1938. 
10 The actual cost was around $164,000,000 although the Bureau thought it would cost about 
$44,000,000.  See O Knight “Correcting Nature’s Error: The Colorado Big Thompson Project” 
(1956) 30(4) Agricultural History 157 at 157. 




Conservancy Act in 1937 which gave the board of directors general powers to sell 
or lease water.12 The crucial factor in all this is that the project was actually 
predicated on a water market model.   
Pursuant to the Water Conservancy Act 1937, the Board of the District 
was granted general powers: 
(b) (I) (A) To take by appropriation, grant, purchase, bequest, devise, 
or lease, and to hold and enjoy water, waterworks, water rights, and 
sources of water supply, and any and all real and personal property of 
any kind within or without the district necessary or convenient to the 
full exercise of its powers; 
(B)  To sell, lease, encumber, alien (sic), or otherwise dispose of 
water, waterworks, water rights, and sources of supply of water for 
use within the district.13 
 
The District had a powerful incentive to ensure that the market model 
functioned efficiently and effectively. Intelligent planning has ensured there are 
several major competitive advantages enjoyed by the Colorado-Big Thompson 
market model: (1) there is a high degree of predictability and surety of water 
supply, (2) the Project does not unduly need to worry about return flows and the 
rights of junior appropriators,14 and (3) the transfers are an administrative rather 
than judicial process. Each of these characteristics will be considered in turn. 
6.2.1 (1) The Predictability of Supply. 
The project was designed to deliver a maximum of 310,000 acre-feet per annum.  
The resultant homogenous allotments are defined in these terms that is, one 
                                                 
 
12 C.R.S. §37-45-118. (See note 17 below). 
13  Water Conservancy Act 1937: 37-45-118.  Although the section omits the reference to 
“beneficial use” as is a general requirement of western water law, the Board has this requirement 
of all its allottees, whether permanent or temporary. See however subsection 37-45-118 (II). 
(Which refers to beneficial use of the waters of the works). 
14 However all return flows are dedicated to downstream users so an owner of a water allotment 
cannot reuse the return flows. 
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allotment equates to one acre-foot, and so there are 310,000 allotments in parcels 
(termed units) divided among the allottees.15 If the project were to deliver a full 
quota of 310,000 acre-feet, each unit would receive a full acre-foot, viz 100%.  If 
the project were to deliver, say, 217,000 acre-feet (that is to say 70%) in any year, 
then each allotment would receive 0·7 of an acre-foot.  The annual quota which 
determines how much water is available to each allotment (similar to the New 
Zealand fisheries quota system) is determined by the hydrologists and engineers 
following the winter precipitation (snowfall, runoff forecast, retained soil 
moisture, current reservoir storage etc.) and then is officially declared by the 
Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District Board of Directors.  The Board 
tries to store water during wet seasons by setting a lower quota during these 
seasons for use during drier seasons.   
Traditionally, the Board has set the quota in April – the beginning of the 
irrigation season - at the beginning of spring and the winter snowmelt.  Initially, 
agriculture held 85% of water allotments; however, starting from the late 1960s 
water began to be re-allocated by sale to municipal16 and industrial uses and, as at 
2011, only 34% of these allotments was held by agricultural water users (that is to 
say irrigators).17  There was a growing demand for year-round water deliveries, so 
the Board in 2001 began declaring an initial quota effective 1st November in each 
year, supplemented by the April quota later in the season.  This enables non-
agricultural entities to better plan their water strategies.  The April quota may be 
increased if, in the opinion of the Board after proper advice, it appears the 
hydrological conditions prevailing in any particular season will allow for it.  Thus 
the market system at the Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District has a 
                                                 
 
15 The average amount supplied between 1953 and 2010 is in the region of 213,000 acre-feet. 
(Northern Colorado Water Conservatory District fact sheet 3 December 2010). 
16 It is notable that in 1937 the population of the District was 75,000.  In 2012 it was 850,000. 




commercial advantage in that once the quota is set there is an absolute surety of 
supply. 
6.2.2 (2) The Prior Appropriation System and Return Flows. 
The rights of junior appropriators are a major hindrance generally to water 
transfers in the American west.  Initially riparianism was the imported water rule.  
Riparian rights link  reasonable use of water to ownership of lands adjacent to a 
water source (rivers, lakes streams etc.). They define water rights generally in 
terms of use of water linked to ownership of adjoining land.18  This doctrine only 
recognises the rights of riparian landowners, and the rights of other potential users 
are not protected by riparian law.19  Importantly, from a western United States 
perspective, a riparian owner has rights to water whether or not those rights are 
exercised – the doctrine does have a concept of reasonable use to protect the 
interests of other riparian owners,20 but it does not rely on the actual initiation and 
continuing use - especially beneficial use - of the water for its validity.   
It was quite clear to the early settlers that, in an arid land where rivers 
were few but arid acreages were staggeringly huge, the riparian system would 
simply not work – it “tended greatly to prevent the very development which made 
the lands valuable.”21   In any case, the miners were the driving force for change 
in the west – they were working federal land and could not legally claim a riparian 
right based on ownership.  Thus, in most states, including Colorado, although the 
                                                 
 
18 See A Dan Tarlock, James N Corbridge Jr, David Getches, and Reed Benson Water Resource 
Management (6th ed, Foundation Press, New York, 2009) at 112. 
19 New Zealand generally abandoned riparianism in 1967: Water and Soil Conservation Act of that 
year, and replaced it with an administrative allocation mechanism.  See section 21 Water and Soil 
Conservation Act 1967 and section 354 Resource Management Act 1991; also FM Brookfield 
“Water” in The Laws of New Zealand (Butterworths, Wellington, 1997) 60 at para 51. 
20 In the case where there may be insufficient supply to meet the needs of all relative riparian 
owners the water is rationed according to a broad standard of “reasonableness”. 




riparian system was initially imported, it was abandoned in favour of the prior 
appropriation system.  This prior appropriation system was born in the west, as 
Professor Sax states: “It is a great example of the law of necessity becoming the 
law of the land.”22  It is also a grand example of American practical self-help in a 
region with little, if any, legal infrastructure at the time. One of the leading cases 
states that the diversion and use of water in Colorado had transformed a parched 
land into something of immense value.  Riparianism was totally impractical in 
Colorado, and that, as a matter of practical necessity, the first to appropriate water 
for a beneficial purpose has the prior right to the water, and that right must be 
protected. 23  It is possible to discern the justification of the prior appropriation 
doctrine in terms of individual riparian rights sacrificed on the altar of national 
development, in which a larger number of people have a vested interest.24 
In basic terms the prior appropriation system is a water distribution system 
that enables a person (or entity) to simply take – or appropriate – water  and apply 
it to a beneficial use in a non-wasteful manner with due diligence.  There is 
actually a hint of utilitarianism in the doctrine, and in the Colorado Supreme 
Court decision in Coffin, notably Bentham’s greater happiness principle.  In the 
nineteenth century, utilitarianism played an important role in the democratic and 
political reforms in Britain and its spheres of influence.  With a strict 
interpretation of utilitarianism, an act is not right or obligatory because of its 
inherent character, underlying motives or its relation to divine or other dictates; 
but rather due to the overall human happiness and well-being it produces.25  
                                                 
 
22 Joseph Sax “Why I Teach Water Law” (1984-5) 18 U Mich J L Reform 273 at 274. 
23 Coffin et al. v Left Hand Ditch Company (1882) 6 Colo. 443, at 446-7. 
24 See Terry L Anderson and PJ Hill “The Evolution of Property Rights: A Study of the American 
West” (1975) 18 J L & Econ 163; Donald Pisani “Enterprise and Equity: A Critique of Western 
Water Law in the Nineteenth Century” (1987) 18 Western Hist Q 15. 
25 See, generally, JH Burns (ed)The Collected Works of Jeremy Bentham - An Introduction to the 
Principles of Morals and Legislation (The Althone Press, London, 1970). 
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Importantly, the contemporary emphasis on conservation of a resource in 
an era of gross and profligate waste of other natural resources is particularly 
noteworthy.26  By diverting water, the appropriator acquires a usufructuary right 
but which is an actual property right capable of being held totally independent of 
the title to the land, provided the aforementioned conditions are adhered to.27  The 
fact that the water right is independent means that it can theoretically be traded 
among others, thus ensuring its circulation.  The priority is actually 
chronological, 28  and is determined by the date on which the water was first 
appropriated.29  The first appropriator is termed the “senior appropriator”, and the 
others are termed “junior”: no.1, no.2, no.3 and so on in chronological order of 
their appropriations.  When water becomes scarce, the most junior appropriator 
must discontinue his or her water supply to ensure the supply of his or her 
immediate  chronological superior, and so on up the water rights chain.   
This might appear at first blush to be a relatively straight-forward system, 
but an extra variable is added to the equation in the form of return flows.30  The 
essence is in terms of the interests of others.  In a lot of cases the use of the 
appropriated water is not totally consumptive, − a large portion and in the case of 
irrigation (by far the most common usage of appropriations) something like fifty 
per cent either evaporates or flows back to the stream from whence it came,31 
                                                 
 
26 See, generally, Charles F. Wilkinson Crossing the Next Meridian (Island Press, Washington 
USA1992).  
27 See Schilling v Rominger 4 Colo 100 (1878) at 103; Coffin v Left Hand Ditch Co 6 Colo 443 
(1882) at 446.  
28 Literally “first in time, first in right”. 
29 Or, when the first work was commenced on a project which would take time to complete.  See 
Sax Thompson Leshy and Abrams Legal Control of Water Resources (4th ed, Thompson/West 
Publishing Company, St. Paul, 2006) at 125-126. 
30 With the Colorado-Big Thompson project, an allotment is for one use only and any return flows 
are forfeited back to the scheme and cannot be appropriated or sold.  The thinking behind this 
policy is that when constructed the system was new and the water imported, therefore there were 
no downstream users, and consequently it did not have to contend with pre-existing claims: see 
Article 19 Repayment Contract with U.S. Bureau of Reclamation. 




either above ground as surface water in return sloughs and ditches, or below 
ground as groundwater return flows through a shallow alluvial aquifer.  Thus, the 
returned water is used (and re-used) as it flows down the river.  Accordingly, 
many water rights depend on return flows,32 and any alteration to the location and 
use pattern of upstream water use may affect other downstream appropriators if 
their rights depend on existing historic patterns of use.  Under general western 
water law, the “no injury” rule prevails whereby a transfer of a water right (or a 
portion thereof) may not cause damage to other users,33 thereby protecting the 
rights of downstream third parties to their return flows.   
It can be easily appreciated how complicated this can be and is best 
illustrated by a hypothetical example.34  “A” has an entitlement, from a fully 
allocated stream, to 20 cubic feet per second (cfs), which is used April – 
September in each year for irrigation, and he is proposing to sell 16 cfs of his 
entitlement to “B”, an urban water agency who historically has returned fifty per 
cent of its entitlement as return flow.  There are junior appropriators downstream. 
“A” only consumes twenty-five per cent of his entitlement35 which means that 
historically 15cfs of “A”’s water returns to the stream for use by junior 
appropriators.  If “B” takes 16 cfs, only 11 cfs will be available to juniors (“A” 
will continue to use twenty-five per cent of the remainder of his entitlement, “B” 
will return 8 cfs which means that 11 cfs is available to juniors, not the 15 cfs as 
before.)  The solution is to allow “B” only 8 cfs, of which 4 will be returned: this 
4 plus the 8 left in the stream (half of the 16 originally proposed to be sold) plus 
the 3 cfs returned by “A” from his remaining entitlement equals 15 cfs.  However, 
                                                 
 
32 Return flows are not classified as wasted or abandoned water. 
33 There is a major practical difficulty in establishing the actual volume of consumptive use and 
return flows of a particular right, thereby significantly adding to transaction costs on sale or lease. 
34  Given in Sax, Thompson, Leshy, and Abrams Legal Control of Water Resources (4th ed, 
Thomson/West Publishing Company, St. Paul, 2006) at 270-271. 
35 The inefficiency may be excused under the “community custom” rule. See discussion in State of 
Washington Department of Ecology v Grimes 121 wash 2d 459 (Wash 1993). 
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if “B” intends to use its new entitlement all year round (in the case that, say, “B” 
is a municipality), this would compromise the junior appropriators during October 
– March which under the “no injury” rule would not be allowed.  Further, there 
may be differences in timing of the return flow which may affect junior 
appropriators who rely on “A”’s return flow during the allowed period of April – 
September.  It may, for instance, take days or weeks for “A”’s return flow to find 
its way back to the stream.  “A”’s use in September may support juniors in 
October, but if “B” returns water faster (or slower) than “A” there may not be 
enough water in October to support the junior, and a change in the timing may 
contravene the “no injury rule”. 
In New Zealand we do not have a prior appropriation system, at least not 
in the American sense of that expression.  Importantly, return flows are not an 
issue here.  As part of this research all our Regional Councils were contacted and 
questioned on this point and none factors return flows into its allocative calculus36 
except in cases of non-consumptive use for example hydro-electricity.  New 
Zealand is very fortunate in this regard. 
6.2.3 (3) Administrative Transfers. 
The Colorado-Big Thompson market system also avoids the complexity of junior 
rights and return flows as its initial allocation mechanism is proportional, not 
appropriative, which means the entitlement may be used entirely (with only one 
use) and the interests of junior appropriators are irrelevant, because there are 
none, except to the extent that they are entitled to whatever return flows there are.  
Thus, the District is freed from the complication of managing return flows which 
simply devolve to the District for further distribution.  This clearly suggests a 
much simpler, cheaper and quicker transfer mechanism (a permanent transfer is a 
                                                 
 
36 One Council was distressingly forthright and admitted it was still trying to work out how much 
water it had actually allocated to users. 
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little more complex) within the District boundaries which is exactly what the 
architects of the scheme intended.   Speedy transfer of agriculture-to-agriculture  
allotments is critical to irrigated agriculture in semi-arid regions. 
In general western water law, initially when an appropriation was made 
there was little, if any, government authority overseeing the process, and 
consequently there was no useful public record of users’ appropriation.37  The 
emerging judicial system of the time was utilised to resolve disputes and claims 
were settled by evidence, such as there was.  This was clearly unsatisfactory and 
state-by-state an administrative permit system has been introduced for 
appropriations (except in Colorado which is a judicial process), which has since 
developed to require state administrative bodies, for example State Water Board, 
to include functions such as regulating initial uses, keeping proper records, 
recording diversions, changes of use, and abandonment. 38   The role of these 
administrative bodies is much more substantial than initially envisaged, but most 
importantly it does provide a proper public record.  It is in fact a quasi-judicial 
office with which any proposed changes in water use needs to be filed.  In the 
state of Colorado outside the Colorado Big Thompson Scheme the system is 
wholly judicial whereby a special water court considers an application for 
appropriation and later transfer.  In each system ‒administrative or judicial ‒ 
transaction costs and delay impact on the efficiency of the transfer process, 
despite any understanding that the transfer would finally eventuate.39   
With the Colorado-Big Thompson system the initial allocation and later 
transfer is accomplished through an entirely administrative process, which is in 
contrast with the rest of the state of Colorado. The procedure is short and cheap 
                                                 
 
37  See Sax, Thompson, Lehy, and Abrams Legal Control of water Resources (4th ed, 
Thomson/West Publishing Company, St. Paul, 2006) at 131. 
38  In California the administration also determines whether an application is in the “public 
interest”. 
39 Above n 37 at 269. 
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and is not concerned about adverse impacts on others.  The administrative transfer 
procedure is straight-forward and clearly defined by the Northern Colorado Water 
Conservancy District’s rules.  There are other advantages in the system’s transfer 
process.  Return flows may be retaken by the system as there are no juniors, but 
individual efficiency savings may be transferred ‒ unused water may be 
transferred to another location and use with the approval of the directors.   
There is a contrast between this system and the general western water law 
where a transferor may only transfer water that has been put to beneficial use by 
the transferor.  There is clearly an incentive within the Colorado Big-Thompson 
system to be efficient and conserve water which can then be sold or leased to 
someone else.  Not all western states have adopted conserved water programmes 
(including Colorado), which would allow such a process and in those states that 
have not there is no such incentive as the conserved water is forfeited back to the 
system.  However, there is a strict requirement of beneficial use of the water and 
this is one of the few restrictions on the transfer of Colorado-Big Thompson 
water,40 a restriction totally in harmony with the rest of the western United States.  
There is an overall concern that something valuable and in short supply should be 
used wisely and that there be no opportunity or suggestion of abuse of a rare but 
common resource. 
The Colorado Water Conservancy Act gives the directors of the Northern 
Colorado Water Conservancy Board wide and all-encompassing powers, 41 
including the power to gather waterworks and water rights (including the right to 
exercise powers of eminent domain42) as well as, generally, the power to construct 
and maintain facilities.  The board of directors also has the power to levy and 
                                                 
 
40 This is enshrined in the Water Conservancy Act 1927: 37-45-118 (IV) (f). 
41 See C.R.S. §37-45-118. 
42 The right to compulsorily acquire private property for public purposes. 
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collect tax upon all real estate property within the district.43  In this regard the 
District is a quasi-municipal entity.  This is limited to between one-half a mill on 
the dollar to three mills on the dollar, depending on the valuation of each district, 
and whether it is yet to receive water from the project.  A mill is equal to one 
dollar per one thousand dollars on the valuation of each individual property within 
each district.  This tax is to be added to levies received from sales of water to 
municipalities (class B assessments), large corporations (class C assessments), 
and other landowners who also demonstrate a beneficial use (irrigation) for the 
water (class D assessments).  It is these class B, C, and D water rights which are 
actively traded.   
Whilst it might be assumed the Project with its size, value, and market 
activity would be ordained with a large amount of legal apparatus and dispute 
resolution mechanisms necessary to undertake the administration of such an active 
and dynamic water market, in fact this is not so.   The entire water allotment and 
trading process is managed administratively by the board of directors which 
derives its authority from statute: 
The board shall have the following powers … To make and enforce 
all reasonable rules and regulations for the management, control, 
delivery, use, and distribution of water. 44 
 
Transfers are either permanent or temporary.  The process is entirely simple 
and clearly defined by the District.  To achieve a permanent transfer, all that is 
necessary is a simple application form signed by both parties.  Basic information 
is all that is needed, particularly copies of titles to the properties concerned (where 
the transfer is to another farmer) to enable the District to ensure the rectitude of 
the process.  The purchaser must however demonstrate a justification for the 
                                                 
 
43 C.R.S. §37-45-121 (1) (a); §37-45-122.   
44 C.R.S. §37-45-134 (1) (a) and (b) (2014). 
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transaction by establishing a beneficial use for the water.45  The District charges a 
flat fee of $200 currently, irrespective of the amount of water traded.  The cost of 
title searches are in addition to this amount.  District staff physically inspect the 
purchaser’s property to ensure the stated beneficial use is legitimate and that the 
water procured is supplemental to existing water rights for the property.  The 
completed application is simply submitted to the board of directors which 
considers and if proper approves it at its monthly meeting.  Even after approval a 
further physical check is made to confirm matters.  This takes up to two weeks.  In 
essence, then, the maximum time it might take to effect a sale is no more than six 
weeks, but typically around four.  The judicial process in the rest of Colorado on 
the other hand can take cost tens of thousands of dollars and take up to eighteen 
months to complete.46  Temporary transfers in the Colorado-Big Thompson are 
even simpler – the parties simply lodge a postcard with the District which then 
actions the matter without charge.  By its very nature, a temporary transfer does 
not attract the same rules as to beneficial use as does a sale.  The District’s 
website has provision for buyers and sellers to make contact with each other, thus 
greatly simplifying the process of finding a trading partner. 
It is clear the simple trading system enjoyed by the District raises issues 
about organisation theory, that is to say the corporate framework and the structure 
of systems external to that framework which affect business efficiency, coupled 
with an exercise in simple transaction cost economics, that is, the cost of 
conducting business.  A simple and well-understood process will contribute 
significantly to a reduction in the overall cost of transacting business, and 
conversely a Byzantine system would almost certainly increase the overall cost.47  
                                                 
 
45 Municipalities are allowed a certain measure of leeway and may hold “conditional water rights” 
in anticipation of future growth – an example of typical American practicality. 
46  See Sax, Thompson, Lehy, and Abrams Legal Control of Water Resources (4th ed, 
Thomson/West Publishing Company, St. Paul, 2006) at 269. 
47 See generally Oliver E. Williamson “The Economics of Organization: The Transaction Cost 
Approach” (1981) 87 American Journal of Sociology 548-577. 
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New institutional economics suggests that the concepts of organisation theory and 
transaction cost economics are actually mirror-images of each other.  Given that 
economics in general, and the market system in particular, are both principally 
concerned with the administration of resources for which purchasers are 
competing; organisational structures are important in terms of the impact their 
mechanisms have on the ultimate distribution and re-distribution of those 
resources.  In this context, systems and economic organisations matter, and matter 
a great deal because they are instrumental in making markets work better.  These 
systems consist of procedural rules and regulations as well as dispute-resolution 
mechanisms.  Navigation through these obstacles can be extremely expensive and 
time-consuming.48   
The Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District’s systems keep these 
matters to a minimum through its board of directors’ procedure.  The process is 
mostly reduced to a type of scientific positivism by the employment of engineers 
and hydrologists, although the beneficial use requirement necessitates a certain 
degree of judicial decision-making; however, this is a well-understood concept.  
Interestingly these “institutions” also employ informal rules like codes of conduct 
and customs.  Transaction cost economics assume that human beings are capable 
of opportunistic behaviour, that is to say a tendency to pursue personal interests,49 
and the District’s practice of double-checking each water transfer after the final 
order is made, but also before the transfer actually takes place is entirely 
appropriate and suitably cautious.  In other words, the directors do not merely pay 
lip-service to informal arrangements  ̶  these arrangements are formalised, 
illustrating the inherent tension between the cost of systems and the potential risk 
to efficiency by relaxing those systems.  It is, of course, cost-effective to shape 
                                                 
 
48  See Sax, Thompson, Lehy, and Abrams Legal Control of Water Resources (4th ed, 
Thomson/West Publishing Company, St. Paul, 2006) at 269. 
49 M Turvani “Illegal Markets and New Institutional Economics” in C Menard (ed) Transaction 
Cost Economics (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, 1997) 127 at 129. 
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cultures and routines, and efficient governance leads to efficiency which in turn 
leads to cost-effectiveness.  It is important to remember that the District’s water 
market system is less a true competitive market, but rather more the transfer of 
clearly-defined legal rights to district allotments demonstrates a low-cost 
transaction procedure.  The architecture of the District’s allotment and market 
structure ensures transactions are cheap because they are book-ended by easily 
understood protocols on the one hand and an appropriate and pragmatic safeguard 
against opportunism in the form of speculation on the other. 
The performance of any water market, the Northern Colorado included, is 
related to contract law and clarity of agreement and thoroughness of completion 
of those contracts are critical elements.  Traditionally in contract law the identity 
of the parties is irrelevant.  In the District’s case, while the parties may be at arm’s 
length and may not be perfectly acquainted with each other, they are both under 
the eye of all other allottees.  Such conditions must have an influence on the 
establishment of the character of its market system, especially given the parties 
must remain in a continuing relationship within the District boundaries.  These 
conditions also help towards easing the governance by the board of directors and 
simple governance is appropriate for simple contracts.  In addition the District 
processes a multitude of contracts, and the more often these are processed the less 
opportunity for uncertainty to cloud the arrangements.  These frequent and 
common-form trades ensure transaction-specific costs may be kept to a minimum. 
6.3 The District’s Requirement of Beneficial Use 
The District derives authority to make reasonable rules and regulations for the 
management, control, delivery, use and distribution of water under the Water 
Conservancy Act and these rules are contained in Book 2 of the Northern 
Colorado Water Conservancy District Rules and Regulations.  Five provisions 
have a common denominator of “beneficial use” which is knitted into the very 




Rule I: Water must be used for beneficial purposes 
The Board shall have power on behalf of the District: 
To appropriate and otherwise acquire water and water rights; … to 
provide, sell, lease, and deliver water for municipal and domestic 
purposes, irrigation, power, milling, manufacturing, mining, 
metallurgical, and any and all other beneficial uses …” 
Beneficial uses can only be those permitted by the constitution and 
statutes of Colorado. 
 
Rule II: Water allotted for irrigation must be a supplemental 
supply. 
“The board shall make an allotment of water to petitioning owners of 
land in the district upon which water can be beneficially used … in 
such amount as will in the judgment of the board, together with the 
present supply of water for irrigation purposes on such lands, make an 
adequate water supply for irrigation of such lands …” 
 
Rule III: All water allotted shall be classed by types of service and 
different rates of payment may be applied against each class of 
service. 
In addition to supplemental irrigation allotments, “…water not 
allotted to lands … shall be sold, leased, or otherwise disposed of; 
provided that rates shall be equitable, although not necessarily equal 
or uniform, for like classes of service throughout the district.” 
(A) Interpretations and policies of the Board:- 
(1) From the numerous beneficial uses named in the statute, the 
Board grouped such uses into four classes of service: 
1. Municipal and domestic 
2. Industrial 
3. Multi-purpose (Industrial and Irrigation) 
4. Supplemental irrigation. 
 
Rule IV: The Beneficial uses of water supply allotted by the 
District shall be restricted to the area lying within the District. 
While the statute authorises the Board to provide, sell, lease, or 
otherwise dispose of water for beneficial purposes, it does so – “… 
provided the sale, leasing, and delivery of water … shall only be made 
for use within the District.” 
 
Rule V: Delivery of water shall be withheld from any allottee or 
allotment beneficiary in case of:- 
(1) Default or delinquency of payment of any assessments or charges 
due the District; 
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(2) Non-compliance with provisions of any contract or agreement 
with the District; and 
(3) Non-compliance with or violation of the rules and regulations of 
the Board.50 
 
With a water right transfer transactions, especially a cheap 
administrative process, there is the danger that the system may be put at 
risk and abused by speculators.  Hence the requirement that any water 
right held is actually put to a beneficial use is clearly of major importance 
in the management of its water resources by the District and this is a 
doctrine that is in the very DNA of western American water law. The 
term is used in all western states’ water codes and even in some state 
constitutions.  The wording of nine state codes is virtually identical.51  
Even Rule V (3) distinctly suggests that supply will be curtailed in the 
event the water is not put to beneficial use.52   
 
In general western water law, there is a sustainability calculus in the 
beneficial use principle: an intention to wring the best outcome from a 
scarce resource.  In terms of a resource management discussion, the 
success of the Colorado-Big Thompson’s husbandry of its water resources 
is due to an integrated system of low-cost market efficiency coupled with 
careful practical management with an eye firmly on the beneficial use 
requirement.  If New Zealand were to adopt a water market model, a 
beneficial use requirement will be as pertinent here as it is in America 
because the doctrine addresses head-on issues of sustainability, 
efficiency, and a protection against speculation.  It is entirely appropriate 
                                                 
 
50 These are partial extracts of the relative rules. 
51 See Janet Neuman “Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for Efficiency 
in Western Water Law” (1998) 28 Envtl L 919 at 923-4.   








7  Chapter 7 
7.1 Beneficial Use – A Background. 
The Colorado-Big Thompson market system insists that its water is put to 
beneficial use.  A requirement of this nature is general in all western American 
state water laws.  This chapter will argue that beneficial use is a water resource 
management tool of some utility to New Zealand.  The challenge facing water 
managers is summed up by Tarlock, Corbridge, Getches and Benson as the craft 
the sharing a scarce resource among competing users but at the same time taking 
into account geographic and temporal mismatch of water supplies.1  
New Zealand does not currently have a beneficial use doctrine; however, 
one objective contained in both New Zealand National Policy Statements for 
Freshwater Management is that of B3 “[t]o improve and maximise the efficient 
allocation and the efficient use of water.”  Such a prescription would, it is 
submitted, include the introduction and action of some beneficial use of water 
doctrine in New Zealand.  The repealed Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 
had a form of this doctrine.  The preamble to that Act declared that its objective 
was “to make better provision for the conservation, allocation, use, and quality of 
natural water.”   
The National Water and Soil Conservation Authority under the 1967 Act 
was directed to address beneficial use in its statutory duties under section 14:   
14 (3) (d)  To co-ordinate all matters relating to natural water so as to 
ensure that this natural asset is available to meet as many demands as 
possible and is used to the best advantage of both the country and the 
region in which it exists in the course of nature. 
                                                 
 
1  A Dan Tarlock, James N Corbridge, D H Getches, and Reed D Benson Water Resource 
Management (6th ed, Foundation Press, New York, 2009), at 1. 
180 
 
(m) To promote the best uses of natural water, including multiple 
uses, and to allocate natural water between competing demands. 
 
“Used to the best advantage” and “best uses” strongly suggests of a 
beneficial use notion.  It is noteworthy that the advantage should accrue to the 
country and the region, unlike the American system where the benefit accrues to 
the individual, but, by extension, the region and country would benefit 
accordingly.  Under section 20 of the 1967 Act, Regional Water Boards were 
required to factor beneficial use into their statutory functions: 
20 (5) (c)  …the Board shall promote the protection of water supplies 
of local authorities and the conservation and most beneficial uses of 
natural water within the region. 
 
Applications in respect of natural water were made to the Regional Water 
Board (usually the local Catchment Board acting in this capacity) as required by 
section 24.  Under the Water and Soil Conservation Regulations 1968, the first 
schedule thereto comprised the form of the application, and this form required the 
description of the purpose for which the water is to be used.   
In Greensill v Northland Catchment Commission, the Board held that 
“beneficial use” means that the applicant: “must show amongst other things the 
extent to which the use of the water applied for will be beneficial to him.”2  The 
Court of Appeal in Keam v Minister of Works and Development3 had the final say 
as the meaning and impact of the beneficial use imperative contained in section 
20(5)(c) of the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967.  The Minister of Works 
and Development had applied to take geothermal water.  The application was 
granted by the Water and Soil Conservation Authority in the first instance, but, on 
appeal, the Planning Tribunal had taken the view that it was required to weigh the 
                                                 
 
2 Greensill v Northland Catchment Commission (1971) NZTPA 59 at 59. 
3 Keam v Minister of Worksand Development [1982] 1 NZLR 319 (Court of Appeal). 
181 
 
competing public interest by balancing the benefit that would accrue from the 
exploration of the geothermal field against the benefit of preserving the field for 
scenic attraction and scientific study (Dr. Keam was a scientist).  The Tribunal 
stated it would expect that a comprehensive plan of exploration would first be 
prepared and that a decision to explore would not be made without full evaluation 
of the likely consequences.   
The Chief Justice in the High Court held that in weighing up the benefit 
and losses from use: 
Consideration of beneficial use is only necessary where a water 
supply cannot meet in full all demands for water within the region.  If 
all the demands of a region and likely future demands can adequately 
be met from the sources of water available, the fact that a professed 
use is not beneficial use should not of itself result in a water right 
being declined4 
 
So, according to the learned Judge section 20(5) (c) should read as follows 
to better identify its intent: 
…so far as may be necessary a Board shall promote the protection of 
water supplies of local authorities and the conservation and most 
beneficial uses of water so far as may from time to time be necessary 
to meet in full all demands for or in respect of natural water within the 
region.5 
 
His Honour is suggesting the provision is too broad and uncertain without 
his addition.  In the Court of Appeal, Cooke J approved of this approach, and also 
approved of the approach taken by the Planning Tribunal of balancing the benefits 
to both exploration and preservation, and further that any proposed use must be a 
beneficial use.  However his Honour also agreed with the Chief Justice:  
                                                 
 
4 Minister of Works and Development and National Water and Soil Conservation Authority v 
Keam (1981) 7 NZTPA 289, at 294 per Davison CJ. 
5 Ibid, at 294. 
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It is as a useful general test of that kind that I understand the Planning 
Tribunal’s proposition in its decision in this case [emphasis added] 
that any proposed use of natural water should be a beneficial use, and 
that the loss which might follow from the taking of the water would 
be weighed against the benefit which will result from its use.  
… 
But there may be cases where the Tribunal’s broad test will be 
inappropriate, at any rate if read literally.  For example there might be 
an application to abstract some water for a limited term from a source 
of supply so abundant that during that term there is no reasonable 
possibility of any shortage at all or any other consequence damaging 
to anyone.  In that kind of case it would be wrong, I think, to apply 
the benefit test in any exacting way.  Then it should be enough that 
the applicant wished to have the right for some legitimate purpose 
which he considered of benefit to him.6 
 
These comments suggest two things.  First, the expression “of benefit to him” 
would suggest a judicial interpretation of section 20(5) (c) which differs 
significantly from the prescription in section 14(3) (d).  That provision required 
the National Water and Soil Conservation Authority to ensure water be used to the 
best advantage of both the country and the region.  Section 20(5) (c) simply states 
that the water should be used for the “most beneficial uses of natural water within 
the region”.  Benefit to the individual is not expressed, but may be inferred.  
Secondly, the beneficial use doctrine under the Water and Soil Conservation Act 
differs significantly in both scale and substance from the doctrine as developed by 
the common law in western United States’ jurisdictions as we shall see.  To be fair 
though our version did not have time to mature since it was scrapped by the 
Resource Management Act in 1991 and replaced by an effects-based model.   
In New Zealand, major changes to natural resources law have been made 
legislatively and the Resource Management Act 1991 is a good example of this.  
In America, a sea-change of approach to water law was made through the 
common law.  In both cases change was effected to address a need.  The doctrine 
                                                 
 
6 Keam v Minister of Works and Development [1982] 1 NZLR 319, at 322-323. (Court of Appeal). 
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of beneficial use is a home-grown American notion conceived as a matter of 
practical necessity. 
The concept of riparian rights where only the landowners adjacent to 
waterways would have access to water must have seemed totally impractical to 
English eyes accustomed to gazing at a green and pleasant land but now seeing 
only an arid landscape.  There was already trouble in England, however.  Riparian 
law had evolved somewhat from the relatively temperate pastoral simplicity of the 
Romans, on whose notions the riparian common law was based.7  Getzler suggests 
that after centuries of comparative constancy, human society evolved from the 
simple agrarian model to a less simple agrarian model (an outcome of both an 
improvement in agricultural techniques and productivity in the Middle Ages to the 
Agrarian Revolution in the eighteenth century), to a (subsequent) industrial model 
of the nineteenth century.8  That evolution continues today.   
The water requirements of a simple seventeenth century agricultural system 
are quite different to the water requirements of factory production in the 
nineteenth century, which in turn is different to the water requirements of, say, 
contemporary hydro-electric (or for that matter nuclear) power production.  Many 
factors worked to make a strict riparian doctrine unstable:  ironically the doctrine 
reflected its own subject matter in that flowing water is inherently in a state of 
persistent change, as is the demand for the water and the end use of it.  Water 
allocation rules had accordingly more or less developed in a way to accommodate 
the ever-growing demand for their subject matter.  The standard image of 
nineteenth century industrialised England is probably the “dark Satanic Mill” 
blighting a green grandeur.  But Blake was writing about that in 1804, long before 
steam became prevalent (high technology for the times) so his mills were, at that 
                                                 
 
7 J Getzler A History of Water Rights at Common Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004) at 
1-2. 
8 Ibid, at 8-45. 
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time, powered by the humble water-wheel.  In fact, it was the demand for more 
water-wheels which compelled judges to try and seek legal solutions to 
accommodate the needs of these new players.  There were between 10,000 and 
20,000 watermills in Britain by about 1700, and up to five watermills for every 
mile of usable stream in some areas – figures that were multiplied many times 
over by the time industrialisation really accelerated.9  Getzler is of the view that 
the common law was ultimately quite unable to govern water entitlements, and an 
ad hoc regime of private and public statutes was used to perform the task10.   
7.2 The American “Practical” Approach. 
In the American west, water law similarly evolved to meet demand from milling, 
mining, and agriculture.  The prior appropriation model was introduced to spread 
the water supply beyond the bounds of the riparian system to supply water over a 
parched landscape.11  Professor Tarlock is of the view that the beneficial use 
requirement of the prior appropriation doctrine was originally imposed to control 
purely paper acquisitions of water so that appropriations were limited to the 
amount of water actually put to use rather than the amount claimed.  He traces the 
possible genesis of the notion to the early Mormon settlements in Utah and their 
irrigation practices.  The early Church predicated the privilege of property 
ownership on the productive, non-speculative use of that property.12   
As developed the beneficial use doctrine has certain core characteristics.  
It controls the use of water by individuals, but displays a degree of flexibility.  
There is a general uniformity of application throughout the western states of 
America, but appropriators must have some proprietary interest in the land to 
                                                 
 
9 J Getzler A History of Water Rights at Common Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004) at 
22. 
10 Ibid, at 44. 
11 See Coffin v Left Hand Ditch Company 6 Colo 443 at 446. 
12 A. Dan Tarlock Law of Water Rights and Resources (Thomson Reuters/West Eagon Press, 
Minnesota, 2012) at 323. 
185 
 
which the water right is attached.   The doctrine is absolutely the very basis of the 
body of western water law. “The water codes of all the western states and some 
state constitutions include the term ‘beneficial use’”.13  It is generally described as 
“the basis, measure, and limit of an appropriative right” by western water statutes: 
“Statutes of nine states intone in nearly identical language that ‘beneficial use, 
without waste, is the basis, measure, and limit of a water right.”14  Riparianism 
began to lose its grip in the early Rhode Island milling case of Tyler v Wilkinson15 
which departed from the general English riparian principle at the time that riparian 
owners were entitled to receive their water without obstruction or diminution 
(except for reasonable domestic and stock use), but the real question is what 
amounts to “reasonable use”.16  The judge goes on to say that an appropriation too 
may be recognised either by a grant from all the proprietors whose interest is 
affected by the appropriation, or by a long exclusive enjoyment without 
interruption (twenty years) which affords a just presumption of right.17 
It was, however, the mining industry which drove the need for change.  
Charles F Wilkinson makes the point that the miners had a simple rule – first in 
time, first in right: a principle based on simple common sense.  That principle 
extended to a due diligence rule which required the miner to actively work his 
claim, or the right was lost.  Later developments were consistent with utilitarian 
objectives and an appropriator had to ‘divert’ water by physically taking it out of 
the watercourse.  Importantly the water had to be put to a beneficial use. 18 
                                                 
 
13 Janet C Neuman “Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: the Inefficient Search for Efficiency in 
Western Water Law” (1998) 28 Envtl L 919 at 923. 
14 Ibid, at 923-4. 
15 Tyler v Wilkinson 24 F. Cas. 472 (CCRI 1827).  As to reasonable use see also the later English 
case of Swindon Waterworks Company v Wilts and Berks Canal Navigation Company (1875) LR 7 
HL 697 (HL). See J Getzler A History of Water Rights at Common Law (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2004) at 321. 
16 Per Storey J at 474. 
17 Ibid, at 474.   
18 Charles F. Wilkinson Crossing the Next Meridian (Island Press, Washington, 1992) at 232-234. 
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The landmark decision is the 1855 Californian case of Irwin v Phillips.19  
Irwin had diverted all of a stream from its natural course to his mining operations 
quite some distance away.  Phillips and Jordan later occupied the stream bank but 
found they lacked water for their requirements, so they diverted some of Irwin’s 
water back to the streambed.  Irwin sued and won at local level.  The Supreme 
Court of California considered the matter.  A complicating factor was an 1850 
Statute: 
The common law of England, so far as it is not repugnant to or 
inconsistent with the constitution of the United States or the 
constitution of this State, is the rule of decision in all the courts of this 
State.20 
 
Delivering the decision, Heydenfeldt, J. stated: 
Among the most important are the rights of miners to be protected in 
the possession of their selected localities, and the rights of those who, 
by prior appropriation, have taken the waters from their natural beds, 
and by costly artificial works have conducted them for miles over 
mountains and ravines, to supply the necessities of gold diggers, and 
without which the most important interests of the mineral region 
would remain without development.21 
 
Implicit in this statement is the notion of putting the water to some sort of 
productive and beneficial use.   Irwin v Phillips did not however entirely reject the 
idea of riparianism in California, as the lands involved in the dispute were federal, 
and accordingly the riparian doctrine did not apply to them.  Interestingly, two 
years later the California Supreme Court case of Crandall v Woods22 in essence 
upheld riparian rights for occupied land against later appropriation by others, but 
suggested, obiter, a preference for priority for water on vacant land as a matter of 
                                                 
 
19 Irwin v Phillips 5 Cal. 140 (1855). 
20 1850 Cal. Stat. 219. 
21 Irwin v Phillips 5 Cal. 140 at 146. 
22 Crandall v Woods 8 Cal. 136 (1857). 
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public policy.  Later in 1886, the Californian Supreme Court was obliged in Lux v 
Haggin 23  to decide whether it would uphold riparianism, or an appropriative 
system, or create a new system altogether.  The Court found for both water rights 
systems, but decided that appropriative rights were secondary to riparian rights, 
and expanded the definition of reasonable use by allowing water to be used for 
commercial and agricultural purposes, provided that use did not impact negatively 
on other riparian owners.  Thus California has a hybrid prior appropriation-
riparian model of water management requiring (reasonable) beneficial use of 
appropriated waters, and reasonable use of riparian waters.24   
Reference has already been made in the last chapter to the 1882 landmark 
irrigation case of Coffin v Left Hand Ditch Company25 in relation to the new prior 
appropriation system.  That decision makes bold reference to beneficial use as a 
requirement of an appropriation: “And we hold that…the first appropriator of 
water…for a beneficial purpose has…a prior right thereto.” 26   Interestingly 
though, the idea of “beneficial use” as discussed in the judgment is accepted as a 
given, that is to say there is no attempt to justify the notion; its adoption appears 
to be accepted naturally and taken for granted.  The basic principle was the child 
of experience – a static supply of water which was simply inadequate to satisfy 
the needs and aspirations of the rapidly growing population with the concomitant 
needs of agriculture and industry.   
                                                 
 
23 Lux v Haggin 69 Cal. 255 (1886). 
24 This model was encapsulated into the Californian Constitution (Article XIV) but is now found in 
Article X §2. 
25 Coffin v Left Hand Ditch Company 6 Colo. 443.  
26 Ibid, at 447. 
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7.2.1 Statutory Incorporation of Beneficial Use 
As noted the doctrine has become sanctified in many state constitutions and 
statutes.  For example, the notions of both “reasonable” use and “beneficial” use 
have become enshrined in the California constitution: 
It is hereby declared that because of the conditions prevailing in this 
State the general welfare requires that the water resources of the State 
be put to beneficial use to the fullest extent of which they are capable, 
and that the waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use 
of water be prevented, and that the conservation of such waters is to 
be exercised with a view to the reasonable and beneficial use thereof 
in the interest of the people and for the public welfare.27 
 
An amendment to the constitution provides that a water right is limited to 
the quantity of water reasonably required for the beneficial use to be served, and 
does not extend to waste or unreasonable use.28 Numerous other western states 
adopted it, too:   
 Alaska’s constitution states inter alia “Wherever occurring in their natural 
state, fish, wildlife and water are reserved to the people for common 
use”. 29   Section 4 expands the concept and states that “Fish, Forests, 
wildlife and all other replenishable [emphasis added] resources belonging 
to the State shall be utilized, developed, and maintained on the sustained 
yield principle, subject to preferences among beneficial uses.”30   
 Colorado’s constitution states: “The right to divert the unappropriated 
waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses shall never be denied.”31   
                                                 
 
27 California Constitution Article 10, Section 2. 
28 Article 14, Section 3. 
29 Article 8, Section 3. 
30 Alaska is not one of the dry western states, and can hardly be described as lacking in water. 
31 Article XVI, section 6. 
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 Wyoming’s constitution provides: “Beneficial use shall be the basis, the 
measure and limit of the right to use water at all times…”32    
 Arizona’s constitution provides: “(2) All existing rights to the use of any 
of the waters in the state for all useful and beneficial purposes are hereby 
recognised and confirmed.”33   
 New Mexico’s constitution provides: “Beneficial use shall be the basis, the 
measure and limit of the right to use water.”34  Idaho provides: “The right 
to divert and appropriate the unappropriated waters of any natural stream 
to beneficial uses shall never be denied …”35   
 Utah’s constitution states: “The legislature of the state of Utah having 
heretofore declared … that ‘beneficial use shall be the basis, the measures 
and the limit of all rights to the use of water in this state’.”36   
 Montana’s constitution states: “All existing rights to the use of any waters 
for any useful or beneficial purpose are hereby recognised and 
confirmed.”37   
 Texas’s constitution provides: “The conservation and development of all 
natural resources of this State … including … the waters of its rivers and 
streams [for] power and all other useful purposes, …”38   
These many positive constitutional statements have some recurring 
themes: the recognition and confirmation of existing rights, and the declaration of 
the terms of continued water use. Some states have the beneficial use doctrine 
enshrined in their state statutes, for example Nevada, which states: “[b]eneficial 
                                                 
 
32 Title 41 (Water), Chapter 3, Article 101. 
33 Article XVII (Water Rights). 
34 Article XVI, Section 3. 
35 Article XV, Section 3. 
36 Title 73, Chapter 10, Section 31. 
37 Article IX, Section 3 (1). 
38 Article XVI, Section 59a. 
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use shall be the basis, the measure and the limit of the right to the use of water.”39  
In conjunction:  
Rights to the use of water must be limited and restricted to as much as 
may be        necessary, when reasonably and economically used for 
irrigation and other beneficial purposes irrespective of the carrying 
capacity of the ditch.40 
 
In Kansas: “All appropriations of water must be for a beneficial 
purpose.”41 Again: “Such appropriations shall not constitute ownership of such 
water and appropriation rights shall remain subject to the principle of beneficial 
use.”42   
The Texan Water Code provides: “No right to appropriate water is 
perfected unless the water has been beneficially used for a purpose stated in the 
declaration of intention.”43 “‘Beneficial use’ means the amount of water which is 
economically necessary for a purpose authorised by this chapter when reasonable 
intelligence and reasonable diligence are used in applying the water…”44   
Colorado’s statute states that “Beneficial use is the use of that amount of 
water that is reasonable and appropriate under reasonably efficient practices to 
accomplish without waste the purpose for which the appropriation is lawfully 
made.”45   
Some states have gone as far as providing a list of beneficial uses either in 
the constitution or in statute, for example Colorado determines that “… water for 
                                                 
 
39 Nev. Rev. Stat. 533.035. 
40 Nev. Rev. Stat. 533.060. 
41 Kans. Stat. Ann. 82a-718. 
42 Kans. Stat. Ann. 82a-707. 
43 Texas Water Code Section 11.026. 
44 Texas Water Code Section 11.002(4). 
45 Col. Rev. Stat §37-92-103(4) (2006). 
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domestic purposes shall have preference over … any other purpose, and … 
agriculture shall have preference over…manufacturing.” 46  Montana’s statute 
defines beneficial use (in the definition section) as “the use of water for … 
including but not limited to agriculture, stock water, domestic, fish and wildlife, 
industrial, irrigation, mining, municipal, power, and recreational uses.”47  Texas 
lists agriculture, gardening, domestic uses, stock raising, mining, manufacturing, 
industrial and commercial uses, recreation, pleasure, oil, gas, and sulphur 
production as beneficial uses.48  These examples suggest that the beneficial use 
mandate is very strong in the legislation of those dry western states beyond the 
100th meridian.  They also confirm the comments of Professor Neuman at note 13, 
above.   
The system is flexible, however; and the accepted list of beneficial uses 
grows with time and changes in market conditions and custom.  This is a vital 
component to give the doctrine contemporary relevance.  For example an integral 
component of the appropriation model is an actual diversion – that is to say the 
taking of water from the source for a beneficial use.  Accordingly water simply 
left in-stream for the benefit of recreation and wildlife was once seen as non-
beneficial. “To the nineteenth century mind that created the [beneficial use] 
doctrine, leaving water in place was simply not a use.”49  However, in deference 
to efficiency, most states would allow direct watering of stock from a stream 
overriding the requirement for physical diversion and therefore the need for man-
made structures.50 By extension, today most states have adopted measures which 
recognise instream (that is ecological and recreational) uses of water and have 
                                                 
 
46 Colorado Constitution Article XVI, section 6. 
47 Mont. Code Ann. Section 85-2-102 (4) (a). Strictly speaking this is not a definition of, but rather 
examples of beneficial use. 
48 Texas Water Code Ann. Sections 11.002, 64.003 (19). 
49  A. Dan Tarlock, James N. Corbridge, Jr., David H Getches, and Reed D. Benson Water 
Resources and Management (6th ed, Foundation Press 2009) at 182. 
50 Some for example New Mexico and Utah still required physical diversion as a safeguard against 
the evils of riparianism. 
192 
 
even removed the diversion requirement.  Some have protected streams by setting 
certain flow levels. 51 
7.2.2 Case Law Consideration of Beneficial Use 
In some cases the judiciary played an integral part in the process of allowing in-
stream uses because in three states (Colorado, Idaho, and Nebraska) challenges 
were launched against the legislation, in two of the cases on constitutional 
grounds − such a laissez-faire approach would not amount to a beneficial use.  In 
all three cases (between 1974 and 1990) the courts found in favour of the 
legislature.   
The first of these cases was State, Dept. of Parks v Idaho Dept. of Water 
Administration. 52  At issue was the constitutional provision authorising and 
directing the Park and Recreation Board to appropriate in trust for the people of 
the state certain unappropriated waters in Malad Canyon, and further that such 
recreational use was declared to be a beneficial use.53  The question was whether 
such provision was ultra vires.  This question was relevant in terms of the other 
Idaho constitutional provision that “The right to divert and appropriate the 
unappropriated waters of any natural stream to beneficial uses shall never be 
denied.”54  The Court latched onto the fact that the first provision directed the 
Board to “appropriate”, but not to “divert and appropriate”, but in any event had 
no difficulty in holding that “those values and benefits [of recreational use] 
constitute beneficial uses”55 and therefore constitutional.   
                                                 
 
51 Christine A. Klein “The Constitutional Mythology of Western Water Law” (1994-1995) 14 Va 
Envtl LJ 242 at 363-4. 
52 State, Dept. of Parks v Idaho Dept. of Water Administration 96 Idaho 440 (1974). 
53 Idaho Constitution s 67-4507. 
54 Idaho Constitution art. 15 Section 3. 




In the 1979 Colorado case of Colorado River Water Conservancy Dist. v 
Colorado Water Conservation Bd,56 the relevant statute provided “Nothing in this 
article shall…deprive the people of the state of Colorado of the beneficial use of 
those waters available by law and interstate compact.”57 The Board made three 
applications for minimum stream flow rights under the Act.  The District objected, 
but the Supreme Court ultimately upheld the applications.  The Court noted that in 
1886, it had upheld an appropriation to store water in a natural reservoir in the bed 
of a stream, and that was adequate for an appropriation and therefore a beneficial 
use.58  In the present case, the Court held “…we hold that under SB 97 [the 
relevant statute] the Colorado Water Board can make an in-stream appropriation 
without diversion in the conventional sense.”59  In essence the court held that in-
stream use was beneficial.60   
Oddly enough, the case is diametrically opposed to and ultimately 
distinguished from an earlier Colorado Supreme Court decision on similar 
particulars. 61  In that case where the legislation purported to allow non-
diversionary appropriations, the court simply refused to accept such legislative 
intent.62  The case in Nebraska63 involved an appeal against the Director of Water 
Resources partial grant of in-stream flow appropriations to the Game and Parks 
Commission.  The relative constitutional provision states “The right to divert 
unappropriated waters of every natural stream for beneficial use shall never be 
                                                 
 
56 Colorado River Water Conservancy Dist. v Colorado Water Conservation Bd.197 Colo 469 
(1979). 
57 Colo. Sess. Laws 1973, ch.442, at 1521. 
58 Larimer Co. Reservoir Co. v Luthe 8 Colo. 614. (1886). 
59 Colorado River Water Conservancy Dist. v Colorado Water Conservation Bd 197 Colo. 469 
(1979) at 476. 
60 As required by Colo. Sess. Laws 1973, ch.442, at 1521 (this was not decided on constitutional 
grounds). 
61 Colorado River Conservation District v Rocky Mountain Power Co. 406 P.2d 798 (Colo. 1965). 
62 Justice Hobbs concludes this change of heart was bought about by the intervention of the 
environmental era. See G Hobbs “Colorado Water Law: An Historical Overview” (1997-199) 1 U 
Denv Water L Rev1at 22. 
63 In Re Application A-16642 463 N.W. 2d 591 (1990). 
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denied.”64  The Court upheld both the beneficial nature and non-diversionary 
nature the Director’s decision and stated rather stolidly “…must conclude that the 
use in §6 of the term “divert” serves some purpose other than to prohibit non-
diversionary appropriations.”65 
Although the legislative lists of beneficial uses started with an unavoidable 
reference to the nineteenth century, as time progressed these lists were updated to 
reflect an ever-changing contemporary attitude and requisites.  As can be noted, 
the statutory approach has been to either provide lists of suggested beneficial uses, 
or to avoid lists and allow experience to take its course and have judicial 
pronouncements make up the lists.   Thus, as is usually the case, it has been the 
courts which have provided the some detail of the beneficial use concept.  
Interestingly the judicial inter-relationships in America are somewhat close, and 
states (quite appropriately and usually) regularly refer to each other’s 
jurisprudence for example State of Washington Department of Ecology v Grimes66 
in the judgment of Smith J, although most of the references are to local 
Washington state cases there are references to material from Montana, California, 
Utah, Wyoming, Oregon, and Colorado. 
In spite of…statutory and constitutional distinctions, there seems to be 
little significant variation among the states in the general 
interpretation and application of the beneficial use doctrine.  State 
courts borrow liberally from other states in developing the concept of 
beneficial use for resolution of disputes before them.  In fact the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals has described the beneficial use doctrine as a 
matter of general law among the western states.67  
 
                                                 
 
64 Nebraska Constitution art. XVI §6. 
65 In Re Application A-16642 463 N.W. 2d 591 (1990) at 602. 
66 The State of Washington Department of Ecology v Grimes 121 Wash. 2d. 459 (1993). 
67 Janet C Neuman “Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for Efficiency in 
Western Water Use (1998) 28 Envtl L. 919 at 925. 
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By way of an example of judicial law-making, in the 1872 Montana case 
of Gallagher v Basley,68 Wade C.J. held that waters appropriated for irrigation 
was a beneficial use. As noted, the current 1972 Montana constitution now holds 
this to be so.  In 1866, when the cause of action arose, the state of Montana did 
not have a constitution: the document was lost on its way to the printer and it was 
not until 1889 that the state adopted its first constitution.69  In the New Mexico 
case of In re the Application of Plains Electric Generation and Transmission 
Cooperative, Inc.,70 the relevant New Mexican statute provided: 
[t]he owner of a water right may change the location of his well or 
change the use of the water, but only upon application to the state 
engineer and upon showing that the change will not impair existing 
rights…71 
 
It was agreed by the parties that any change of use would still have to be 
for a beneficial one, the question was whether the intended industrial use (power 
generation) actually was, with the additional question as to whether such would be 
utilised in a timely manner.72  The Court of Appeal of New Mexico (Minzner J) 
upheld the state engineer’s opinion that, in fact, it was.  In a very real practical 
sense the courts have reflected the changing attitudes and needs of the times.  
Janet C Neuman states that in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth 
century the beneficial use concept focused on a limited category of activities, 
reflecting the times, for instance domestic use, farming, stock raising, mining, 
milling, power production.  Development of the concept saw an expansion of 
beneficial activities like recreation, aesthetics, wildlife habitat, pollution 
                                                 
 
68 Gallagher v Basley 1 Mont.457 (1872).  This decision was affirmed by the Federal Supreme 
Court.  See 87 U.S. 670 (1875). 
69 See Article III section 15 of the 1889 Constitution for the relative provision.   
70 In re the Application of Plains Electric Generation and Transmission Cooperative Inc 106 N.M. 
775 (1988). 
71 New Mexico Statutes Annotated 1978 section 72-12-7. 
72 The anxiety was that the notion of future use was too speculative. 
196 
 
abatement.  Similarly other activities have not withstood scrutiny from a 
contemporary perspective. 73 
In 1899, the City of Los Angeles needed more water to service an 
expanding population (seventy-five thousand).  Burdened with a need to develop a 
further water supply and construct head-works, the City acquired an area of land 
that had a water supply adjacent to the city boundaries.74  However, included in 
the City’s proposed uses were ponds and artificial lakes, and the Court amply 
demonstrated a nineteenth century attitude: 
The last matter of difference relates to water used in the ponds and 
artificial lakes.  The real objection to this seems to be that it looks like 
extravagance or waste.  We feel that where water is so precious it 
should not be used for mere matters of taste and fancy, while those 
who need it for useful purposes go without.75 
 
Reasoning that an outside authority superintending the City’s decisions 
would be “intolerable”, the Court perceived the issue as a matter of degree: 
While, therefore, I am not prepared to say that the discretion of the 
municipal authorities could not under any circumstances be interfered 
with, I do not see how we can do so here.  It is clearly a municipal use 
which is familiar in municipal history.76  
 
In terms of Colorado’s beneficial use requirements, in Empire Water & 
Power Co. v Cascade Town Co,77 the question before the United Sates Supreme 
Court was whether leaving water in its natural watercourse in a waterfall was a 
beneficial use in the sense of its aesthetic quality under Colorado’s legal 
                                                 
 
73 Janet C Neuman “Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for Efficiency in 
Western Water Use” (1998) 28 Envtl L 919 at 927-8. 
74 The idea was to purchase the land as well so the city could keep stock away thereby preventing 
contamination of the water.  
75 City of Los Angeles v Pomeroy 124 Cal. 597 at 650 per Beatty CJ. 
76 Ibid, at 650. 
77 Empire Water & Power Co. v Cascade Town Co 205 Fed 123 (1913). 
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structures.  The Court found that the attitudes of people has changed since the 
days of the early settlers, and in any event the state Constitution should be 
interpreted in a general, not narrow sense and embrace new instances as they 
arise. 78 Ultimately however the complainant failed.  The case was exceptional, 
“but we think the complainant is not entitled to a continuance of the falls solely 
for their scenic beauty.  The state laws proceed upon more material lines.”79  
Although as an aesthetic amenity the use was beneficial to the user, the Court felt 
(this was 1913 after all) the state of Colorado needed to manage its water 
resources to foster the type of development the public wanted, or needed – 
milling, mining, irrigated agriculture, and the growing towns and cities.   
Such pragmatism manifests itself in many of the dry states’ water 
jurisprudence.  Attitudes and imperatives change over time however.  For instance 
western states allow for the maintenance of golf courses.  The current Kansas 
statute for example provides that irrigation use extends to the maintenance of 
crops, gardens, orchards, lawns (not exceeding 2 acres), and the watering of golf 
courses [emphasis added], parks cemeteries athletic fields and racetrack 
grounds.80  California considers the irrigation of golf courses a beneficial use but 
only with recycled non-potable water where available.81  The same applies in 
Colorado (where available), and in Nevada.  Clearly the courts and the legislatures 
give the implementation of the doctrine a degree of flexibility to ensure its 
relevance.  For instance, there is a strong argument that the state of Oregon allows 
water to be used for scenic purposes, which is unlikely to have been accepted in 
the nineteenth century:  
                                                 
 
78 Ibid, at 128 per Hook, Circuit Judge. 
79 Ibid, at 129.  It has to be remembered that the “benefit” is usually taken to mean “profit”. 
80 Kansas Water Appropriation Act K.A.R. 5-1-1. (June 2012). 
81 Section 13550(a) Art.7 2005.  Recycled water may have a high salt content so is not always 
suitable for landscape irrigation. 
198 
 
Conserving the highest use of the water for all purposes, including … 
scenic attraction or any other beneficial use to which the water may be 
applied for which it may have a special value to the public.82  
 
Neal H. Bell points out that the Oregon state legislature has made it quite 
clear that it understands the public concern and affection for aesthetics by 
“expressly withdrawing [that is, excluding] from appropriation the waters of 
streams along the Columbia River and other places where there are waterfalls and 
other scenic attractions”.83 In Idaho, Shepard C.J. stated: “…use of water for 
providing recreational and aesthetic pleasure represents an emerging recognition 
in this and other states of social values and benefits from the use of water.”84 
A few states have taken the opposite approach and specifically declared 
certain uses not to be beneficial.  Professor Neuman gives a few examples:85 
Oklahoma does not view the use of water in coal slurry pipelines to be 
beneficial,86 and Kansas provides that evaporation of water from sand and gravel 
pits is not beneficial.87  The use of geothermal water for any purpose other than its 
heat value is not beneficial in Idaho. 88   Despite the fact that there are 
constitutional and legislative variations among the western states, generally 
speaking, there is a remarkable even tenor about them, and a consistency in the 
general understanding and application of the doctrine.  The requirement for 
beneficial use has remained constant, but functions have developed over time.    
As is clear from the foregoing, the determination of beneficial use is first 
and foremost a judicial function.  This is clear from State Dept. of Parks v Idaho 
                                                 
 
82 Ore. Rev. Stat. §537.170 (3) (1963). 
83 Neal H. Bell “Beneficial Use of Water” (1964-1965)  3 Willamette L J 382 at 385. 
84 State, Dept. of Parks v Idaho Dept. of Water Administration 96 Idaho, 440 at 444 (1974). 
85 Janet C Neuman “Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for Efficiency in 
Western Water Use” (1998) 28 Envtl Law 919 at 927. 
86 Okla, Stat. tit. 27§7.6 (1997). 
87 Kan. Stat. Ann. § 82a-734 (1997). 
88 Idaho Code § 42-233 (1996). 
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Dept. of Water Administration and the unequivocal statement from Bakes J: “… 
this Court is the final arbiter of the construction of the Idaho Constitution, and 
therefore must determine whether or not the [intended uses] in this case are a 
‘beneficial use’…”89  
In the western states, an appropriation of water must be in respect of a 
parcel of land to which the appropriator must have some entitlement, either legal 
or equitable and on which the water is put to use, but to a beneficial use.  The least 
requirement is some colour of a possessory right thus giving priority to those with 
some sort of commitment and vested interest in the land.  However, in a 
demonstration of American pragmatism, it has been held that where a water 
distribution company is involved (and there are many of these operating in 
America), there is no need for the company to have an interest in land (which it 
usually doesn’t) because it is the consumer – rather than the company – which is 
the true appropriator and who puts the water to beneficial use: Wheeler v Northern 
Colorado Irr. Co.90 On the other hand, in Lake Shore Duck Club v Lake View 
Duck Club,91 the plaintiff made use of a parcel of “uninclosed [sic] public domain, 
no part of which has ever been tilled”.  At no stage was the plaintiff ever the 
owner of the relative lands, nor did it have any proper right of occupation.   The 
water was used for the propagation and growing of vegetation suitable for the 
breeding of wild fowl.  Thurman J held that such use may very well be beneficial, 
but the appropriator had not effected a valid appropriation, as it did not have an 
interest in the land used for the purpose. 
We are decidedly of the opinion that the beneficial use contemplated 
in the making of the appropriation must be one that inures to the 
                                                 
 
89 State, Dept. of Parks v Idaho Dept. of Water Administration 96 Idaho 440 at 448 (1974). 
90 Wheeler v Northern Colorado Irr. Co 10 Colo. 582. (1888). 
91 Lake Shore Duck Club v Lake View Duck Club 50 Utah 76 (1917). 
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exclusive benefit of the appropriator and subject to his complete 
dominion and control.92   
 
The key characteristic of the western system it that the Americans have 
taken an evolutionary approach in defining and developing what a beneficial use 
actually is.  This of course gives flexibility to the doctrine but malleability is not 
its singular, nor its most important attribute.  The notion is actually three separate 
but connected components, each an indispensable part of the whole – (a) the 
initial appropriation of the water (b) to be used diligently for some beneficial 
purpose (c) without un-necessary waste.93 The first (originating) component is a 
correct appropriation of the water.  Priority in the western states is not dictated by 
the date of filing,94 but rather the date on which the water is first applied to a 
beneficial use, or, as in the case of a project that takes time to complete (as was, 
for instance, the situation in the New Zealand case of Central Plains Water Trust 
v Ngai Tahu Properties Limited and Canterbury Regional Council95), then in the 
western states the priority relates back to the date on which the initial work 
leading to the application was commenced.  It is to be noted that the initial step 
has to be a stroke, or strokes, of some authority which indicate clearly the 
intention of the appropriator: “Clearing a road to improve access…discussing the 
intent to appropriate with state officials, staking the springs, and filing an 
application…all manifested Vought’s intent to appropriate.”96   
7.3 Comparison with New Zealand 
In New Zealand our originating process is purely administrative, that is to say an 
application is made to the relative regional or unitary council for a water right 
                                                 
 
92 Ibid, at 79. 
93 See Coffin v Left Hand Ditch Company 6 Colo 443 (Colo 1882); Tulare Irrigation District v 
Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation District 45  P.2d 972 (Cal 1935). 
94 Colorado still uses a judicial rather than administrative process. 
95 Central Plains Water Trust v Ngai Tahu Properties Limited and Canterbury Regional Council 
[2008] NZCA 71. 
96 In Re Vought 76 P.3d 906, (Colo 2003) at 915 per Hobbs, J.  
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under section 88 and the fourth schedule of the Resource Management Act 1991.  
Thus, the question of priority in New Zealand is a bureaucratic one involving the 
filing of an application, rather than the American approach where the physical 
activity of actually diverting the water is the important defining moment. 
By far the most important of the ideas encapsulated by the beneficial use 
doctrine however are the last two – the actual use of water as an anti-speculation 
measure, 97  and the requirement to minimise waste – an efficiency measure 
squarely under the aegis of section 7 (b) of our Resource Management Act 1991.  
The beneficial use of water is diminished if a fair amount of the water is 
squandered in the process.   
Public intrusion into essentially private arrangements is justifiable:  Professor 
Sax suggests that as water is a public resource used privately, the decision as to 
how to employ the resource can be justified as a public one rather than a private 
one.  Such a doctrine would also emphasise to users they have a certain 
responsibility inherent in their water rights, but would also alert others that 
permit-holders have a responsibility, and they would be keen to see that 
appropriators “toe the line”.  Accordingly, an appropriator would have a duty to 
use the resource prudently, in ways that will ultimately benefit the public. 98  The 
important element in Professor Sax’s observation is in the word “used”, and if it is 
not used, there is the grave danger that the appropriation will be deemed to be 
speculative.   
A proper-functioning beneficial use doctrine as devised by the American west 
has lessons for New Zealand if we are to extract the best efficient use of our water 
                                                 
 
97 The benefit to the individual ultimately benefits the community: see Sax, J “Reserved Public 
Rights in Water” (2012) 36 Vermont Law Review 535, at 538. 




appropriations.  More importantly, in the event that New Zealand does adopt a 
water market model, there is the danger that the market system might be open to 
abuse by speculative activities on the part of some market players.  An artificial 
inflation of prices might occur, and appropriated water might be locked away 
from any form of use.  New Zealand’s own beneficial use doctrine, with its anti-
speculation component, would be a useful tool to prevent an abuse of the 
allocation to private individuals of a public resource.  It is appropriate to now 
study how the Americans have dealt with the anti-speculation element of their 




8 Chapter 8. 
8.1 Beneficial Use – An Anti-Speculation Doctrine. 
8.1.1 Background 
The last chapter discussed the Americans approach to the beneficial use doctrine.  
A study of the various components that make up the doctrine is essential.  One of 
the components is a proscription against the speculation of water rights, a crucial 
element in any water market.  A market system usually invites speculation, and 
this chapter will argue that New Zealand should take steps to hinder the possible 
speculation of water rights.  Despite the general economic view that speculators 
can provide a useful function in a market system, the Americans have concluded 
that speculation in water rights is not desirable.  In the American west where 
water rights have traditionally been traded, speculative trading of those rights has 
always been rigorously discouraged.   
The old English riparian system in a sense acted as its own auditor on 
water speculation matters since water rights could only be sold with the land, 
therefore the only way to speculate would be to hold the land until the time was 
appropriate to sell the riparian rights attached to it.1  It is still possible to do so, 
obviously, but the doctrine has inherent limiting and saving factors.  
Firstly, riparian rights are not exclusive – there is the duty of co-owners to 
share the water with others. “The old maxim ‘Aqua currit et debet currere ut 
solebat’ … denotes that water is the common and equal property of everyone 
through whose domain it flows….2  In other words riparian owners “… must so 
                                                 
 
1 A riparian owner has an entitlement to but is not compelled to use water and will not lose water 
rights from non-use as is the case under the beneficial use doctrine.  See FJ Trelease “Co-
ordination of Riparian and Appropriative Rights” (1954-5) 33 Tex L Rev 24 at 41. 
2 Tennessee Coal, Iron &R Co v Hamilton 14 So 167 at 170 per Stone J (Ala 1893). 
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use it [water] as not to destroy or unreasonably impair the equal rights of others”,3 
when exercising a right to use water passing over their lands.   
Secondly, there is the limiting factor of the reasonable use principle:  
The criteria…for determining reasonableness can be summarised as 
follows.  First, attention should be given to the size, character and 
natural state of the water course.  Second, consideration should be 
given the type and purpose of the uses proposed and their effect on 
the water course.  Third, the court should balance the benefit that 
would inure to the proposed user with the injury to the other riparian 
owners.4 
 
Thirdly, there are restrictions – enforced by common law – on off-tract 
and out of catchment usage.5  The old Roman principle held, in general terms, that 
the lower riparian land was obliged to accept water flowing to it naturally without 
any act of man.   
In Alberger v Philadelphia Electric Company,6 the electric company tried 
to import water from outside the catchment to cool a nuclear power plant.  The 
water use had absolutely nothing to do with the use or enhancement of the riparian 
land itself.  Philadelphia had intended to use its riparian waters outside the 
boundaries of the riparian lands.  As such it was held by the Court to be beyond 
the servitude-using right ancillary to the ownership of the riparian land. 7   In 
Anaheim Union Water Co. v Fuller,8 the defendant was diverting water from the 
Santa Ana River to land which was not in the catchment.  The plaintiff 
complained, notwithstanding it was accepted fact that more than enough water 
                                                 
 
3 Elmore v Ingalls 17 So. 2d. 674, per Livingston, J at 674. (Ala 1944). 
4 Three Lakes Ass’n v Kessler 91 Mich. App. 371, at 377 per Bashara J (Mich Ct App 1979). 
5  Although some American states have relaxed this requirement by introducing statutory 
permitting systems. 
6 Alberger v Philadelphia Electric Company 112 Pa Commw 441 (Pa 1988). 
7 Ibid, at 453 per Barbieri Senior Judge. 
8 150 Cal. 327 (Cal. 1907). 
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was left in the river for the plaintiff’s purposes.  The Court found that to be 
irrelevant – others above or below might want to make use of the water.  Clearly, 
it would be extremely difficult to set about conceiving and executing a pre-
determined plan to achieve any sort of speculative advantage under a riparian 
system.  If the riparian system were to be replaced by a home-grown distributive 
mechanism, fears of a speculative abuse of that system needed to be addressed.  
The beneficial use doctrine met the challenge of speculation head-on, and tried to 
ensure that appropriated water was only put to good use, with the emphasis on 
“use”: 
The definition of beneficial use is similar among prior appropriation 
jurisdictions, and it typically includes just about any domestic, 
agricultural, or industrial activity, including sewage treatment, crop 
production, stock watering, hydroelectric power generation, mining, 
and recreational pursuits.  It does not, however, extend to speculative 
water uses.9 
 
The simple fact is that speculation usually involves neither production nor 
job creation. Such latitude was anathema to the common nineteenth century 
American attitude.  Concern for the economic well-being of the average person 
can be seen in various quarters in nineteenth century America.  The National 
Grange was established in 1867 just after the American Civil War, and this 
society advocated, and continues to advocate for, rural American agriculture with 
a concern to improve the lot of small-scale agricultural people.10  The Knights of 
Labor had been established in 1809 and advocated for both social and cultural 
improvement for the average citizen.11  The People’s Party (the ‘Populists”) was 
established in 1891 and briefly crusaded on behalf of the average farmer against 
powerful élites, especially banks and railways.  The federal Sherman Antitrust Act 
                                                 
 
9 Sandi Zellmer “The Anti-Speculation Doctrine and its Implications for Collaborative Water 
Management” (2007-2008) 8 Nev LJ 994 at 1004. 
10 See information about National Grange at <www.nationalgrange.org/policy/>. 
11 It was disbanded in 1947. 
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was passed in 1890 and included provisions to protect people against the 
perceived evils of monopoly.12  There were the same concerns in New Zealand.  
The Liberal Government took office in 1891 and was concerned to address the 
then-recent New Zealand economic and social order to address the same issues as 
their American cousins.13   
8.1.2 The Dangers of Speculation 
Speculation certainly does not connote the notion of “use”, let alone beneficial 
use.  In the case of water, the notion of use excludes the idea of speculation since 
the amount of water acquired is limited by the beneficial use doctrine to the 
amount actually needed as opposed to the amount the appropriator was physically 
able to divert.14  There is actually an echo of Locke’s instruction to pre-political 
humans that they may appropriate what they need in the way of natural resources, 
but leaving enough in common for others.15   
Generally speaking, speculation has the potential to cause unexpected and 
unpredictable (and ultimately undesirable and sometimes disastrous) fluctuations 
in prices.  The notion is to be contrasted to monopoly which is a simple lack of 
competition and by extension a proper market restraint on prices.  Both were 
feared by nineteenth century western American citizens, especially in the twin 
forms of railway-barons and cattle-barons.  The developing legal framework of 
water law doubtless reproduced this general concern to keep this strategic asset 
safe from abuse.  Monopoly and unfettered speculative accumulation may lead 
inexorably to power.  Janet Neuman makes the point: 
                                                 
 
12 Sherman Antitrust Act 26 Stat. 209 chapter 647 (1890). 
13 This is not surprising according to historian Keith Sinclair, since “they had all drunk from the 
same intellectual spring.”  See K Sinclair A History of New Zealand (revised ed, Penguin, London, 
1969) at 172 et seq. 
14 In terms of control, the doctrine prevents the type of monopoly enjoyed by riparian owners. 
15 The Second Treatise on Government (1690) Chapter 5 section 27. 
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When something as important as water is scarce, those who control it 
can be very powerful indeed.  The fear of concentrated power and 
control over resources in the developing West shaped the water law 
generally, and the beneficial use doctrine in particular.16 
 
The Utah Supreme Court when discussing the unsuitability of riparianism 
for its state put it thus: 
Riparian rights have never been recognised in this territory, or in any 
state or territory where irrigation is necessary; for the appropriation of 
water for the purpose of irrigation is entirely and un-avoidably in 
conflict with the common-law doctrine of riparian proprietorship.  If 
that had been recognised and applied in this territory it would still be 
a desert; for a man owning ten acres of land on a stream capable of 
irrigating a thousand acres of land or more, near its mouth, could 
prevent the settlement of all the land above him.17 
 
The spectre of power through control is quite clear in Justice Blackburn’s 
statement.  Although some economic theory will acknowledge that at least in 
some markets speculation can be useful by encouraging investments, 18  the 
activities of speculators can drive up the price of an initial investment by 
aggravating demand-pull inflation.  Other investors react to the price rises by 
venturing into the market, the demand thus further driving prices up.  Something 
eventually collapses the confidence of the investors, and a consequential lack of 
demand causes prices to fall creating fear among the market players, and a herd 
mentality leads to mass sales and a corresponding decline in prices.   
That is not the end of it, however; the losses can cause a default on bank 
loans.  Genuine producers, uncertain of the future may reduce output and 
postpone planned investment.  Banks will worry about risks of default and may 
reduce the amount of credit on offer, even for genuine productive enterprises.  
                                                 
 
16 Janet Neuman “Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for Efficiency in 
Western Water Law” (1998) 28 Envtl L 919 at 963 (footnote omitted). 
17 Stowell v Johnson 7 Utah 215 at 215 per Blackburn J (UT1891). 
18 See B Layton, below n 24.  
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Consumers become infected by negative sentiment and postpone their own 
purchases and investments, especially major items like cars and houses.  Of 
course speculation is actually common in investments such as real estate, futures, 
gold etc.; it was indeed the primum mobile of early western land and resource 
development and it could be argued that as everybody was able to participate, 
since the assets were bountiful, there was overall tacit approval.19   
But locking up scarce and essential water resources from use by 
individuals and communities who have an immediate need to slake 
their thirst or grow crops on which to sustain themselves is a mortal 
sin under western water law.  The universal prohibition against 
speculation in water resources stems from the near universal distrust 
of concentrated power over resources in the developing West, which 
in turn was a foundational force in shaping the doctrine of beneficial 
use.20 
 
There have, of course, been many examples of speculative disasters 
throughout relatively recent history. The effect of “tulipmania” on seventeenth 
century Netherlands was bad enough in its damage to the economy generally and 
the value of tulip bulbs in particular. Crucially public confidence in the tulip 
market was impaired, but tulips are totally unnecessary for human survival.  The 
same cannot be said of water.  A crash in a market is only a threat to the economy; 
with a non-fungible resource like water the result may possibly be catastrophic. 
It must be remembered, of course, that all capital is speculative to some 
extent. It would be hard to envisage any market without some degree of 
speculation: parties engage in the buying and selling of commodities simply to 
gain profit by a rise or fall in market values.  It is possibly a question of degree, − 
calculated risk-taking as against naked gambling. 
                                                 
 
19  The 160-acre farm unit envisaged by the Homestead Act 1862 was never going to find 
approbation in the arid west. 
20 Sandi Zellmer “The Anti-Speculation Doctrine and its Implications for Collaborative Water 
Management” (2008) 8 Nev LJ 994 at 998.  
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It is interesting to note the experience of Chile with the problem of 
speculation: the 1981 Water Code was a compromise between free-market neo-
liberal economics and more circumspect conservatives.  The neo-liberals, though, 
received the lion’s share of the concession – “a laissez-faire legal framework that 
allowed private market transactions of water rights, and tight restrictions on 
government spending and regulation of the water sector.”21  More importantly the 
Code of 1981 did not address the issue of unused water rights.22  Problems of 
speculation and monopoly structures led to reforms in 2005, which empowered 
the President to exclude certain water resources from economic competition 
where the protection of the public interest was necessary, along with the 
introduction of fees for non-use, and the limitation of requests for water rights to 
cases of genuine need, that is to say those applying for water rights will have to 
justify the amounts of water they are requesting.   
Perhaps there should be a cautious approach to Layton’s position in his 
paper “Tradable Systems for Water: Best Use and Maximising Value”23 : 
“…speculators can serve a useful function lubricating tradability and 
through this improving the allocative efficiency of outcomes.  Rules 
that encourage participation in the market by as wide and diverse a 
group as possible will tend to improve the outcomes in terms of 
allocative efficiency.”24 
 
Layton is correct in that speculators may perform a useful function.  
Speculators may relieve others of risk.  For example if a speculator offers to buy a 
crop which has not yet been planted, the farmer is relieved from the worry of the 
price at harvest time so he or she can get on with the primary job of a farmer, that 
                                                 
 
21 CJ Bauer Siren Song (RFF Press, Washington, 2004) at 48. 
22  It was argued that a Pigouvian tax for non-use would be too bureaucratically difficult to 
introduce.  It might also be argued that such a tax could be the subject of intense political lobbying 
by interest groups on both sides of the argument. 
23 T Daya-Winterbottom (ed) RM Theory & Practice RMLA (2011) 107. 
24 Ibid, at 116. 
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is, farming and in that sense the speculator enhances the allocative efficiency of 
the crop.  The futures contract guarantees the price, and any profit gained by the 
speculator can be seen as a fee for the risk taken.  Competition, politics, weather, 
and demand largely dictate the final price, and farmers who do not enter into some 
sort of a futures contract are in a sense themselves speculators.25  Nonetheless, 
there is arguably a negative attitude towards speculation held by members of the 
general public who do not share economists’ general view of speculators.  The 
problem – and it is a big problem – is the question of speculative bubbles as seen 
in the tulip example.  Robert J. Shiller refers to a speculative bubble as one form 
of social epidemic leading to herd behaviour. 26   Investor enthusiasm is no 
substitute for methodical calculation of real value.  An artificial increase in the 
price of access to water would be corrosive to the integrity of water markets, and a 
system which allows for such speculation quite undesirable.  
8.1.3 Speculation and Publically-Owned Resources 
A principle that avoids speculation by individuals in a commonly-held resource 
can probably be seen in terms of distributive justice and thus essentially a 
dialogue about the way things ought to be – that is to say an allocation that is fair 
to everyone.  The speculation by prior appropriation of a commonly-held resource 
gained fundamentally for free is different from the speculation of stocks and 
shares – or even tulips – which must be first purchased.  An artificial 
accumulation of property rights in a commonly-held resource by some individuals 
to the exclusion of others would be seen to be contrary to principles of fairness.  
In this sense, utilitarianism (which is predicated on a sentiment of generalised 
benevolence – “the greatest happiness for the greatest number”), and, indeed, 
                                                 
 
25 See generally Thomas Sowell Basic Economics (4th ed, Basic Books Persus, New York, 2011). 
26 Robert J. Shiller Irrational Exuberance (2nd ed, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2005) at 
157-173.  See also Robert J. Shiller Finance and the Good Society Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, 2012) at 178-186. 
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basic democracy may be viewed simply as systems that sacrifice the preferences 
and chances of property rights of the minorities and the unskilled to the benefit of 
the majority.  Accordingly there is a chance of no real equality of opportunity.   
While theories abound as to the origins and importance of property 
rights,27 as well as the nature of those rights,28 it could be argued that a property 
right is an extremely important right in our western constitutional order, without 
being described as a fundamental human right.  “… on a scale of one to ten, 
constitutional rights are a 10, property rights are a 9.”29 Thus, it may be argued 
that property rights are not natural rights, but a creature of law, and therefore 
modifiable by law.   Naturally, there are different types of property, reflected in 
different types of ownership 
The rhetoric of property often seems to resound with the notes of 
heroic autonomy – “I can do what I like with my property” – perhaps, 
as noted earlier, in the same way that we so often symbolize property 
by easily segregated lands rather than flowing and necessarily-shared 
water.30 
 
Ownership of a water right is viewed differently in the western states than 
the ownership of land. Water rights are subservient to the land to which they are 
attached.   Land is our chief motif for property (“real” property) and if water were 
to be that principal symbol, perhaps we might think of property rights in a totally 
different way.   
                                                 
 
27 Carol Rose suggests seven: See “Property Rights as the Keystone Right?” 71 Notre Dame Law 
Review 329. 
28 Leigh Raymond suggests four: See Private Rights in Public Resources Resources for the Future, 
Washington, 2003. 
29 AH Properties Ltd & Another v Tabley Estates CP 142/92 High Court Hamilton (1993) at 36 per 
Hammond J. 
30 Carol Rose “Property Rights as the Keystone Right?” 71 Notre Dame Law Review 329 at 365.  
Of course, generally speaking, one cannot do what one wants to one’s property. 
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A strong argument concerning the origins and importance of property 
rights states that those rights (the priority argument) arose out of Locke’s social 
contract theory, that peoples originally gathered property around them and traded 
the excess, so rules were needed to protect the property they have acquired - the 
“bottom up” theory. The converse theory is the “top down” theory which proposes 
that property accumulation is a government policy so it is able to render more 
tax. 31   Endogenous growth theory advocates that economies expand by the 
introduction of human capital (including work) and innovation, especially to 
property.  Thus, both theories contain a proposal of an increase in value of 
property items, and not the least because the purchaser values the items more than 
the vendor and accordingly the item may be of higher value in the hands of the 
new owner.  Harold Demsetz holds that: 
…property rights are an instrument of society and derive their 
significance from the fact that they help a man form those 
expectations which he can reasonably hold in his dealings with others.  
The dealings find their expression in the laws, customs, and mores of 
a society.32 
 
Daniel FitzPatrick makes the point that Demsetz assumes that property 
rights evolve naturally with the rise in the value of resources, but ignores the fact 
that there are also complex social systems at play.33  David A Schorr,34 using 
Colorado as an example poses an interesting theory about the origins of property 
rights, particularly in natural resources.  He summarises the two generally 
                                                 
 
31 Ibid, at 333-340.  
32 Harold Demsetz “Towards a Theory of Property Rights” (1967) 57 (2) Papers.  Proceedings of 
the Seventy-ninth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association 347-359, at 347. 
33 Daniel FitzPatrick “Evolution and Chaos in Property Rights Systems: The Third World Tragedy 
of Contested Access” (2006) 115 (5) Yale Law Journal 996 at 1045.  It is interesting to note in 
terms of distributive justice that between 1850 and 1866 Congress discussed various bills to 
regulate miners’ activities but discussions bogged down over ways to exclude Chinese from the 
harvest of metals: see G Coggins, C Wilkinson & J Leshy Federal Public Land and Resources 
Law (3rd ed, Foundation Press, New York, 1993) at 95. 
34  A Schorr “Appropriation as Agrarianism: Distributive Justice in the Creation of Property 
Rights” (2005) 32-1 Ecology Law Quarterly 3.  
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opposing theories as the “optimists” and the “pessimists”, where the optimists’ 
position is that the creation of property rights was founded on the theory that such 
would offer advantages in efficiency and wealth maximisation.  The pessimist’s 
view is that interest groups manipulate the law to effect a re-distribution of 
valuable resources in their favour.  Schorr’s (optimistic) “third way” view is 
essentially that rights are allocated in terms of distributive justice.  These terms 
must be consistent with the norms of fairness, not necessarily in terms of 
allocative efficiency.  His optimistic view is that, rather than being insidious, the 
evolution of property rights is guided by principles of justice.35 
Chief among his arguments in support of this position is the historical 
evidence of the origins of the prior appropriation doctrine in the mining districts 
of Colorado.  “The miners’ ideology and analogs to their rules are clearly 
discernible…”36  This includes a concern for a broad and fair distribution of 
resources.  An example of this may be seen when the gold claim by John Gregory 
in Colorado in May 1859 attracted around 5,000 people within 3 weeks,37 so a fair 
distribution code was essential – if for no other reason than to keep the peace.  
Such rules did include a prior appropriation system, but there were limitations on 
the size and number of diggings staked by any one person, which was clearly both 
a distributive and anti-speculation measure.   
Janet C Neuman makes the point that “The fear of concentrated power and 
control over resources in the developing West shaped water law generally and the 
beneficial use doctrine in particular.”38  Further, the Californian Supreme Court 
stated in Irwin v Phillips  that the miners’ doctrine of prior appropriation was a 
                                                 
 
35 Ibid, at 7. 
36 Ibid, at 11. 
37 See Charles W Henderson “Mining in Colorado” (Washington Government Printing Office 
1926) at 29. 
38 Janet C Neuman “Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for Efficiency in 
Western Water Law (1998) 28 Environmental Law 919 at 963. 
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matter of “a universal sense of necessity and propriety”39  The claims had to be 
actually worked, or they were forfeit.  The echo of an anti-speculation intent can 
be clearly detected, that is, “use it or lose it”.  Such claims would be returned to 
the pool of un-owned property (res nullius); it would then be available for 
distribution to other genuine claimants.  Schorr points to other legislative matters, 
viz Colorado’s legislation pre Coffin,40 and the 1876 Colorado Constitution.  Early 
Territorial legislation drew on principles of existing mining rules.41  The common 
law monopoly of water by riparian landowners was legislatively abolished thus 
effecting a fairer distribution – with the right of access in the form of statutory 
easements across riparian owners’ land.42   The amount of water needed was 
effectively confined by limiting the size of irrigated farms to 160 acres,43 which, 
by spreading the allocation, was clearly a distributive function.  Schorr points out 
that the Colorado constitution of 1876 effectively entrenched this distributive 
quality: statutory easements were confirmed, as was the priority system.  Three 
other principles were confirmed, viz public ownership of the state’s surface water, 
the requirement for water to be put to a beneficial use, and the complete abolition 
of riparian privileges.44   For Schorr, by far the most important aspect of the 
constitution was the question of public ownership, on distributive grounds.  
The conceptual punch of the section lies precisely in this public-
property theory as the basis for the right of appropriation.  Opening up 
the opportunity to acquire a water right to all members of the public 
was not, as one might have expected, based on a theory of the water 
being res nullius, unowned, and therefore freely available to all.  It 
                                                 
 
39 Irwin v Phillips 5 Cal 140 (1855) at 146. 
40  Coffin v Left Hand Ditch Co. 6 Colo. 443 (Colo.1882).  This introduced the “Colorado 
Doctrine” of prior appropriation, and finally laid the riparian system to rest in Colorado, and then 
leading to the same principle elsewhere in the west. 
41 For example, Act Concerning Irrigation (December 7, 1859). 
42 1861 Irrigation Act (1861 Colo. Sess. Laws) at 67. 
43 Act Concerning Irrigation, (1859) §1 at 214.  This was more or less contemporary with the 
federal Homestead Act 1862, which envisioned farms of 160 acres each beyond the 100th 
meridian. 




was, rather, as in riparian doctrine, the property of the public, publici 
juris.  Only the right to use could be acquired, and then only under 
conditions stipulated by the owner (through its agent, the state).  The 
recognition of public ownership…was important for providing the 
theoretical and legal underpinnings for the limitations on 
appropriation that would be applied by the state to prevent the 
replacement of monopoly by riparian owners with monopoly by 
speculating appropriators.45   
 
The distributive inequity of speculation is illustrated by a theoretical 
example whereby one group (the speculators or hegemons) perform the task of 
specifying who shares in the benefits and who does not by artificially inflating the 
cost of a commonly-held resource to their own advantage.  By doing so, they 
damage the interests of the others and one group receives unearned gains at the 
expense of others who are denied the opportunity to beneficially use water for 
their own benefit and that of the greater good.  Distributive concerns suggest 
everyone should have access to an acquisition price free from manipulation. 
Society needs to formulate institutions in an effort to diminish these concerns and 
to prevent infractions as best as it can, and in the western States of America this 
institution is the anti-speculation component of the beneficial use doctrine. 
The famous American politician and engineer Elwood Mead (he was head 
of the Bureau of Reclamation from 1924 to 1936) was implacably opposed to 
water rights becoming tradable property: “The water of the public streams will 
become a form of merchandise…” 46   His worry was that speculation and 
monopoly would inevitably permeate the water institutions as they had with the 
other natural resources oil, copper, coal and iron, and that legal structures would 
be unable to prevent it.47  His advocacy was ultimately unable to prevent the 
development of water markets, however the strict beneficial use requirement acted 
                                                 
 
45 “Appropriation as Agrarianism: Distributive Justice in the Creation of Property Rights” (2005) 
32-1 Ecology Law Quarterly 3 at 42. 
46 E. Mead Irrigation Institutions.  The Macmillan Company, New York (1903), at 264. 
47 Ibid, at 365. 
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as an institutional auditor of the transfer system by preventing speculative abuse, 
as best it could.  Provided the appropriator had diligently posted and recorded his 
notices and commenced and prosecuted his work in a timely manner, the claim for 
water dates or “relates back” to the time the notice was posted or work 
commenced.   Therefore if the appropriation complies with this relation-back 
requirement, the assumption is that there is no speculation.48   
Intent is an important component in demonstrating bona fides and 
rebutting a claim of speculation.  A certain amount of leeway is afforded however 
and each case is judged on its own merits.  The Idaho Supreme Court in Sand 
Point Water & Light Co. v Panhandle Development Co.49 put it thus: 
It seems to us, however, when we consider that this work was being 
prosecuted in a mountainous section of the state where there is heavy 
snow fall and a long winter season with much rough and stormy 
weather which would interrupt and delay the character of work that 
was being carried on, that the amount and kind of work which is 
shown to have been done evidences good faith, reasonable diligence, 
and a purpose to complete the work and apply the waters to the 
beneficial use designated… the work upon the ground and its 
continued prosecution was ample actual notice to respondent, or any 
other subsequent claimant to these water, as to the nature of the claim 
asserted by the appellant.50 
 
The system is flexible enough to allow for future demands, especially in 
the case of municipalities, which are currently the fastest growing consumers of 
water in the United States: 
The concern of the city is to assure an adequate supply to the public 
which it services.  In establishing a beneficial use of water under such 
                                                 
 
48 Originally prior to the relative administrative structures, a simple commencement of the work 
was sufficient.  Arguments were resolved by lawsuit (unless by self-help), but evidence may be a 
big problem, see Sax, Thompson, Leshy, and Abrams Legal Control of Water Resources (4th ed, 
Thomson West, St Paul, 2006) at 131. 
49 Sand Point Water & Light Co. v Panhandle Development Co 83 P. 347 (Idaho 1905). 
50 Ibid, at 349 per Ailshie J. 
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circumstances the factors are not as simple and are more numerous 
than the application of water to 160 acres of land used for agricultural 
purposes.  A specified tract of land does not increase in size, but 
populations do, and in short periods of time.  With that flexibility in 
mind it is not speculation but the highest prudence on the part of the 
city to obtain appropriations of water that will satisfy the needs 
resulting from a normal increase in population within a reasonable 
period of time.51 
 
With a degree of flexibility, the doctrine has the potential to remain relevant and 
to address contemporary issues as and when they arise. 
8.2 The Colorado Experience with the Anti-Speculation 
Philosophy. 
In balancing anti-speculation requirements and exceptions to the rule to allow 
forward planning obligations for municipal interests, Sandi Zellmer states that 
Colorado law is fairly typical in that it allows cities to anticipate and plan for 
projected population increases. 52   In fact there is a pragmatic preference for 
municipalities in general, to enable them to more effectively prepare for the future 
– the “growing communities” doctrine.  “… a municipal water supplier [may] 
hold a priority date for an unused block of water rights in anticipation of future 
needs.”53   
                                                 
 
51 City and County of Denver v Sheriff 105 Colo. 193, at 202 per Otto Buck, J. (Colo. 1939).  
Denver’s water supply was acquired in 1918 when the population was between 150,000 -200,000.  
At the time of Sheriff’s case in 1939, the population was about 350,000.  Currently it is about 
620,000. 
52 Sandi Zellmer “The Anti-Speculation Doctrine and its Implications for Collaborative Water 
Management” (2008) 8 Nevada Law Journal 994 at 1014. 
53 Janis E. Carpenter “Water for Growing Communities in the Pacific Northwest” (1997) 27 Envlt 
L 127 at 128. See also A. Dan Tarlock and Sarah B. van der Wetering “Western Growth and 
Sustainable Water Use: If There are no ‘Natural Limits’, Should We Worry About Water 
Supplies?” (2006) 27 Pub Land & Resources L Rev 33 at 48 et seq.  
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A “preference” is a general term with a number of varying effects, from a 
superior right against others to a better right than others for the same purpose.54  It 
is no trifling matter however as, although it avoids the allegation of speculation by 
virtue of its pragmatism, any city whose future uses are put at the top of the 
priority list will squeeze out the marginal land at the bottom.55   
In City & County of Denver v Northern Colorado Water Conservancy 
District,56 the problem confronting the Bench was that for some 20 years Denver 
had not begun the actual construction of its water project and had made no 
attempts to secure funding for it apart from a fruitless approach to the U.S. 
Reclamation Service.  The Colorado Supreme Court held there was no steady 
application of city’s appropriation and this had the effect of paralysing all river 
development for some 19 years without a single shovel-full of dirt having been 
excavated.  This was held to be unfair to other water users of more modest means 
who had continued to work their appropriations but were pushed down the 
seniority ladder by the city which had done nothing on its intended appropriation 
for about two decades.   
Notably, however, there were three dissenting judgments. These 
confirmed the finding of the same court in Sherrif’s case of 1939, and expressed 
sympathy for Denver’s predicament.  Justice Moore’s dissenting judgment stated 
that municipal planning requires managerial discretion involving an ever-
changing problem: “That is no less true today, with the increased population 
condition, and furnishes an approach to the one serious challenge to the good faith 
of the city…”57   
                                                 
 
54 See Frank J. Trelease “Preferences to the use of Water’ (1955) 27 Rocky Mtn L Rev 133 at 133.  
55 Ibid, at 159. 
56 City & County of Denver v Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District 276 P.2d 992 (Colo. 
1954). 
57 Ibid, at 1020. 
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Further flexibility and protection from the imputation of speculation is 
found in another similar co-existent doctrine called the “progressive growth 
doctrine”, which gives support to those wishing to anticipate future needs for 
water by documenting those needs.  Potential applicants include municipalities, 
but also developers and farmers (for irrigation).  The position was articulated thus 
in St. Onge v Blakeley:58 
It is not requisite that the use of water appropriated be made 
immediately to the full extent of the needs of the appropriator.  It may 
be prospective and contemplated, provided there is a present 
ownership or possessory right to the lands upon which it is applied, 
coupled with a bona fide intention to use the water, and provided that 
the appropriator proceeds with due diligence to apply the water to his 
needs.59 
  
In State ex rel. State Engineer v Crider,60 the Court found (quoting Kinney 
on Irrigation and Water Rights Vol.2 p.1568): 
“… where the purpose of the appropriation is for the irrigation of new 
land by a settlor, although the quantity first used is not the full amount 
claimed, the settlor may year by year increase the quantity used, as he 
gets his land ready for cultivation, up to the full amount of his claim 
… provided he does not delay the final use for all the water claimed 
for an unreasonable time.”61 
 
In 1954, the Colorado Supreme Court had mentioned that speculators may 
not appropriate water and, thereby, subsequently compel other bona fide 
appropriators to “pay them tribute” by purchasing a right which had been 
guaranteed to them by the Colorado Constitution.62  The odd aspect of the anti-
                                                 
 
58 St. Onge v Blakeley 245 P. 532. (Mont. 1926).  This case also demonstrates the excruciating 
complexity of some water cases: a profusion of witnesses and 1000 pages of testimony. 
59 Ibid, at 539 per Matthews J. 
60 State ex rel. State Engineer v Crider 431 P.2d 45. (N. M. 1967). 
61 Ibid, at 49 per Spiess J. 
62 City & County of Denver v Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District 276 P.2d 992 at 
1009 per Stone CJ (Colo. 1954). 
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speculation doctrine is that although it was generally accepted that such a 
hypothesis was encapsulated in the “use” prescription of the beneficial use notion, 
it was not until 1979 that in Colorado River Water Conservation District v Vidler 
Tunnel Water Company.63 it was actually articulated as an independent tenet.  The 
question before the Supreme Court was whether the water requested - with no 
associated definite use by Vidler’s municipal customers - was purely a speculative 
and conjectural claim: “Our constitution guarantees a right to appropriate, not a 
right to speculate.”64   
The unstated anti-speculation intention is contained in all state 
constitutions and/or statutes, but subsequent to Vidler that intention is discussed in 
negative terms about speculation rather than positive terms about use – a change 
in perspective.  Vidler Tunnel and Water was involved in the business of dealing 
in and supplying water for a variety of different purposes from municipal,65 
industrial, and agricultural to recreational and energy generation.  It was minded 
to increase its storage capacity by about 156,000 acre-feet.  Crucially, the 
company did not have in place any contracts for the end use of the water it was 
planning to store.  The company did however have use for approximately 7,000 
acre-feet on land it either owned itself or leased.  The Supreme Court held that the 
company was entitled to appropriate the 7,000 acre-feet only:   
The right to appropriate is for Use, not merely for profit.  As we read 
our constitution and statutes, they give no right to pre-empt the 
development potential of water for the anticipated future use of others 
not in privity of contract, or in any agency relationship, with the 
developer regarding that use.  To recognise conditional decrees 
grounded on no interest beyond a desire to obtain water for sale would 
as a practical matter discourage those who have need and use for the 
                                                 
 
63 Colorado River Water Conservation District v Vidler Tunnel Water Company 594 P.2d 566. 
(Colo.1979). 
64 Ibid, at 568 per Carrington J. 
65 The company was a private corporation not a municipality, but had been contracted in the past 
to various municipalities. 
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water from developing it.  Moreover, such a rule would encourage 
those with vast monetary resources to monopolize, for personal profit 
rather than for beneficial use, whatever unappropriated water 
remains.66 
 
The Court found that a general need for water was insufficient and 
appropriators must show that they individually have the ability to place the water 
to beneficial use, or that they represented someone who had that ability and that 
firm contracts or agency agreements were in place.  This was the genesis of the 
anti-speculation doctrine as such – the Court did not “articulate a new legal 
requirement…but rather merely applied longstanding principles of Colorado water 
law.” 67   Vidler was decided in the context of a private company, not a 
municipality, and the court did not expect the requirements of firm contractual 
commitments or agency relationships to apply with equal force to 
municipalities.68  In 1979, immediately after the Vidler decision, the Colorado 
General Assembly amended the definition of “appropriation” in the Water Right 
Determination and Administration Act 1969 to enshrine the anti-speculation 
doctrine articulated in that case: 
(3)(a) “Appropriation” means the application of a specified portion of 
the waters of the state to a beneficial use pursuant to the procedure 
prescribed by law but no appropriation of water, either absolute or 
conditional, shall be held to occur when the proposed appropriation is 
based upon the speculative sale or transfer of the appropriative rights 
to persons not parties to the proposed appropriation, as evidenced by 
either of the following: 
 (I) The purported appropriator of record does not have either a 
legally vested interest or a reasonable expectation of procuring such 
interest in the lands or facilities to be served by such appropriation, 
unless such appropriator is a government agency or an agent in fact 
for the persons proposed to be benefited by such appropriation 
                                                 
 
66 Colorado River Water Conservation District v Vidler Tunnel Water Company. 594 P.2d 566, at 
568 per Carrigan, J (Colo.1979). 
67 City of Thornton v Bijou Irrigation Co. 926 P.2d 1 at 37 (Colo. 1996). 
68 Ibid, at 38. 
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 (II) The purported appropriator of record does not have a 
specific plan and intent to divert, store, or otherwise capture, possess, 
and control a specific quantity of water for specific beneficial uses.69 
 
Thus the anti-speculation doctrine as enacted in Colorado gives flexibility 
to governmental agencies responsible for supplying water to individual users 
while acting as a brake on speculative undertakings by private parties. The 
appropriations by municipalities must be consistent with reasonably anticipated 
requirements based on established projections of future demand.   
It is clear from the preceding cases that the anti-speculation principle was 
driven by the application for conditional water rights, that is to say the water right 
would ripen in the event the owner implements his or her appropriation within a 
reasonable amount of time.  It is important that the applicant clearly demonstrate 
the ability, intent and commitment to pursue and complete the appropriation: 
No claim for a conditional water right may be recognised or a decree 
therefor granted except to the extent that it is established that the 
waters can and will be diverted, stored, or otherwise captured, 
possessed, and controlled and will be beneficially used and that the 
project can and will be completed with diligence and within a 
reasonable time.70 
 
Additionally, an owner of a conditional appropriation must periodically 
demonstrate to the water court that the project can and will proceed to completion:  
In every sixth calendar year after the calendar year in which a water 
right is conditionally decreed or in which a finding of reasonable 
diligence has been decreed, the owner or user thereof, if such owner 
or user desires to maintain the same, shall file an application for a 
finding of reasonable diligence, or said water right shall be considered 
abandoned.71  
                                                 
 
69 1979 Colo. Sess. Laws 1366, 1368 (codified at §37-92-103(3) (a)). 
70 Colorado Revised Statutes §37-92-305 (9) (b). 




This is not a mere gratuitous statement, however – the procedure is serious 
and designed to protect both the resource and potential applicants from 
speculative accumulation of water rights. Moreover it was held by the Colorado 
Supreme Court that circumstances may overtake the applicant.   
In Municipal Subdistrict, Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District 
v Oxy USA Inc.,72 Oxy had applied for a conditional water right in connection 
with an application to extract oil from shale on the applicant’s land.  In its 
hexennial73 application to maintain the right, it was held that the “can and will” 
standard and the anti-speculation doctrine applied to subsequent diligence 
proceedings.  The Court found it could take into account in the renewal 
application the then current economic feasibility, or otherwise, of oil shale 
extraction due to low oil prices and thus whether the applicant had proved that it 
diligently developed its rights as well as whether it can and will complete the 
project.  
The anti-speculation doctrine was initially intended to prohibit the 
entry of conditional decrees when the holder had nothing more than 
an intent to sell the right at an unknown time in the future for a profit.  
However, because a conditional right, or some portion of that right, 
may become speculative over time, we now hold that just as the “can 
and will” test continues to apply in later diligence proceedings, so 
does the anti-speculation doctrine…  If a water right initially clears 
the anti-speculation hurdle, yet later becomes speculative, then the 
project is not moving towards completion and beneficial use.74 
 
A special note needs to be made regarding groundwater.  The legal 
position of groundwater in Colorado is somewhat abstruse.  Traditionally 
groundwater extraction was for relatively minor amounts extracted by humble 
                                                 
 
72 Municipal Subdistrict, Northern Colorado Water Conservancy District v Oxy USA Inc.990 P2d. 
701 (Colo.1999). 
73 This is the term generally used in the United States. 
74 Ibid, at 709 per Kourlis J. 
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traditional methods such as windmills.  However with developments in pumping 
technology and cheap electricity, pressure on sources became drastic.75  As a 
consequence, the law regulating groundwater in Colorado has developed quite 
recently.  The Ground Water Management Act was passed in 1965 76  and 
established the Ground Water Commission.  Colorado’s groundwater is defined in 
four categories, one being “designated water” which is not interconnected with 
surface water.  This water is regulated by the Ground Water Commission.77   
In Jaeger v Colorado Ground Water Commission,78 Jaeger was minded to 
apply to the Commission for a right to withdraw designated water.  He intended to 
sell the water in the future but had no present contractual commitment for the sale 
and purchase of the water for beneficial purposes.  His argument was that the 
relevant statute did not require a beneficial use: 
If after such hearing it appears that there is no unappropriated waters 
in the designated source or that the proposed appropriation would 
unreasonably impair existing water rights from such source or would 
create unreasonable waste, the application shall be denied; otherwise 
it shall be granted …79 
 
No mention is made of beneficial use, and this was relied on by Mr Jaeger.  
However the court had no difficulty in swatting his argument aside: 
In fact, the anti-speculation doctrine was developed to encourage full 
utilization of water resources by making water available to those with 
a genuine, immediate use for the water.  The anti-speculation doctrine 
works to supplement the statutory permit system and to encourage the 
fullest use of designated ground water resources. 
                                                 
 
75 About 18% of Colorado’s water came from these sources in 2003: Colorado Ground Water 
Commission v North Kiowa-Bijou Groundwater Management District 77 P.3d 62, at 69 (Colo. 
2003).  
76 See Colorado Revised Statutes §§148-18-1 to 38. 
77 The others are regulated by either the water courts or the state water engineer. 
78 Jaeger v Colorado Ground Water Commission 746 P.2d 515 (Colo. 1987). 
79 See (now) Colorado Revised Statutes §37-90-107 (4). 
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In summary, the arguments of the appellant that the anti-speculation 
doctrine is not applicable to this case are not persuasive.80 
 
The judicial eye is constantly on speculative potential.  One of the 
categories of Colorado’s groundwater is “not non-tributary groundwater”, that is 
water in the Dawson, Denver, Arapahoe, and Laramie-Fox Hills aquifer, known 
as the Denver Basin that do not satisfy the definition of non-tributary 
groundwater.  The right to use that water is restricted to those owners of the 
overlying land, not by the application of prior appropriation rules.   Despite this, 
the Colorado Supreme Court found that Colorado water was a public resource and 
appropriators seeking to use Denver Basin groundwater only possess an inchoate 
statutory right to use the water, but to suggest that the anti-speculation doctrine 
does not apply because the use of the water is limited to the overlying landowners 
disregards the goal of conservation ant the public nature of the resource. 81 
To be consistent, the Colorado Supreme Court has held that although by 
statute water courts must allocate non-tributary ground waters without immediate 
plans for use,82 the Ground Water Management Act contains a beneficial use 
requirement,83 and it is the State Engineer who evaluates that beneficial use.  Thus 
whilst an applicant may obtain a decree to appropriate water without showing any 
plan for its use, that applicant may not secure a well permit from the Engineer 
without demonstrating a beneficial use for the water.84 
                                                 
 
80 Jaeger v Colorado Ground Water Commission 746 P.2d 515 at 523 per Lohr J (Colo. 1987). 
81 Colorado Ground Water Commission v North Kiowa-Bijou Groundwater Management District 
77 P.3d 62 at 80 per Bender, J (Colo. 2003). “Conservation” is an interesting choice of word.  
Gregory Hobbs has described the current period of Colorado water law as the “environmental era” 
(see Colorado Water Law: An Historical Overview 1 U Denv Water L Review 1 at 22 1997-1998). 
82 Colorado Revised Statutes §37-92-305 (11); §37-90-137 (6). 
83 Colorado Revised Statutes §37-90-102 (2). 
84 East Cherry Creek Valley Water & Sanitation District v Rangeview Metro District 109 P.3d. 
154, at 158 per Coats J. (Colo. 2005). 
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In the major case of High Plains A&M LLC v Southeastern Colorado 
Water Conservancy District, 85  the Supreme Court of Colorado confirmed the 
notion that the beneficial use doctrine is attached to applications for changes in 
water rights.86  High Plains had applied to change historical irrigation rights to any 
of over fifty various (and seemingly random) uses in any of 28 counties in 
Colorado.  The Water Court had found the application “expansive and nebulous” 
making it difficult to satisfy the “no injury” rule as well as determining whether 
the beneficial use rule could be complied with.  The Water Court held that the 
application violated the State’s anti-speculation doctrine.  High Plains specifically 
argued that on a strict reading of §37-92-103(3) (which states that an 
“appropriation” of water means the application of a specific portion of the waters 
of the state to a beneficial use) and §37-92-305(9) (b) (which states that a 
conditional water right must also be for a beneficial use), the anti-speculation 
doctrine only applied to new appropriations and not to change application 
proceedings.  The Supreme Court had no difficulty in disagreeing.  Crucially, at 
the time of the filing of the applications, High Plains had no agreements with 
anyone to establish a beneficial use for the changed water rights in any of the 28 
counties mentioned in the applications.  The Court reiterated its finding in the 
1891 case of Strickler v City of Colorado Springs 87  that water rights are 
transferable property rights, provided there is no injury to others, and (by 
inference) the water is put to a beneficial use.  High Plains found that Strickler 
had not been overtaken by statutory provisions, but in any event those statutory 
provisions still anticipated a beneficial use on transfer: 
                                                 
 
85 High Plains A&M LLC v Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District 120 P.3d 710 
(Colo. 2005). 
86 The same fate befell the companion case of ISG LLC v Arkansas Valley Ditch Association 120 
P.3d 724 (Colo. 2005). The facts of both cases are virtually identical, and the judgments handed 
down on the same day, 12 September 2005. 
87 Strickler v City of Colorado Springs 26 P.313 (Colo. 1891). 
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… the … Act anticipates, as a basic predicate of an application for a 
decree changing the place of use, that there is a sufficiently described 
actual beneficial use to be made at an identified location or locations 
under the change decree. 
A guess that a transferred priority might eventually be put to a 
beneficial use is not what the Colorado Constitution or the General 
Assembly envisioned as the triggering predicate for continuing an 
appropriation under a change of water right decree.  The change 
application process is intended to facilitate transfers that are 
calculated to result in a continued application of the appropriated 
water to specified beneficial uses at different locations from the 
current decree under conditions to prevent injury to other water 
rights.88 
 
In the event the Court found otherwise, the prior appropriation doctrine in 
Colorado would be incomprehensible and of unmanageable complexity.  
Furthermore and just as importantly, the attitude of the Supreme Court judiciary is 
quite plain in the judgment.  Part of that attitude is derived from history, but a 
telling passage of the judgment indicates the justices have a firm eye on the 
future: 
In its findings resulting from the Statewide Water Supply Initiative, 
the Colorado Water Conservation Board projects an approximate 
twenty percent shortfall in supply to meet water requirements by the 
year 2030 across the state that may need to be filled by temporary or 
permanent agricultural transfers of water; this assumes that presently 
contemplated projects of local government water suppliers are 
actually built.89 
 
This is clearly a sustainability discourse very much like the imperative to 
promote sustainability contained in section 5 of our Resource Management Act 
1991.  Moreover, the judgment makes note of the over-appropriated status of three 
of the four main rivers in Colorado.90 
                                                 
 
88 Strickler v City of Colorado Springs 120 P.3d 710 at 720-721 per Hobbs J (Colo. 2005). 
89 Ibid, at 722. 
90 Ibid, at p 722. 
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Given the lack of new water to appropriate, and increasing demand, 
most issues with respect to potential speculation are likely to occur in 
these changes of water rights cases as opposed to new appropriations.  
High Plains and others have been cognizant of this change in 
economic conditions and have purchased irrigation water rights, 
hoping to sell those rights to urban areas located not only in the 
Arkansas Basin but throughout the front range.91 
 
The Colorado Supreme Court has proved to be steadfast in its approach to 
anti-speculation matters.  In Pagosa Area Water and Sanitation District v Trout 
Unlimited 92  (“Pagosa 1”), the Water Court had decreed a conditional 
appropriation to Pagosa of some 35,300 acre-feet with direct flow rights totalling 
180 cubic feet per second, and for a period of 100 years.  Trout Unlimited argued 
that neither the Water Court nor Pagosa could justify the amount of water so 
appropriated.  The District’s engineer was of little help when he stated at trial that 
the claim was a “no-brainer ’cause you go to the site capacity and you do your 
darndest to get that amount built.”93 The Supreme Court noted that governmental 
agencies were not “completely immunised” from accusations of speculation;94 and 
while governmental agencies may appropriate for future projected needs without 
firm contractual commitments or agency relationships, the amount of water 
claimed is 
(s)ubject to the water court’s determination that the amount 
conditionally appropriated is consistent with the municipality’s 
reasonably anticipated requirements based on substantiated 
projections of future growth.95 
 
                                                 
 
91 Scott A. Clark and Alix L. Joseph “Changes of Water Rights and the Anti-speculation Doctrine: 
The Continuing Importance of Actual Beneficial Use” (2005-2006) 9 U Denv Water L Rev 533 at 
563. 
92 Pagosa Area Water and Sanitation District v Trout Unlimited 170 P.3d 307 (Colo. 2007).  
Pagosa/San Juan are a water & sanitary district/water conservancy district respectively 
(governmental agencies).  Trout Unlimited is a fisheries conservation organisation. 
93 Ibid, at 311. 
94 Referring to City of Thornton v Bijou Irrigation Co. 926 P.2d 1 37 at 38 (Colo.1996). 
95 Ibid, at 80. 
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However this concession is “to be construed narrowly”.96  The Supreme 
Court was not satisfied that the Water Court made correct findings of fact and 
accordingly the matter was referred back to that court for re-evaluation.  The 
Water Court was instructed to make new findings on existing and new evidence 
offered by the parties.97  It transpired that the Water Court did not re-examine the 
evidence as the Supreme Court requested and ignored the directive in Pagosa 1 to 
find out which party was correct.  As a result the Water Court issued another 
decree giving Pagosa 25,300 acre-feet, with direct flow rights totalling 150 cubic 
feet per second.  Trout Unlimited was still dissatisfied, and claimed the suggestion 
of speculation still hovered over the latest appropriation, arguing it did not 
conform to credible future water use projections.  
The company again appealed: Pagosa Area Water and Sanitation District 
v Trout Unlimited98 (“Pagosa 2”).  Tellingly, though the Supreme Court gave the 
Water Court’s factual findings no regard at all.99  Addressing the two main water 
rights granted by the Water Court, the Supreme Court found both the direct flow 
rights and the storage rights to be clearly excessive.  In essence the Districts failed 
to satisfy the Supreme Court that they had a specific future beneficial uses for the 
water. By failing to justify the amounts of water decreed by the Water Court, 
Pagosa was effectively failing the anti-speculation test. Further, the court refused 
                                                 
 
96 Pagosa Area Water and Sanitation District v Trout Unlimited 170 P.3d 307, at 317, per Hobbs, 
J. 
97 Ibid, at 320. 
98 Pagosa Area Water and Sanitation District v Trout Unlimited 219 P.3d 774 (Colo. 2009). 
99 Under the relevant statute (CRS §§37-92-302, -304, -305) the Supreme Court is able to conduct 
the proceedings de novo, but “we defer to the water court’s findings of fact unless the evidence is 
wholly insufficient to support those determinations.” Ibid, at 779.  
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to accept the population figures suggested by Pagosa, 100  and therefore by 
extension the flow rights and water storage claimed. 
We agree that the “reality checks” the Water Court has included in the 
remand decree are appropriate for upcoming diligence determinations.  
But the “reality checks” are not a substitute for the Districts’ burden 
of proving the need for the amounts of water they claim should be 
conditionally decreed.101 
 
Derek L. Turner sums up “Pagosa 2” thus: 
Pagosa II puts municipal water developers on notice that the 
Colorado Supreme Court will scrutinize the factual findings of water 
courts to determine if the amounts of water conditionally decreed are 
truly needed to serve the reasonably projected municipal needs.  The 
Pagosa II decision also functions as a warning shot from the Colorado 
Supreme Court to state water courts saying, in effect, “We are 
concerned with water speculation, and when we ask you to make 
specific findings concerning the anti-speculation doctrine, we really 
mean it.”102 
 
The Colorado Supreme Court has continued to demonstrate an 
implacable disposition to ensure the state’s anti-speculation doctrine is 
given due respect by applicants.  In Upper Yampa Water Conservancy 
District v Dequine Family,103 the question was whether the District could 
establish that it had sufficient need for additional water that could be put 
to beneficial use.  The Water Court held that it did not and accordingly 
could not satisfy the anti-speculation doctrine.  The Supreme Court 
agreed.  It was clear the District needed the water to satisfy the existing 
                                                 
 
100 About 63,000.  A General Assembly-authorised study suggested a range between 34,500 and 
41,500. See Pagosa 2 at 787.  The water court had ignored the directive in Pagosa 1 to find out 
which party was correct.  
101 Pagosa Area Water and Sanitation District v Trout Unlimited 219 P.3d 774, at 788 per Hobbs, 
J. (Colo. 2009). 
102 Derek L. Turner “Pagosa Area Water & Sanitation District v Trout Unlimited and an Anti-
speculation Doctrine for a New Era of Water Supply Planning” (2011) 82 U. Colo L Rev 611 at 
668. 
103 Upper Yampa Water Conservancy District v Dequine Family 249 P.3d 794 (Colo. 2011). 
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contractual obligations it had with municipal and commercial users, rather 
than the reasonably anticipated future population demands of the 
municipalities with which it had contracts.   
It is now too well-settled to merit elaboration that the intent to 
appropriate water for a beneficial use, proof of which is an integral 
part of the applicant’s obligation to show it has made a “first step” 
towards appropriation, cannot be based on the speculative sale or 
transfer of the appropriate rights.104 
 
Accordingly, it was held that the conditional water right application was 
for speculative purposes. 
Interestingly enough, the Upper Yampa District tangled with the Colorado 
Supreme Court again a few years later.  At issue was the intention of the District 
to increase its water storage capacity as a hedge against the ravages of drought.  
On the face of it, this would seem to be an eminently sensible step to take.  The 
court did not agree. 
The District urges that placing water into storage “uses” it by 
removing the water from the stream system to “accomplish” a 
particular “purpose” – namely, use when needed at a later date.  
However defining storage for a later date as “use” seems more akin to 
“speculative hoarding”, and, as such is in direct tension with 
Colorado’s long-standing anti-speculation policy.105 
 
To be fair, this position is consistent with the Court’s ruling in the 1912 case 
of Highland Ditch Co v Union Reservoir Co106 (mentioned in the Wolfe judgment) 
in which it was held that diversion and storage by themselves are not sufficient to 
                                                 
 
104 Ibid, at 797 per Coats, J. The first step is supposed to clearly demonstrate an immediate specific 
beneficial use or reasonably anticipated future needs.  
105 Upper Yampa Water Conservancy District v Wolfe 255 P3. 1108 at 1111 per Eid J (Colo. 
2011). 
106 Highland Ditch Co v Union Reservoir Co 127 P.1025 (Colo. 1912). 
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constitute an appropriation without the water being beneficially applied.107  It may 
be consistent but it is also a very strict application of the doctrine.  Highland Ditch 
was a case relating to irrigation, not the forward planning of a municipality.  In 
2011 the Supreme Court was unbending in its attitude towards water speculation: 
“Otherwise storage facilities would be an incentive to hoard water in advance of 
receiving absolute decrees – contrary to the anti-speculation doctrine.”108  Janet C. 
Neuman makes the point that transfers have become the perceived threat that 
speculation and monopoly was one hundred years ago, certainly among rural 
interests which see urban sprawl and increasing water consumption as a threat to 
western agriculture.109   
8.3 The Difference between the Colorado and New Zealand 
Approaches. 
There is no mistaking the attitude of the Colorado Supreme Court when dealing 
with these speculation cases.  In water matters, the Court functions not merely as a 
venue for settling legal disagreements but also as a gatekeeper protecting the 
integrity and virtue of a state-managed strategic resource.  In this regard it acts 
very much like our Environment Court, but with a great deal more clout.  Scott A. 
Clark and Alix L. Joseph put it thus: 
Application of the anti-speculation doctrine: 1) protects the public’s 
interest in this valuable resource; 2) promotes maximum utilization of 
the State’s limited water supply; 3) protects other water users from 
unspecified injury; and 4) protects the integrity of Colorado’s water 
court system.110 
 
                                                 
 
107 Ibid, at 1025. 
108 Upper Yampa Water Conservancy District v Wolfe 255 P3. 1108 at 1112 per Eid J (Colo. 
2011). 
109 “Beneficial use, Waste, and Forfeiture” (1998) 28 Envtl L 919 at 971-2. 
110 Scott A. Clark and Alix L. Joseph “Changes of Water Rights and the Anti-speculation Doctrine: 




Colorado’s Constitutional provisions provide authority for the first two 
matters identified by Clark and Joseph.  Article XVI §5 states that water is the 
property of the state and is dedicated to the use of the people of the state.  The 
implication is that benefit is perpetual, and consequently continued beneficial use 
is necessary for the continued existence of a water right.111 Article XVI §6 states 
that water may only be appropriated by those who will put it to beneficial use.  
Hence, stockpiling water for an unspecified future use is not allowed.112   
The third matter is statutory.  It is up to the applicant to satisfy the Water 
Court that there is no injury to others in a change of use application (Colorado 
Revised Statutes §37-92-304; §37-92 305). The appellant in the High Plains case 
was totally unable to satisfy this requirement in the Supreme Court.   
Clark and Joseph argue the fourth matter relates to the cost and 
inconvenience adjudicating water rights to the parties.  Again, High Plains 
articulates the problem: the company forced “the state and water users to expend 
thousands (if not millions) of dollars debating the merits of a nebulous project of 
uncertain future.”113  Thus the strict approach of the Supreme Court is justified by 
making it clear to potential players the Court’s solid and uncompromising attitude.  
Further, the cases suggest quite strongly that the Supreme Court is exemplary in 
discharging its constitutional and statutory duties.  
There is the temptation to compare our Court of Appeal case of Fleetwing 
Farms Limited v Marlborough District Council.114  It is fair to say this case is a 
procedural, rather than substantive, discussion of the Resource Management Act 
                                                 
 
111 See High Plains A&M, LLC v Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District 120 P.3d 
710 (Colo. 2005). (Above n 70). 
112 Upper Yampa Water Conservancy District v Wolfe 255 P3. 1108 (Colo. 2011). 
113 “Changes of Water Rights and the Anti-speculation Doctrine: The Continuing Importance of 
Actual Beneficial Use” (2005-2006) 9 U. Denv. Water L. Rev 533, at 571. 
114 Fleetwing Farms Limited v Marlborough District Council [1997] 3 NZLR 257. 
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1991.  While it is also fair to say the appeal was actually on matters of procedure, 
the Court of Appeal’s discussions about the purpose of the Act somewhat misses 
the point,115 which is quite simply that there is a statutory duty imposed on the 
various tribunals to take into account in any decision-making the sustainable 
management of the nation’s natural resources.   It may be argued that the Bench in 
Fleetwing did not discharge this duty, and it may be equally argued that given the 
same circumstances the Colorado Supreme Court would not be found wanting in 
this regard, for instance as demonstrated by its attitude and approach to both 
Upper Yampa District cases.116   
Referring back to Clark and Joseph’s final point about time and expense, 
the Central Plains cases which follow Fleetwing demonstrate how that decision 
compounded rather than settled the issue as new parties debated the point as to 
just when an application is “filed”,117  despite the Court of Appeal in both cases 
having the opportunity of rectifying matters.  Kenneth Palmer states in an article 
on the Ngai Tahu case that: 
In many respects, the “first in, first served rule” derived from 
Fleetwing has advanced in a manner that misunderstands and 
marginalises the basic function and objective of the RMA – to ensure 
that scarce resources are fairly and properly allocated to achieve 
sustainable management for the well-being of the community.118 
 
The Colorado Supreme Court would definitely agree.  A further and more 
fundamental matter to which the American court would have great difficulty with, 
and identified in, the Ngai Tahu case was the fact that Ngai Tahu simply did not 
have any information as to how the water was to be used.  This point is well made 
                                                 
 
115 See discussion in chapter 2.  
116 See pages 20-21 supra. 
117 See Central Plains Water Trust v Synlait Limited [2009] NZCA 609; Central Plains Water 
Trust v Ngai Tahu Properties [2008] NZRMA 200. 
118 “Priority of Competing Resource Consent Applications – Marginalisation of the Sustainable 
Management Purpose” (May 2008) Resource Management Bulletin 133 at 136. 
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in the judgment of Robertson J.  Although section 88 of the Resource 
Management Act 1991 makes it essential that the applicant provide an 
environmental assessment of the activity, and that in the absence of such 
information the authority may return the application as incomplete,119 the consent 
authority decided that section 91 should apply which allowed it to determine not 
to proceed with notification if other applications are necessary and it is 
appropriate to better understand the application that those further applications be 
made.120  
Robertson J’s opinion was that in a situation where the “take” part of the 
application was understood but not the “use” segment, it is “bereft of reality to 
suggest that a consent authority … would not give consideration to the use to 
which the water was going to be put.”121  He went on to state that the Resource 
Management Act, read as a whole, suggests the “take” part of the application 
cannot be adjudicated upon without full information about the consequent use.  
This position is taken at an elementary level on environmental considerations 
simply because the assessments of the environmental impacts would be 
impossible.122  Under the scrutiny of the Colorado Supreme Court however and 
the beneficial use principles which it would apply, the Central Plains case would 
fail instantly because it smacks strongly of speculation, and there would be 
absolutely no point in approaching the Court without intelligible and compelling 
submissions.   
The position was further discussed by the Court of Appeal in Central 
Plains Water Trust v Synlait Limited.123  Again, the question under discussion was 
exactly when an application gained priority – when simply filed, or when the 
                                                 
 
119 Resource Management Act 1991, s88 (2); s88 (3). 
120 Resource Management Act 1991, s91 (1).   
121 Central Plains Water Trust v Ngai Tahu Properties [2008] NZRMA 200, at para 132.      
122 Schedule 4 Resource Management Act 1991. 
123 Central Plains Water Trust v Synlait Limited [2009] NZCA 609. 
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application is ready for notification under the Act.124  Whilst the facts of the case 
are uncomfortably complex, in simple terms the Court of Appeal held that the 
priority belonged to the party first to file a complete application.  Once again the 
issue was raised about the “take” and “use” components of an application.  
Startlingly, the Court of Appeal expressed the opinion that “[t]o give Part 2 [the 
purpose and principles of the Act] full rein would cut across the RMA’s strict time 
limits and the detailed regime containing them.”125  The Colorado Supreme Court 
would be flabbergasted at the suggestion that the Act’s core rubric should be 
sacrificed on the altar of bureaucratic expediency.126  It would certainly not agree 
that procedure should not be “swamped by aspiring to substantive perfection”,127 
but would see it simply as a matter of the consent authority complying with a 
statutory obligation.   
Once again, in the event that the Synlait case came before the Colorado 
Supreme Court, it would have a different outcome as although Central Plains filed 
first, it was not able to provide the “use” details (as to the portions of the various 
applications which clashed) to satisfy the anti-speculation rubric which, like 
“sustainable management” under the Resource Management Act in New Zealand, 
is at the very heart of Colorado’s water law. 
It would appear that an anti-speculation doctrine in New Zealand would 
surely make the consent application method a much simpler process in some 
cases, given the bureaucratic entanglements resulting from our Fleetwing 
procedure, however that application process is started.  If as the Land and Water 
Forum tells us all New Zealand’s economically significant catchments are close to 
                                                 
 
124 When an application is ready for notification, the applicant loses control of the process. 
125 Ibid at paragraph 82. 
126  In a marvellous display of prescience, Malcolm Grant had stated in 1995 that strong 
commitment to the sustainability ethic was needed if that imperative were to survive the threat of 
“bureaucratic engulfment” “Sustainable Management: A sustainable Ethic?” Paper presented to 
Resource Management Law Association Annual Conference Christchurch 6-7 October 1995. 
127 Central Plains Water Trust v Synlait Limited [2009] NZCA 609 at paragraph 92. 
237 
 
being fully allocated or even over-allocated (as at 2010),128 a market system of re-
allocation will be necessary to re-distribute those allocations, and with a market 
system comes the inevitable temptation to speculate.  In that case a domestic anti-
speculation doctrine will be highly desirable.   
It is interesting to note that the Land and Water Forum has, in November 
2015, finally addressed the issue of speculation. 129  It is almost tacked on as an 
after-thought.  The Forum’s idea is to deal with the problem through the 
Commerce Act.  With respect this is an inefficient method and the problem of 
speculation would be better dealt with by a beneficial use doctrine.   
It is acknowledged that such a policy may have the effect of driving the 
speculative endeavours underground, that is to say as a water right may only be 
held overtly and used as such, the best way to save water for speculative purposes 
would be to consume as much as possible now.  A cost-benefit analysis might 
indicate that it will be profitable to waste water but recoup those losses in a future 
sale of the water right.  
Professor Neuman writes that it is impossible to say how often this happens 
but is sure it is unlikely that “large numbers of individual western irrigators are 
consciously and intentionally irrigating only with an eye towards selling off their 
water rights at a later date.”130 She makes the point that both land and water 
values are likely to appreciate over time and since land with water rights attached 
is likely to be more valuable than bare land only, some farmers may continue to 
irrigate until the time is ripe to sell.  That is fundamentally different though from 
                                                 
 
128 Report of the Land and Water Forum: A Fresh Start for Fresh Water, September 2010, at p10. 
129 The Fourth Report of The Land and Water Forum, November 2015, at paragraphs 290-296. 
130 “Beneficial use, Waste, and Forfeiture” (1998) 28 Envtl. L. 919 at 968-9. 
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the appropriation of water and the commencement of wasteful irrigation simply to 
hold the water for future speculative uses.131   
The American beneficial use doctrine has another component designed to 
address an issue of this nature – the avoidance of waste.  A New Zealand anti-
speculation doctrine would be predicated on the “management” component of the 
Resource Management Act’s purposes and principles: the notion of avoidance of 
waste in a beneficial use doctrine is predicated on the “efficiency” imperative in 
that Act.  Increasing pressure on New Zealand’s water stocks dictates that 
avoidance of waste is another essential element to our own beneficial use doctrine 
and it is important to now review the American approach to this question. 
 
                                                 
 
131 Ibid, at 969. 
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9 Chapter 9 
9.1 Beneficial use and the Question of Waste. 
The American beneficial use doctrine is well-rounded and addresses not only 
speculation, as shown in the last chapter, but also the thorny issue of waste of 
water resources.  Speculation in water rights by holding them unused to sell them 
at a future date for a profit is in a sense a type of waste: the water is unproductive.  
However, water may also be wasted by inefficient utility.  Usually with 
commodities, an increase in demand is met by an increase in supply.  However, in 
the case of water, as demand for the resource increases the supply remains 
constant.  Therefore, a proscription against inefficiency and waste is an important 
tool in the quest to share available supplies as far as is practicable, and this is the 
case in all countries.  Shupe1 makes the (self-evident) point that “…consumptive 
demands of modern America threaten to overtake the land’s capacity to provide.”  
Michael Toll comments: 
So long as the population of the West remained small, the prior 
appropriation system worked reasonably well because there was 
sufficient water to meet settlers’ modest demands.  The rapidly 
growing population of the West and the attendant swelling demand 
for water resources, however, has increasingly stressed this delicate 
system. 2 
 
The Iowa legislature has put it thus:   
The general welfare of the people of the state requires that the water 
resources of the state be put to beneficial use which includes ensuring 
                                                 
 
1 Steven J. Shupe “Waste in Western Water Law: A Blueprint for Change” (1982) 61 Or. L. Rev. 
483, at 483. 
2  “Reimagining Western Water Law: Time-Limited Water Right Permits Based on a 
Comprehensive Beneficial Use Doctrine” 82 U. Colo L Rev 595 at 597 (2011). (Footnotes 
omitted). 
3 Iowa Code §455B.262.  The provision was adopted in 1957, and the direction to conservation is 
to be noted. 
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that waste or unreasonable use, or unreasonable methods of use of 
water be prevented, and that the conservation and protection of water 
resources be required with the view to their reasonable and beneficial 
use in the interests of the people…3 
 
The seriousness of the problem can be seen in Colorado’s statistics as an 
example.  Colorado is the third fastest-growing state in the United States.  
Between 1990 and 2000 the population grew by over thirty per cent.  Between 
2000 and 2009, the population grew by nearly seventeen per cent, and by 2050 the 
population is forecast to double from its present 4.8 million to 10 million people.4 
If waste is a symptom of inefficiency, section 7 of our Resource 
Management Act 1991 addresses the issue and reads (in part) as follows:- 
7.  Other matters 
In achieving the purpose of this Act, all persons exercising functions 
and powers under it, in relation to managing the use, development, 
and protection of natural and physical resources, shall have particular 
regard to – 
… 
(b) the efficient use and development of natural and physical 
resources. 
 
The Act does not actually define “efficient”, but it is reasonable to adopt a 
general dictionary definition, rather than the several different approaches 
preferred by economic theories.  In this general regard “efficiency” can be taken 
to refer simply to achieving a result with minimum waste or effort. 5   This 
definition was adopted by the Environment Court in Marlborough Ridge Ltd v 
Marlborough District Council: “This basic definition of “efficient” is certainly 
                                                 
 
 
4 Leila C. Behnampour “Reforming a Western Institution: How expanding the Productivity of 
Water Rights Could Lessen our Water Woes” 41 Envtl L 201 at 205 (2011). (Footnotes omitted). 
5 This is the definition contained in the Concise Oxford Dictionary (Eighth Edition). 
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consistent with the purpose of the Act.” 6 Consequently the avoidance of waste is 
quite demonstratively an integral component of that definition of efficiency.   
Once again, the Act does not give any definition of “waste”, or any 
assistance in quantifying “minimum waste”.  Similarly, it would be reasonable to 
adopt a general dictionary definition of “waste” – say, to spoil for want of proper 
attention, or skill, or care, that is, to squander. Judge Jackson in Marlborough 
Ridge Ltd v Marlborough District Council approved the general approach: “…the 
general definition does show why efficiency is a qualitative goal that has been 
included in the RMA – most people would prefer to avoid “waste”.”7 
The avoidance of the waste of water makes perfect sense in New Zealand, 
but is vital in a western American landscape, and New Zealand can learn a lot 
from the American experience.  The concept of waste in the American west is a 
fluid one and, interestingly, Colorado Supreme Court Justice Hobbs makes the 
salient point: “In-stream flows were traditionally considered to be a waste of 
water: today they are fundamental to the implementation of public values.”8  Leila 
Behnampour states “The historical underpinnings of Western water law, however, 
were premised on harnessing water for development, encouraging out-of-stream 
use, and diligently protecting vested rights – principles that often conflict with 
conservation.”9  As such, Hobbs is suggesting a sea-change of attitude towards 
ecology and the environment ‒ and water use in the American west.10  That said, 
in terms of traditional appropriations, the most efficient use of an extremely 
                                                 
 
6 Marlborough Ridge Ltd v Marlborough District Council [1998] NZRMA 73 at 86 per Judge 
Jackson. 
7 Ibid, at 86. 
8 Gregory Hobbs “Priority: The Most Misunderstood Stick in the Bundle” (2002) 32 Envtl L 37 at 
55. 
9 Leila C. Behnampour “Reforming a Western Institution: How expanding the Productivity of 
Water Rights Could Lessen our Water Woes” 41 Envtl L 201 at 203. (2011). 
10 The New Zealand Resource Management Act recognises these values.   
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scarce non-fungible, but vital, commodity is essential, whether it be for 
agriculture or industry, and this is self-evident.   
In the context of the American prior appropriation system however 
efficiency has a very human face, because it may impact directly on the welfare of 
other appropriators in the same system.  By way of example, in the case where a 
junior appropriator is downstream of a senior appropriator and relies on return 
flows for his or her water use, in the event the senior “wastes” water 
unnecessarily, other than by simple preventable evaporation (which takes a huge 
toll on water use), improved efficiency of the upstream senior diverter could result 
in reduced return flows for downstream diverters.  This new “water use 
efficiency” upstream might directly affect the water availability and welfare of the 
downstream junior, or juniors.  
9.2 The Approach Taken by Various Western States 
In American jurisprudence waste of water has a special significance.  If an 
appropriative right can only be acquired for a beneficial use, it is logical that any 
appropriated water that is wasted (beyond what is deemed to be acceptable limits 
in each case) is not, as a matter of simple construction, put to beneficial use.  If 
the first ingredient of that imperative defines how water may be used, the second 
defines the extent to which the water may be applied, that is to say only so far as 
its use benefits the appropriator, and thus by extension society.  In this guise, it is 
a policy against waste.   
The early case of Smith v Hawkins put it thus: “ … an appropriator can 
hold, as against one subsequent in right, only the maximum quantity of water 
which he shall have devoted to a beneficial use … ”11  Steven J. Shupe makes the 
point that the practical definition and the legal definitions of the concept of waste 
                                                 
 
11 Smith v Hawkins 120 Cal. 86, at 88 per van Fleet, J. (1898). 
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do not necessarily accord.12  He tells us that practically speaking, waste may be 
defined as the volume of water diverted for use, but not actually consumptively 
used, by the crop.   Losses may originate in the conveyance system by 
evaporation, seepage and use by phreatophytic trees,13 or in application in the 
field (evaporation and irretrievable percolation).  Shupe states that one-quarter of 
water withdrawn from a stream fails to reach the farm boundary,14 and of that 
portion only about a half is actually used by the crop.  In other words in a practical 
sense more than half the water diverted for use by the average farmer is wasted.  
The legal definition, however, is a different matter.   
A review of case law suggests an apt definition would be “the amount of 
flow diverted in excess of reasonable needs under customary irrigation practices”. 
15  It can be seen immediately that the notion of waste is not absolute, but is 
subject to the vagaries of local customs.  Thus, beneficial use may not be as 
beneficial as might be supposed at first blush, and a more apt definition might 
include an appropriation of sufficient water to accommodate both customary 
waste and crop consumption.16  By way of illustration, in the old leading case of 
Barrows v Fox17 the court stopped short of declaring the plaintiff’s water use as 
wasteful, despite the fact that the water needed for domestic and stock could be 
supplied by a three-quarter inch steel pipe, rather than the open ditch and flume 
customarily used since 1877, and the amount of wasted water (which was quite 
considerable) was acceptable:  
                                                 
 
12 Steven J. Shupe “Waste in Western Water Law: A Blueprint for Change” (1982) 61 Or. L. Rev. 
483. Shupe is both a lawyer and a civil engineer. 
13 These are deep-rooted and derive water from aquifers.  In 1974 the Colorado Supreme Court 
held that the removal of such trees might also lead to major erosion and detrimental effects to the 
health of the stream and water: Southeastern Colorado Water Conservancy District v Shelton 
Farms Inc. 529 P.2d 1321, at 1327 per Day, J. 
14 Bruce A. Maak, writing a decade earlier claims the figure to be one-half: “Water Waste – 
Ascertainment and Abatement” 1973 Utah L. Rev 449, at 449. 
15 Above n 12 at 491. 
16 Above n 14, at 489-491. 
17 Barrows v Fox 98 Cal 63 (1893). 
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Ditches and flumes are the usual and ordinary means of diverting 
water in this state, and parties who have made their appropriations by 
such means cannot be compelled to substitute iron pipes, though they 
may be compelled to keep their flumes and ditches in good repair so 
as to prevent any unnecessary waste. 18 
 
As noted, all western states have adopted the beneficial use doctrine.  
Also as already noted, as with beneficial use in general and the anti-speculation 
doctrine in particular, each state generally has different but similar notions of the 
principle of waste, and a toolbox of legislative and common law devices to 
manage it.  By way of example some actually prohibit the waste of water 
specifically, and using several legislated devices.  The Texas Water Code for 
example describes waste as a public nuisance: 
(a) A person who permits an unreasonable loss of water through 
faulty design or negligent operation of any waterworks using 
water for a purpose named in this chapter commits waste, and the 
commission may declare the works causing the waste to be a 
public nuisance…19 
 
Nevada describes waste in certain circumstances to be a criminal 
misdemeanour: “Any person who wastes water in violation of any of the 
provisions of subsection 1 is guilty of a misdemeanor.” 20   California has its 
“reasonable use” doctrine: 
It is hereby declared that because of the conditions prevailing in the 
state the general welfare requires that the water resources of the state 
be put to beneficial use to the fullest extent of which they are capable, 
and that the waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use 
of water be prevented…21 
 
                                                 
 
18 Ibid, at 67 per Beatty CJ. 
19 Texas Water Code, §11.093. 
20 Nevada Revised Statutes 533.463 (2). 
21 California Water Code §100-112. 
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Idaho requires ditch owners to maintain their apparatus to standard: 
The owner or owners of any irrigating ditch, canal or conduit shall 
carefully keep and maintain the embankments thereof in good repair, 
in order to prevent the water from wasting during irrigation season, 
and shall not at any time permit a greater quantity of water to be 
turned into said ditch, canal or conduit than the banks thereof will 
easily contain or than can be used for beneficial or useful 
purposes…22 
 
Utah provides that the state engineer may require repairs to be undertaken 
to any ditch: 
To prevent waste, loss, pollution, or contamination of any waters 
whether above or below the ground, the state engineer may require the 
repair of construction of head gates or other devices on ditches or 
canals, and the repair or installation of caps, valves, or casings on any 
well or tunnel or the plugging or filling thereof to accomplish the 
purpose of this section. 23 
 
The Colorado Constitution, as already stated, mentions blandly (and 
broadly) that the right to divert unappropriated waters of any natural stream to 
beneficial use shall never be denied.  The prohibition of waste is implied, but was 
made explicit by the common law: “The laws of Colorado are designed to prevent 
waste of a most valuable but limited natural resource, and to confine the use to 
needs.”24 
None of the statutes actually defines what “waste” in fact is. Clearly, to do 
so would be to unnecessarily solidify the concept.  It has been argued that a fluid 
concept of waste, discussed on a case by case basis would appropriately reflect its 
subject matter.  The Supreme Court of California put it this way: 
                                                 
 
22 Idaho Code §42-1203. 
23 Utah Code §73-5-9(1). 




…Preliminarily, it should be stated that, whatever quantity an 
appropriator has actually diverted in the past, he gains no right thereto 
unless such water is actually put to a reasonable use. (26 Cal. Jur. 93, 
sec 286) What is a beneficial use, of course, depends upon the facts 
and circumstances of each case.  What may be a reasonable beneficial 
use, where water is present in excess of all needs, would not be a 
reasonable beneficial use in an area of great scarcity and great need.  
What is a beneficial use at one time may, because of changed 
conditions, become a waste of water at a later time. 25 
 
An obvious change of conditions might be an increase in demand due to 
an increase in population.  In 1915 Samuel C. Wiel had written (quoting from 
“Water Rights in Western States” first edition at 333): 
It seems to the writer not impossible that the courts will declare that 
what constitutes waste is a question of fact depending upon the 
evidence in each case, and not a question of law for declaration by the 
legislature. 26 
 
The notion of waste is clear in theory, then, but, in practice, the position is 
somewhat bewildering. Given that the efficacy of the doctrine depends on the 
effect of court decisions, the judicial tone was set early on.  In Combs v 
Agricultural Ditch Co., Elliott, J stated: 
An excessive diversion of water cannot be regarded as a diversion to 
beneficial use, within the meaning of the constitution and water in this 
country is too scarce, and consequently too precious, to admit to 
waste.  The constitutional rule of distribution, ‘first come, first served’ 
does not imply that the prior appropriator may be extravagantly 
prodigal in dealing with this peculiar bounty of nature.  We are aware 
that it may not be practicable to attain mathematical exactness in 
measuring the flow of water, but a reasonable approximation to 
substantial accuracy should be aimed at in determining controversies 
relating to water supply. 27 
                                                 
 
25 Tulare Irrigation District v Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation District 3 Cal 2d 489 at 567 per 
Waste CJ (1935).  
26 “What is Beneficial Use of Water” California Law Review Vol. 3 Issue 6, 460 at 467. 





In 1912, the United States Supreme Court refused to recognise a right which 
would require appropriating the entire pre-dam current of the Snake River to 
deliver a relatively small volume of water actually put to beneficial use.  
In this arid country where the largest duty and the greatest use must 
be had from every inch of water in the interest of agriculture and 
home-building, it will not do to say that a stream must be dammed so 
as to cause sub-irrigation of a few acres at a loss of enough water to 
surface irrigate ten times as much by proper application…28 
 
In Oregon, the Supreme Court was faced with a determination of the 
relative rights of various claimants to the use of the Silvies River and its 
tributaries. The Court heard that all water of the Silvies River had been 
appropriated and put to beneficial use.  However, the custom in the district was to 
let nature take its course and to let the river channel overflow naturally during the 
time the mountain snow melted and to flood the area, and, as the flood subsided, 
to place dams, dikes, levies and restrictions in the channel to raise the water level 
and cause further flooding.   
A method such as this was regarded as very wasteful since large areas 
were exposed to evaporation, and inefficient too – too much water at certain 
times, and too little at others.  Three or four claimants had systems approaching 
the practical with ditches and laterals, and under this system were growing crops; 
with flood irrigation only wild meadow grasses were grown.   It was quite clear 
that there was sufficient water to irrigate a greater area if it were properly 
managed.  Bean, J. stated that the customs were: 
…obviously wasteful, and do not serve the purpose of utilising the 
waters of the steam to their full extent in the application of water to a 
                                                 
 
28 Shodde v Twin Falls Land & Water Co. 224 US 107 at 124-5.  Actually the Court was quoting 
from the earlier case of van Camp v Emery 13 Idaho 202. (1907). 
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beneficial use, and should only be sanctioned only until a fair 
opportunity is had to construct ditches or canals and pipelines, or 
other artificial works, where necessary, to conserve the water and 
minimize the waste thereof, so as to irrigate as large an area as 
possible…29  
 
Again, at page 329, the Court stated: “Natural irrigation, in the crude 
manner indicated apparently applies only a portion of the water to a real beneficial 
use.”  Despite these pronouncements the Court, in a long and detailed judgment 
acknowledging the customary wasteful and inefficient nature of the system, did 
not turn its collective mind to the issue and appears to have sanctioned the 
continuation of these outdated and prodigal practices.  An approach of this nature 
is ambivalent to the resolution of the matter at issue, that is to say the avoidance 
of waste.   
Similarly, in 1934, the same court wrestled with the problems associated 
with the water rights of the Deschutes River and its tributaries.30  That Court had 
addressed the issue earlier in 1930, and at that time whilst stating:31 “It is a duty of 
the court in adjudicating water rights to suppress all wasting of water…”,32 but 
had finally passed the matter back to the state engineer who reported back two 
years later.  It is clear from the report that the area contained some of the worst 
soils in the state, and that losses of about 45% and up to 65% in some cases were 
experienced, and that the state engineer thought it possible that losses could be 
reduced by repairing the delivery systems.  The Court however concluded that 
                                                 
 
29 In re Water Rights in Silvies River 237 P. 322 (1925) at 328. It is worth noting that the vast 
majority of the claimants had appropriations originating in the 1880s. 
30 In re Water Rights of the Deschutes River, 36 P.2d 585 (Supreme Court Oregon, 1934). 
31 In re Water Rights of the Deschutes River, 286 P 563, at 666 (Supreme Court Oregon, 1930).  
The same judge, Bean J was prominent in all three of these Oregon cases. 
32 Janet Neuman in her seminal paper “Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient 
Search for Efficiency in Western Water Use”. 1998 28 Envtl. L. 919 at 934, note 97, suggests 
although not identified in the judgment the Court is using the word “duty” in two ways: to describe 
the Court’s duty to enforce the law to suppress waste, and as a term of art in water law, that is an 
amount of water specified per acre as necessary to grow typical crops. 
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there was no certainty that the appropriators could do better, and reading between 
the lines felt that as the methods were customary, it would not go so far as to state 
the losses were wasteful.  Accordingly the question of water consumed but not 
actually used was left unaddressed, despite both reports containing several 
references to the imperative to avoid waste.  Such pronouncements do appear to 
be hortatory in nature.33  
9.3 The Question of Waste and the Issue of Local Custom. 
The Californian Supreme Court grappled with a long-standing and acrimonious 
case in 1935, Tulare Irrigation District v Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation District.34 
The facts generally were that one district’s water use deprived the other.35  One of 
the arguments put forward was that there was an uneconomic waste of water, of 
around 40% - 45% caused by poor methods of diversion.  The claimant suggested 
this loss should not be more than 30%.  There was a great deal of conflicting 
evidence, but the Supreme Court found that the appropriators were not scientific 
about their methods of diversion and there was indeed an uneconomic use of 
water but as the losses had been carried on for a number of years, the methods 
employed were customary.  A finding of customary use was made in spite of the 
fact that a great number of appropriators admitted using the water to drown 
gophers – a use the Court specifically declared not to be beneficial.  However: 
…an appropriator cannot be compelled to divert water according to 
the most scientific method known.  He is entitled to make a 
                                                 
 
33Janet Neuman makes an apt observation at note 101 page 934 of her paper.  She states that one of 
her colleagues (Jim Huffman) claims a proper functioning water market would solve the problem 
of waste with ease. (Farmers selling saved water).  Similarly as a corollary she claims that if 
farmers were obliged to pay for their water avoidable waste would be minimised. 
34 Tulare Irrigation District v Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation District 45 P. 2d 972. (Cal1935). 
This case had been litigated since 1916. 
35 The District appropriated the water and then supplied same to its stockholders, of which there 
were a large number. 
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reasonable use of the water according to the general custom of the 
locality, so long as the custom does not involve unnecessary waste. 36  
 
It was accepted by the Court that other schemes in the San Joaquin Valley had 
conveyance losses averaged well over 40%, and two in particular suffered losses 
ranging between 55.2% and 57.9%, and (by way of balance) four government 
schemes built by engineers, not farmers, suffered an average loss of 46.8%.  
Accordingly the level of waste was found to be customary and therefore 
acceptable, the drowning of gophers notwithstanding.37   
Neuman38 makes mention of the Newlands Project saga in the early 1980s.  
This was a United States Federal project in Nevada to supply water to 73,000 
acres (which only grew alfalfa and other forage crops),  and the trial court had 
awarded a water duty of 3.5 acre-feet for bottomlands, and 4.5 acre-feet for bench 
lands.  “Water duty” is described  as “ … that [variable] measure of water, which, 
by careful management and use, without wastage, is reasonably required to be 
applied to any given tract of land for such period of time as may be adequate to 
produce therefrom a maximum amount of such crops as ordinarily grown 
thereon.” 39  The United States challenged these awards in the Federal Supreme 
Court as being too generous, but the Court did not agree.  After delivering some 
platitudes in relation to the legal concept of beneficial use, the Court found as 
follows:40 
1. The beneficial use controversy is essentially a question of fact. 
                                                 
 
36 Tulare Irrigation District v Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation District 45 P. 2d 972 at 996 per the 
aptly-named Waste CJ. 
37 The judgment, on more than one occasion, makes mention of the fact that the appropriator was 
not one unit but rather a multitude of different appropriators, so it is tempting to suggest the Court 
was being somewhat pragmatic. 
38 See note 34 supra. 
39 U.S. v Alpine Land & Reservoir Co. 697 F.2d 851, at 854 per Kennedy, Circuit Judge. (U.S. 
Supreme Court, 1983). 
40 Ibid, at 856-857.  See also Neuman, op.cit., at 939-940. 
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2. The water duty awarded by the trial court reflects the amounts 
customarily provided to farmers since 1926 (when the Project began 
operating). 
3. The evidence tended to show that the farmers’ customary water use 
was reasonable in the circumstances 
4. Although the United States’ evidence tended to show that historical 
crops could be obtained with less water, this conclusion was based on 
possible rather than meticulous field conditions, and had used figures 
over a 26 year period, rather than the significantly higher yields over 
the past 10 years. 
As a result, the Federal Court upheld the water duties awarded by the 
Nevada trial court.  Neuman is highly critical of this approach.  Her view is the 
decision suggests there has been a strong resistance to any change in the 
“beneficial use without waste” doctrine and the customary use excuse for 
continuing waste is a major impediment to change. She questions whether it was 
wise to divert nearly the entire flow of two rivers to grow stock food in an area 
that receives five inches of rain a year while destroying two fish species in the 
process.  Her summary of the Alpine case is that while irrigation is a beneficial 
use of water, and while the methods used were customary (over a period of 75 
years), the strong suggestion is that the farmers could do better, but as nobody had 
actually tried, they did not know for sure.  Therefore, the Court cannot force 
change, but until customs change for reasons quite unconnected with legal 
requirements, the courts will not rule anyone out of line.  Once a custom changes, 
the law may then force the stragglers into line – which results in a “glacial” pace 
of change due to the use of a customary standard.41  New Zealand should take a 
much tougher line and require excessive waste to be discontinued.  Such a stance 
is taken in other areas of natural resources for example air and water pollution. 
                                                 
 
41 Janet Neuman at 940. 
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9.4 The Matter of Conspicuous Waste. 
Naturally the courts have found uses to be wasteful in certain cases.  The Supreme 
Court of Idaho considered the issue in 1922.42  The appropriator piped a ditch 
which had traditionally lost over 50% of its water.  The appropriator wanted to 
keep the water saved.  The Court found however that the losses were excessive 
and unreasonable and therefore was waste, to which the appropriator was not 
entitled.  The appropriator was entitled to an allowance for reasonable loss in 
conducting the water to its place of use, but held the loss of 50% was not 
reasonable: 
The farmers could not reasonably have been expected to build a 
cement lined ditch at the cost of $100,000, as suggested by one of the 
witnesses.  But they could have reasonably expected to prevent the 
water spreading out at several places as shown by the evidence.  We 
are satisfied that the loss was unreasonable, excessive, and against 
public policy, and that respondents and their predecessors in interest 
could have forced the individual appellants to take measures to greatly 
reduce it if the issue had ever been raised between them. 43 
 
It is clear from the judgment that the Court was not so much concerned 
about the level of waste but rather, although a customary practice, it was the 
nature of that waste that raised objections − water was allowed to simply spill out 
of the earthen ditches and this could have been rectified without much trouble and 
expense: 
Although the user is not bound to extraordinary diligence in means 
and methods of use, may proceed according to local custom, he is 
bound to reasonable care in construction and maintenance of 
appliances to the end that of the vital fluid others be not unnecessarily 
deprived…In places their ditch is little more than an injuriously wide 
and shallow brook…In so far as plaintiffs claim right at all times to 
the flow of Coal [the waters of the Coal canyon] merely to avoid dry 
ditches and to secure the benefit of possible cloudbursts in the 
                                                 
 
42 Basinger v Taylor 211 P. 1085 (Supreme Court Idaho 1922). 
43 Ibid, at 1086. 
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mountains, it is unreasonable use, waste, and damage to other 
appropriators and without right in law.44  
 
The Supreme Court of New Mexico considered the question of waste in 
New Mexico v McLean in 1957.45   The waters of an artesian well had been 
allowed to run uncontrolled for 24 hours a day without an irrigation system, and 
with no attempt to control waste.  The New Mexico Constitution contains a 
provision that an excessive diversion through waste cannot be regarded as a 
beneficial use,46 and also provided for forfeiture if such non-use continues for a 
period of four years.47  Despite the user providing evidence that he did water 
native grass and his livestock, the Court held that to find for the user would be 
tantamount to the Legislature doing “a vain and useless thing which accomplishes 
no purpose in conserving our natural resources – but on the contrary, will permit 
the depletion thereof.” 48   The waste in this case was blatant and when “a 
landowner exceeds this use [beneficial purposes] he is appropriating to himself 
that which belongs to others…”49  Accordingly the findings of the trial court were 
reversed by the Supreme Court which found that the defendant was in fact 
illegally irrigating his lands from the relative artesian well.  It was the hopelessly 
inefficient system and the profligate nature of the waste, not the waste itself, 
which so offended the Court.   
In 1971, the Court of Appeal in California was faced with a similar grossly 
wasteful case.50  In this instance the appropriator diverted the entire flow of a 
creek for what was described as essentially domestic use.  The Court of Appeal 
stated that the appropriator’s diversion is not measured by the flow originally 
                                                 
 
44 Dern v Tanner 60 F.2d 626 at 628 per Bourquin, District Judge (District Court Montana 1932). 
45 New Mexico v McLean 308 P.2d 983 (New Mexico 1957). 
46 Article 16, §§1, 2 and 3, and §75-11-2 (1953). 
47 §75-11-8. 
48 New Mexico v McLean 308 P.2d 983 at 988 per Lujan CJ. 
49 Ibid, at 988-989. 
50 Erickson v Queen Valley Ranch Co. 99 Cal. Rept. 446. (California Court of Appeal, 1971). 
254 
 
appropriated, but by the amount of water put to beneficial use, plus an additional 
flow necessary to deliver it, and to make reasonable use of the water in 
accordance with the general custom of the district so long as this did not involve 
unnecessary waste.51  Unhappily for the appropriator in this case, the transmission 
losses were over 80% of the water diverted. 
By holding that transmission losses amounting to five-sixths of the 
flow are reasonable and consistent with local custom, the [trial] court 
effectively placed the seal of judicial approval on what appears to be 
inefficient and wasteful means of transmission.  Such a holding is not 
in conformity with the demands of article XIV, section 3 [of the State 
Constitution which declares a general policy to eschew waste, 
unreasonable use and methods of use of water.]52 
 
The lower Court was obliged to fashion findings and a judgment 
consistent with the constitutional policy of water conservation.  Again, as with 
New Mexico v McLean it was the extraordinary extent of the waste that so 
outraged the Court. 
Another case of extraordinary waste was Imperial Irrigation District v 
State Resources Control Board. 53  In 1980, a farmer complained that his land was 
being threatened by water overflowing from the Salton Sea.54  It was found that a 
large amount of water was, in fact, finding its way into that lake, and the Board 
required the District to take certain ameliorative action by way of a corrective 
conservation plan.  The District (finally) appealed, including an appeal on 
jurisdictional questions.  There was no dispute over the fact that a large amount of 
                                                 
 
51 Ibid, at 449 - 450. 
52 Ibid, at 450. 
53 Imperial Irrigation District v State Resources Control Board. 225 Cal. App. 3d 548 (Court of 
Appeal, California (1990). 
54 The Salton Sea is a shallow saline endorheic lake (that is to say it has no outflow) which is 
below sea level.  It is only five feet deep at its deepest point, is more saline than the Pacific Ocean, 
and is a closed drainage basin. 
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water was lost in the system. 55   The question was whether the losses were 
reasonable or not.  The District contended that the overflow flooding the Salton 
Sea was actually achieving good, by preventing salinization (given the actual level 
of salinity this appears a forlorn justification).  Thus, if the use were beneficial it 
must also be reasonable.  In addition the District contended that there was no 
competing demand for appropriators to make use of the overflow and therefore it 
must be considered “surplus”, rather than “wasted” water.  The Court of Appeal 
could not agree, and because the Board had both a constitutional and statutory 
duty to prevent waste, affirmed the Board’s decision that the use was 
unreasonable and wasteful, as a matter of law, despite the accusation that the 
Board was trespassing on the District’s autonomy.56 
…the general welfare requires that the water of the State be put to 
beneficial use to the fullest extent of which they are capable, and that 
the waste or unreasonable use or unreasonable method of use of water 
be prevented…57 
 
The Court also stated 58  that to “say on the one hand that water 
conservation is the responsibility of the Board, and then to preclude it from 
measuring waste in irrigation practices, would be an absurd position.” As to the 
lack of dispute between users (the complainant Elmore was not a user), the Court 
held that the constitutional imperative over-rode such matters.  Sax and others59 
make the important point that in some cases of waste, there is no one to complain, 
                                                 
 
55 A total of between 365,000 and 694,000 acre-feet inclusive of canal spill, excessive tail-water, 
and canal seepage (at 554).  This is a gigantic amount, given that the maximum storage by the 
Colorado-Big Thompson system is 310,000 acre feet, of which about an average of 220,000 acre-
feet is diverted annually. 
56 Professor Neuman (at 942 n158) points out that the appellate court pragmatically reviewed the 
decision more as a conclusion of law than of fact, despite the US Federal Court treating beneficial 
use as a matter of fact in the Alpine case (supra at n 41).  This enabled the appellate court take less 
heed of findings of fact. 
57 Article X section 2, California Constitution. 
58 Imperial Irrigation District v State Resources Control Board. 225 Cal. App. 3d 548 at 561. 
59 Joseph L. Sax, Barton H. Thompson, John D. Leshy, and Robert H. Abrams Legal Control of 
Water Resources (West Publishing Co Minnesota, 4th edition 2006) at 178-179. 
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for example an unreasonable diversion to the detriment of in-stream 
environmental health, or even the situation where one party demonstrates an 
intention to use conservation methods then fails to do so.  In the end the simple 
fact was that a huge amount of Colorado River water was ultimately flowing into 
the Salton Sea, which meant it was lost to other potential users who could 
otherwise put it to beneficial use, and which water also contributed to the flooding 
of lands adjoining the lake.   
One of the best known cases on waste is the 1993 case of Department of 
Ecology v Grimes,60 the facts of which are thankfully relatively straight forward.  
In 1981, the Department of Ecology of Washington State was minded to review 
the existing water rights to Marshall Lake and Marshall Creek.  Mr and Mrs 
Grimes held water rights which tracked back to 1906.  They requested a 
continuation thereof at the customary rate of 3 cubic feet per second instantaneous 
flow, and storage of 1520 acre feet in the Lake reservoir.  The referee, however, 
after some calculations, curtailed the rights to 1.5 cubic feet per second and a 
storage right of 920 acre feet – a reduction of 50% and 40% respectively.  This 
new amount was calculated on the basis of “reasonable use”, that is the water duty 
for irrigating alfalfa  was calculated at 1.2 cubic feet a second,61 to which the 
referee added 25% transportation loss (both amounts being the formula for a 
proper beneficial use).  In relation to the storage, the referee found that the lake 
also has recreational benefits to others at resort facilities located around the lake.  
Mr and Mrs Grimes challenged these findings, but in evidence admitted that their 
system required a flow of 3 cubic feet per second to deliver 1 cubic foot per 
second to the paddock, and they agreed that their system was highly inefficient, 
and that it was losing between and half and two-thirds of their water.  They 
                                                 
 
60 Department of Ecology v Grimes 852 P.2d 1044. (Washington, 1993). 
61  Such a figure had been accepted by the Department of Ecology from Washington State 




responded, however, with a bifurcated argument.  First, they argued that it was the 
custom of the district to irrigate as they had in the past.  Amicus argued that the 
“local custom” test has historically been applied to determine whether or not an 
application is wasteful within the beneficial use definition, and this should be 
applied to general adjudications. The Court held however:62 
While customary irrigation practices common to a locality are a factor 
for consideration, they do not justify waste of water…Local custom 
and the relative efficiency of irrigation systems in common use are 
important elements, but must be considered in connection with other 
statutorily mandated factors, such as the costs and benefits of 
improvements to irrigation systems, including the use of public and 
private funds to facilitate improvements. 
 
Accordingly, the Court approved the referee’s consideration of a certain 
report prepared by Washington University (referred to in the judgment as the 
“Irrigation Report”).  Thus, while absolute efficiency is not a requirement63 a 
reasonable efficiency test would only include the referee’s suggestion of a 25% 
loss for transportation, not the 50% to 66% figure admitted by Mr and Mrs 
Grimes.  In other words, reasonable waste is permitted, but not profligate waste - 
customary or not - and each case is judged on its own merits.  The Grimes’ second 
argument was that the right could not be “taken” 64  because the right was a 
property right, for which compensation ought to be paid.65 The Court had no 
difficulty in dismissing this argument since the beneficial use concept, as 
developed in the common law, operates as a permissible limitation on water 
rights.  In other words, water that is wasted unconscionably is never part of a legal 
                                                 
 
62 Department of Ecology v Grimes 852 P.2d 1044 at 1053 per Smith J. 
63 Ibid, at 1051. 
64 c.f. the derogation argument in Aoraki Water Trust v Meridian Energy Ltd. [2005] 2 NZLR 268, 
at 275-6.  
65  They quoted the US Fifth Amendment which specifically prohibits the taking of property 
without compensation.  In addition, mention was made of the Washington Water Code introduced 
in 1917, some 11 years after the commencement of the Grimes’ water rights, which specifically 
protects the integrity of existing rights (at p1048). 
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appropriation and therefore Mr and Mrs Grimes never had a legitimate right to the 
wasted water in the first place to have it taken from them.  It is reasonable to 
suggest the case is a matter of balancing the protection of an individual’s right on 
the one hand, and on the other, emerging attitudes towards waste and the best use 
of public resources within the confines of the Fifth Amendment. 
9.5 The Controversial Issue of Water Storage in the American 
West. 
While it is not clear whether New Zealand would engage in a debate about water 
storage, especially given the current government’s affection for new water storage 
and delivery systems; the matter is somewhat contentious in the American west.  
The Supreme Court of Idaho determined the issue of water storage in the case of 
American Falls Reservoir District No2 v Idaho Dept. of Water Resources. 66  The 
Court in that case found that there are two principles in Idaho water law – “first in 
time, first in right” coupled with that of the optimum use of the State’s water.  
However these principles were held to be subject to the requirement of reasonable 
use.67  The appellants argued that they should not be required to exhaust their 
available storage water prior to being able to make a delivery call against junior 
appropriators.  In other words, they claimed to be able to continue storing their 
saved water while at the same time curtailing junior water use so those seniors 
could continue diverting and using further water themselves.  The question to be 
asked was how much stored water was a reasonable amount of water to be so 
stored.  The Idaho Conjunctive Management Rules provided that a water right 
holder was entitled to maintain a reasonable amount of storage.68 The question 
was also to “determine whether the senior has a sufficient water supply to meet 
                                                 
 
66 American Falls Reservoir District No2 v Idaho Dept. of Water Resources 154 P.3d 433 (Idaho, 
2007). 
67 Ibid, at 438 per Trout J. 
68 Rule 42.1g. 
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actual needs rather than permitting water to be wasted through storage and non-
use.”69   
As previously discussed, the Idaho constitution and statutes do not 
permit waste and require water to be put to beneficial use or be lost.  
Somewhere between the absolute right to use a decreed water right 
and an obligation not to waste it and to protect the public’s interest in 
this valuable commodity, lies an area for the exercise of discretion by 
the Director.70 
 
The Court ultimately felt it was better to have a scientifically calculated 
conclusion than to precipitately enforce a priority call on the juniors.  The Court 
essentially held that to permit waste by excessive storage without regard for need 
would itself be unconstitutional.71  Naturally, it is all a matter of balancing the 
water right on the one hand and notion of reasonable use on the other.    In this 
regard, American Falls is really a resurrection of the early case of Schodde v Twin 
Falls Land and Water Company,72 which actually gave rise to the reasonable 
method of appropriation doctrine. 73   In that case, an appropriator (similar to 
Erickson) diverted almost the entire flow of the Snake River (prior to the dam 
being built) in order to put a very small amount of water to beneficial use.  The 
dam that was subsequently constructed downstream from Schodde’s farm resulted 
in his being unable to irrigate some 400 acres.  Schodde trotted out the traditional 
                                                 
 
69 American Falls Reservoir District No2 v Idaho Dept. of Water Resources 154 P.3d 433 at 450 
per Trout J.  The judge also expressed her opinion that the principle of prior appropriation is easier 
stated than applied. 
70 Ibid, at 451.  The Director’s discretion (Director of the Idaho Department of Water Resources) 
in such matters was actually the nub of the case that is whether such discretion was constitutional 
or not.  The question really was whether the statutory rules failed to recognise the basic common 
law principle of the prior appropriation doctrine that senior rights were always superior to those of 
the junior. 
71 Ibid, at 451 per Trout J. 
72 Schodde v Twin Falls Land and Water Company 224 U.S. 107 (U.S Supreme Court, 1912). 
73 See A. Dan Tarlock “The Legacy of Schodde v Twin Falls Land and Water Company: the 
Evolving Reasonable Appropriation Principle” 42 Envtl L 37 at 37 (2012). Tarlock is arguing that 
Schodde has been under-utilised. 
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argument about his prior appropriation protection from derogation.74   The U.S. 
Supreme Court however, decided that although Schodde did indeed have a prior 
right, there was no guarantee his mode of delivery would be protected: “As we 
have pointed out, the court below did not question the right of the plaintiff to take 
by proper means …”75 
Notably, the new dam irrigated some 300,000 acres and supported some 
5,000 people and so Schodde’s wasteful diversion was unconscionable. Anyway 
to find against the new dam would be unthinkable: “It is clear that in such a case 
the policy of the state to reserve the waters of the flowing streams for the benefit 
of the public would be defeated.” 76 
9.6 The Colorado Experience 
Colorado was one of the states which embraced the Schodde principle as a 
powerful doctrine to avoid wasteful diversions.    For example, in 1961, the 
Colorado Supreme Court in the leading case of City of Colorado Springs v 
Bender77 ruled that before senior appropriators could enjoin juniors to curtail their 
lawful appropriation, those seniors needed to satisfy the Court that they had 
created a reasonable and adequate means of diversion, and Schodde was quoted as 
authority: 
At his own point of diversion on a natural watercourse, each diverter 
must establish some reasonable means of effecting his diversion.  He 
is not entitled to command the whole or a substantial flow of the 
                                                 
 
74 By the time the matter finally came to hearing Mr Schodde had died, and his widow was 
substituted in his stead. 
75 Schodde v Twin Falls Land and Water Company 224 U.S. 107 at 125 per White CJ. 
76 Ibid, at 120. 
77 The City of Colorado Springs v Bender 366 P.2d 552 (Colorado, 1961).  This case was cited and 
approved in the later case Buffalo Park Development Co v Mountain Mutual Reservoir Co. 195 
P.3d 674 (Colorado, 2008). 
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stream merely to facilitate his taking a fraction of the whole flow to 
which he is entitled.78  
 
White J did go on to say that the senior appropriators “cannot be required 
to improve their extraction facilities beyond their economic reach, upon a 
consideration of all factors involved.” 79  Once again, it is a question of balance; 
but there is no question that in Colorado and elsewhere the question of efficiency 
of diversion will be a factor in enforcing priorities.  In terms of a general waste 
doctrine, the Colorado Supreme Court made its feelings known very early on.  In 
Thomas v Guiraud, Mr Guiraud had indeed diverted the entire flow of the stream, 
more or less as had both Erickson and Shodde.  The Court, however, gave Mr 
Guiraud its blessing as it was satisfied he was not wasting the water and was 
putting the entire diversion to a beneficial use, but at the same time the court 
conceded that Guiraud “could not appropriate more water than was necessary to 
irrigate his land.”80  A few years later, the same Court addressed the issue of the 
Town of Sterling’s water needs.  The town had simply appropriated extra water 
from various springs.  The town understood that domestic supplies had preference 
over other users.  Sterling stated that it simply could not supply water to meet the 
demand.  In the end the Court was unable to decide what the reason for the 
shortage of supply actually was, whether it was pressure of population or simply a 
matter of waste, so no order was made – it was first necessary to calculate “how 
much water of the volume diverted into plaintiff’s ditch is actually consumed by 
those living under it”.81 Predicament and necessity were no comfort to the town. 
Oddly enough, there is a lack of Colorado cases directly on the issue of 
waste.  However, the Colorado Supreme Court appears to take every opportunity 
to repeat its message of the essence of the appropriation doctrine and emphasising 
                                                 
 
78 Ibid, at 555 per White J.  In fact Bender involved a flowing aquifer, not a stream. 
79 Ibid, at 556. 
80 Thomas v Guiraud 6 Colo. 530 (Colorado 1883) at 532. 
81 Town of Sterling v Pawnee Ditch Extension Co. 94 P. 339 (Colorado, 1908) at 342. 
262 
 
the prohibition of waste included by way of obiter dictum, and in remarkably 
consistent terms.  Pulaski Irrigating Ditch Co v City of  Trinidad was a case of a 
municipality attempting to sell water saved by the introduction of more efficient 
systems, and  Teller J stated: “It is also settled law that an appropriator is limited 
in his use of water to his actual needs.  He must not waste it …”82  In Weibert v 
Rothe Bros., Inc. the Court was to adjudicate on a change of point of diversion for 
an existing irrigation well.  Lohr J states “The owner of a water right has no right 
as against a junior appropriator to waste water, that is to say divert more than can 
be used beneficially.” 83  Again, in City of Thornton v Bijou Irr. Co. the Supreme 
Court was to tackle a broad spectrum of issues, including water quality, but 
nothing to do with waste.  However, Lohr J repeated word for word (without 
acknowledgment) the statement of Teller J above. 84 The same Court, in 2002, 
adjudicated again on a change in the point of diversion from a well and stated 
“Diversions are implicitly limited to an amount sufficient for the purpose for 
which the appropriation was made, without waste or excessive use.” 85   The 
Supreme Court in Ready Mixed Concrete Co. in Adams County v Farmers 
Reservoir and Irrigation Co. considered the issue of a change in water use from 
irrigation to storage to replace water evaporated in gravel pits.  Justice Hobbs 
states:  
Colorado water law defines beneficial use to include reasonably 
efficient means of diversion, conveyance, and use. §37-92-103(4), 
C.R.S. (2004).  Thus water users have a right and responsibility to 
engage in reasonably efficient water practices.  Wasting water by 
diverting it when not needed for a beneficial use, or running more 
                                                 
 
82 Pulaski Irrigating Ditch Co v City of Trinidad 203 P.681 (Colorado 1922) at 682 
83 Weibert v Rothe Bros., Inc. 618 P.2d 1367 (Colorado, 1980) at 1371. 
84 City of Thornton v Bijou Irr. Co.926 P.2d 1 (Colorado 1996) at 65. 




water than is reasonably needed for application to beneficial use is 
“waste”. 86 
 
The message is routinely hammered home by the judiciary, and the 
message is that an appropriation of water includes the amount of water to be 
applied to a beneficial use, together with a reasonable volume of water necessary 
to carry this amount of water from the point of extraction to the point of use, and 
each case is judged on its own merits.  This is an absolutely fundamental 
characteristic of American water law.  It is a characteristic which could be 
relevant to New Zealand, and nothing makes this starker than the seemingly more 
frequent and severe droughts experienced in those parts of the country which have 
embraced irrigation, namely Hawke’s Bay, Marlborough, and Canterbury.  The 
United States’ experience has a lot to offer New Zealand, including a possible 
template by which we can address the issue of water waste now before the 
problem becomes magnified by increased water use bought about by a water 
permit market system. 
Colorado, in common with other western states, in addition to the common 
law and a broad constitutional requirement, 87  has also imposed statutory 
limitations on the waste of water.  The Groundwater Management Act,88 and the 
Water Right Determination and Administration Act,89 both carefully administer 
and manage water resources in the State.  The Colorado Groundwater Act for 
example gives the State Engineer power to ensure wells are constructed and 
maintained as to prevent waste of water,90 and the Water Right Determination and 
Administration Act gives statutory power to the Colorado General Assembly to 
                                                 
 
86 Ready Mixed Concrete Co. in Adams County v Farmers Reservoir and Irrigation Co 115 P.3d 
638. (Colorado 2005) at 645. 
87 Colo. Const. Art. XVI Section 6 (2012). 
88 CRS §37-90-101 to 143. 
89 CRS §37-92-101 to 602. 
90 C.R.S. §37-90-110 (1) (b). 
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impose limitations on the exercise of water rights to prevent waste and to promote 
beneficial use.91 
Further, as already noted, embedded in the concept of beneficial use is the 
concept of “water duty” or “duty of water”.  In common with other western states, 
the Colorado courts often utilise this idea as a further mechanism in the water 
management inventory.   
The concept of duty of water emerged to help explain how the amount 
actually required to irrigate crops should be determined [footnote 
omitted]. Courts emphasize the importance of taking the steps 
necessary to allow water to do its “duty” of growing crops.92 
 
Essentially water duty is a duty to use only enough volume of water to 
mature a particular type of crop.93  References are made to water duty from time 
to time in the water law reports of all western jurisdictions. 94  If beneficial use 
describes what categories water may be used for, water duty defines the amount of 
water required for that beneficial use. If the notion of waste is more a term of art 
than law, water duty has a somewhat scientific underpinning. The duty acts as a 
limit on the volume of water which may be diverted under a water right and is 
designed to prevent waste.95  In 1909, the duty was described as: 
In determining the “duty of water”, or quantity essential to the 
irrigation of any given tract of land, we must take into consideration 
the character, the climatic conditions, the location and altitude of the 
                                                 
 
91 C.R.S. §37-92- 305 (11). 
92 Lawrence J MacDonnell “Montana v Wyoming: Sprinklers, Irrigation, Water Use, Efficiency 
and the Doctrine of Recapture” 5 Golden Gate Univ. Environmental Law J. 265, at 294 (2011-12).  
93 Initially there was some confusion as to the real meaning of the term, and in some cases it used 
to refer to the actual amount of water applied to the land, whether beneficial or not.  See “Duty of 
Water” Monthly Weather Review October 1911 article by AL Fellows 
(<http://docs.lib.noaa.gov/rescue/mwr/038/mwr-038-10>). 
94 The case of Department of Ecology v Grimes 852 P.2d 1044. (Washington 1993) is a good 
example.  (At n 62, above). 




lands to be irrigated, the kind of crops, period of time irrigated, and 
the necessary manner of irrigation, as well as many other 
contingencies not arising here. 96 
 
In 1954 the Supreme Court of Colorado provided a very thoughtful and 
often-quoted definition: 
Although the expression ‘Duty of Water’, in the opinions of some 
present day scholarly hydrologists and technical engineers, may be 
outmoded, provincial, unscientific, and otherwise objectionable, 
nevertheless it is a term well understood and accepted by every 
rancher and farmer who has had practical experience in the artificial 
irrigation of land for the production of crops.  It is that measure of 
water, which, by careful management and use, without wastage, is 
reasonably required to be applied to any given tract of land for such 
period of time as may be adequate to produce therefrom a maximum 
amount of such crops as are ordinarily grown thereon.  It is not a hard 
and fast unit of measurement, but is variable according to conditions. 
97 
 
This definition is now the standard, having been given a judicial 
commendation by being quoted with approval by the United States Court of 
Appeals in US v Alpine Land & Reservoir Co.98  The notion of “duty” generally 
denotes either a legal or moral obligation, but viewed through the lens of western 
American water law “water duty” is seen as both.   
9.7 The Promotion of Inefficient Practices 
The beneficial use doctrine had its inception during a time of the plunder of 
natural resources in the American continent, as described in chapter one.  These 
resources were so bounteous that it was considered they could never be 
                                                 
 
96 Hough v Porter 98 P.1083 at 1101-2 per King C. (Oregon 1909). 
97 Farmers Highline Canal & Reservoir Co v City of Golden 272 P. 2d 629 at 634 per Clark J 
(Colorado 1954). 
98 US v Alpine Land & Reservoir Co. 697 F.2d 851 (U.S. C.A. 9th Circuit 1983). 
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depleted.99  In a sense this conception provided the impetus for expansion and 
prosperity.  The problem is that with a burgeoning population such conspicuous 
consumption will inevitably lead to demands which will exceed supply and will 
destroy the very resources on which we all rely.  It is, essentially, a discussion 
about sustainability.  The principle of waste in water law is specifically designed 
to address this problem and to reduce the amount of water simply frittered away.  
Unfortunately, there is some doubt whether the principle of waste as applied by 
the courts is really achieving the desired effect.  Shupe makes the claim (in 1982) 
that “judicial sanction of inefficient techniques allows billions of gallons of 
irrigation water to be diverted daily from western streams and aquifers without 
being used by crops.”100  Neuman blames this failure on the fact that the concept 
has had a generous application, has generally been poorly defined, and forfeiture 
has not being aggressively pursued.101  Doubtless, the quaint idea of customary 
practices contributes in no small measure to the problem.  Whilst chronically 
wasteful practices have been attacked judicially, perhaps the western water courts 
when reviewing inefficient water usage might question whether even some 
customary practices are wasteful and therefore intolerable.  The common law is 
well-equipped for the evolutionary process of modernising out-dated doctrines.  In 
terms of an administrative approach, Neuman expresses concern that in many 
cases the water duties imposed by agencies have been simply too generous and 
perpetuate existing wasteful practices rather than insisting on efficiency 
improvements.102 
                                                 
 
99 See generally Charles F Wilkinson Crossing the Next Meridian (Island Press, Washington, 
1992). 
100 Stephen J Shupe “Waste in Western Water Law: A Blueprint for Change” (1982) 61 Or L Rev 
483 at 484. 
101 Janet C. Neuman “Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for Efficiency 
in Western Water Use” (1998) 28 Envtl L 919 at 975. 
102 Ibid, at 982. 
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Another matter of waste is that of water conservation legislation in 
western America which allows appropriators to trade water they salvage by the 
introduction of efficient practices.  “Waste” is not an easily defined common law 
term because the notion is applied on a case by case basis, and as noted the courts 
have given their blessing to various traditionally wasteful practices, unless 
extraordinarily profligate, and as a result not all customary methods are classified 
as waste.  The judiciary might attack one appropriator with no guarantee that the 
finding will apply to others, resulting in a lack of uniformity.  Thus some form of 
incentive in the shape of conserved water legislation, if possible, would appear to 
be desirable.  Stephen F. Williams states:  
Similar waste would result from unmitigated application of the rule of 
capture to oil and gas reserves – the other great resource to which it 
normally applies. All major oil and gas states, however, have adopted 
conservation legislation aimed at curing the problem.  It is thus 
curious that neither legislative action nor even scholarly discussion 
has focussed on this defect of prior appropriation law. 103 
 
Agriculture is the major user of ground and surface water in the United 
States – an average of 80% over the whole nation, but over 90% in many western 
states.104  Moreover, “It is estimated that a seven per cent reduction in the amount 
of water consumed [beneficially used] by irrigated agriculture could support a 
doubling of all other uses of water.”105  Moreover, as Leila C. Behnampour points 
out some western states have some imminent tough choices to make, given 
dwindling supplies and climate change effects, even to the point of deciding 
                                                 
 
103 “The Requirement of Beneficial Use as a cause of Waste in Water Resource Development” 
(1983) 23 Nat Resources J 7 at 7.  Shupe acknowledges an exception in a 1971 paper by C. Meyers 
and R. Posner.  Janet Neuman’s seminal paper was published in 1998. 
104  United States Department of Agriculture (Economic Research Service) see 
<www.ers.usda.gov/topics/farm-practices-mana> (accessed 20 August 2013). 
105  Mark Honhart “Carrots for Conservation: Oregon’s Water Conservation Statute Offers 
Incentives to Invest in Efficiency” 1994-5 66 U Colo L Rev 827 at 828. 
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whether certain agricultural pursuits should be continued in some arid areas. 106   
As noted the beneficial use doctrine works against any efficiency drive because 
any saved water must be returned to the state to be appropriated by someone else 
and there is no real incentive to save.  
Some states, however, have introduced conserved water statutes that 
amend or adapt the beneficial use doctrine to allow the appropriator to improve 
water efficiency and then retain the conserved water which may be sold, leased or 
otherwise transferred to another.107  This model provides incentive and improves 
the allocative efficiency of the doctrine, as well as creating a positive regime by 
rewarding efficiency.   One of the impediments to the transfer of water rights is 
the ‘no injury’ rule.  Changes to appropriations are not allowed if they impact 
negatively on other appropriators.  The improper interception of return flows on 
which other water rights depend has been a major concern whenever these 
proposals have been considered by State legislatures.  This would not be an issue 
in New Zealand, as we do not have junior appropriators in the American 
understanding of the term because none of our allocating authorities factor return 
flows into their calculations of water available for allocation.   
In western American jurisdictions the rule can add significantly to the cost 
and delay as the authorities have to evaluate the potential effect of the change on 
others (some juniors rely on the return flow of water to supply their own 
appropriations). Some states, including Colorado (which is largely over-
appropriated), have rejected the idea of conservation statutes due to the possible 
effects on junior appropriators. Some others have managed to adopt them (notably 
California, Montana, Washington and Oregon), all of which are prior 
                                                 
 
106 “Reforming a Western Institution: How Expanding the Productivity of Water Rights Could 
Lessen Our Water Woes” 2011 41 Envtl L 201 at 201. A good example is the contentious issue of 
rice paddies in Texas.   
107 A good example is the California Water Code (section 1011), which was the first of the 
conserved water statutes. 
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appropriation states and which clearly means essentially that under traditional 
rules the appropriator does not have claim to any of the salvaged water.  The 
rights of junior appropriators are carefully protected but the conservation 
legislation has been successfully woven into these rules.   Leila C. Behnampour’s 
article though (above at n.114) points out that of these states, California (the first 
to adopt the system) and Montana have indeterminate results owing to inadequate 
record-keeping. Washington has a system where the state funds the improvement 
in return for the saved water,108 either in whole or in part, and has this has been 
relatively successful.109  It is the state of Oregon which has been most successful.  
That success has been measured by the number of applications (currently an 
average of 6 per annum), and an 87% percentage success rate.110 While it is true 
that none of these systems has been intensely successful, at the very least they 
provide concrete evidence of a legislative intent to encourage efficiency and water 
conservation.  It is truly astonishing that Colorado has not yet adopted these 
measures, given it is one of the driest of the western states and 85% of its water is 
used for irrigation.111  Possibly the answer lies in the legal rights of senior water 
users who may still be in control of the legal processes of the state, and the 
problem of junior appropriators who rely on return flows of wasted water for their 
supply.  There is, obviously, a problem if these juniors were required to purchase 
or re-purchase their appropriations. 
Of course there are alternatives, for example Colorado’s Alternative Water 
Transfer Methods Grant Program, which assists with the transfer of a portion of a 
farmer’s historical use to municipal use, while enabling the farmer to continue 
using the remainder.  However, what is really required is a more aggressive 
                                                 
 
108 The emphasis in Washington State is to focus on in-stream flow protection.  
109 Unless the appropriator receives some reward for the exercise in the form of at least some water 
there is no incentive to undertake the exercise in the first place. 
110 “Reforming a western Institution: How Expanding the Productivity of Water Rights Could 
Lessen Our Water Woes” 2011. 41 Envtl. L. 201, at 219. 
111 Ibid, at 226. 
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enforcement of the waste doctrine, and this is a lesson for New Zealand: “Waste 
enforcement is a huge issue in Western water law and it may require many 
creative and conventional efforts to begin to change the entrenched low standards 
of efficiency”. 112  Further, there is no reason why enforcing legislation could not 
be introduced.  Such legislation is universal in matters of air and water quality and 
generally in matters of pollution and it would be difficult to justify and argument 
against such measures in matters of water quantity.  Behnampour’s conclusion is 
that measures could be introduced – water conservation statutes as well as the 
adoption of a more aggressive judicial attitude to waste – a combination of carrot 
and stick. 
Shupe made suggestions in 1982 as to how he thought the doctrine of 
waste could be enhanced.113  Essentially, he submitted that the stick approach 
should be employed.  His strong submission was that the courts should stop 
treating inefficient customary systems as part of a water right, for example the 
waste in Tulare Irrigation District v Lindsay-Strathmore Irrigation District 45 P. 
2d 972 (at note 36 above).  He identifies a 5-step approach.114  The first step is to 
acknowledge that a water right only give a right to actually use that water for a 
beneficial use, that is to say the quantity and flow required to achieving that 
benefit.  Secondly, any water appropriated above this is a privilege, not a right.  
Wasteful practices of the nineteenth century became part of the appropriator’s 
protectable right due to the limits of technology available at the time.  This is not 
the case today.  Thirdly, an appropriator needs to acknowledge that the excess 
water taken as a privilege is subject to termination and be made available to others 
who will put it to a beneficial use.  Fourthly, forfeiture for non-use and misuse 
needs to be strengthened.  Currently, only the most blatant cases of misuse are 
actioned.  The fifth step is the most crucial: embrace modern efficient technology.  
                                                 
 
112 Ibid, at 231. 
113 Shupe “Waste in Western Water Law: A Blueprint for Change” (1982) 61 Or L Rev 483. 
114 Ibid, at 492. 
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Shupe emphasises the usufructory nature of a water right, and that if the water is 
not put to beneficial use, no benefit is derived and no right established – no matter 
how much water is appropriated.  Early appropriators gained water rights by using 
water to grow crops, and that quantity including an allowable waste constituted a 
protectable water right.  However, with the effluxion of time, technologies have 
been developed which allow for more efficient processes, and accordingly the old 
systems become a privilege rather than a right.  To be fair, originally the old leaky 
inefficient systems were the only practical methods available to the initial 
appropriators.  The point Shupe makes however is that these new technologies 
enable us to recognise what a wasteful appropriation of water actually is, so if 
understandings of waste change so too can the magnitude of a protectable water 
right.115  So, the excess water which the old inefficient system consumes is now 
constituted as waste, and, as such, is liable to forfeiture to the state to be again 
appropriated by someone else. Neuman agrees: 
The courts should scrutinise water rights claims in general 
adjudications and individual actions and ask hard questions about 
whether uses are truly beneficial and non-wasteful by [contemporary] 
standards.  Administrative water agencies need to bite the bullet and 
aggressively enforce against waste and forfeiture, promote 
conservation, and give clear legal guidance for an updated beneficial 
use doctrine.  Western state legislatures should embrace the 
responsibility to insure water supplies for their future citizens, and 
give courts and agencies a mandate and funding to seek efficiency 
improvements. 116 
 
The real challenge, of course, is to work out how much water is actually 
wasted and therefore forfeited, and this is a mandate for water and soil engineers. 
                                                 
 
115 Ibid, at 496. 
116 Janet C. Neuman “Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for Efficiency 




The conserved water statutes allow the appropriator to sell, lease or otherwise 
dispose of the water that he or she has managed to save.  Water markets can assist 
with the re-distribution of that saved water.   The lesson from the western 
American experience of the waste doctrine for New Zealand ‒ and indeed for 
water lawyers internationally ‒ however is that the doctrine in America is not 
really adequately utilised, and an improved two-pronged contemporary approach 
would be effective in improving the efficiency of water use.  Wherever possible, 
conservation statutes which enable appropriators to review and improve their 
water practices and sell or otherwise alienate the water thereby saved (the carrot), 
should be coupled to a more stringent enforcement procedure to encourage 
efficiency especially by tightening the rules of customary practices, with both 
harnessed to an effective doctrine of forfeiture by which the rights of those who 
do not comply are diminished (the stick).  Forfeiture is another aspect of the 
beneficial use doctrine and accordingly a discussion of the forfeiture doctrine and 




10 Chapter 10. 
10.1 Beneficial Use and the Doctrine of Forfeiture. 
10.1.1 Introduction 
In summary, then, the beneficial use doctrine generally requires that water is used 
productively without unnecessary waste, with the emphasis on user.  For the 
beneficial use doctrine to have any teeth, it needs to have enforcement provisions 
to ensure lawful appropriations are used according to the terms of the principles 
under which they were issued.  The Americans take this extremely seriously.  
Thus, if a water right is not being used, or is found to be speculative or unduly 
wasteful, the right may be subject in whole or in part to forfeiture.  New Zealand 
has a somewhat similar provision for non-use in the Resource Management Act 
1991.1   
In American water law forfeiture is both a strategic but at the same time 
controversial doctrine.  It is strategic in the sense that it is intended as an 
efficiency tool for the use and management of a scarce but essential core natural 
resource, and controversial in that it is seen by some to be a somewhat draconian 
measure that is to say the stripping away of a property right.   In the event that any 
appropriator is not actually using the water right for the purpose for which it was 
established, the state forms the view that this right should therefore be taken away 
to be made available to someone else who will.  The western states justify this 
position on the grounds that first, as stated, it is essential that water resources be 
used wisely due to their importance and scarcity; but, secondly, those states also 
assume the duty to husband water resources on behalf of the general public, not 
just the appropriator.  Taking away a water right will always be regarded as 
controversial, especially by those adversely affected.  Water rights are a clearly-
                                                 
 
1 Sections 125 and 126. 
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defined property right in the United States: “After the initial appropriation, 
however, the water right, like a mining claim, could be leased or sold.  It was 
property – from the very moment it was first put to use.”2 As such these rights 
have a definite value which can in some cases be very high. Consequently the 
effects of forfeiture may be quite dramatic. Efforts to strip these rights from an 
owner must be taken with great care, and it is entirely appropriate to study the 
doctrine in some detail. 
The doctrine has its basis in both Lockean social contact theory where the 
greatest purpose of society is to protect the individual’s property rights,3 and 
Blackstone’s view that, although property rights are vested in the individual by 
immutable laws of nature, these rights may be necessarily curtailed by the 
requirements of living in a civilised society.4  Of course water is not the only 
natural resource which may be subject to forfeiture: for example, under the 
(American) Federal Land Policy and Management Act 1976, a mining claimant is 
required to file an affidavit of annual assessment of work before 31 December in 
each year (that is no later than the 30 December).  Failure to do so is deemed by 
the Act as “conclusively to constitute an abandonment of the mining claim”.5  In 
United States v Locke,6 Locke filed his affidavit on the 31st December 1980, one 
day late.  His mining claims were valued in the millions of dollars.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court was implacable: Congress intended to void claims which were not 
filed prior to 31 December and, therefore, evidence of lack of intent to abandon 
was irrelevant.7  The Supreme Court took a very strict approach to the matter.  In 
the specific case of water, the earlier chapter on waste demonstrated that the 
                                                 
 
2 Charles F. Wilkinson Crossing the Next Meridian” (Island Press Washington 1992) at 232-233. 
3 “The Second Treatise of Civil Government” (1690) Chapter 9 paragraph 124. 
4 See Robert Burns “Blackstone’s Absolute Rights” (1985-1986) 54 U. Cin L Rev 67 at 73.  
5 43 USCA §1744 (a) (1) (c). 
6 United States v Locke 105 S. Ct. 1785 (US 1986).   
7 Ibid at 1795-6. The word “abandonment” is a misnomer because if intent is irrelevant, then what 
the statute is really referring to is forfeiture. (See post). 
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doctrine is fundamentally a matter of an inappropriate level of water consumption 
to achieve certain results and the wasted water may be forfeited.  Forfeiture, on 
the other hand, is more a question of non-consumption as in the case of 
speculation.  Both may result in at least some loss of a water right:  
Some courts combine waste and forfeiture, saying that a wasteful use 
produces a forfeiture just as nonuse does…However I maintain a 
distinction between the two, because a wasteful user is using 
[consuming] water, while a forfeiter is not.8 
 
The whole idea underlying the doctrines of waste and forfeiture (and its 
close relation abandonment) is that the water is returned by an agreed legal 
process to the source from whence it came to then be appropriated by others who 
will put it to beneficial use.  Those ‘others’ under the American system of 
appropriation are not necessarily potential new users, but more likely to be junior 
appropriators who under the procedure would become more senior, and who 
would then have a greater chance of having their water requirements fulfilled.   
…this excess water belongs to the public under Colorado water law, 
subject to appropriation and use in order of decreed priority; any 
purported conveyance of water the appropriator does not “need” or 
has not put to a beneficial use flags as an illegal enlargement.9 
 
Forfeiture and abandonment in western water law are quite different 
legally, and it is important to understand the distinction between the two.  The old 
western water law maxim of “use it or lose it” expresses the common law 
fundamental that unless an appropriator makes use of the water right, it will be 
deemed to have been abandoned – if the essential element of intention to do so 
                                                 
 
8 Janet C, Neuman “Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for Efficiency in 
Western Water Law” (1998) 28 Envtl L 919 at 928 (at note 53).  Perhaps there is a distinction 
between a substantive rule about the duties of a right-holder and a procedural rule about the 
consequences of a breach. 
9 Burlington Ditch Reservoir & Land Co. v Metro Wastewater Reclamation Dist. 256 P.3d. 645 at 
665 per Hobbs J. (Colo. 2011). 
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can be demonstrated.  If a prima facie case of abandonment can be shown by 
those alleging it, the onus then falls on the appropriator to rebut that evidence by 
demonstrating there was no such intention to abandon the right.  There is an 
understandable requirement that “the abandonment of a real property right cannot 
be declared except upon clear and convincing evidence.”10  Such a system is 
clearly a messy, time-consuming, and expensive exercise; persuasive proof of an 
intention to abandon can be very difficult to establish.  If a case is made, the right 
is lost forthwith no matter how long the abandonment has been occurring.  
However, whilst abandonment is a common law notion, forfeiture is a statutory 
construction and generally provides that water rights are lost if they are unused for 
a set period of time, usually five years.  Crucially, intent is immaterial: 
Abandonment is a common law doctrine involving the occurrence of 
(1) an intent to abandon and (2) an actual relinquishment or surrender 
of the water right.  Forfeiture, on the other hand, is predicated upon 
the statutory declaration that all rights to use water are lost where the 
appropriator fails to make beneficial use of the water for a continuous 
five-year period.11 
 
Forfeiture statutes have been favoured by most western states, 12  because, as 
administrative processes, they are much simpler and cheaper to apply than 
abandonment.  It has to be recognised however that in the first instance 
administrative decision-making of this sort is a quasi-judicial process predicated 
on an analytical and judicial standard adopted from processes and concepts which 
have become accepted within an historical pattern (that is precedents), 
demonstrating traditional attitudes and established judicial principles.  In 
American water law these decisions are not made by a low-ranking office-
worker; they are made by the State Engineer or equivalent senior official.  The 
                                                 
 
10 Carrington v Crandall 147 P.2d 1009 at 1011 per Ailshie J (Idaho 1944). 
11 Sears v Berryman 623 P.2d 455 at 459 per Shepard J. (Idaho 1981). His Honour repeated his 
statement a year later in Jenkins v State Department of Water Resources 647 P.2d 1256 at 1260 
(Idaho 1982). 
12 Colorado and Montana are notable by excluding forfeiture from their statutory toolboxes. 
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whole purpose of administrative processes is to try to avoid the time and cost of 
litigation which can either significantly hinder or assist each party depending on 
their financial circumstances. 
Abandonment, then, is a voluntary relinquishment of a water right, and the 
emphasis is on “voluntary”, if it can be proved; whereas forfeiture is an 
involuntary or forced loss of that right.  Nearly all the seventeen western states 
have implemented a statutory forfeit provision – designed to be “quick, clean, and 
predictable.”  
Indeed, the difficulty in proving the subjective intent element of 
abandonment led to the adoption of forfeiture periods as a more 
effective means of enforcing loss of rights by non-use.  Thus, 
legislatures considered the clear, uniform, statutory forfeiture periods 
to be an improvement on the doctrine of abandonment.13 
 
Interestingly enough, the early Californian case of Utt v Frey14 - a case 
directly on the question of abandonment – does not even discuss the level of 
evidence needed, nor does the  well-known case of Smith v Hawkins of the same 
year which established the doctrine. 15   However, significant cases since 
Carrington v Crandall16 have reinforced the need for “substantial evidence”, or 
“clear and convincing evidence”, as needed to effect a legal abandonment.17 
                                                 
 
13 Ibid, at 22. 
14 Utt v Frey 39 P. 807 (Cal. 1895). 
15 Smith v Hawkins 42 P.453 (Cal. 1895). 
16 Carrington v Crandall 147 P.2d 1009 (Idaho 1944). See note 10 supra.  See also Tarlock, 
Corbridge, Getches, and Benson “Water Resources and Management” (Foundation Press, New 
York, 2009) at 259-265.  
17  For example Gilbert v Smith 552 P.2d 1220 (Idaho 1976); Jenkins v Idaho Dept. Water 
Resources 647 P.2d 1256 (Idaho 1982); Sagewillow Inc. v Idaho Dept. Water Resources 70 P.3d 
669 (Idaho 2003). 
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10.1.2 Forfeiture – A Statutory Construct. 
It was Elwood Mead who exhorted state legislatures to codify water laws, 
including provisions for termination of rights as an anti-speculation measure.  
Anderson and Kraft explain that his argument was that first, individual water 
rights furnished individual farmers with independence, and in the second place 
speculators and monopolies would endanger such a system and so should be 
strenuously avoided.  “In Mead’s West, there would be no wealthy speculators 
developing water works in anticipation of selling water to settlers.” 18   Such 
speculative claimants would have their appropriations taken from them to be 
made available to other genuine utilisations. 
Each state has its own manner of managing of dealing with forfeiture.  The 
taking of someone’s property by the State is not a process to be taken lightly and 
it is appropriate to take a careful look at the approaches utilised by a few western 
states to illustrate the broad method undertaken by these legislatures.  Two states 
– Arizona and Nevada – have specifically applied statutory forfeiture in such a 
way as to exempt rights perfected prior to the passing of their relative water 
codes. This means these rights may only (in theory) be lost by abandonment.  The 
suggestion was that the state could not, and should not, modify rights which had 
already been vested by the further addition of onerous statutory amendments to 
the established and accepted common law rules of abandonment.  Arizona has put 
it thus: 
Except as otherwise provided in this title or in title 48,19 when the 
owner of a right to the use of water ceases or fails to use the water 
appropriated for five successive years, the right to the use shall cease, 
and the water shall revert to the public and shall again be subject to 
                                                 
 
18 Peter R. Anderson and Aaron J. Kraft “Why Does Idaho’s Water Law regime Provide for 
Forfeiture of Water Rights?”  (2011-2012) 48 Idaho L Rev 419 at 424. 
19  Section 48 is an extremely lengthy provision covering a multitude of matters, including 
remedies for the non-payment of taxes. 
279 
 
appropriation.  This subsection or any other statutory forfeiture from 
nonuse shall not apply to a water right initiated before June 12 1919. 
20 
 
Arizona has thus explicitly exempted forfeiture of rights prior to 1919.  
The state’s first comprehensive water code was enacted on the 12 June that year 
and specifically exempted pre-existing rights.  The original statutory provision 
read:21 “Nothing in this act contained, shall impair the vested rights of any person, 
association or corporation to the use of water”.  For the avoidance of doubt, §45-
141(B) states that no forfeiture or abandonment in whole or in part shall ensue in 
the event that water is used on less than all the land to which a right was 
appurtenant.  In the interests of equity the legislature accepts a variety of excuses 
for non-use22 from drought or other unavailability of water, to serving in the 
armed forces, to allowances accorded to municipalities in the event of a change of 
use from irrigation.  This may seem to be relatively straight forward, but the 
Arizona Supreme Court has held that a large portion of the water statute is 
unconstitutional.  In San Carlos Apache Tribe v Superior Court ex rel. County of 
Maricopa23 Feldman J stated: 
On remand, the trial judge held most of the statutory changes 
unconstitutional because they applied retroactively to affect vested 
property rights, thus violating the due process clause of article II, 
section 4 of the Arizona Constitution, or because they violated the 
separation of powers clause of article III of the Arizona Constitution.  
For most part we agree and affirm.24  
 
                                                 
 
20 Arizona Revised Statutes §45-141-(C).  Pursuant to §45-141-(A) surface water and groundwater 
are essentially treated the same. 
21 1919 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch.164 §56. 
22 Ariz. Rev. Stat. §45-189 (E).  The provisions for indulgences are very broad: see A.R.S. §45-
189 E (13) (“Any other reason that a court of competent jurisdiction deems would warrant 
nonuse.”). 
23 972 P.2d 179 (Ariz.1999). 
24 Ibid, at 202 per Feldman J. 
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The Court’s reasoning was that the 1995 amendments to the water laws 
had the legal effect of reducing the opportunities to challenge appropriative 
claims, and thus claimants of reserved rights – the Indian Tribes as well as the 
United States – were at a relative disadvantage.  As to the matter of forfeiture, the 
provisions of §45-141(B) (above) were held to be unconstitutional because they 
created a new protection against a finding of abandonment or forfeiture that did 
not previously exist.25  Failure to use appropriated water on all appropriated land 
must be determined in accordance with the law as it existed at the time of the 
event, not on the basis of subsequently enacted legislation.26  In relation to §45-
141-(C) (which protected rights prior to 12th June 1919), there was an 
inconsistency with another provision in the same Act (probably accidental) which 
states that the Act applies to all rights to appropriate water initiated or perfected 
on or before the effective date of the Act and to any rights subsequently initiated 
or perfected (that is to say all water rights).27 The Court was persuaded that the 
legislation suggested a general intent that the statute’s various provisions be 
applied retroactively and thus the Court struck §45-141-(C) down as being 
unconstitutional simply on the basis that if applied retrospectively it creates a new 
and unconstitutional protection for pre 1919 water rights that may have been 
forfeited and then vested in others under the existing law prior to 1995.  The 
problem was that if a certain pre-code water right were to be eradicated for non-
use, and other claimants had acquired valid water rights, then to restore those lost 
rights by statute would unfairly (and in the view of the Court unlawfully) take 
these rights from other (junior) appropriators.  Again, forfeiture and the resultant 
                                                 
 
25  This defence according to Feldman J did not exist in the former version of the statutory 
provision (at p206). 
26 Ibid, at 206 per Feldman J. 
27 Quoted in the judgment as s24 of Chapter 9 -421R –S Ver. of HB 2276. 
281 
 
changes in priority must be determined under the law as it existed at the time of 
the event alleged to have caused the forfeiture.28   
Oddly enough, despite this judgment of the Arizona Supreme Court being 
handed down in 1999, nothing has happened to rectify or clarify matters and the 
relative provisions are still “on the books”, and the interpretation is possibly 
therefore still an open question.  San Carlos was viewed favourably in the 
Washington case of Lummi Indian Nation v State 29 but was judiciously ignored 
by the Arizona Appeals Division in the 2005 case of Phelps Dodge Corp. v 
Arizona Department of Water Resources 30  This case was not on point, but 
provided a general statement on §45-141-(C), and the question of forfeiture was 
included in the judgment with absolutely no mention of San Carlos nor the 
acceptability or otherwise of the section.   
Nevada’s laws provide, since 1999, for forfeiture of groundwater only.31  
Forfeiture does not apply to surface water which may only be lost through the 
principle of abandonment.  The section, which rambles somewhat, provides in 
part:   
534.090 
1. Except as otherwise provided in this section, failure for 5 
successive years after April 15, 1967, on the part of any holder of any 
right, whether it is an adjudicated right, an unadjudicated right or a 
right for which a certificate has been issued pursuant to NRS 533.425, 
and further whether the right is initiated after or before March 25, 
1939, to use beneficially all or any part of the underground water for 
the purpose for which the right is acquired or claimed, works a 
                                                 
 
28 Ibid at 206 per Feldman J. 
29 Lummi Indian Nation v State 241 P.3d 1220 (Wn. 2010). 
30 Phelps Dodge Corp. v Arizona Dep’t of Water Res. 118 P.3d 1110. (Ariz. App Div 2005). 
31 These rights may be lost through abandonment: N.R.S. §534.090 (4). 
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forfeiture of both undetermined and determined rights to the use of 
that water to the extent of the nonuse. 32 
 
§533.060(2) states that “Rights to the use of surface water shall not be 
deemed to be lost or otherwise forfeited for the failure to use the water therefrom 
for a beneficial purpose.”   Nevada substantially reviewed its water laws in 1999, 
and the above passage appears to remove the forfeiture period from the surface 
water statutes. §534.090 (2) goes on to provide some statutory relief to enable the 
State Engineer to extend in certain circumstances the time necessary to “work a 
forfeiture” to enable appropriators to get their house in order, as it were. 
The Nevada Supreme Court has been quite strict on forfeitures.  In Town 
of Eureka v Office of State Engineer of Nevada, 33 the town found itself in need of 
extra water rights to satisfy its municipal obligations so purchased 640 acre-feet of 
rights and commenced to use its entitlements.  The State Engineer, however, later 
found that there was a period of non-use of 440 acre-feet of this water during the 5 
years from 1983 to 1988, and, as a consequence, the town found itself with an 
entitlement of only 200 acre-feet.  On judicial review, the District Court agreed; 
but the Supreme Court held that Eureka had “cured” the forfeiture by resuming 
substantial use.  In essence, if unused water rights are brought back into use prior 
to a formal declaration of forfeiture, such action constitutes a cure to the 
forfeiture.  The Court pointed out that both Idaho and Wyoming (which have 
statutes similar to Nevada) have held this to be so, 34  provided no claim or 
proceedings of forfeiture have begun.  Moreover, “[b]ecause the law disfavors a 
forfeiture, the State bears the burden of proving, by clear and convincing 
                                                 
 
32 Nevada Revised Statutes 534.090. §533.425 provides that the State Engineer (who is the head of 
the Nevada Division of Water Resources) must issue a certificate of appropriation once he has 
satisfactory proof of the appropriation. 
33 Town of Eureka v Office of State Engineer of Nevada 826 P.2d 948 (Nev.1992). 
34 Ibid, at 952. 
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evidence, a statutory period of non-use.”35  The non-use cannot be absolved by the 
filing of a mere application to change the diversion point, however, because no 
beneficial use of the water is being made in the interim.36 
It is interesting to debate whether the Nevada Supreme Court would hold 
the forfeiture statute to be constitutional.  The Bench in the Eureka case certainly 
thought it was and held it to be so. 37   Nevada does not have the statutory 
confusion that Arizona has, so the decision is relatively straight forward.  It is 
only “relatively” straight forward because the case of In re Manse Spring 38 had 
determined the meaning of the state’s forfeiture statute of the time.  The relevant 
statutory provision stated that: 
…in case the owner or owners of any such ditch, canal or reservoir 
shall fail to use the water therefrom for beneficial purposes for which 
right exists during any five successive years, the right to use shall be 
considered abandoned, and they shall forfeit all water rights, 
easements and privileges appurtenant thereto…39 
 
The legislation also provides however: 
Nothing in this act contained shall impair the vested right of any 
person to the use of water, nor shall the right of any person to take and 
use water be impaired or affected by any of the provisions of this act 
where appropriations have been initiated in accordance with law prior 
to the approval of this act. 40 
 
                                                 
 
35 Ibid, at 952. 
36 See Preffered Equities Corp. v State Engineer, State of Nevada 75 P.3d 380 (Nev. 2003). 
37 Town of Eureka v Office of State Engr. Of Nevada 826 P.2d 948 at 949 (Nev.1992). 
38 In re Manse Spring 108 P.2d 311 (Nev. 08). 
39 1913 Nevada Statutes 140, §8 amended1940).  See also Andersen Family Associates v Hugh 
Ricci, P.E. 179 P.3d 1201, at 1206 (Nev. 20 by 1917 Nevada Statutes 190 §1. 
40 1913 Nevada Statutes 84 Comp. Laws §7970 (referred to in the judgment at 314). 
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The real question before the Court in Manse Spring was the cross-
pollination in the wording of the statute of abandonment and forfeiture principles, 
which are quite distinct from each other.  One party argued that abandonment 
rules should apply; the other for forfeiture rules.  The Court found that the 
abandonment rules applied and further, as the initial trial judge found there was 
substantial evidence to suggest there was no intention to abandon, his findings 
were affirmed.  The Manse legislation in 1913 specifically excluded the 
impairment of pre-1913 vested water rights, but the Nevada legislative provision 
lacks a similar provision. There was no question therefore of retroactivity in the 
legislation, but, if there were, it would not have met with approval by the Court: 
The trial court held that to apply the terms of section 8 would have the 
effect of impairing rights to the waters of Manse Spring which had 
vested prior to the enactment of the 1913 statute, and therefore said 
section should be excluded; that rights acquired before 1913 could 
only be lost in accordance with the law in existence at the time of the 
1913 statute, namely intentional abandonment.  With this conclusion 
we agree.41 
 
The Nevada Supreme Court’s approach to Manse Spring was discussed 
and approved at federal level in U.S. v Alpine Land & Reservoir Co.42 
California, with its hybrid water law system, recognises both prior 
appropriation and riparianism; but riparian rights are, of course, not subject to 
forfeiture.  These rights are neither created by use nor lost by non-use, but are 
rather acquired by owning riparian land. 43  The water law system is quite complex 
– the state maintains separate ordinances for surface water (which is subject to 
forfeiture) and groundwater which is further subdivided into three differing 
                                                 
 
41 In re Manse Spring 108 P.2d 311 at 316 per Orr J. (Nev. 1940).  The Court went on to point out 
that this is not to mean that an acquisition prior to 1913 would assure the appropriator the right to 
the water indefinitely, without regard to placing it to beneficial use (at 316). 
42 U.S. v Alpine Land & Reservoir Co 983 F.2d 1487. (US 9th Cir. 1992). 
43 See generally Lux v Haggin 10 P.674 (Cal. 1886); California Water Code §100-101; California 
Constitution Art. X §2. 
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groups, two  of which (two types of “non-percolating groundwater”) are subject to 
forfeiture, but the other (“percolating groundwater”) is not.  California embraced 
its comprehensive water code in 1914 and the new code had the effect of tidying 
up earlier statutes.44  The idea of forfeiture, however, had been in the sights of 
Californian jurisprudence for some years.  In the early case Smith v Hawkins,45 the 
Supreme Court discussed the Californian Civil Code of the day, section 1411 of 
which stated that the appropriation of water must be for some useful or beneficial 
purpose, and when the appropriator or his successor in interest ceases to use it for 
such purpose, the right ceases.46   As odd as it may seem, the Code did not 
stipulate a time by which such a loss would be suffered so the Supreme Court, in 
an example of judicial pragmatism, drew on other analogous areas of Californian 
law: 
In this state five years is the period fixed by law for the ripening of an 
adverse possession into a prescriptive title.  Five years is also the 
period declared by law after which a prescriptive right depending on 
enjoyment is lost for nonuser; and, for analogous reasons, we consider 
it to be a just and proper measure of time for the forfeiture of an 
appropriator’s rights for a failure to use the water for a beneficial 
purpose. 47 
 
At least the approach taken by the Court was practical.  Importantly, 
though the Court distinguished between forfeiture and abandonment; the latter 
was held not to apply.48  This approach was approved and applied by the same 
Court in the major case of Lindblom v Round Valley Water Co,49  and confirmed 
                                                 
 
44  Pre-1914 rights are common law appropriative ones; post-1914 rights are administratively 
issued by the State Water Resources Control Board (formerly the California Water Commission) 
under a comprehensive permit system.  In general terms, the distinction is very much like our old 
Deeds system and current Torrens system of land transactions. 
45 Smith v Hawkins 42 P.453 (Cal.1895). 
46 See Smith v Hawkins 42 P.453 at 454. 
47 Ibid, at 454. 
48 In fact if abandonment had been upheld, the Court would not have had to decide on a time 
period because the abandonment would have taken effect straight away. 
49 Lindblom v Round Valley Water Co. 173 P.994 (Cal.1918). 
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that non-use for five consecutive years or more results in forfeiture, regardless of 
intent.50  The relevant current legislative provision for forfeiture is contained in 
the California Water Code, the general provisions of §1240: “The appropriation 
must be for some useful or beneficial purpose, and when the appropriator or his 
successor in interest ceases to use it for such a purpose the right ceases.”  §1241 is 
more specific: 
1241. If the person entitled to the use of water fails to use beneficially 
all or any part of the water claimed by him or her, for which a right of 
use has vested, for the purpose for which it was appropriated or 
adjudicated, for a period of five years, that unused water may revert to 
the public and shall, if reverted, be regarded as unappropriated public 
water… 
 
Relief is granted in certain circumstances, for example the forfeiture 
period in certain cases may be extended by an additional period of not more than 
10 years in the case of water appropriated for irrigation but not used by reason of 
compliance with crop control or soil conservation contracts with the Federal 
Government, or, in other cases of hardship, decided on a case by case basis.51  As 
in Arizona, the standard of proof in successful forfeiture cases is quite high.  In 
Barnes v Hussa,52 the California Court of Appeal did not make a finding of partial 
forfeiture, despite the fact that the pipeline utilised by the Barneses was capable of 
transporting only about two-thirds of their entitlement, on the grounds that the 
Hussas did not offer any evidence that for the relevant five years the full water 
entitlement was, in fact, physically available for diversion.  It should be noted that 
California does have a Conserved Water Program, which is contained in §1011 of 
the Water Code and which states, in essence, that there can be no forfeiture, upon 
the lapse of the forfeiture period, of appropriative rights to water so conserved 
thus making the conserved water available for sale or lease by the appropriator. 
                                                 
 
50 Ibid, at 996 per Sloss J. 
51 California Water Code §1241.6. 
52 Barnes v Hussa 136 Cal App 4th 1358 (Cal. Ct of App 2006). 
287 
 
Idaho also retains a five year forfeiture period, and the current statute 
provides as follows: 
All rights to the use of water acquired under this chapter or otherwise 
shall be lost and forfeited by a failure for a term of five (5) years to 
apply it to the beneficial use for which it was appropriated.53 
 
The Code lists eleven statutory separate defences in the nature of a relief 
against forfeiture,54  including the usual tolerance given to municipalities, and 
conservation practices.  In Idaho, the statutory exceptions are not exhaustive, and, 
as usual in these circumstances, the common law steps up when necessary: an 
appropriator is forgiven if the wrongful acts of others prevent the use of water. 
The only reason the water owned by the plaintiff was not applied to a 
beneficial use for the five-year period relied on by the defendant to 
establish its asserted rights was that the defendant wrongfully 
deprived plaintiff of its use…55 
 
Clearly, the passage suggests circumstances over which the appropriator 
has little or no control.  It is also quite clear that the appropriator will receive legal 
support: “Forfeiture or abandonment of water rights is not favoured and is not to 
be presumed, and all intendments are to be indulged in against a forfeiture.” 56 
Such generosity of expression leaves little room for doubt.   
This is in stark contrast to section 237: “The provisions relating to the loss 
of water rights by non-use and abandonment as set forth in section 42.222 shall 
apply to groundwater.” 57   The problem is that the word “abandonment” is not 
used at all in section 42.222, and given the basic difference between forfeiture for 
                                                 
 
53 Idaho Code §42.222(2). 
54 §42.223. 
55 Hodges v Trail Creek Irrigation Co. 297 P.2d 524 (Idaho 1956) at 527 per Keeton J. 
56 Ibid, at 527 per Keeton J. 
57 Idaho Code §42.237. 
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non-use and abandonment such sloppy legislative drafting is quite inexcusable, 
especially given the historical confusion experienced in Idaho in the past (or 
perhaps it might explain the confusion):   
The Idaho Code’s language governing appropriation, including the 
forfeiture statute itself, came from the Wyoming Code.  But the Code 
utilized the process of adjudicating water rights from the Colorado’s 
system…Wyoming gave jurisdiction over disputes to a board of 
control (an administrative agency) while Colorado gave original 
jurisdiction over disputes to the courts.  Further complicating matters, 
Idaho’s 1903 act did not change the beneficial use statute Idaho had 
previously copied from California.  So, in 1903, Idaho effectively 
meshed the beneficial use requirement, as enacted in California, with 
portions of two comprehensive Water Codes adopted in Colorado and 
Wyoming.  Idaho’s new Water Code thus contained a diverse and 
mismatched pedigree: an explicit forfeiture statute, like Wyoming’s; 
an adjudication system like Colorado’s, which did not recognize 
forfeiture; and, California’s beneficial use statute, which the 
California Supreme Court interpreted as an independent basis for 
forfeiture. 58 
 
The Idaho Supreme Court finally settled the issue in Carrington v 
Crandell: 
What has just been said relates to forfeiture (abandonment as it is 
designated by the statute, sec 41-216 I.C.A.).  While the statute 
designates it as “abandonment”, it is in fact a statutory forfeiture.59 
 
Actually, Idaho’s forfeiture statute is somewhat loosely-worded.  The 
relative portion of §42.222 (2) commences “All rights to the use of water…shall 
be lost and forfeited… (emphasis added)”  Argument was presented to the 
Supreme Court that this was simply all or nothing, leaving no scope for a partial 
                                                 
 
58 Peter R. Anderson & Aaron J. Kraft “Why Does Idaho’s Water Law Regime Provide for 
Forfeiture of Water Rights” 48 (2012) Idaho L. Rev. 419, at 426 (footnotes omitted).  See also 
Smith v Hawkins 42 P. 453 (Cal 1895). 
59 Carrington v Crandell 147 P.2d 1009 (Idaho 1944) at 1011 per Ailshie J. 
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forfeiture.  The Idaho Supreme Court had little difficulty in dismissing the 
argument: 
If this court were to find that I.C.§42.222(2) does not authorise partial 
forfeiture of a water right, once the amount element of a water right is 
decreed, a water user could hold the water against all subsequent 
appropriators by using only a part of the water. 60 
 
What the Court is stating is simply that, unless the notion of a partial 
forfeiture is accepted, the doctrine of forfeiture would be substantially devalued.  
In any event, in a spirit of consistency, the Idaho Supreme Court has agreed with 
the approach taken by the Idaho Department of Water Resources, which was 
always to accept partial forfeitures.61 
Oregon’s Revised Statutes tread a familiar path:62 
…Whenever the owner of a perfected and developed water right 
ceases or fails to use all or any part of the water appropriated for a 
period of five successive years, the failure to use shall establish a 
rebuttable presumption of forfeiture of all or part of a water right.63 
 
The statute goes on to provide that the appropriator has the burden of 
rebutting the presumption (if the appropriator chooses to do so, of course) by only 
showing one or more of the statutory excuses listed in §540.610 (2).64  This list 
includes the usual indulgence to municipalities,65 and addresses the question of 
                                                 
 
60 State v Hagerman Water Right Owners, Inc. 947 P.2d 400, at 407-408, per Schroeder, J (Idaho, 
1997). 
61 One further interpretation, not argued, would be that all rights are forfeited in the event that not 
all entitlements are put to a beneficial use.  This, of course, would be inherently contrary to the 
rules of natural justice and water which is being correctly put to a beneficial use would be lost too. 
62 O.R.S. Vol.13 §540.610. 
63 Forfeited rights revert to the public to again be subject to appropriation in the usual manner: 
§540.610 (5). 
64 There are 14 altogether. 
65 These indulgences are not unlimited: there are certain limitations on municipalities’ rights.  See 
Waterwatch of Oregon v Water Resources Com’n 88 P.3d. 327. (Or Ct of App 2004). 
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climate change.  Interestingly, it provides that the appropriator may rebut the 
presumption of forfeiture by showing:66 
The end of the alleged period of nonuse occurred more than 15 years 
before the date upon which evidence of nonuse was submitted to the 
commission [the Oregon Water Resources Commission] or the 
commission instituted cancellation proceedings under ORS 540.631 
(Cancellation of forfeited water right) whichever occurs first.67 
 
It would appear that proceedings are considered initiated when evidence of 
non-use is submitted to the Commission.  Further, an appropriator may only 
restore a water right if forfeiture proceedings do not begin within 15 years of the 
resumption of use.  Of particular note is the fact that forfeiture is not automatic 
(that is it is not an administrative action).  §540.631 provides that the Commission 
shall initiate proceedings for cancellation, and give the appropriator 60 days’ 
notice of the date of hearing in order that the appropriator may protest the 
proposed cancellation, by showing any of the excuses listed in §540.610 (2).  
Also, Oregon provides that if an appropriator uses less water to accomplish the 
beneficial use allowed by the right, the right is not subject to forfeiture as long as 
the appropriator has the capacity to use the entire rate and is otherwise ready 
willing and able to make full use of the right.68  Thus, this provision slots neatly 
into Oregon’s Conserved Water Program allowing the appropriator to sell or lease 
the water saved.   
Oregon does not baulk at the thought of applying statutory forfeiture to 
pre-code water rights.  In Crandall v Water Resources Dept. of State of Oregon,69 
Crandall was the owner of water rights with a priority date of 1872.70   The 
                                                 
 
66 §540.610 (2) (f). 
67 Utah has a similar statutory provision. 
68 §540.610 (3). 
69 Crandall v Water Resources Dept of State of Oregon 626 P.2d 877 (Or 1981). 
70 Oregon first codified its water law in 1909. 
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Supreme Court had no hesitation in confirming the forfeiture in entitlement of 
15.6 cubic feet per second reducing the right from 40 cubic feet per second to 24.4 
cubic feet per second.  Similarly, in Rencken v Young,71  a water right with a 
priority of 1888 was almost completely forfeited to the state.72  The rectitude or 
otherwise of forfeiting rights to water extant before the water code of 1909 is not 
canvassed.  Also, clear and convincing evidence was necessary to support a 
statutory forfeiture.73  Strictness does not only apply to time: it also applies to 
place.  In Hannigan v Hinton74 the owner of a mining water right used the water at 
a location other than the certified place of use in the permit.  The Oregon Supreme 
Court held that the term “place of use” is a component of “use” for the purposes 
of forfeiture and summarily stripped the water right from the owner. 
Washington adopted its Water Code in 1917,75 but it was amended in 
1967.  The original statute recognised and affirmed those water rights already in 
existence: “Nothing contained in this chapter shall be construed to lessen, enlarge, 
or modify the existing rights of any riparian owner, or any existing right acquired 
by appropriation, or otherwise”.76  The current section states: 
Any person entitled to divert or withdraw waters of the state through 
any appropriation authorised by enactments of the legislature prior to 
enactment of chapter 117, Laws of 1917, or by custom, or by general 
adjudication, who abandons the same, or who voluntarily fails, 
without sufficient cause, to beneficially use all or any part of said 
right to divert or withdraw for any period of 5 successive years after 
[1 July 1967], shall relinquish such right or any portion thereof, and 
said right or portion thereof shall revert to the state, and the waters 
                                                 
 
71 Rencken v Young 711 P.2d 954 (Or 1985). 
72 The relative time period was 1979 to 1983, with an irrigation season from March to October.  
Rencken recommenced use in November 1983, but this did not save his right.  He was left with 
enough water to irrigate 0.1 of an acre.  The approach is nothing if not very strict. See also US v 
Locke at note 6 supra. 
73 Rencken v Young 711 P.2d 954 at 961(Or 1985) (per Campbell J).  See also cases at note 14 
supra. 
74 Hannigan v Hinton 97 P. 3d 1256 (Or 2004). 
75 Washington Laws 1917 chapter 117. 
76 Washington Laws 1917 chapter 117 §1. 
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affected shall revert to the state, and the waters affected by said right 
shall become available for appropriation in accordance with RCW 
90.30.250. 77 
 
Interestingly enough, the statute employs the term ‘relinquish” rather than 
“forfeit” and thereby it somewhat shifts the emphasis for the loss on the lack of 
function by the appropriator (relinquish in the sense of renounce), rather than the 
positive force of the State actively stripping the right away (forfeit in the sense of 
being deprived). The other emphasis in the section is to reinforce the notion that 
the waters appropriated are “waters of the state”.  The appropriator is under no 
illusion that the right is usufructuary only: the appropriator only owns the right to 
use the water. 78  The sting is in the expression “sufficient cause” which is defined 
by §90.14.140.  This section lists the only narrow defences available to a 
delinquent appropriator.  The courts have no ability to extend this list, except by 
defining what the individual clauses actually mean. 79   In other words, the 
relinquishment (forfeiture) is only rebuttable in terms of the statute itself.  Clearly, 
Washington might face issues in relation to the wording of its statute in terms of 
the unconstitutional taking of a water right, the priority of which pre-dates the 
Water Code, as did, say, Arizona and Nevada.   
This argument was actually advanced in the well-known case of State 
Dept.of Ecology v Grimes.80 In that case, the Grimes’ water right went back to 
1906, some 11 years before the Water Code, and their argument was that any 
diminishment of their rights would be unconstitutional.  The Washington Supreme 
Court’s practical approach was that the forfeiture had nothing to do with the 
constitution, and was it decided on the basis that a water right is only valid where 
                                                 
 
77 §90.14.160. 
78 Washington has a conserved water program by which the state will fund the efficiency measures 
and generally speaking take the saved water in lieu of payment.  See §90.42.020(2).  No issue of 
forfeiture exists.  See also §90.14.140(1) (i). (Effective until 30 June 2019). 
79 One defence is that of military service during “military crisis”, whatever that may refer to. 
80 State Dept.of Ecology v Grimes 852 P.2d 1044. (Wn.1993). See Chapter 8 supra. 
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the appropriator beneficially, continuously, and diligently uses the water, which 
Mr and Mrs Grimes were not doing; and, accordingly, there can be no “taking” 
(constitutional or otherwise) of a water right where the appropriator is not using 
the water, simply because a right does not exist for the water not being used.  The 
situation was well put by the Supreme Court of Nebraska:81 the application of a 
water right operates as a “condition subsequent” to the grant of the right; the 
Wyoming Supreme Court referred to beneficial use as a “continuing obligation”.82 
Wyoming has an integrated system: both forfeiture and abandonment are 
provided by statute, and neither requires the element of intent.  The main 
difference between the two is the identity of the person who commences the 
proceedings: abandonment proceedings are commenced by members of the 
public, 83 and forfeiture proceedings by the state engineer. 84   
The section goes on to identify precisely those persons with water rights 
who may petition for an order of abandonment.85   
Neither section requires specific intent, but both sections provide for the 
only excuse for non-use; namely, an absence of water to put to a beneficial use.86 
There is however the thorny issue of partial forfeiture in Wyoming water law.  
The abandonment provisions contain a stipulation that partial non-use is excused 
in the case where there was an insufficient supply of water but only if the 
                                                 
 
81 In re Application A-15738 of the Hitchcock & Red Willow Irrigation Dists. 410 N.W. 2d 101 at 
106 per Hastings J. (Neb. 1987). 
82 Basin Electric Power Coop. v State Board of Control 578 P.2d 557 at 563 per Rose J. (Wyo. 
1978). 
83 W.S.A. §41-3-401 (a).  The provision goes on to allow an appropriator to apply for extensions of 
time (5 years each) to enable him to get his or her house in order. 
84 W.S.A. §41-3-402 (a). 
85  W.S.A. §41-3-401 (b) (i) and (ii).  Essentially, any water user who might benefit from a 
declaration of abandonment, or who might be injured by a reactivation of the water right. 
86 W.S.A. §41-3-401 (b); W.S.A. §41-3-402 (b). 
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appropriator’s diversion infrastructure is in good working order.87  Like Idaho, 
although the statute does not actually state specifically that a partial abandonment 
will be entertained (in fact §41-3-401 (a) talks about “all water rights and 
privileges” being forfeit), the courts have accepted partial abandonment – to give 
the doctrine some real meaning – and in Laramie Rivers Co. v Wheatland Irr. 
Dist. the Wyoming Supreme Court declared that in order for partial abandonment 
to succeed the Board of Control needs to determine the actual volume of water 
which the appropriator had actually used for the relative 5-year period, with the 
appropriator losing in abandonment proceedings only those rights to that volume 
of appropriated water in excess of the amount used.88 In the case of the forfeiture 
provision,  §41-3-402 (a) instructs the State Engineer that if an appropriator has 
failed to use “any portion” of surface, underground, or reservoir water 
appropriated by him for a period of five successive years, he may initiate 
forfeiture proceedings.   
However §41-3-402 (j) is in direct conflict and provides that “Nothing in 
this section shall be construed to allow the state engineer to initiate forfeiture 
proceedings against water rights which are being put to beneficial use, wholly or 
in part.”  The State Engineer appears to have resolved the impasse by informally 
accepting §41-3-402 (j) as the correct interpretation.89  He has probably taken the 
line of least resistance.  Professor Squillace correctly points out that this is not a 
desirable outcome.90 His view is that the courts would likely defer to the State 
Engineer’s view and his office’s interpretation through rulemaking proceedings.   
More importantly, however, the alternative view (that the legislature anticipated 
partial forfeitures) would give much-needed impact to the doctrine given that 
                                                 
 
87 W.S.A. §41-3-401 (f). 
88 Laramie Rivers Co. v Wheatland Irr. Dist. 708 P.2d 20 (Wyo. 1985) at 36 per Rose J. 
89 See Mark Squillace “A Critical Look at Wyoming Water Law” XXIV (1989) Land & Water L. 
Rev. 307 at 337. 
90 See comments on State v Hagerman Water Right Owners, Inc. at note 63 above. 
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partial forfeitures are more likely than forfeitures of entire water rights, thereby 
releasing unneeded water resources from one place to others of high demand.91   
10.1.3 The Doctrine of Abandonment – The Colorado Experience. 
Not all states employ the usual five-year statutory forfeiture mechanism.  Montana 
does not, and neither does Colorado. In other words, the unintentional loss of 
water rights by forfeiture as such is not recognised by either state.  Instead, there 
is a statutory presumption of an intention to abandon if there is a ten year failure 
to use the water right for the beneficial use for which the water was appropriated.  
Colorado’s statutory provision reads as follows: 
For the purpose of procedures under this section, failure for a period 
of ten years or more to apply to a beneficial use the water under a 
water right when needed by the person entitled to use same shall 
create a rebuttable presumption of abandonment of a water right with 
respect to the amount of such available water which has not been so 
used; except that a presumption may be waived by the division 
engineer or the state engineer if special circumstances negate an intent 
to abandon. 92 
 
The definition section (§37-92-103(2)) spells out that intent to discontinue 
use permanently is an essential ingredient.  There follows a short list of statutory 
exemptions from the presumption of intent.  The section actually reads more like 
the usual forfeiture process but it has a longer non-use period.  The Colorado 
system requires each Division Engineer93 to prepare abandonment lists: 
…He [the Division Engineer] shall also prepare decennially, no later 
than July 1 1990, and each tenth anniversary thereafter, a separate 
abandonment list comprising all absolute water rights which he has 
                                                 
 
91 Mark Squillace “A Critical Look at Wyoming Water Law” XXIV (1989) Land & Water L. Rev. 
307 at 337-338.  
92 C.R.S. §37-92-402. 
93 Colorado is divided into 7 water divisions each with its own engineer, who are all under the 
auspices of the State Engineer. 
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determined to have been abandoned in whole or in part and which 
previously have not been adjudged to have been abandoned. 94 
 
Notice is given to affected water rights holders, and those who do not 
object are deemed to have abandoned their rights and these are stripped from 
them.  Those who do object, head to the Water Court to justify their position.  The 
common law,95 on the other hand, may be somewhat more benevolent and holds 
that non-use of a water right for an “unreasonable period” can give rise to a 
rebuttable presumption of an intention to abandon and the case law suggests that 
the presumption cannot be overcome simply by self-serving denials: 
…that to rebut the presumption of abandonment arising from such a 
long period of nonuse [nearly 40 years], there must be established not 
merely expressions of desire or hope or intent, but some fact or 
condition excusing such a long nonuse.96 
 
In the 1973 case of In re CF&I Steel Corp. in Las Animas County,97 the 
period of non-use of 54 years was held to be unreasonable, and there was no 
evidence that CF&I Steel had attempted to lease, sell, or otherwise use the water 
right during the long period of non-use, and the company had dismantled its 
diversion and transportation works, making it impossible to divert water at its 
decreed points.  The presumption was, therefore, not rebutted.  Evidence of good 
faith to alienate water rights suggests that there is no intention to abandon.98   In 
any event twenty years had already been held to be unreasonable: San Luis Valley 
Irrigation District v Alamosa.99  In all cases, the question of abandonment is to be 
                                                 
 
94 C.R.S. §37-92-401(1) (a). 
95 The statutory and common law systems exist side by side and provide separate legal processes. 
96 In re Water District No. 47 in Water Division No.1: Mason v Hills Land & Cattle Co. 204 P.2d 
153 (Colo. 1949). 
97 In re CF&I Steel Corp. in Las Animas County 515 P.2d 456 (Colo. 1973). 
98 See Danielson v City of Thornton 775 P.2d 11 (Colo. 1989). 
99 San Luis Valley Irrigation District v Alamosa 135 P. 769 (Colo. 1913). 
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determined by weighing all the evidence and assessing the credibility of witnesses 
– each case is judged on its own merits.100 
There is another aspect of the Colorado abandonment rules which might 
have been of some assistance to New Zealand in the Central Plains crop of cases 
and the problem of priority of resource consent applications.  Colorado employs 
the notion of a ‘conditional water right’ which is described as a right to perfect (a 
process by which the water right is made absolute) a water right with a certain 
priority upon completion with reasonable diligence of the appropriation upon 
which such water right is to be based.101  The essence of the system is that the 
water is finally used for the beneficial use identified in the application.  An 
appropriator is then required to demonstrate intent by an overt act for the purposes 
of completing the “first step” towards perfecting the conditional right.102  This 
constitutes notice to interested parties of the nature and extent of the proposed 
demand on the water supply.103   The sting in the tail is that the conditional 
appropriator is required every six years to apply to the Water Court for a finding 
of “reasonable diligence”, that is to say he or she has “demonstrated a steady 
application of effort to complete the appropriation in a reasonably expedient and 
efficient manner under all the facts and circumstances.”104  If the Court does not 
make such a finding, the “conditional water right shall be deemed considered to 
be abandoned.”105  As noted in United States v Locke,106 the courts can be very 
tough on time limits.  In Bar 70 Enterprises, Inc. v Highland Ditch Ass’n, 107 the 
clerk of the Water Court sent a certified letter to Highland notifying them that 
                                                 
 
100 Consolidated Home Supply Ditch & Reservoir Co. v Town of Bertoud. 896 P.2d 260 at 267 per 
Mullarkey J. (Colo. 1995). 
101 C.R.S. §37-92-103(6). 
102 C.R.S. 37-92-305 (9) (b).  
103 See generally City of Thornton By and Through Utilities Bd. V City of Fort Collins 830 P.2d 
915 (Colo. 1992). 
104 C.R.S. §37-92-301 (4) (b). 
105 C.R.S. §37-92-301 (4) (a) (I). 
106 United States v Locke 105 S.Ct. 1785 (US1986).  See above n 6.  
107 Bar 70 Enterprises, Inc. v Highland Ditch Ass’n 694 P.2d 1253 (Colo. 1985). 
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their conditional water right would be considered cancelled unless an application 
for a finding of reasonable diligence was filed during the month of August 1981.  
The application was filed on the 4th September. The Court found that, physically, 
due diligence had been demonstrated but that this notion also included filing the 
application in a timely manner.  Therefore, the conditional right was considered 
abandoned and terminated.  In the New Zealand Central Plains cases, the water 
right was granted without precise knowledge of how these rights were to be 
exercised.  Under Colorado law, the beneficial use must be identified in the 
application, and this requirement was significantly absent from the Central Plains 
cases. 
In summary, then, water rights in Colorado may be lost by common law 
abandonment after an unreasonable period of non-use, or by the division engineer 
reviewing abandonment lists in respect of absolute rights, or by the Water Court 
finding an absence of due diligence in the case of conditional water rights.  There 
is, as such, no doctrine of forfeiture incorporating an absence of intent coupled 
with a list of statutory defences, which, in some states, limits the occasion for a 
defence against the accusation of non-use. 
Given their abhorrence of speculation and waste, it is surprising how 
reluctant the courts are to make a finding of forfeiture (because it is a statutory 
construct) and abandonment (because it relies on demonstration of intent).  In 
terms of Colorado law those asserting the intent to abandon must established their 
case by a “preponderance of evidence”108  but the rebuttal must disclose some fact 
or condition that excuses the non-use, or shows the owner’s intent not to abandon: 
a lesser evidentiary burden.109  The Colorado courts have in the past accepted a 
                                                 
 
108 Haystack Ranch, LLC v Fazzio 997 P.2d 548 at 552 per Martinez J (Colo. 2000). 
109  Ibid, at 552.  Intent is a subjective element which may be difficult for an objector to 
demonstrate so the system shifts the burden of proof from the objector to the appropriator to show 
there was no intent to abandon. 
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variety of excuses, each case being judged on its own merits. These are listed in 
East Twin Lakes Ditches and Water Works Inc. v Board of County 
Commissioners. 110  Haystack Ranch, LLC v Fazzio case discusses repairs and 
maintenance of diversion structures: 
The current owner argued that he rebutted the presumption of intent to 
abandon by repairing some of the diversion structures and trying to 
put the water rights to their historical use…These activities would 
have overcome a presumption of intent to abandon had the previous 
owners undertaken them…such “activities constitute only an attempt 
to revive what was already dead.” 111 
 
Attempts to put the water to the beneficial use for which it was 
appropriated were also accepted by Haystack as an excuse.  Haystack had been 
successful in having its water right removed from the abandonment list, and also 
had tried to get alternative points of diversion authorised by the state: “We agree 
with Haystack’s analysis that these actions can constitute proof of an attempt not 
to abandon.”112  The Haystack case also mentions the non-appearance of the water 
rights on the state engineer’s abandonment list as a possible excuse: 
We observe that the division engineer’s removal of the water rights 
from the abandonment list is evidence that the water court may 
consider in determining whether an abandonment has occurred.  
However we conclude that the division engineer’s decision alone is 
not sufficient…113 
 
                                                 
 
110 East Twin Lakes Ditches and Water Works Inc. v Board of County Commissioners. 76 P.3d 
918, at 922. (Colo. 2003). 
111 Haystack Ranch, LLC v Fazzio 997 P.2d 548, at 554 per Martinez J (Colo. 2000). (reference 
omitted). 
112 Ibid, at 554.  In Haystack’s case though these actions took place after the water rights were 
abandoned by the previous owner and so could not be resuscitated. 
113 Ibid, at 555. 
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Evidence of attempts to sell a water right has been held to rebut the 
presumption of abandonment.  In People ex re. Danielson v City of Thornton,114 
the presumption of abandonment was rebutted by the production of three 
documents outlining the proposed sale of the water right.  In City & County of 
Denver v Snake River Water Dist, the Colorado Supreme Court stated: “[d]iligent 
efforts to sell a water right are evidence of intent not to abandon.”115  The leasing 
of water rights has also been accepted.  In Beaver Park Water, Inc. v City of 
Victor 116  the water right owner was facing an action of abandonment.  The 
Supreme Court pointed to a list of uncontested points raised in defence, including 
the fact that the water rights were leased for 50 years in 1949.  This was accepted.  
However: “[g]enerally, the reasons underlying the nonuse period are only relevant 
to the question of intent to abandon and will not alone rebut a prima facie 
showing of abandonment.”117  The last excuse mentioned in the East Twin Lakes 
case is the thorny matter of economic or legal obstacles to exercising the water 
right.   In that case, the appropriator (Lake County) had tried for some 30 years to 
raise sufficient funds to enable it to line its ditch (approximately 6 miles), in order 
that the appropriated water could be used.    The intention to line the ditch was 
abandoned after about 20 years, and the non-use carried over for about another ten 
years.  In the end, the water right was sold, but faced a claim of abandonment.  
The Supreme Court found that abandonment had not occurred.  Although there 
were a number of reasons the Court held to be indicative of a lack of intent to 
abandon, the Court found the presence of legal or economic obstacles to be a valid 
                                                 
 
114 People ex re. Danielson v City of Thornton 755 P.2d 11 (Colo. 1989). 
115 City & County of Denver v Snake River Water Dist. 788 P.2d 772 (Colo. 1990) at 778 per Lohr 
J.  Given the Supreme Court constantly abjures speculation, that word does not appear once in the 
judgment. 
116 Beaver Park Water, Inc v City of Victor 649 P.2d 300 (Colo. 1982). 
117 Ibid, at 303 per Hodges CJ. 
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reason. 118   The Court had previously accepted this excuse.  In Hallenbeck v 
Granby Ditch & Reservoir Co. the Court had found:  
“…reasonable justification for non-use may very well exist where it 
can be shown 
that economic, financial or legal difficulties or natural calamities 
prevented the storing of all the water that was originally decreed.” 119 
 
However, Justice Hobbs delivered a strong dissenting judgment.120  His 
point was that the ditch could not deliver the water to its place of use, and, in 
truth, the owners simply did not want to make the investment which an actual 
water user would be required to make to maintain the priority of the water right.  
He found that the Water Court had given weight to the ranch manager’s request to 
fund the necessary improvements despite the owner’s affirmative decision not 
to. 121   Further, his judgment notes that the Court has traditionally accepted 
economic difficulty as a justifiable excuse for non-use in very limited 
circumstances, for instance the Great Depression, and shortages during World 
War 2.  “Run of the mill” economic difficulties have not been recognised by the 
Colorado Supreme Court.122   
It is submitted that, in order for the doctrine to have some real teeth, 
Justice Hobbs’ interpretation of the evidence of a presumption of abandonment is 
the correct one.  In general, the fact that the partnership may have experienced 
financial hardship does not provide comfort to those competitors unable to gain 
use of the water, which remained unused.  The fact that the right was leased to 
                                                 
 
118 East Twin Lakes Ditches and Water Works Inc. v Board of County Commissioners. 76 P.3d 918 
at 925 per Rice J. (Colo. 2003).   
119 Hallenbeck v Granby Ditch & Reservoir Co. 420 P.2d 419. (Colo. 1966) at 426 per Stoon CJ. 
120 Chief Justice Mullarkey and Justice Kourlis “joined in the dissent”. 
121 East Twin Lakes Ditches and Water Works Inc. v Board of County Commissioners. 76 P.3d 918 
at 926 per Hobbs J.   
122 East Twin Lakes Ditches and Water Works Inc. v Board of County Commissioners. 76 P.3d 
918, at 927-928 per Hobbs J.   
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another is of no consequence because he was unable to use the water as well.  
Justice Hobbs concluded his remarks by stating that the fact that the State 
Engineer did not place the relative right on the abandonment list is a purely 
administrative matter, and has nothing to do with the owners’ intent.123  The East 
Twin Lakes case demonstrates neatly why states have overwhelmingly opted for 
the forfeiture procedure with its more predictable outcome, especially in those 
states which severely limit statutory defences.  The other point is that water rights 
are property rights, and, as such, if their status is plainly defined and definite, so 
too is their attractiveness in a market transaction. 
Clearly, then, a statutory forfeiture provision would engender more certainty into 
proceedings attacking an unused water right, as well as more certainty of tenure in 
the event of a sale.  A ten year period, as under common law abandonment 
processes, may also be regarded as too long.  The more definite action of 
forfeiture, if seen in context, is an important tool in the process of getting rid of 
old rights which in western water law clutter the allocative landscape.  It is not 
just the state water engineers who have their focus on those rights, but also other 
potential water rights competitors.    
Depriving water managers of statutory forfeiture for the oldest water 
rights and relegating them to the less predictable, less uniform, and 
ultimately more expensive process of proving intentional 
abandonment erects inefficient and unnecessary hurdles in the path of 
rational water management.124 
 
                                                 
 
123 See Haystack Ranch, LLC v Fazzio 997 P.2d 548 at 555 per Martinez, J (Colo. 2000). (stating 
that such actions alone by the Engineer are not sufficient to overcome the presumption). 
124 Janet C. Neuman and Keith Hirogawa “How Good is an Old Water Right?  The Application of 
Statutory Forfeiture Provisions to Pre-Code Water Rights” 4 (2000-2001) U Denv Water L Rev 1 
at 27 (footnote excluded). 
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10.2 Forfeiture in New Zealand 
In a New Zealand context, as in the United States, it must be remembered that it is 
the State’s duty to manage the country’s common water resources for the benefit 
of everyone.  Like the American system, our Resource Management Act provides 
for termination of a consent.  Section 125 generally provides that a consent will 
lapse if not given effect within 5 years from the date of its commencement.  
“Given effect” has been held to be a matter of degree which will vary from case to 
case.  If the remaining matters are of such a nature that it could not be reasonably 
held that there had not been compliance with the terms of the consent, the that 
consent may be regarded as having been effective.  In any event, the Resource 
Management Act does not use the words “failure to complete” which suggests 
some lee-way is appropriate.125  The 5-year time limit may be extended if certain 
statutory requirements are met including whether “substantial progress” has been 
made in giving effect to the consent.126  “Substantial progress” does not mean the 
majority of work needed to completed because the implementation of a consent is 
a continuing process.  More important is a continuity of progress.  Councils are 
able to take into account practical and economic realities of constructing and 
completing a major development.127   
Section 126, on the other hand, provides generally that a consent that has 
been exercised in the past but has not been exercised for a period of 5 years 
thereafter, the consenting authority may cancel the consent. 128  Research for this 
thesis has revealed that only four of the allocating authorities in New Zealand 
have ever exercised the power under s126 and only 3 or 4 times at the most, 
although one Council has cancelled 32, all unused.  None of those Councils 
                                                 
 
125 See Goldfinch v Auckland City Council [1998] NZRMA 97. 
126 Section 125(1)(b).  
127 See Body Corporate 97101 v Auckland City Council [2000] NZRMA 202.  




believe consents may be partially cancelled.  This is probably bureaucratically 
sound, because clearly not all consents under the Act are in respect of water 
(which may be only partially but at the same time effectively exercised), and 
councils probably strive for a consistent application of policy towards the 
statutory provision. 129  Further, in terms of consents for the extraction and use of 
water, councils will certainly look at the historical water usage at the time an 
application for renewal is made.  Given that consents may have a life of 35 years, 
and also given both the increase in demand for water and the likely deleterious 
effect of climate change on supplies where droughts are likely to be more frequent 
and of longer duration, a drastic rethink both of New Zealand’s water 
management system and allocative approach to water resources is entirely 
appropriate.   
An effective American-style “use it or lose it” forfeiture policy including 
stringent application of sections 125 and 126 of the Resource Management Act 
and a conscientious control of wasteful practices would both enhance the dictates 
of efficiency and the interests of future generations which after all are the basic 
philosophies behind the Resource Management Act.  The shadow of forfeiture 
would certainly focus a water permit-holder’s attention on effective and proper 
use of a water resource, especially in catchments that are fully allocated. 
 
                                                 
 
129 It might be problematic to partially cancel a consent to a subdivision. 
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11 Chapter 11 
11.1 Conclusion 
This research has identified that New Zealand has adopted a somewhat haphazard 
legal approach to water management.  Water has been simply allocated without 
any thought to the efficiency or otherwise of its utility.  With the advent of water 
markets, the lesson from the Americans ‒ especially the stark difference between 
general Colorado water markets and those of the Colorado-Big Thompson system 
‒ suggests New Zealand must keep transaction costs to a minimum, but, more 
importantly, we must introduce an American-style beneficial use doctrine to reign 
in not only abuse of water rights but also flagrant inefficiency.  We must insist 
that rights are actually used and not parked up, and used as effectively as 
practicable.  Abandoning the first-in-first-served process will deliver a message of 
some consequence that the management of water resources must be taken 
seriously by applicants.  Given the allocative state of our catchments, that model 
will die out naturally anyway, as water available for new allocations dries up. The 
market system will be an essential tool to re-distribute water rights already 
allocated. 
It is quite some progression from viewing our watery planet externally 
from the vaults of space to ultimately making a commitment to efficiently and 
sustainably husband its freshwater resources, which, after all, entail only about 
2.5% of Earth’s total water stock.  It is a true voyage of discovery, though, 
comprising an examination of the twin processes of efficiently re-allocating 
permits which allow the extraction of freshwater, but at the same time ensuring 
that those who have the privilege of acting as temporary guardians of this resource 
as a consequence of their allocated water rights do so in a responsible, pragmatic 
and efficient manner.  It is a journey which follows the trail blazed by Our 
Common Future and New Zealand’s commitment to Agenda 21 in 1992, and the 
prescription to adopt a more sophisticated approach to both economic and 
environmental matters.  Water in New Zealand has historically been allocated 
irrespective of the effective use or otherwise of the water, contrary to the intent of 
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the Resource Management Act.  It has been argued that New Zealand’s first-in-
first served policy of resource allocation is not the best model for such matters,1 
especially in the case of non-fungible resources.  This thesis has argued that this 
needs to change, and, in the re-allocative process, New Zealand needs to adopt an 
American-style beneficial use doctrine.  The simple fact is that necessity compels 
change and adaption to new realities.  The twin realities of increased demand for 
water brought about by a greater population and more intensive farming practices 
coupled with climate change realities are manifest arguments for a more 
thoughtful and sustainable approach to freshwater management.  The Americans 
adopted a first-in-first-served system, but the beneficial use acted as auditor to 
monitor water use.  The Colorado-Big Thompson system in keeping with the rest 
of the western states is very strict on the beneficial use requirement but its systems 
allow it to keep transaction costs to a minimum.  Our Resource Management Act 
contains a prescription for sustainable management and the introduction of water 
markets coupled with a beneficial use concept are both tools useful towards 
achieving this instruction.  Admittedly there is the still unresolved debate as to 
whether the Act’s principles favour economic development or the environment, 
but it has been argued in chapter 2 that the environment must take precedence 
because economic development ultimately derives from it.   
In truth, environmental constructs should not be political footballs to be 
kicked about.  Of course, in times of economic hardship, attempts will invariably 
be made to sacrifice environmental matters on the altar of economic expediency.  
Environmental bottom lines need to be entrenched.  Hence, sustainability is a 
moral contemporary discussion as much as anything else; and, however it is 
defined, the objective remains constant. Ultimately the bio-system, including the 
myriad of life forms human and otherwise which comprise that structure and on 
which we all utterly rely, suffers the distress of human mismanagement.  The 
                                                 
 
1 See Chapter 3 supra. 
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natural environment is currently supplying the needs for over 7 billion humans but 
that figure is projected to approach10 billion by the year 2050.2  In this context, 
how natural resources ‒ especially water resources ‒ are used is a fitting and 
proper question to be addressed by the sustainability debate. 
The National Policy Statement for Freshwater Management issued in 2011 
(some 15 years after the Fleetwing decision), and the second Statement which 
came into effect on the 1 August 2014, both make it clear the Government wants 
the first-in-first-served model to be abandoned and it requires allocating 
authorities to change their Regional Plans to adopt a more efficient and effective 
method of allocating access to freshwater.3  More importantly, however, in terms 
of re-allocation of water permits, the Statement requires allocating authorities to 
ensure provision is made in regional plans for the inclusion of criteria by which 
approvals of transfer of water permits are to be decided, including an 
improvement to maximise the efficient allocation of water.4  There is, therefore, a 
possible foundation from whence a water market system might spring, and 
following on from that a beneficial use requirement to properly husband the 
transfer process.  The Third Report of the Land and Water Forum in 2012 made it 
clear that water markets were desirable.5  The Government has signalled the same 
thing: since 2011 it has committed around half a billion dollars towards water-
related projects.  This is a serious amount of money which demonstrates the 
Government is taking water infrastructure very seriously.  Clearly water storage 
and delivery systems are essential where possible if an established effective water 
market is to become established and thrive.   
                                                 
 
2  See Rachel Becker “World Population Expected to Reach 9.7 Billion by 2050” National 
Geographic <www.news.nationalgeographic.com>. 
3 Objective B1; Policy B2. 
4 Policy B4. 
5 Paragraphs 64-68. 
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11.2 Beneficial Use and the Resource Management Act 
New Zealand needs to introduce a beneficial use doctrine to oversee the 
inevitable process of re-allocation of water permits.  The key is the keep 
transaction costs and delay to a minimum.  There is little point in finding a 
requirement for water in the spring or summer if the transaction is not concluded 
until the winter. There is no reason why our own beneficial use doctrine cannot 
subsist together with the effects-based system required by the Resource 
Management Act, given the Act’s concern for future generations contained in 
section 5(2) (a), and the efficiency requisite in section 7(b).  The effect would be 
that a particular water permit allowing an appropriator to extract water for a 
beneficial use as included in a Regional Plan would only be granted provided the 
effects of that use were within the parameters anticipated by the Resource 
Management Act.  In any event, the title of the Act is the Resource Management 
Act and this legal management should in the case of water extend to include a 
beneficial use doctrine.  The approach approved by the Court of Appeal in the 
cases so far is not a sustainability discourse.  Essentially what the Court is saying 
is that if an applicant is early enough in the allocative queue that person will have 
a significant distributive advantage over later applicants who will be required to 
demonstrate different criteria than those earlier applicants.  Circumstances change 
and to be fair it is entirely probable that the Court of Appeal in the Fleetwing 
decision did not in any way foresee in 1997 the change in demand for access to 
natural resources like water currently experienced by allocating authorities.   
As already noted, 6  the Government has sent signals that it favours 
economic instruments in the form of tradable water permits, by requiring 
allocating Councils make provision for the transfer of water permits in their 
Regional Plans, and by providing seed money for the establishment of the 
                                                 
 
6 See also Chapter 3 supra. 
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necessary infrastructure in the form of storage and delivery systems. Such an 
initiative had been on the legislative horizon for some time.  In 2004, the Water 
Programme of Action inter-departmental working group, building on a Ministry 
for the Environment technical report of the same year, had favoured the 
encouragement of water permit transfers: “Enhance the transfer of allocated water 
between users…central government facilitation and encouragement for local 
councils to consider water transfers”.7  Of course, such a provision in Regional 
Plans might present extra challenges to councils in administering and monitoring 
the transfer process.   
In addition New Zealand does not have a history in water markets 
(although there are a few special cases in existence already) and it is natural that a 
water market system may be regarded with some suspicion, especially by farmers 
who, if the American experience is instructional, may be fearful that 
municipalities and industry will price access to water out of the agricultural 
market.  There is also the question of change, and how it might affect social 
cohesion: there may be disruption by economic changes involved.  However, 
faith in water markets may increase as catchments are closed off to new 
applicants and a re-distribution of permits in whole or in part becomes 
fundamental.  Markets may not be suitable for all of New Zealand’s catchments 
however, many of which are small in size and in which transaction costs might 
figure as a major factor.   
Having said that, tradable water permits have the potential to be less 
bureaucratic and much quicker than the traditional regulatory approach as they 
give more autonomy to the participants, but they must be framed within robust 
regulatory minimum water levels and flows which are essential for appropriate 
                                                 
 
7 “Freshwater for the Future: Issues and Options, a Public Discussion Document of New Zealand’s 
Freshwater Resources” p 21, “Action 7”. 
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environmental protection.  Not insignificantly, markets may engender a collegial 
community of interest among the market players, which is the case with the 
Colorado-Big Thompson project.  The major advantage of water markets 
however is where demand for water exceeds supply.  It will be a process of 
division, not multiplication.  Simply issuing new permits is not feasible and a 
market re-allocation of existing permits in whole or in part may be the best 
solution for those seeking access to water.   
It is probably fair to say that, in the western United States, up until about 
the 1970s the emphasis was on developing new water supplies by constructing 
dams and reservoirs; but, from that point on, the concern has been with 
reallocation of supply through water markets.  The relative success of the 
fisheries quota system in New Zealand suggests we have the ability to initiate a 
workable system from scratch.8  New Zealand has a robust legal infrastructure 
and there is no reason why a water market system could not be parachuted into 
the system.  Clearly, section 122 of the Resource Management Act (“Consents 
not real or personal property”) will have to be addressed to give water permits 
some proper and easily understood property definition, which the legal system 
will protect. 9   It is notable that the then-Minister for the Environment, the 
Honourable Nick Smith, announced on 21 January 2015 that one of the areas of 
change the government anticipates for the Resource Management Act is that of 
giving greater weight to property rights under the Act.10 The “take” and “use” 
components of a water consent would need to be separated.  Under a beneficial 
use model, the “use” component would be an element of the application anyway, 
in the sense that the consent would be to take water for a beneficial purpose, and, 
                                                 
 
8  See Tietenberg & Lewis Environmental & Natural resource Economics (9th ed, Pearson 
Education Ltd, Harlow, 2014) at 370-372. 
9 A point made by Gregory J Hobbs Jr. “Priority: The Most Misunderstood Stick in the Bundle” 
(2002) 32 Envtl Law 37 at 51. 




if not so used, or wasted, the right would be reviewed and possible forfeited in 
whole or in part.   
The market system with its element of self-interest suggests participants 
would, more as a by-product of their activities, help preserve a natural resource.  
Vendor and purchaser both carefully calculate the risks and opportunities 
involved and accordingly it is vital that information to make such a decision be 
readily available, but, equally as important, the parties must have confidence in 
the accuracy of that information.  The initial experience in Chile ‒ where some 
corporations hoarded huge quantities of water rights for purely speculative 
purposes ‒ suggests a cautious and temperate approach to a market reform in 
New Zealand.  The lesson learned from Chile is that a totally free market model 
of water management is not necessarily compatible with an integrated 
management of water resources.  “Although this approach [The Chilean free- 
market system] has some economic benefits, its institutional consequences have 
led to serious structural problems in management and regulation.”11  The zeal of 
the 1981 water reforms was somewhat muted by the necessary further reforms in 
2005.  In essence, those reforms needed to address among other things issues of 
speculation by introducing graduated fees for unused water rights, as well as 
issues of environmental sustainability.12  A totally laissez faire system, clearly, is 
not appropriate; and Chile’s experience suggests eschewing an anti-speculation ‒ 
and it must be said a forfeiture policy ‒ is extremely unwise.  In terms of 
sustainability, at least New Zealand has requirements such as those contained in 
the National Policy Statement for Freshwater Management 2014,13  reiterating the 
requirements of section 30 (1) (e) Resource Management Act 1991 which address 
minimum water levels and flows (provided these requirements are not violated); 
                                                 
 
11 CJ Bauer Siren Song: Chilean Water Law as a Model for International Reform Resources for 
the Future, Washington, 2004 at 120. 
12 Environmental concerns were novel in Chilean water law. 
13 Policy B1. 
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but a domestic beneficial use doctrine will shore up our approach to sustainability 
by eschewing waste, non-use and speculation.  The doctrine would emphasise 
that the right to access to water carries with it a well-understood requirement to 
use that water responsibly.  The ripples of abuse of water rights spread very wide, 
and the introduction of water markets predicated on a beneficial use doctrine 
would go a long way to preventing such abuse. 
11.3 Beneficial Use and Efficiency 
The efficiency of legislation and the system it establishes (for any institution) is 
determined by the transaction costs of that institution.  The opportunity costs of 
using, selling or leasing an allotment will be its value to another party who 
appraises it more highly and pays appropriately for its use.  It is this calculus 
which drives rational economic decisions.  Transaction costs which may vary 
from time to time are a vital component in this equation.  In Chile, as it will be in 
New Zealand, geography to a large extent dictates from area to area what these 
costs will be.  The Chilean policy of dramatically reducing government 
involvement in transactions had the potential to limit the exposure of the parties 
to these costs.14 Generally, in the western United States, water market transaction 
costs can be extremely high (and it has to be said the beneficial use requirement 
can add substantially to these costs), and this contrasts dramatically with the 
model demonstrated by the Colorado-Big Thompson system.   
It is interesting to note that both the Chilean and the Colorado-Big 
Thompson models were constructed, rather than having evolved; the former 
based on economic theory, the latter on experience.  Although not strictly a 
biocentric objective in the sense of actively husbanding and protecting the 
                                                 
 
14 Given it was no longer prepared to provide the relative infrastructure as it traditionally had 
(Water Code 1981 Article 5 (41)) the government’s success in this regard is open to debate.  See 
generally EF Madden “Chilean Water Policy –Transaction Costs and the Importance of 
Geography” <http://shelf.library.cmu.edu/HSS/2010/a1424318.pdf>.  
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environment – the Colorado engineers are able to calculate how much water will 
be stored in the various reservoirs and distribute it accordingly ‒ a system of 
successful integration of a low transaction cost market and efficient and practical 
management.  The Colorado-Big Thompson is not typical of a general western 
American water market; however its model would suit New Zealand conditions 
quite well.  Neither has to worry about injury to junior appropriators. In New 
Zealand the permit holder has to operate within appropriately-imposed minimum 
water levels and flows.  Provided the process of transfer of legally robust rights is 
simple enough, and the infrastructure costs (which are highly unlikely to be 
totally externalised) are kept to appropriate levels, there is no reason why a 
market system should not succeed;15 but, as already noted, this will require some 
co-operation from the relative councils.  These councils could promote the market 
model by including on their websites information through which vendors and 
purchasers can get in touch with one another, as is the case with the Colorado 
Big-Thompson project.  Charles Howe makes the point that elsewhere in 
Colorado there is a general lack of this basic information: 
Neither the State Engineer’s office nor the water courts have 
publically available centralized databases of the names of water right 
owners, making it difficult to contact owners.  Water rights 
transactions and ownership are recorded at the county level like real 
estate transactions; however, the lack of a more centralized system to 
account for water rights whose above- and below-ground tributaries 
span multiple counties complicates interpreting these records.  
Equally important, sale prices are not recorded, complicating the 
problem of “price discovery” (figuring out what a reasonable offer to 
buy or sell might be).16 
 
As noted above, a beneficial use doctrine has the potential to drive up 
transaction costs.  Howe makes the point that “In Colorado [that is outside the 
                                                 
 
15 Predictability of supply once the annual allotment has been calculated is an advantage the 
Colorado-Big Thompson project has that few water systems can match. 
16  Charles W. Howe “Reconciling Water Law and Economic Efficiency in Colorado Water 
Administration” (2012-2013)16 University of Denver Water Law Review 37 at 40. 
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Project] transaction costs create substantial barriers to market transactions while 
the “beneficial use” and the closely related “anti-speculation” doctrine 
substantially narrow market scope.”17  However, it is important for New Zealand 
to introduce a domestic version of a western American-style beneficial use 
doctrine for a number of reasons.  First, such a requirement would assist stressed 
water sources “meet the reasonably foreseeable needs of future generations”18 as 
well as “the efficient use and development of natural and physical resources”19   
Equally as important, New Zealand has not historically had much experience in 
water markets but with human nature as it is and the introduction of a market 
model, precautions must be taken to protect water resources from the ravages of 
potential abuse. It is not only impropriety from “big business” that the resource 
needs to be protected from, but also abuse by small permit holders up and down 
the country.  Water is a common resource managed by the regional councils on 
behalf of the Crown, which suggests it would be unconscionable that the resource 
should be abused in that way.  If a resource is commonly held, everyone should 
have a duty of responsible stewardship and to avoid abuse, and to protect as well 
as encourage its use and governance by responsible resource management by 
every user.  Howe again: 
The origins of both doctrines [beneficial use and anti-speculation] 
historically lay in concerns about the monopolisation of unused water 
supplies. Common-sense beneficial use requirements prevented early 
settlers from claiming entire streams and promoted efficiency of use 
by discouraging “waste” and threatening forfeiture of the right.20 
 
The beneficial use doctrine, then, has several functions, and these 
functions are as applicable in the United States as they are in New Zealand.  In the 
                                                 
 
17 Ibid, at 38-39. 
18 Resource Management Act 1991 section 5 (2) (a). 
19 Ibid, section 7 (d). 
20 Ibid, at 41. Sandi Zellmar makes the point that there is no Wal-Mart, ExxonMobil, or General 
Electric of the western water world.  See Sandi Zellmer “The Anti-Speculation Doctrine and its 
implications for Collaborative Water Management” (2008) 8 Nev L J 994 at 1023. 
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first place, it is a husbandry of a valuable and scarce resource and a method of 
reducing its exposure to the shock of abuse.  Secondly, it is supposed to be an 
efficiency tool governing the utility of water resources, although just how 
effective it has been in this regard is open to debate.  Thirdly, there is an element 
of distributive justice in the doctrine as although the initial allocation has been 
assigned on a first-come-first-served basis, the system has the potential to weed 
out those who have the rights but who will not use them ‒ or indeed will abuse 
them ‒ and ensuring that those delinquent rights are then made available to others 
for appropriation.  The concept is a good example of how the law may adapt to 
new and changing circumstances.  In its youth, the American court system was 
faced with a problem of some moment and was able to cobble together some legal 
principles to reflect the factual situation presented by both nature and the human 
demands of it.  The application of the notion has been remarkably consistent 
throughout the various states and from this point of view may be considered to be 
quite robust.  Certainly, in one sense it has proved to be somewhat flexible; and 
uses once decreed not to be beneficial are now regarded as such.  The best 
examples are recreation, species habitat protection and other environmental 
matters.  As Justice Hobbs states: 
In 1965 the Colorado Supreme Court declared that the maintenance of 
instream flow “is a riparian right and is completely inconsistent with 
the doctrine of prior appropriation.”  However in 1979, the Court 
upheld the constitutionality of Colorado’s 1973 statute which allowed 
the Colorado Water Conservation Board to make and enforce 
minimum stream flows and lake level appropriations in priority for 
the purpose of preserving the environment to a reasonable degree.  
The environmental era had intervened.21   
 
Flexibility gives the concept currency and contemporary relevancy.  The 
courts “…have allowed the list of acceptable uses to evolve and change along 
                                                 
 
21 Gregory J Hobbs Jr “Colorado Water Law: An Historical Overview” (1997-1998) 1 U. Denv 
Water L Rev 1 at 22. 
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with the evolution in values… and understanding about the importance of 
water…”22   In addition the flexibility of the system is “internal” in the sense that 
it does not dictate how users are to conduct their business (for example it does not 
instruct farmers when and how to irrigate their crops) and as such there is a 
natural internal tension between this pliability and the efficiency ingredient 
encapsulated in the doctrine.  Too much prescription would turn the concept into a 
bureaucratic nightmare with enforcement problems.  Generally speaking, if a user 
conforms broadly to accepted local practices, there is not likely to be a problem.   
In truth the flexibility notion should encourage innovation and conservation 
practices but in fact it does not and as a result water conservation statutes have 
appeared in several states.  The problem is the threat of speculation which sits 
firmly within beneficial use doctrine. 
11.4 Protection from Speculation 
In New Zealand, the idea of speculating on water rights has historically never 
been a problem because a flourishing general market for water rights has not 
existed.  However, with the introduction of active water markets it is likely that 
speculation will be an issue which needs to be addressed, or at the very least steps 
taken if it were ever to become an issue.   Riparianism in a sense acted as its own 
auditor, and speculation under that system would be very difficult anyway; but 
with the passing of the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 effectively 
extinguishing riparian rights, no robust American-type beneficial use doctrine was 
introduced.  As noted, there was a beneficial use ideal attached to that Act, but 
totally different to the American notion.  As New Zealand did not regularly trade 
in water rights there was no problem.   However that situation is in the process of 
change. 
                                                 
 
22 Janet C. Neuman “Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for Efficiency 
in Western Water Law” (1998) 28 Envtl L 919 at 947. 
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The Bench in the early Colorado case of Coffin v Left Hand Ditch Co23 
was arguably concerned to protect water supplies from the control of the few.  
John Locke’s view that natural resources are acquired by the expenditure of work, 
and limited to the amount a person could actually directly use found its way into 
the beneficial use doctrine: 
...the abrogation of riparian ownership of surface waters was a 
manifestation of anti-monopolism and anti-speculation ideology, 
directed against the potential concentration of water wealth in the 
hands of those who could afford to buy up the riparian lands of the 
arid-country streams.24 
 
Such precautions are quite appropriate given human nature, generally, and, 
specifically, the experience in Chile.  The Colorado Supreme Court has 
consistently demonstrated an unswerving philosophy of enforcing the anti-
speculation doctrine, even in the case of municipalities.25  As demonstrated, the 
doctrine can be flexible as well.  The progressive growth doctrine will allow 
claimants including developers to perfect their water right in the future by 
documenting their anticipated need for water and hold onto their unused rights in 
the meantime without fear of losing priority or suffering forfeiture of those rights.  
The proviso is that they demonstrate a bona fide intent to use the water, and 
proceed with due diligence.  The growing communities doctrine (which only 
applies to municipalities) is a widely-recognised component of western water law 
and allows municipal water right owners to maintain more water rights than they 
are currently using for future population projections without the fear of a claim of 
abandonment or speculation.  Conditional decrees allow complex developments to 
proceed.  Under this notion, the water court recognises a priority date for a new 
                                                 
 
23 Coffin v Left Hand Ditch Company 6 Colo. 443 (1882). 
24 David B Schorr “Appropriation as Agrarianism: Distributive Justice in the Creation of Property 
Rights” (2005) 32 Ecol L Q 3 at 33. 
25 There was a jocular exchange between Charles Wilkinson and Gregory Hobbs in 1991 as to 
whether the prior appropriation doctrine was in fact dead: see 1991 21 Envtl Law xxix, and 1087. 
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appropriation but conditional on the claimant demonstrating a plan to divert, or 
otherwise capture and control water and making diligent progress towards putting 
the water to beneficial use.26  “Each of these exceptions serves as a safety-valve of 
sorts, alleviating the impediments posed by the anti-speculation doctrine…”27, in 
certain cases.   
There has been some criticism of the anti-speculation rule in America.  
The main objection is that the rule fosters covert activity – by generally 
prohibiting an appropriator from reserving water for future use, the rule 
encourages potential speculators to conceal use by wasting resources in the form 
of constructing of works that are either unjustified or premature.28  Neuman is of 
the opinion that this assertion itself is somewhat speculative, there being no 
statistics to back it up making it difficult or impossible to prove.  Individuals 
might overstate their requirements somewhat but this is quite different from large 
scale speculation: “…it is hard to imagine that a large number of individual 
western irrigators are consciously and intentionally irrigating only with an eye 
towards selling off their water rights…”29  Another criticism is that the doctrine 
discourages forward planning, but the exceptions above suggest otherwise.  
Further, a study by the University of Arizona and the Bren School of 
Environmental Management found that “almost half of all transfers in the twelve 
                                                 
 
26 There are other exceptions for example foreign (or developed) water (water that a party has 
caused to enter the supply stream that would not have otherwise entered and Indian Reserved 
Water Rights.  Sandi Zellmer is of the opinion that the former is in need of reform. See “The Anti-
Speculation Doctrine and its implications for Collaborative Water Management” (2008) 8 Nev L J 
994 at 1029. 
27 Sandi Zellmer “The Anti-Speculation Doctrine and its implications for Collaborative Water 
Management” (2008) 8 Nev L J 994 at 1013. 
28 See Stephen F Williams “The Requirement of Beneficial Use as a Cause of Waste in Water Law 
Development” (1983) 23 Bat Resources J 7 at 12-13. 
29 Janet C Neuman “Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for Efficiency in 
Western Water Use” (1998) 28 Envtl l 919 at 968-969. 
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western states took place in one state – Colorado.  The lion’s share of these 
transfers involved the Colorado-Big Thompson Project.”30  
Professor Neuman is of the opinion that the anti-speculation doctrine has been 
generally successful. “The beneficial use requirement has fairly effectively 
achieved the purpose of preventing outright speculation in western water 
resources.”31  Doubtless the anti-speculation rule will continue to develop in the 
west, as it would if adopted in New Zealand.  “But the time for rescission of the 
anti-speculation doctrine has not yet come, and perhaps it never will.”32  The 
doctrine is an efficiency discourse in the sense that it tries to ensure that water 
allocations are actually worked; however, the beneficial use system also tries to 
ensure that individual allocations when worked are done so in an efficient manner 
by avoiding unnecessary waste. 
11.5 Demand for Water 
As an efficiency exercise, conservation is essential when there is an increase in 
demand for water from a static supply. That demand is driven not only by 
population increase, but also agriculture is becoming more intensive both overseas 
and in New Zealand.  Increased agricultural production entails not just efficient 
farming practices but also increased stock-feed production.  The more crops a 
farmer can grow – be it grass, forage crops, or whatever – the better; and an 
increase in production of animal feed or even grain crops for human consumption 
will require more water.  Not being able to rely on simple rainfall, supplementary 
water is required and the demand for same will likely increase.  A prohibition 
                                                 
 
30 Brewer, Glennon, Ker, and Liebcap “Transferring Water in the American West 1987-2005” 
(2007) 40 U Mich J L Reform 1021 at 1043.  Colorado has the reputation of having the most 
stringent anti-speculation laws. 
31 Janet C Neuman “Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for Efficiency in 
Western Water Use” (1998) 28 Envtl l 919 at 968. 
32 Sandi Zellmer “The Anti-Speculation Doctrine and its implications for Collaborative Water 
Management” (2008) 8 Nev L J 994 at 1030. 
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against wasteful water uses as incorporated into American water law is an 
essential tool in curbing extravagance and to give some elasticity to a finite 
resource.  The problem for the American west is that the waste doctrine has not 
been totally effective.  The initial intent was to require an efficient use of water to 
stretch its distribution as far as reasonably possible and to reward such efficiency 
with a secure water right.  Thus, as much as possible of an arid countryside could 
be transformed into production by the careful use of an unchanging supply of 
water. However, the definition of waste in the American west is somewhat 
nebulous and tends, except in the most flagrant of cases, to err on the side of the 
wasteful appropriator.  For instance the “customary practices” exception to the 
concept of waste gives comfort to inefficient operations. 33   Custom changes 
extremely slowly and is not, in the case of water, driven by reasons connected to 
legal requirements.34  This exception stymies the push to embrace more modern 
proficient methods.  In large measure the customary rule is founded on a simple 
cost-benefit analysis that the cost of lining or piping delivery systems and indeed 
installing more modern up to date irrigation systems (for instance trickle systems) 
was not outweighed by the value of the water thereby saved.  The Californian 
Supreme Court suggested custom should not be seen as an excuse to indulge old-
fashioned and wasteful methods. 35   Breaking in parched land is no longer a 
demand in the west.   
The challenge for the contemporary America is now the same challenge for 
New Zealand: to foster efficient production and at the same time protecting 
vibrant ecosystems that can survive the ravages of human economic drive.  New 
Zealand is potentially in a good position to achieve this end by the adoption now 
                                                 
 
33 Janet C Neuman refers to this as the “lowest common denominator standard”: “Beneficial Use, 
Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for Efficiency in Western Water Use” (1998) 28 
Envtl l 919 at 975.  
34 Ibid, at 940 and 976. 




of our own version of a beneficial use doctrine.  The Americans tend largely to 
pay lip-service to the principle of waste (except in the most blatant of cases) 
because there wasted water which is not simply evaporated tends to become part 
of the return flow to then be used by junior appropriators.  If return flows are 
altered, theoretically there could be injury to junior appropriators’ entitlements.  
The equation actually comes down to a question of timing.  It may take return 
flows some years to find their way back to the source, and this may upset the 
delicate balance of junior allotments.   New Zealand is very fortunate in this 
regard, as we do not have junior appropriators in the American sense, and none of 
our allocating authorities have needed to worry about return flows except in the 
case of non-consumptive uses like hydro-electricity.  In any event, most of our 
water infrastructure is recent or indeed yet to be built, so is or will be 
comparatively modern.  There is nothing wrong with forcing modern technology 
and practices on water users.  Such proposals have been retrospectively 
introduced on other environmental matters (for example air and water quality), 
and are relevant and appropriate measures in good environmental husbandry 
which safeguard and sustain water resources “to meet the reasonably foreseeable 
needs of future generations.”36  New Zealand must insist on strong anti-waste 
criteria.  Possibly our domestic waste doctrine could extend water duty for 
individual crops with a very tight customary practice notion coupled with water 
conservation measures which would encourage the adoption of more efficient 
practices.  Most importantly, we must not fall into the American trap of operating 
a system where the meaning and standard of waste is too ill-defined and unclear.  
It is really a matter of fairness because the consequences of a finding of waste are 
                                                 
 
36 Resource Management Act 1991 section 5(2)(a). 
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severe.  The somewhat vague definitions of “beneficial use” and “waste” prevent 
a reliable understanding of what behaviour is acceptable.37 
11.6 Forfeiture 
Forfeiture is a major sanction under western water law.  The consequences are 
drastic as affected appropriators will have a property right – and possibly a (very) 
valuable property right – stripped from them. Such an action cannot be taken 
lightly,38 and would need to be exercised with caution.  The western American 
experience suggests that a statutory forfeiture model would be more effective ‒ 
and not to mention certain ‒ than the old common law principle of abandonment.  
Certainty is crucial given the extreme results of forfeiture, not just for the 
appropriator but also for potential new appropriators who may keep an eye on 
unused allocations and after five years then apply for the water themselves.  While 
forfeiture on the face of it argues against the requirement that water permits be a 
secure property right (with all the legal consequences which that entails), these 
rights have a condition subsequent attached to them which requires the rights to 
be actually continually exercised.  Further, some jurisdictions in America have a 
series of exemptions which dilute the effectiveness of the process.  Idaho is a 
good example: “…Idaho’s exception-laden forfeiture rule has created a host of 
water rights that are eligible to be held, unused, to the disadvantage of other water 
right holders and would-be appropriators.”39  As New Zealand’s catchments near 
full allocation, forfeiture will be an important tool to ensure those who have 
allocations actually use them and do not simply needlessly frustrate the 
aspirations of potential new players who are denied water.  At present, the 
                                                 
 
37  See Janet C Neuman “Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for 
Efficiency in Western Water Use” (1998) 28 Envtl l 919 at 976. 
38 There is provision for such action already in the Resource Management Act 1991: sections 125 
and 126.  The forfeiture period of 5 years in those sections coincides with the American forfeiture 
system. 
39  Peter R Anderson & Aaron J Kraft “Why does Idaho’s Water Law Regime Provide for 
Forfeiture of Water Rights?” (2012) 48 Idaho L Rev 419 at 446. 
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Resource Management Act does not provide for partial lapses of consents 
(sections 125 and 126),but, in the case of water permits, it should.  In American 
terms, astute juniors may scrutinise water use thereby guarding their water 
expectations and keep their seniors honest – at least theoretically.  Such 
examination may also help allocating authorities tidy up and maintain accurate 
records which will be hugely valuable in New Zealand to Councils, water users, 
and potential applicants.   
11.7 The Future for New Zealand 
A critical aspect of the New Zealand experience is the position of Maori interests. 
The Maori view is that water is a particular taonga, or treasure and they are the 
true guardians of it. It is possible to assume a traditional Maori hesitation to the 
idea of water marketing but having said that Maori do have substantial 
agricultural interests in New Zealand.40 A beneficial use model would enhance 
responsible management and use of water.  Further it would promote and facilitate 
higher levels of stewardship while allowing a market-based approach to water 
management.  This echoes the principles of obligatory responsible stewardship 
and management contained in the kaitiakitanga doctrine.41 
While the task in America is to update their beneficial use doctrine to satisfy 
contemporary needs, New Zealand’s duty is to introduce a domestic doctrine from 
scratch but taking note of the American experience. 
Administrative water agencies need to bite the bullet and aggressively 
enforce against waste and forfeiture, promote conservation, and give 
clear legal guidance for an updated beneficial use doctrine.  Western 
state legislatures should embrace the responsibility to insure water 
                                                 
 
40 To be fair and consistent, Maori have successfully embraced the marketing of other resources 
such as fish. 
41 See section 7 Resource Management Act 1991. 
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supplies for their future citizens, and give courts and agencies a 
mandate and funding to seek efficiency improvements.42 
 
A New Zealand doctrine will define us as a nation – we have a somewhat 
undeserved international reputation as a “clean, green” country, and, if we define 
our doctrine prudently enough, we may go a long way to deserve this reputation.  
For example, one question is whether or not water used by a coal-fired electricity 
plant should be classed as a beneficial use in New Zealand.  The same question 
may be asked of nuclear-powered plants.  These are legal in New Zealand in the 
sense that they have not been prohibited by law.  The question is whether water 
used in such an industry might be classified in New Zealand as beneficial.  In 
terms of water storage, New Zealand will decide whether this is simply prudence 
of a waste of production.  
In essence, sustainable development is a process of change in which 
the exploitation of resources, the direction of investments, the 
orientation of technological development, and institutional change are 
all in harmony and enhance both current and future potential to meet 
human needs and aspirations.43 
 
The introduction of a beneficial use doctrine is exactly a process of this 
sustainable development.  The doctrine is exactly within the parameters of the 
mandates introduced by the Resource Management Act in 1991, including 
sustainable management, efficiency, and a concern for future generations.  The 
same can be said of a water market system that recycles old water rights.  New 
Zealand’s industrial agricultural model, a component of which is intensive input, 
invites the moderating and tempering influence of such a doctrine.  Our Common 
Future stressed the broad importance of the integrated nature of the environment 
                                                 
 
42 Janet C Neuman “Beneficial Use, Waste, and Forfeiture: The Inefficient Search for Efficiency in 
Western Water Use” (1998) 28 Envtl l 919 at 995. 
43 World Commission on Environment and Development Our Common Future (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 1987) at 46. 
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and international development.  The same concerns are relevant at a local level, 
and these concerns narrate a complex network of relationships between all living 
creatures (including humankind) and their habitats, and portray a complex 
calculus comprising matters of engineering (for example modern drip-irrigation 
techniques), environmental protection (by minimum water levels and flows) and 
environmental resource management.  A beneficial use doctrine has the potential 
not only to audit the market process but also to some measure manage the 
interaction and impact of human activities on the environment.  The same 
principles would superintend the activities of the market to ensure the enterprise 
of the system is not abused and is, in fact, utilised as an auxiliary for Mother Earth 
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